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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This project is a study of the way that people use language actively to achieve certain 
ends in communication, the way that they organise their spoken discourse to 
construct, convincingly, the state of their lives, both ‘internal’ and ‘external’. It does 
this primarily through an analysis of the systematic properties of the descriptive, 
communicative and interpretative skills which members use in the accomplishment of 
the meanings central to everyday existence. More specifically, this project is a study 
of verbal accounts of, and doctor-patient interaction relating to, clinical depression. 
The project begins from the premise that most social studies of depression and its 
diagnosis have been subject to the same problematic treatment of language as a 
‘transparent medium’ as the psychiatric frames upon which the modern clinical 
understanding of depression in the UK is itself based. I aim, in view of this, to 
demonstrate how hitherto neglected elements in the social analysis of the condition 
can be revealed with the application of an alternative methodology, a methodology 
which treats talk-in-interaction as a dynamic and constructive phenomenon rather 
than a neutral conduit for the passage of information. My empirical data takes the 
form of a set of General Practitioners from a single practice in the North West talking 
freely about depression and their experiences of diagnosing it, and actual 
consultations between these GPs and their patients. Drawing upon Wittgenstein, 
Ethnomethodology, Discursive Psychology and, particularly, Conversation Analysis 
this project examines the ways in which doctors and patients construct, negotiate and 
manage ‘depressive’ meanings in the course of medical interaction, always holding 
tightly to Wittgenstein’s maxim that practice gives words their significance. 
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STANDARD CONVERSATION ANALYTIC 
TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOLS 
 
 
These transcription symbols, which are used throughout this project, are standard 
throughout conversation analytic research, were developed by Gail Jefferson. The 
presentation below is adapted from Wooffitt, 1992:xi 
 
(.5)  The number in brackets indicates a time gap in seconds (i.e. in this 
instance   five tenths) 
 
(.)  A dot enclosed in brackets indicates a pause in the talk of less than two 
tenths   of a second. 
 
·hh  A dot before an ‘h’ indicates an in-breath by the speaker. More h’s 
indicate a   longer breath. 
 
hh  An ‘h’ indicates an out-breath. The more h’s the longer the breath. 
 
(( ))  A description enclosed in double brackets indicates a non-verbal activity. 
 
-  A dash indicates a sharp cut off of the prior word or sound. 
 
: Colons indicate that the speaker has drawn out the preceding sound or 
letter. More colons indicates a greater degree of stretching of the sound. 
 
( )  Empty brackets indicate the presence of an unclear fragment on the tape. 
 
(guess)   The words within a single bracket indicate the transcriber’s best guess at 
an   unclear fragment. 
 
.  A full stop indicates a stopping fall in tone, not necessarily the end of a 
   sentence. 
 
,  A comma indicates a continuing intonation. 
 
?  A question mark indicates a rising inflection, not necessarily a question. 
 
* An asterisk indicates a ‘croaky’ pronunciation of the immediately  
following section. 
 
↑↓  ‘Up’ and ‘Down’ arrows represent a rising or falling intonation, 
respectively. 
 
CAPITALS With the exception of proper nouns, capital letter indicate a section of 
speech louder than that surrounding it. 
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º  º Degree markers indicate that the talk they encompass was noticeably 
quieter than that surrounding it. 
 
underline Indicates speaker emphasis 
 
Thaght  A ‘gh’ indicates a guttural pronounciation in the word. 
 
>  <  ‘More than’ and ‘less than’ signs indicate that the section of talk they 
   encompass was noticeably quicker than surrounding talk. 
 
=  ‘Equals’ indicates contiguous utterances. 
 
[  Square brackets between adjacent lines of concurrent speech indicate the
    onset and end of a spate of overlapping talk. 
 
Details regarding the speakers from outside the talk itself are only given where relevant. 
A more detailed discussion of these transcription symbols can be found in Heritage, 
1984a:ix-xvi. 
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A NOTE ON ETHICS 
 
 
 
 
As per the requirements of the Blackpool, Fylde and Wyre Health Trust Research Ethics 
Committee, all data used in this thesis is purged of specific details that could potentially 
identify a patient or GP. Equally, all data not used directly in the thesis has been 
destroyed. Moreover, although the group of GPs who collaborated with the project are 
not only of the male gender, at their specific request (to protect anonymity) all speakers 
marked as ‘GP’ herein are referred to by the majority gender, which is male. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Major Depression in The Shadow of Wittgenstein 
A General Introduction 
 
‘If there is one central intellectual reality at the end of the twentieth century, it is that the 
biological approach to psychiatry - treating mental illness as a genetically influenced 
disorder of brain chemistry - has been a smashing success. Freud’s ideas, which dominated 
the history of psychiatry for the past half century, are now vanishing like the last snows of 
winter.’ 
Edward Shorter1 
“A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac” 
 
The language of ‘Mental Health’ surrounds us. Much as Michael Billig (1995) shows us 
how everyday media discourses and routine cultural practices position us as citizens 
within the nation-state, constructing and reconstructing the doctrine of nationalism at the 
most ‘banal’ level, so today categories of mental health and illness, devised and 
negotiated within psychiatric circles, are incorrigible components of everyday discourse 
which serve to locate, reference and explain the normal and the abnormal in act and 
character. The terminology of mental illness (take depression, obsession or anxiety) has 
been, in a number of analyses, portrayed as categories of everyday public 
feeling/emotion which have been institutionally medicalised (Edwards, 1997). In an 
intriguing historical loop, this terminology now feeds back into talk shows, magazines 
and everyday chat as a set of medical categories for public consumption – Major 
Depressive, Obsessive Compulsive or Anxiety Disorders (Amirault, 1994). A 
commanding debate rages in the social sciences as to whether these categories have any 
basis in ‘reality’ at all; it is claimed, for example, by the anti-psychiatry movement that 
they are simply tools of the establishment for the marginalisation and subjugation of 
certain behaviours (Szasz, 1972; Gergen et al, 1996). Whether they reference ‘real’ 
(which is to say ‘natural’) phenomena or not, however, there is little doubt that mental 
illness categories are out there, in the public realm, and that they have very real meanings 
in very real social contexts which have very real consequences. A doctor’s diagnosis of 
14 
 
Major Depression is sufficient reason to be given leave from work. A diagnosed 
Schizophrenic can, against their will, be detained by police under the Mental Health Act.  
Addressed in this project is a specific mental illness, Major Depression. There is 
a massive medical literature on the topic addressing nosology, epidemiology, forms, sub-
forms and diagnostic techniques; various schools of psychology also write extensively in 
the field. It is important to highlight at this early stage, however, that the purpose of this 
project as a social study is not to deconstruct  or ‘debunk’ Major Depression back to 
nothingness, not to show how ‘mental’ illness is ‘’artificial’ illness as do a range of other 
social studies (Szasz, 1972; Gergen et al, 1996). Neither is it intended to in any way 
supplant medical definitions and practices with new or ‘better’ ones. The purpose here is, 
simply, to explore aspects of the social organisation of Major Depression in general 
practice that are largely overlooked or dismissed in contemporary research, and which 
may have implications for the diagnostic process. A critique of medical and 
psychological definitions and diagnostic frameworks is included in this project 
(particularly in Chapter 2), but only insofar as to demonstrate that there are no absolutes, 
no ways of defining Major Depression that are ultimately, transsituationally and 
flawlessly ‘correct’, no self-evident benchmarks against which other interpretations can 
be measured for accuracy. This liberates us from the quest for an absolute truth of Major 
Depression, which in turn abolishes the need for evaluative arguments based on the 
comparison of a static framework to the ‘real world’, a doctor’s knowledge to a static 
framework or public knowledge to that of a doctor. Such evaluation serves to do little 
more than highlight ‘inadequacies’ in practices, practitioners and patients alike 
(Silverman, 1997). Rather, at risk of repetition, the project is grounded in an acceptance 
of the fact that Major Depression has a flexible social reality2. The ontological status of 
Major Depression is not at stake here. 
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Major Depression is, then, a social construction in the broadest sense of the term, a 
cultural product of human knowledge and activity, but at no point herein will it be 
implied that this ‘cheapens’ the category. After all, every illness is defined and diagnosed 
through the activities of human beings  - observation, classification and interpretation3. 
At no point will it be argued that people are not possibly suffering or that diagnosis is a 
cynical or ‘false’ enterprise. Richard Harvey Brown articulates the point perfectly; ‘[T]he 
fact that a truth is socially constructed does not make it untrue.’ (Brown, 1994:23). To 
elaborate further, Ian Hacking (1999) highlights the manner in which there is an ongoing 
(reflexive) interaction between mental illness categories and the people categorised 
which has implications for both the actions of the people and the meanings of the 
categories themselves.  
 
‘People…can become aware that they are classified as [mentally ill]. They can make 
tacit or even explicit choices, adapt or adopt ways of living so as to fit or get away from 
the classification applied to them. These very choices, adaptations, or adoptions have 
consequences for the group, for the kind of people that is invoked. The result may be 
particularly strong interactions. What was known about people of a kind may become 
false because people of that kind have changed in virtue of what they believe about 
themselves.’ (Hacking, 1999:34).  
 
Hacking’s sophisticated argument moves the debate well beyond simplistic, and 
ultimately fruitless, issues of whether or not such illnesses are ‘real’ and toward the type 
of questions which will be asked by this project: How, and from what resources, is a case 
of Major Depression assembled? How do people negotiate meanings for Major 
Depression? How do people orient to, or resist, or challenge a diagnosis of Major 
Depression? Within which activities is Major Depression made relevant as real? The 
primary realm in which such meanings are addressed is language, spoken and written 
discourse of a variety of forms (Schütz, 1962; Sacks, 1992), and it is the use of language, 
particularly talk, with respect to Major Depression that forms the empirical core of the 
project. What I aim to provide, thus, is a discursi
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claimed within the remit of clinical psychiatry, psychoanalysis or behavioural or 
cognitive psychology. Embracing the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the 
ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel and, particularly, the conversation analysis of 
Harvey Sacks, a rigorous empirical approach to situated social and cultural 
understandings of Major Depression is employed in terms of the practical functions, the 
activities, that language as discourse performs in the descriptive talk of doctors, and in 
the spoken interaction that constitutes the actual primary care consultation. 
 
1.1. MAJOR DEPRESSION AND MEDICINE: THE OFFICIAL LINE. 
Major Depressive Disorder is the most common chronic condition found in primary care 
in the UK, its incidence exceeding rates of asthma, diabetes and hypertension (Paykel & 
Priest, 1992). It is, furthermore, by some margin the most common mental illness seen 
by general practitioners. Contemporary medical surveys are fairly consistent in the 
findings that around two thirds of adults in the UK will, at some time, experience 
depressed mood of sufficient severity to adversely influence their activities (Effective 
Health Care, March 1993. Number 5). Furthermore, it is argued that up to a half of the 
people seeking advice at a general practice may have depressive symptoms, with around 
10% actually having a Major Depressive Disorder (Effective Health Care, March 1993. 
Number 5; Geddes & Butler, 2001), though this can be as high as 30% in the elderly. 
The lifetime risk for a Major Depressive Disorder is, overall, 15%; the risk for females 
being around 19% while the risk for males is 10% (Paykel & Priest, 1992). In the UK, 
psychiatric referral rates are around three in every thousand (approximately 10% of those 
diagnosed in general practice) of which around one in every thousand is admitted to 
hospital (Paykel & Priest, 1992). It is widely thought that episodes peak in middle age, 
and that such episodes are liable to coincide with detrimental social and economic 
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changes of circumstance, such as unemployment or divorce (Effective Health Care, 
March 1993. Number 5). Recurrence is common, with a quarter of diagnosed patients 
having some form of recurrence within one year, increasing to up to 80% within ten 
years (Anderson et al, 2000). It is thought, however, that about 50% of patients with 
depression who visit their GP are not recognised as being depressed (Anderson et al, 
2000). Many factors have been identified as contributing to this. For example, patients 
who present with physical symptoms are less likely to have their depression recognised 
(Tylee et al, 1995), and people from different cultural backgrounds may present 
symptoms in different ways causing confusion to GPs. Elderly patients, meanwhile, may 
experience depression in coexistence with other physical illnesses, or, due to increased 
incidences of bereavement in their lives, are more likely to accept deep sadness and 
physical dysfunction as a ‘natural’ state of affairs (Tylee & Katona, 1996). It is also 
accepted that GPs differ in their knowledges, skills and attitudes (Tylee, Priest & 
Roberts, 1996), the questions that they ask and their wider consultation style. This will 
invariably cause variation in depression detection rates (Paykel & Priest, 1992). 
A number of steps have been taken to improve the identification rates of Major 
Depressive Disorder in primary care, as best summarised in a 1992 concensus statement 
- resultant of a collaboration between the Royal Colleges of both General Practitioners 
and Psychiatrists (Paykel & Priest, 1992) - and the 1996 volume “Depression in General 
Practice”, a guidebook for general practitioners (Tylee, Priest & Roberts, 1996). In these 
publications, normative frameworks of ‘good practice’ for doctors are stipulated, 
frameworks intended to improve the depression detection rates in primary care 
consultations. Suggested features of such ‘good practice’ include using ‘open’ questions, 
not hurrying the consultation, employing a friendly and empathic style, asking for 
clarification of verbal cues and using screening tests. The American Psychiatric 
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Association (APA), authors of the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition” (DSM-IV), the most influential text in UK medicine relating 
to the diagnosis of Major Depression (Anderson et al, 2000), argue that the provision of 
ever more precise and detailed nosologies of mental illness should facilitate 
communication and improve the chances of clinical prediction (APA, 1994).  
 
1.2. MAJOR DEPRESSION, DIAGNOSIS AND CULTURE. 
Contemporary medical understandings of Major Depression are grounded in, and 
dominated by, the assumptions and methods of biomedicine and psychology (Gergen et 
al, 1996; Hacking, 1999). Not only is this true of the definitions and descriptions of 
Major Depression used to guide General Practitioners in diagnosis, but also of the 
frameworks against which a practitioner’s professional performance in implementing 
these guidelines is then evaluated (McLeod, 1994). These disciplines, for Kenneth J. 
Gergen (1991), are classically ‘modernist’ science. The human individual at the centre of 
study (be that ‘ill’ patient or diagnosing doctor) is conceptualised as a knowable, 
measurable, cognitive universe, ‘..reliable, self-contained and machine-produced..’ 
(Gergen, 1991:44-45), which can function ‘properly’, or in a (correctably) ‘deviant’ 
manner. Indeed, it has become a ‘common sense’ assumption in most contemporary 
social science that each individual is an autonomous, bounded and more-or-less unique 
cognitive universe (Harré & Gillett, 1994; Michael, 1996; Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1998) 
and of a very different order of phenomenon to the collective ‘society’. It will be a 
contention of this project that this key meta-narrative is demonstrably flawed, and its 
rigidity severely limits the areas of human action and experience that can be seen as 
‘relevant’ to the study of Major Depression. For example, 
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‘One consequence [of individualistic assumptions] has been a focus on quantitative studies 
concerned with the attributes of individuals. This has meant that linguistic and sociological 
issues, such as language use and social context, have been downplayed…’ (Silverman, 
1997:15) 
 
With respect to the character of mental illness itself, many studies across a range of 
social sciences have addressed this debate in some detail, highlighting the manner in 
which the individualistic bias of contemporary medicine silences potentially crucial 
issues that exist outside of the body of the ‘afflicted’ person (Foucault, 2001; Gergen, 
1991; Bowers, 1998). Karl Tomm (1990), for example, takes the APA to task for their 
claim that the DSM-IV is grounded in scientific/objective knowledge, resultant of a 
‘descriptive approach’ which is ‘generally atheoretical’ (APA, 1994).  
 
‘The authors seem oblivious to the significance of their individualistic presuppositions. 
There was no mention of the possibility of another point of view. They simply ignored the 
body of knowledge based on an alternative assumption, namely that human behaviour, the 
mind, and its disorders, may be more fundamentally grounded in social phenomena than 
individual phenomena.’ (Tomm, 1990:2) 
 
Equally, with respect to the evaluation of a General Practioner’s abilities to identify 
Major Depression, Tylee, Priest and Roberts (1996) and Paykel and Priest (1992), in 
their reviews of current problems in primary care, acknowledge that unquantifiable 
factors such as variability in tacit knowledges, culture, use of language, ad hoc skills, 
attitudes and social understandings of all parties play key roles in the diagnostic process. 
The orthodox technique presently employed in the NHS for the evaluation of such 
‘elusive’ factors, however, is the measurement of pre-agreed normative frames of ‘good 
practice’ against actual consultations to assess their effectiveness. McLeod (1994) has, 
however, identified a number of problems with this method: 
 
• Observers find it difficult to differentiate different measures (‘empathy’, ‘open style’) 
and instead tend to rate according to a personally held image of ‘a good doctor’. 
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• Ad hoc decisions are often made regarding which part of a consultation should be 
assessed. The scope can extend from a whole consultation (or even several with the 
same patient) down to a micro-segment of a single consultation. What the former 
gains in understanding of context, it loses in precision, and the latter gains precision at 
the expense of contextual knowledge. 
• Even employing precise and reliable measures only enables the observer to assess the 
presence or absence of the predetermined mode of ‘good practice’, not the skill with 
which it is delivered.  
 
These problems are all rooted in the single assumption that it is possible for a researcher 
to have better knowledge of what is going on in a consultation than either the doctor or 
patient involved, what David Silverman (1997) terms the ‘Divine Orthodoxy’.  
 
‘[Participants’] knowledge is assumed to be imperfect, indeed they may even lie to us. In 
the same way, practitioners…are always assumed to depart from normative standards of 
good practice…It makes the social scientist into the philosopher-king (or queen) who can 
always see through people’s claims and know better than they do.’ (Silverman, 1997:23-
24) 
 
This is, in turn, rooted in the ‘objectivism’ of approaches such as psychology and bio-
medicine – it presupposes that the ‘correctness’ of human activity, even in direct 
interaction, is measurable on an objective, individualistic scale. The actual details of the 
actions of the individuals examined are subjugated to pre-determined frameworks 
relating to individual conduct. By setting normative standards and measuring the 
performance of the doctor against them, the complexity of everyday language and the 
functional, or constructive, properties of apparently ‘dysfunctional’ (as determined by 
these frameworks) behaviours are inevitably overlooked. The deployment of pre-defined 
measures of ‘good practice’ cannot do justice to the ad hoc communicative and 
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inferential skills that both doctors and patients use in specific contexts, and condemns all 
parties to failure. 
The aims of this project do not, however, stop at the point of criticising bio-
determinism for adopting a very limited view of human beings and then illustrating that 
socio-cultural issues may also be relevant to the study of Major Depression and its 
diagnosis. Indeed, it will be argued that many social scientific studies that do exactly this 
are themselves guilty of determinism, simply replacing the (objectively measurable) 
mind/body with (objectively measurable) society/social structures as the key agents in 
the production of a unified, self-identical condition or a difficult diagnosis. This 
reduction of the social world to causal ‘variables’ is itself highly problematic in that it 
portrays people as ‘cultural dopes’ (Garfinkel, 1967), puppets of sociologically-defined 
variables such as gender, class or race, and treats their actions as mere outcomes of an 
interplay between these structures. The detail and complexity of these actions, once 
again, is ignored. This is, for Silverman (1997), the ‘Explanatory Orthodoxy’, a rush to 
provide reasons for activity which fails totally to explore the manner in which ‘activities 
come to have meaning in what people are actually doing in everyday (naturally 
occurring) situations’ (Silverman, 1997:24). 
What is required, then, is a move away from the apparently incorrigible notion of a 
private and bounded individual driven by ‘internal’ knowledge-getting and action-
producing processes (cognitions) or the influence of monolithic social structures. 
Cognitive processes remain little more than hypothetico-deductive constructs (Harré & 
Gillett, 1995)4, and Platonic essentialism (the argument that people’s actions are 
representative of the cognitive processes that underpin them), it is useful to note, is 
equally a neat inversion of the argument that internal process is constituted out of such 
actions5. Likewise, social ‘structure’ has no existence outside of human experience; it 
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cannot be assumed to have a homogeneous, pre-agreed social meaning. As Derek 
Edwards highlights, 
 
‘[K]nowledge and reality, those two sides of the epistemological coin, are provided and 
guaranteed not by a reality or ‘nature’ that exists independently of how we come to know 
it; nor by processes of knowing that are contained within the perceptual-cognitive 
apparatuses of individual minds or persons. Rather, knowledge and reality are cultural 
categories, elements of discourse, invented, used and defended within social practices.’ 
(Edwards, 1997:52) 
 
Empirical investigation in this project is instead, thus, based upon the assertion that the 
actions of an individual cannot be abstracted from the socio-cultural space in which they 
occur (Widdecombe & Wooffitt, 1995; Edwards, 1997), and equally on the key 
ethnomethodological notion that ‘context’ cannot be analysed separately from the 
shaping force of human activity (Garfinkel, 1967). As such, the primary target for 
investigation here is neither human-as-subject nor human-as-object, but the intersubject: 
the domain in which individuals exploit learned culturally-available, socially-organised 
skills and techniques to attend to the local, interactional tasks relevant to, among other 
things, making sense of Major Depression, or the diagnosis of a case of Major 
Depression in primary care. 
   
1.3. TALK AS ACTION. 
One of the key tools that people employ in the intersubjective domain is talk, and it is the 
analysis of talk that constitutes the empirical core of this project. People do talk. 
Everyday talk is the primordial site of human interaction (Sacks, 1992). The doctor-
patient consultation is based on talk. John Heritage (1984), with respect to these 
observations, neatly summarises the key problems with many areas of social research 
discussed so far. 
 
‘[There has been] a pervasive and long-standing view which treats language exclusively in 
terms of its representative function. Within this view, the meaning of a word is what it 
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references, corresponds with, or stands for in the real world. Within this view, the function 
of sentences is to express propositions, preferably true ones, about the world...this 
essentially pre-Wittgensteinian view of language has remained a tacit assumption for 
generations of social scientists. As such it has permeated sociological activity at all its 
levels- empirical, theoretical and metatheoretical.’ (Heritage, 1984a:137) 
 
In short, the words that people use in interaction are not simply neutral avenues to the 
workings of the brain. They are significant social actions in themselves. 
For the purposes of situating the project in a wider tradition of thought, it is key to 
highlight that Wittgenstein (1953) was the first to clearly and explicitly formulate human 
cognition, the very core concepts of the self, as being linguistic in character. The uses of 
‘mental’ vocabulary and the constraints upon it are, from this point of view, socially 
derivative and embedded in a matrix of human social activity. This classic work 
(alongside that of Bakhtin, which received later recognition in the West) laid the 
foundations for a multiplicity of social scientific studies of language use as a genuinely 
dynamic phenomenon, rather than a simple conduit of (falsifiable) information about 
mind, body and the world at large. This new appreciation of the constructive properties 
of discourse, as Robin Wooffitt argues in one such project,  
 
‘..has led to some radical reformulations of the use of accounts as research resources, and, 
more significantly, precipitated a burgeoning of empirical projects which make language 
use itself the subject of analytic work.’ (Wooffitt, 1992:11) 
 
Such studies have inhabited a number of different academic disciplines and sub-
disciplines; Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), Conversation Analysis (Sacks, 1992; 
Wooffitt, 1992; Schegloff, 1991), the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Gilbert and 
Mulkay, 1984; Woolgar, 1988a & 1988b), Social Psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987; Parker, 1991; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1997; Billig, 1991 & 1997) and 
Linguistics and Sociolinguistics (Fairclough, 1991 & 1995) to mention but a few. These 
projects, although enormously varied in the detail of their actual analytic approaches, are 
united in their appreciation of the fact that written and spoken discourse is variable, 
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constructive and constructed. From this angle, the case is made that talk is a form of 
action in itself, and, as such, the variabilities in the way that people talk about themselves 
and their world can be treated as a resource for study in terms of the functions that they 
perform, rather than a barrier to it. 
 
‘Rather than seeing..discursive constructions as expressions of the speakers underlying 
cognitive states, they are examined in the context of their occurrence as situated and 
occasioned constructions whose precise nature makes sense to participants and analysts 
alike in terms of the social action these descriptions accomplish.’ (Potter & Edwards, 
1992:2) 
  
This assertion opens up the possibility of exploring Major Depression as a socially 
meaningful phenomenon, produced, maintained and transformed in the negotiated 
activities of GPs and patients. The following thesis overview outlines a number of areas 
in which such a focus can be revealing. 
 
1.4. THESIS OVERVIEW. 
Approximately speaking, this thesis adopts a three-part structure. The first of these parts 
(Chapters 2 and 3) is a critical exploration of contemporary approaches, across a range of 
disciplines, to the understanding of Major Depression and the diagnosis of mental illness. 
The second (Chapters 4 and 5) addresses hard alternatives to the approaches outlined in 
the first, examining the implications of an ethnomethodologically-inspired analysis of 
active language use for a study of Major Depression. The third (Chapters 6 to 9) is a 
practical analysis of empirical data collected in the primary care environment applying 
the techniques outlined in the second.   
Chapter 2 begins with a brief critical review of the key contemporary text on the 
medical-psychiatric classification and diagnosis of Major Depression (and its sub-forms), 
the DSM-IV, exploring the frameworks posited. It includes interrogation of three 
psychological approaches to depression which also have influence on contemporary 
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clinical practice; psychoanalysis, behavioural psychology and cognitive psychology. 
Chapter 3 is, meanwhile, a contrastive critical review of classic sociological studies of 
the broad phenomenon of ‘mental illness’. The purposes of this exercise are three fold: 
firstly, to glean any useful insights that the social studies can provide, and, using them, to 
begin to build a critique of the classificatory frameworks and evaluation methods 
outlined in Chapter 2; secondly, to illustrate how, while often useful, many of these 
social studies are still beholden to the problematic assumptions and methods embedded 
in the texts they analyse and to which they supposedly offer an alternative, or critique 
and finally, to begin to address how diagnosis/recognition of a ‘mental condition’ is 
reliant on the use (by both doctor and patient) of socially-organised, culturally available 
symbols which are embedded in particular social practices rather than being simple 
representations of verifiable ‘internal/external states’. As such, the beginnings of an 
understanding of ‘depression’ (and its causes and effects) grounded in its local social 
meanings, and the differences that these make in people’s actual lives, rather than in 
abstract (universalised) codes can be developed. Drawing particularly upon Len Bowers’ 
Wittgenstein-inspired ‘The Social Nature of Mental illness’, the point here is to collapse 
the easy (taken-for-granted) dualities employed by many of the other studies described 
throughout Chapters 2 and 3: psychological and physiological; inner and outer; 
individual and society; cause and effect. From this point, an argument will be built that 
reconceptualises the psychiatric and physiological categories that constitute Major 
Depression (itself such a category) in terms of the situated public procedures employed 
by people in the achievement of their interactive intelligibility, that is, what they do in 
interaction rather than what they might ‘mean’ in isolation. As such, the key to 
understanding specific instances of human behaviour becomes a grasp of the meanings 
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that inform them and the assumptions upon which they are founded, and, crucially, an 
analysis of the cultural practices within which these meanings are realised.  
Chapter 4, meanwhile, takes the ongoing concerns of the project thus far and 
elaborates them into a concrete methodology for the examination of the situated 
understandings and construction of depression in active talk. All of the data used in this 
project were collected from a single general practice in Lancashire in the months of 
January to April 2001, and take two forms. The first ‘type’ of data was collected on a 
single pre-arranged day in April at the practice itself. Each of the six participating 
practitioners sat for a short and informal interview on the broad topic of depression and 
their experience of its diagnosis in the primary care environment. These interviews were 
tape recorded with the full consent of the GPs. The second form of data was collected by 
the General Practitioners (GPs) themselves over a three month period. Two surgeries 
were tape recorded per GP, with all relevant ethical concerns observed, each lasting for 
around three hours and comprising of 14 to 18 individual consultations.  
 It will be the contention of the chapter that, of contemporary methodologies 
which could claim to be sensitive to the concerns outlined in the previous chapter, 
Conversation Analysis (CA) is by some margin the most appropriate for the analysis of 
data such as that collected. Firstly, the wider parent discipline of ethnomethodology is 
outlined to provide a clear background to the underpinning themes of CA and the manner 
in which they differ from the assumptions behind the medical and psychological 
practices already examined. Following a discussion of the basic tenets of CA, a review of 
existing CA studies of medical/psychiatric phenomena and doctor-patient interaction is 
provided to help illuminate relevant themes in this field already uncovered by 
conversation analysts and which could be referentially useful in the later analysis 
chapters. Also discussed here is the validity of CA, which focuses primarily on the turn-
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by-turn sequential unfolding of conversation, as a methodology for the analysis of the 
largely ‘monologue’-style data produced in the (aforementioned) interviews with GPs 
that were conducted. Finally, the chapter features a critical appreciation of the fields of 
Discourse Analysis and Discursive Psychology which share many methodological 
themes and foci with CA. The aim herein is to highlight both the useful insights that 
studies in these areas can provide, but also the shortcomings that explain why the 
approach employed in this project is informed chiefly with Conversation Analysis.  
In Chapter 5 a preliminary analysis is offered of one unstructured interview 
between myself and a general practitioner and one doctor patient consultation. Such a 
strategy provides an expanded illustration of the workings of the Conversation Analytic 
methodology itself and, as Robin Wooffitt argues, 
 
‘A dividend of single case analysis is that it generates a range of issues for subsequent 
investigation…revealing some of the resources employed by [speakers] will provide a 
general insight as to the range of interactional tasks and issues which are relevant to the 
production of these utterances at the specific time. These concerns…subsequently inform 
further analysis over a larger data corpus.’ (1992:73) 
 
Expanding on some themes emergent of the analyses in Chapter 5, the main analysis then 
begins in Chapter 6 with an exploration of the collected interview data. The focus here is 
upon the practical skills utilised by GPs to realise certain knowledges as relevant to a 
general question such as ‘What is Depression?’ (the opening of all the interviews) and 
the situated activities within which elicited accounts of depression are constructed and 
negotiated as factual within a dialogue between GP and interviewer. The analyses show 
how the accounts of Major Depression are artfully designed in such a way as to be 
sensitive to potentially sceptical reception, to limit critical interpretation and 
circumscribe negative inferences that the category may make available. 
Developing one particularly striking theme emerging from the analyses in 
Chapters 5 and 6, Chapters 7 and 8 explore the manner in which ‘delicate objects’ are 
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(re)produced in the consultation itself. Chapter 7 explores GP-Patient interaction data 
with a particular view to highlighting the active skills of both GPs and patients in 
constructing and negotiating the character of specific symptoms and issues to reach 
mutually acceptable goals and delimit possibly damaging inferences. Rather than assume 
that there is a public stigma associated with any particular symptoms that (obstructively) 
informs the behaviour of patients6, however, the analysis clearly shows how both 
speakers (GP and patient) in each consultation work collaboratively to mark certain 
conversational areas and objects as ‘delicate’ or potentially troublesome (Silverman, 
1997). Chapter 8, meanwhile, develops all themes thus far examined in terms of the 
diagnosis of depression itself, addressing in particular a striking theme emergent from the 
data: that of the negotiation of diagnosis. A number of social studies have explored the 
doctor-patient relationship from the perspective of ‘power’, arguing that in a consultation 
the GP has power and the patient does not (for example, Fairclough, 1992). This is then 
used as an explanatory resource in the demonstration that patients very rarely question a 
GP. Conversation analytic studies have also generally demonstrated that, compared to 
most everyday interaction, there is an asymmetry in doctor-patient interaction in terms of 
apparent rights to perform certain conversational acts, such as asking questions and 
challenging assertions (Frankel, 1984; Heath, 1992). Patients generally orient to a more 
‘passive’ role in this respect. What is interesting in the corpus of data collected for this 
project is that while most diagnoses are treated in exactly this fashion, diagnoses of 
depression are very often questioned, disputed or, even, rejected. This is an interesting 
insight in itself, but the key focus of the chapter is upon the social resources that patients 
mobilise in making such challenges. Far from appearing ‘passive’ the patients can be 
seen to deconstruct, reorganise and re-characterise the condition and indeed the 
diagnostic process itself in the process of undermining the diagnosis. The chapter further 
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explores activity in the consultation subsequent to a diagnosis of depression, addressing 
particularly the conversational skills employed by GPs to the ends of ‘resisting the 
patients resistance’. As a wide variety of CA studies have shown, a challenge to a 
diagnosis is something that rarely happens in the primary care consultation (Heath, 1986 
& 1992; Maynard, 1991; ten Have, 1991 & 1993). This project’s data corpus reveals, 
however, that in no cases of a challenge being made does the consultation descend in to 
‘chaos’, nor is the local social solidarity (Silverman, 1997) significantly compromised. 
Rather, a range of strategies are utilised by GPs in transforming meanings within the 
context itself such that a diagnosis of depression may be ultimately achieved in a manner 
satisfactory to both participants in the interaction. To reprise some concerns outlined in 
section 1.2, the analysis will conclude as is will progress throughout – with a focus upon 
the constructive competences of participants in interaction, rather than with a programme 
for assessing deficits in terms of pre-defined notions of ‘good communication’. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Major Depression, Mind and Body: 
The Various Approaches of Psychology and Psychiatry 
 
‘The field of psychopathology has not yet reached a level of knowledge that would allow 
identification of the best system of classification for depression. Some authors have even 
argued that classification systems are no more than convenient creations constructed for 
our own purposes, and that they do not necessarily have any true basis in reality.’  
E. Edward Beckham, William R. Leber & Lorraine K Youll7 
“The Handbook of Depression” 
 
 
Contemporary clinical practice in the front line of the British National Health Service, 
that is to say in Primary Care, is directed chiefly by policy guidelines produced by the 
government-approved British Medical Association (BMA). These guidelines are based 
on standardised diagnostic criteria which are themselves based upon research derived 
from a variety of sources. The object of this chapter is to critically outline the climate in 
professional clinical/psychiatric and psychological spheres regarding the classification 
and diagnosis of Major Depression. Part 2.1 explores the complex and highly influential 
clinical meta-frames for the classification and diagnosis of Major Depression (and its 
various subtypes) suggested in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
Fourth Edition (1994) produced by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). Parts 
2.2 to 2.4, meanwhile, focus in detail upon alternative models of Major Depression and 
its causes and therapies to the contemporary clinical orthodoxies detailed in 2.1; of 
particular interest are those frameworks for the understanding and  identification of the 
condition arising from psychoanalysis, behavioural psychology and cognitive 
psychology, all of which, to varying degrees, have influence on contemporary UK health 
policy and practice8. There has undoubtedly been a shift in emphasis, in the last decade, 
towards the prevention of Major Depression, and away from expensive drug therapies 
recommended by the DSM-IV, and this has increased the interest in the potential of 
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psychological modes of identification and treatment. As Scott (1996) remarks in the 
Journal of Affective Disorders: 
 
‘Although recognisable improvements occur more rapidly with pharmacotherapy, drugs 
are only effective whilst an individual continues to take them. In psychological therapies 
such as cognitive therapy, the goal is to produce permanent and specific changes in coping 
strategies. The effects of such interventions may therefore be more durable and may have a 
greater impact on the risk of relapse in the longer term.’ (Scott, 1995,:292) 
 
The final section of the chapter (2.5), meanwhile, constitutes a summarised critique of all 
of the approaches discussed with a view to describing social and interpersonal aspects of 
Major Depression that are commonly overlooked or ignored by individualistically-
oriented sciences. This should provide a foundation on which to build a case for the 
exploration of the condition as a vividly social phenomenon with meanings that, in actual 
cases of human action and interaction (particularly that between doctors and patients), 
are not fixed or abstract but flexible and only concretely realised within such action. 
 
2.1. WHAT IS DEPRESSION? 
PART 1: MODERN PSYCHIATRY AND DIAGNOSTIC CLASSIFICATION.  
The contemporary clinical focus on Major Depression as a widespread and complex 
chronic condition is underpinned by the efforts of nosologists to accurately define and 
classify the illness and its various subtypes. The most influential contemporary systems 
for defining and classifying the condition in modern clinical practice in the UK are those 
developed by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and published in the International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) and, closely linked, the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth 
Edition (DSM-IV). While the models proposed in the two bear few differences, this 
section of the chapter will focus upon the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria, which seem to 
gain more citations in British medical journals. As Manning (2001) asserts, 
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‘There has been considerable and deliberate convergence between ICD-10…and DSM-IV, 
with ICD doing most of the accommodation. The reason is that not only is the American 
Psychiatric Association, as author of the DSM system, supportive of its use, but other 
countries, including the UK, in effect use the DSM rather than ICD system in research and 
clinical work.’ (Manning, 2001:85) 
 
Most writers on the DSM-IV agree that there are three fundamental benefits arising from 
the production of detailed nosologies of mental illnesses: 
 
1. Communication: The provision of a common language that enables communication 
about mental disorders, such that epidemiologies and trans-national studies will not 
be complicated by differing terminologies and diagnostic criteria.  
2. Research Classification: The provision of descriptive systems for the classification 
of persons, that is to say the bracketing of complex sets of symptoms within a 
singular conceptual frame, such that research may be conducted into the causes and 
correlates of mental disorder. 
3. Clinical Prediction: The facilitation of information transfer regarding treatment and 
prevention between clinicians in decision-making positions. 
 
The first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders was 
published in 1952, listing 106 mental illnesses. While designed to provide standardised 
criteria for psychiatrists, psychologists and General Practitioners in diagnosing mental 
disorders as suggested above, it also provided diagnostic codes for use in medical record 
keeping and for medical insurance reasons. Subsequent editions were published in 1968 
(DSM-II), 1980 (DSM-III), 1987 (DSM-III-R, a revision) and most recently the DSM-IV 
in 1994, which lists three distinct manifestations of Major Depressive illness in the 
section on ‘mood disorder’9. These syndromes are, in turn, specified variously by course 
and episode10. Moreover, also listed are a group of closely related Manic Depressive 
(Bipolar) and Anxiety disorders; the nosologies for these are included in Appendix 1. 
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FIGURE 2A: SYMPTOMS IN A MAJOR DEPRESSIVE EPISODE 
 
1 
Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every 
day, as indicated by either self-report or observation 
made by others.  
3 
Significant (5% or more) weight loss when not 
dieting or weight gain or decrease or increase in 
appetite nearly every day.  
2 
Significantly diminished interest or pleasure in all, 
or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every 
day (as indicated by either self-account or 
observations of others). 
4 
 
Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day. 
7 
Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or 
inappropriate guilt nearly every day, not merely self-
reproach or guilt about being sick. 
5 
Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every 
day where observable by others, not simply 
subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed 
down. 
8 
Diminished ability to think or concentrate or 
make decisions nearly every day, either by 
subjective account or as observed by others. 
6 
 
Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day. 
9 
Recurrent thoughts of death, though not just fear of 
dying, recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific 
plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for 
committing suicide. 
The criteria included here are summarised versions of those set out by the APA, which 
should prove adequate for the purposes of this study11.  
A key reference point in the DSM-IV nosology of Major Depression is the notion 
of an ‘Episode’. It is essential to highlight from the outset that an ‘Episode’ as specified 
in the DSM-IV does not have its own diagnostic code and cannot be diagnosed as an 
entity in itself, rather it serves as a ‘building block’ (APA, 1994) for the subsequently 
described disorder diagnoses. The criteria for the presence of a Major Depressive 
Episode are as follows:   
 
(a) Five (or more) of the symptoms listed in figure 2A must have been present during the 
same two week period and represent a change from previous functioning; at least one of 
the symptoms must be either ‘depressed mood’ or ‘loss of interest or pleasure’12.  
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(b) The symptoms do not meet criteria for a ‘Mixed’ Episode (see Appendix 1).  
(c) The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.  
(d) The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or a 
general medical condition.  
(e) The symptoms are not better accounted for by Bereavement, the symptoms persist 
for longer than 2 months or are characterised by marked functional impairment, morbid 
preoccupation with worthlessness, suicidal ideation, psychotic symptoms, or 
psychomotor retardation.  
(APA, 1994) 
 
The duration of a Major Depressive Episode is variable. Typically, an untreated episode 
will last for six months or more irrespective of the age of the sufferer at onset.  
 
‘In a majority of cases, there is complete remission of symptoms and functioning returns to 
a premorbid level. In a significant proportion of cases (perhaps 20%-30%), some 
depressive symptoms insufficient to meet the full criteria for a Major Depressive Episode 
may persist for months to years and may be associated with some disability or distress.’ 
(APA, 1994:325) 
 
As discussed, the basic features of such an episode form the diagnostic cores of all three 
Major Depressive illnesses. 
 
2.1.1. Major Depression and the DSM-IV: 
(296.2x) Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode. 
The primary feature of a Major Depressive Disorder, as opposed to episode, is durational 
and may assume either ‘Single Episode’ (296.2x), where the episode diagnosed is the 
first experienced by the patient, or ‘Recurrent’ Forms (296.3x). The authors of the DSM-
IV stress that it can be difficult to distinguish between ‘..a single episode with waxing 
and waning symptoms and two separate episodes..’ (APA, 1994:339) and thus categorise 
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an episode as having ended when the full criteria have not been met for two months. 
Thus, Single Episode Major Depressive Disorder is described as:   
 
(a) Presence of a single Major Depressive Episode.  
(b) The Major Depressive Episode (Episodes) is not better accounted for by 
Schizoaffective Disorder and is not superimposed on Schizophrenia, 
Schizophreniform Disorder, Delusional Disorder, or Psychotic Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified.  
(c) There has never been a Manic Episode, a Mixed Episode, or a Hypomanic Episode13.   
(APA, 1994) 
 
2.1.2. Major Depression and the DSM-IV: 
(296.3x) Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent. 
(a) Presence of two or more Major Depressive Episodes.  
(b) The Major Depressive Episode (Episodes) is not better accounted for by 
Schizoaffective Disorder and is not superimposed on Schizophrenia, 
Schizophreniform Disorder, Delusional Disorder, or Psychotic Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified.  
(c) There has never been a Manic Episode, a Mixed Episode, or a Hypomanic Episode.   
(APA, 1994) 
 
The criteria are further specialised by the addition to the nosology of 
Severity/Psychotic/Remission specifiers (numbered 1 to 6), which relate to the current or 
most recent episode. Severity specifiers are defined by the number of criterial symptoms 
present in an episode, the severity of these symptoms and the degree of functional 
disability or distress (APA, 1994). A ‘Mild’ (x1) episode features only five or six 
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depressive symptoms, and continued capacity for normal functioning though with 
increased effort. An episode that is ‘Severe Without Psychotic Symptoms’ (x3) is 
marked by the presence of nearly all the symptoms above, and a clear functional 
disability while a ‘Moderate’ (x2) episode is an intermediate of the two. The specifier 
‘Severe With Psychotic Features’ (x4), meanwhile, denotes that the episode is 
accompanied by delusions or hallucinations, which take two main forms: 
 
1. Mood-congruent psychotic features: Delusions or (typically) transient hallucinations 
focused around the self-directed themes of guilt or deserved punishment consistent 
with the moods emanating from the depression. 
2. Mood-incongruent psychotic features: The delusional/hallucinatory themes are 
inconsistent with the moods emanating from the depression. 
 
Further specifiers relate to remission. ‘Partial Remission’ (x5) describes an episode 
where either the full criteria are no longer met, or no criteria are met, but the remission 
period has been less than two months. An episode in ‘Full Remission’ (x6) requires a 
period of 2 months where there are no longer any significant depressive symptoms14. 
There are further specifiers that can be added regarding the Longitudinal Course of the 
illness and Seasonal Patterns, which will be better understood following a discussion of 
the criteria for the diagnosis of Dysthymic Disorder. 
 
2.1.3. Major Depression and the DSM-IV: 
(300.4) Dysthymic Disorder. 
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Dysthymia is, in contrast to most incidences of Major Depression, an extreme long term 
problem that can onset in childhood or adolescence and upon which episodes of Major 
Depression can be superimposed, as described in the following criteria. 
(a) Presence, while depressed, of two (or more) of the symptoms listed in figure 2B. 
 
(b) During a 2-year period (1 year for children or adolescents) of the disturbance, the 
person has never been without the key symptoms for more than 2 months at a time.  
(c) No Major Depressive Episode has been present during the first 2 years of the 
disturbance (1 year for children and adolescents); i.e., the disturbance is not better 
accounted for by chronic Major Depressive Disorder, or Major Depressive Disorder, 
In Partial Remission.  
(d) There has never been a Manic Episode, a Mixed Episode, or a Hypomanic Episode, 
and criteria have never been met for Cyclothymic Disorder.  
(e) The disturbance does not occur exclusively during the course of a chronic Psychotic 
Disorder, such as Schizophrenia or Delusional Disorder.  
(f) The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a 
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g. hypothyroidism). 
(g) The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.15 
FIGURE 2B: SYMPTOMS IN DYSTHYMIC DISORDER 
 
1 
Poor appetite or overeating. 
3 
Low energy or fatigue. 
2 
Insomnia or hypersomnia. 
4 
Low Self-Esteem 
5 
Poor Concentration or difficulty making 
decisions. 
6 
Feelings of hopelessness. 
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(APA, 1994) 
 
Finally, Recurrent Major Depressive Disorder is specified in terms of ‘Seasonal Pattern’. 
As described in the DSM-IV: 
 
‘The essential feature is the onset and remission of Major Depressive Episodes at 
characteristic times of the year. In most cases, episodes being in fall or winter and remit in 
spring. Less commonly, there may be recurrent summer depressive episodes. This pattern 
of onset and remission of episodes must have occurred during the last 2 years, without any 
nonseasonal episodes during this period. In addition, the seasonal depressive episodes must 
substantially outnumber any unseasonal depressive episodes over the individual’s 
lifetime.’ (APA, 1994:389) 
 
The Seasonal Pattern specifier does not apply where psychosocial variables such as 
school terms or phases of unemployment are better explanations of the fluctuations in the 
condition. 
 
2.1.4. Major Depression and the DSM-IV: 
(311) Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. 
This category includes the various disorders that do not meet the full criteria for Major 
Depressive Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder or one of the ‘Adjustment Disorders’ (APA, 
1994:623-627) that feature Depressed Mood. The DSM-IV lists six examples of this type 
of Depressive Disorder: 
 
1. Premenstrual dysphoric disorder, defined as: 
  
‘In most menstrual cycles during the past year, symptoms..regularly occurred during the 
last week of the luteal phase (and remitted within a few days of the onset of menses). 
These symptoms must be severe enough to markedly interfere with work, school or usual 
activities and be entirely absent for at least 1 week postmenses.’ (APA, 1994:350)  
 
2. Minor depressive disorder. At least two weeks in duration, but showing fewer than 
five of the criteria for a full Major Depressive Episode. 
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3. Recurrent brief depressive disorder. Episodes of two to fourteen days duration taking 
place at least once a month for twelve months (and having no association with 
menstrual cycle). 
4. Postpsychotic depressive disorder of Schizophrenia. A Major Depressive Episode that 
takes place during the residual phase of Schizophrenia. 
5. A Major Depressive Episode superimposed on Delusional Disorder, Psychotic 
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified, or the active phase of Schizophrenia. 
(APA, 1994) 
 
This framework is applicable where a clinician has diagnosed a depressive disorder, but 
has not concluded whether it is of one of the previously described varieties, the direct 
result of a general medical condition or due to substance abuse. 
 
2.1.5. Major Depression,  the DSM-IV and Biologic Psychiatry: Commentary. 
The wide variety of criticisms levelled at the DSM-IV (and its predecessors) ranges from 
those concerned with specifics of application to assaults on the core ontology upon 
which the whole tome is founded. In this section, a few of the most common will be 
documented, with a view to working towards a more detailed critique of the reasoning 
that underpins modern psychiatric/psychological approaches to Major Depression at the 
end of the chapter.  
One of the key issues that needs to be addressed in this section is a popular 
discomfort with the psychiatric tendency to generate an equivalence between symptoms 
and actual illness. In the DSM-IV, a set of specific recognisable signs are postulated 
which come to define the core character of ‘Major Depression’ while any actual ‘cause’ - 
assumed to be of biological or genetic origin, although this has never been in any way 
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proved (Kaiser, 1996) - goes largely ignored and certainly untreated. ‘Major Depression’, 
to follow this argument, only exists as a set of symptoms16 the recognition of which is, in 
reality, a very different concern to aetiology (Sims, 1995). As sociologist Derrol Palmer 
(2000) highlights, the ‘disorderly’ conduct which is figured to be symptomatic of 
‘mental’ illness is actually identified on social rather than biological grounds. 
Expressions of ‘depressed mood’, ‘guilt’ or ‘fatigue’ could be recognized as particular 
behaviours long before deviant biochemical origins were ascribed to them, an assertion 
which serves to undermine the posited central importance of biological knowledge in the 
field of diagnosis. Moreover, conflating symptom and disease means that, following an 
affirmative diagnosis, medication is prescribed to eradicate the manifestation of certain 
(social) activities, thoughts and feelings rather than to ‘cure’ depression. Drug treatment 
is, thus, little more than a chemically-based exercise in behavioural modification. David 
Kaiser articulates the point in a Psychiatric Times commentary: 
 
‘As a practicing psychiatrist, I have watched with growing dismay and outrage the rise 
and triumph of the hegemony known as biologic psychiatry…This process of equating 
symptoms with illnesses has been repeated with every diagnostic category, culminating 
in perhaps one of the greatest sophistries psychiatry has pulled off in its illustrious 
history of sophistries, namely the creation of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
(currently in its fourth incarnation under the name DSM-IV), the bible of modern 
psychiatry.’ (Kaiser, 1996:web)  
 
There are a number of standard, empirical criticisms of the DSM-IV’s management of all 
mental illnesses that arise particularly from within psychiatry itself (see Tomm, 1990). 
The first of these is that nature of any DSM-defined disorder, its diagnostic criteria and 
where the categories begin and end are determined not in any way by the phenomenon 
being described itself, but by APA committees. This lends to a suggestion that an 
enterprise which claims to be at the forefront of scientific knowledge but is to no extent 
‘scientifically’ conducted is invariably subject to ‘political’ concerns. For example, it has 
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been argued that the constitutive power in defining what is a ‘healthy’ or ‘unhealthy’ 
psychiatric state can be easily abused to objectify and institutionalise the values of 
certain powerful class/gender/cultural positions (Caplan, 1991 & 1995). The DSM-II, for 
example, included homosexuality in its list of mental illnesses, with symptoms based on 
traditional stereotypes (Bayer, 1987). Moreover, it was not actually removed from the 
seventh print of the text in 1973 due to ‘advancing scientific knowledge’, but rather as a 
result of a vote by the APA (still disputed by some psychiatrists today) prompted by 
protests and sustained pressure throughout the 1950s and 1960s from organised action 
groups (Bayer, 1987). This contestability of the diagnostic categories within the 
psychiatric establishment itself brings to the fore another key concern relating to the 
DSM-IV; the human implications of the sheer range of behaviours that are now classified 
as ‘illnesses’. As Kenneth Gergen (1996) remarks: 
 
‘At the present time, one may be classified as mentally ill by virtue of cocaine intoxication, 
caffeine intoxication, the use of hallucinogens, voyeurism, transvestism, sexual aversion, 
the inhibition of orgasm, gambling, academic problems, antisocial behavior, bereavement, 
and noncompliance with medical treatment. Numerous additions to the standardized 
nomenclature continuously appear in professional writings to the public. Consider, for 
example, seasonal affective disorder, stress, burnout, erotomania, the harlequin complex, 
and so on. What, we might ask, are the upper limits for classifying people in terms of 
deficits?’ (Gergen et al, 1996:63) 
 
This expanding scope of the DSM and its psychiatric progeny, for Gergen, encourages 
the promotion of highly selective attention by a psychiatrist/GP to individual deficits and 
selective inattention to the actual competence and knowledge held by a patient. In some 
critiques (Kaye & Gergen, 1992; Kaye, 1995; see also the extended interrogations of 
Marcuse, Goffman and Foucault in the next chapter), this tendency is considered 
tantamount to the objectification and dehumanisation of a patient for the purposes of 
professional classification. 
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‘…when the [mental illness] terms are applied in daily life they have substantial effects - 
in narrowing the explanation to the level of the individual, stigmatizing, and obscuring the 
contribution of other factors (including the demands of economic life, media images, and 
traditions of individual evaluation) to the actions in question. Further, when these terms are 
used to construct the self, they suggest that one should seek professional treatment. In this 
sense, the development and dissemination of the terminology by the profession acts to 
create a population of people who will seek professional help. And, as more professionals 
are required - as they have been in increasing numbers over the century - so is there 
pressure to increase the vocabulary.’ (Gergen et al, 1996:65) 
  
Labelling a patient as ‘sick’ in this totalising way is not only to pathologise them, but to 
stigmatise and segregate them, which in turn perpetuates the use of such labelling. While, 
again, the APA insists that this is not the case, there is a fairly simple stride from 
‘someone with depression’ to the meta-label of a ‘depressive’. 
Another central empirical problem arising from the DSM-IV relates to its 
inability to encompass many practical clinical situations. Consider again the core 
symptom list for a Major Depressive Episode listed in Figure 2A above. What is 
particularly unambiguous in this list is that the DSM-IV locates mental illness symptoms 
exclusively within individuals. The symptoms manifest somatically (weight loss, 
psychomotor problems) or psychologically (depressed mood, feelings of worthlessness), 
but always in a manner to be experienced internally and biologically. As such, social 
contexts are not in themselves to be regarded as relevant in the structure of the illness; 
indeed, one of the key DSM-recommended considerations to be made by a practitioner in 
diagnosing Major Depression is whether or not the symptoms are better explained by the 
vividly social concept of bereavement. If they are, then the patient is not in fact suffering 
from Major Depression at all and is not to be diagnosed as such. This, however, provides 
us with a major bone of contention. Implicit in the exemption of bereavement behaviour 
from the diagnostic frame is an acknowledgement of the importance of social 
environment in the production of human behaviours. The guidelines for diagnosis, 
however, remain grounded in roundly individualistic presuppositions (Bowers, 1998) 
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and ask of a practitioner to take into account only individualistic phenomena, thus 
leaving a wide range of front-line real-world concerns unaccounted for.  
The psychiatric ‘rule of thumb’ is, fundamentally, that assessments relating to the 
individual’s psychological health should not be made on the basis of interpersonal, 
familial, cultural, or institutional concerns (Tomm, 1990). These concerns are, however, 
virtually impossible to ignore in the practical action of ‘making a diagnosis’, yet a 
diagnosis incorporating any such concerns is, from a DSM point of view, not a diagnosis 
at all. To return to the example of bereavement, how can an assessment relating to 
whether or not an individual is ‘bereaved’ be made on a biological basis, and without 
reflection on the social/cultural order of which the patient is a part? Different cultures 
have very different traditions and norms which actually serve to define what 
bereavement itself is and how it should be ‘normally’ experienced. Attempting to bring 
this heterogeneity of historically and culturally embedded human activities within a 
single objective framework of what ‘is’ and ‘is not’ evidence of bereavement represents 
a crass disregard for the complexity and variety of human social experience, firmly 
coupled with an over-emphasis on a general syndrome at the expense of attention to 
specific experiences and personal/cultural contexts as constructed and interpreted by 
doctors and patients in specific concrete social activities.  
 Underpinning all of the criticisms listed above is the primary problem of the 
DSM’s radical and frequently unworkable individualisation of the whole concept of 
mental illness. As Bowers (1998) argues, there is a largely unheeded relevance in 
sociological knowledge to the contemporary psychiatric enterprise. 
 
‘Although [sociological] ideas have influenced thinking within psychiatry they have by 
and large been rejected by the most influential and powerful professional group in 
psychiatry: the psychiatrists themselves.’ (Bowers, 1998:5) 
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The DSM-IV disregards the relevance of social phenomena in the aetiology, 
understanding and identification of Major Depression and leaves us with a somewhat 
implausible model of the human being as an isolated, de-socialised bio-unit to be 
interpreted by a practitioner of medicine in much the same way (and using much the 
same methods) as a rock is interpreted by a geologist, or a star by an astronomer. As will 
become apparent throughout this chapter, a blindness to socially-oriented perspectives is 
not a flaw unique to the DSM-IV; the following sections interrogate three ontologically 
similar, though cosmetically different, conceptualisations of Major Depression that 
impact upon contemporary clinical practice. 
  
2.2. WHAT IS DEPRESSION? 
PART 2: PSYCHOANALYSIS. 
‘If one listens patiently to the many and various self-accusations of the melancholic, one 
cannot in the end avoid the impression that often the most violent of them are hardly at all 
applicable to the patient himself, but that with some insignificant modification they do fit 
someone else, some person whom the patient loves, has loved or ought to love...So we get 
the key to the clinical picture - by perceiving that the self-reproaches are reproaches 
against a loved object which have been shifted on to the patient's own ego.’ 
Sigmund Freud17 
“Collected Papers, vol. 4”  
 
Psychoanalytic perspectives on Major Depression, though stripped of the dominance 
they once had, still influence therapeutic techniques worldwide. Moreover, as will be 
demonstrated, certain notions arising from psychoanalysis regarding the nature of the 
illness are taken up in the diversity of theories documented from both behavioural and 
cognitive schools of psychology that also provide detailed interrogations of the 
condition, the co-occurrence of its various symptoms and its causes. All psychoanalytic 
approaches to Major Depression, the term being used for convenience here (as it is not 
always the label of choice of psychoanalysts themselves) have their thematic roots, 
inevitably, in the work of Sigmund Freud. 
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 Freud began his career in neurology, his early interest being in the possibility of a 
psychoneural project which could explain all mental phenomena. His model of mental 
function, at least partly as a result of lack of specific knowledge of the brain at that time, 
was based on an archetype developed by physicist Gustav Fechner; that of mental health 
as a homeostatic entity (Robbins & Everitt, 1999). The ‘new’ (psychoanalytic) direction 
in his analysis of mental disorder was taken in a case examined with Joseph Breuer, from 
1895’s “Studies in Hysteria”. In this study they discovered that the recovery of a hysteric 
named Anna O seemed to be facilitated by cartharsis, the release of tension, what the 
patient herself called the ‘talking cure’. Within these terms, catharsis could be seen as a 
means to the attainment of homeostasis (Jackson, 1994). He came to term ‘imbalancing’ 
conditions18 as psychoneural conditions, the symptoms of which stemmed from 
unconscious conflicts redolent of early childhood trauma which had disrupted sexual 
development, while he saw depression19 as being an actual neurosis, like anxiety and 
neurasthenia (Jackson, 1994). It is worth underlining, at this point, that this move did not, 
for Freud, constitute any considerable change of direction, not in the manner that it is 
often documented today. It is an often forgotten element of Freud’s work that he depicted 
the processes underpinning psychiatric conditions as taking place in a closed (hydraulic) 
space in the brain; on this basis he was insistent that psychiatry and neurology need not 
be exclusive (Hampden-Turner, 1981). Freud’s ultimate claim was that, with improved 
knowledge of brain physics, the actual neuroanatomical locations of psychoanalytic 
constructs would eventually be realised. 
 
2.2.1. Psychoanalysis and Depression: Theory.  
Freud’s first expanded model of ‘melancholia’20 was originally formulated by one of his 
pupils, Karl Abraham, and subsequently developed by Freud himself. Within this model 
46 
 
it was hypothesised that the feelings characteristic of melancholia, intense sorrow and 
self-hatred, stemmed from aggression directed at a loved but lost object (Sarason & 
Sarason, 1989). The ‘object’ was usually taken to be a parent, particularly the mother, 
though it could be any figure or symbolic ‘ideal’ significant in the individual’s early life 
which was lost through death, rejection, separation or betrayal. The child, argued Freud, 
internalised a representation of the object to lessen the pain of its loss, causing hostility 
reserved for the object to be turned inwards at a part of the child’s own ego.  
 
‘Loss in early childhood is postulated to serve as a diathesis, a vulnerability factor which 
will lead to depression later in adulthood if the individual is confronted with a significant 
loss or disappointment.’ (Gotlib & Hammen , 1997:68) 
 
Essentially, Freud argued that the presence of this diathesis would predispose individuals 
to depression in later life whenever they were again confronted with loss. An important 
element of this thinking was that the depressed patient held some considerable 
ambivalence toward the loved object, and, as a result, the aggression and sorrow was 
attended by guilt or shame (Sarason & Sarason, 1989). As such, Freud noted that the 
symptoms of most depressions were not unlike the characteristics of someone in 
mourning, or suffering from a high level of grief after a significant loss. The point of 
departure was, however, that unlike in ‘normal’ cases of grief, the depressed person 
experienced a total loss of self-esteem and would accuse themselves of worthlessness or 
inadequacy. In extreme cases the guilt and retroflexed anger were so intense that the 
patient’s behaviour could become suicidal (Radden, 2000). 
 Psychoanalysts since Freud have amended or altered his theory to varying 
degrees. The first significant amendment was made by Rado in 1928, an amendment 
which emphasised the social context and relations of the depressed adult. In this 
synthesis of Major Depression, it was argued that the condition is representative of an 
attempt to regain self-esteem following an interpersonal loss. Rado accepted Freud’s 
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description of depression and basic theme of the condition as rooted in childhood trauma, 
but postulated that individuals predisposed to depression remain child-like in having an 
elevated dependence on others for their personal sense of worth (Jackson, 1994). They, 
as such, are more liable to be seriously affected by disappointments or frustrations in 
their social environments than non-depressives. The initial anger or frustration of a 
depressive episode alienates those in the depressive’s immediate environment, and the 
subsequent displays of guilt or self-denigration constitute an attempt to atone for this 
alienating behaviour and regain interpersonal support. Where this self-punishment is 
unsuccessful in re-establishing the desired social approval, and thus self-esteem, the 
condition would escalate into full melancholic depression. 
 The first real challenge to Freud’s core aetiology of Major Depression from 
within psychoanalysis came from Melanie Klein in 1934, who argued that depressive 
behaviour is rooted not in early life trauma, but in an early failure to overcome 
potentially depressive fears and anxieties as a result of an inadequate bond between 
mother and child in the first year of life (Radden, 2000). Under these conditions the child 
could not feel loved or secure, the ambivalence toward loved objects could not be 
overcome and optimal self-esteem could not be established. The individual was thus 
condemned to depressive predisposition. It is this model of depression, emphasising the 
role of mother-child relations in shaping behaviour and adjustment, that forms the core of 
contemporary object-relations theories in psychoanalysis. For example, Bowlby (1981) 
argued the evolutionary line that, historically, it would have been critical for ostensibly 
defenceless infants to seek the protective support of significant objects, specific adults, to 
enable their survival and that, in these terms, many of the activities in which infants 
engage21 serve a care-eliciting function. Consequently it is inherent in modern man that 
specific unbroken interpersonal bonds in childhood are essential to ‘normal’ 
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development. The threat of loss of these invariably induces anxiety or sadness and, 
where these bonds do not form or are prematurely lost, especially the central bond with 
the mother, then depressive predisposition is inevitable.  
 
2.2.2. Psychoanalysis and Depression: Commentary. 
What is initially striking about the psychoanalytic account of depression is how different 
it appears, on the surface, to the frames postulated in the DSM-IV and also how the 
prime focus is placed on very different areas. While the DSM prioritises the nosological 
enterprise, the chief clinical concerns of Freud and his intellectual progeny are 
aetiological in character; indeed, the criticism of equating symptom with illness that 
persistently undermines the DSM is not one that can in any sense be levelled at the 
theories discussed in section 2.2.1. Both psychoanalysis and biological psychiatry locate 
the condition very vividly within the individual as a mode of internal ‘deviant’ 
experience that manifests in ‘abnormal’ behaviours; the symptoms of depression as 
originally specified by Freud, however, are all ‘psychological’ in character, feelings of 
melancholy, worthlessness, guilt and suchlike, and the condition in its totality is 
portrayed very specifically as one of ‘the mind’ rooted in specific (treatable) causes. 
The key point of divergence between DSM-IV and psychoanalytic accounts of 
Major Depression clearly relates, however, to the Freudian integration of the social world 
into its aetiology. As described in section 2.1.5, the DSM explicitly refuses any 
suggestion that the illness as specified therein can be a direct result of social conflict. 
Indeed where an individual exhibits the postulated depressive symptoms but can be 
shown to be in a period of bereavement, then they are not to be considered depressed at 
all. Causality is taken to be biological, and thus on the whole, so is therapy. Freud, 
Abraham, Rado and Klein, meanwhile, locate the causes of depression exclusively in the 
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character of social relationships past and present. A traumatic social experience (loss, 
lack of love, inadequate bonds etc.) is internalised as a diathesis which then activates as 
depression in response to comparable social experience later in life (disappointment, 
bereavement etc). The mode of recommended therapy thus cruxes around the elimination 
of the diathesis via the restoration of everyday senses of integration, love, inclusion (the 
social elements of which the diathesis emphasises a lack). 
Another key node of divergence between psychoanalytic and DSM-IV 
approaches to Major Depression relates to the status of language within the theoretical 
frame. Both acknowledge that, in practical circumstances, the practitioner is reliant upon 
accounts provided by patient (or third party) in making a diagnosis. While the APA 
characterise the patient’s accounts of experience and feelings as passive commentaries 
on static psychological and physiological traits and states to be interpreted as ‘true’ or 
‘false’ and collated into a syndrome, however, the psychoanalysts emphasise a more 
active role of for language in both the understanding and therapy of a depressive. 
Respectively, thus, it functions as an interpretable symbolic means through which a 
skilled therapist can access the underlying (hidden) psychological states which are 
driving the problematic condition, and as a social action in itself which can be used in the 
restoration of bonds and healthy beliefs. While this acknowledges that talk is an activity 
in itself, with more than a simple representative function, it treats it as a manifestation of 
hidden drives rather than a skilled means for achieving social actions used by a 
competent speaker. This is directly linked to the central criticism I would like to level at 
the psychoanalytic approach to Major Depression. While psychoanalysis is regularly 
criticised by biologic psychiatry for being ‘unscientific’, ‘bereft of foundation’ and ‘self 
fulfilling’ (which is to say that psychoanalytic patients are guided to conform to 
psychoanalytic theories), such criticisms are grounded in the assertion that biological 
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FIGURE 2C: PSYCHOANALYTIC CARTESIANISM. 
 
psychiatry is ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’, an assertion that has itself already been shown 
to be problematic. The issue I would like to address here, in terms of the aims of this 
project, is somewhat more fundamental. In order to facilitate the operation of his theory, 
Freud advanced a highly deterministic view of ‘human nature’; the depressive individual 
is seen to be played upon by a variety of causal influences which set up complex internal, 
unconscious intrapsychic mechanisms which in turn serve to direct their behaviour:  
 
‘On the basis of the [conscious/unconscious] division in the psyche and the unique 
configurations of mechanisms that hold sway there, each of us has a different personality, 
the nature of which cannot really be discerned by self report.’ (Harre & Gillett, 1994:132) 
 
The human being, from this point of view, cannot be portrayed as a self-reflective agent 
in their own activities; indeed, psychoanalytic explanations of a person’s behaviour can 
be produced which are in direct contradiction of the subject’s own. The assumption that a 
theorist/therapist can know more about the life and ‘mind’ of an individual than the 
individual in question is highly practically problematic, not to say arrogant, but also 
incorrigible throughout psychology and psychiatry. As an understanding of human 
dynamics it serves, crucially, to draw a hard line between ‘mental activity’ and 
‘behaviour - a dualism between mind and body, or what we might call Cartesianism22. 
This model of depressive functioning is schematised in figure 2C.  
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Simply put, the assumption that ‘mind’ and body belong to separate orders of 
phenomena and should be treated differently is exactly that: an assumption that grounds 
a theory without any clear proof of its own veracity (Garfinkel, 1967; Coulter, 1979; 
Harré & Gillett, 1994; Widdecombe and Wooffitt, 1995; Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1998). 
Moreover, as a basis for grand theories of ‘human nature’ it is notoriously inadequate as 
while it may occupy the status of ‘common-sense’ in most Western cultures today, 
anthropological and historical evidence demonstrates that the assumption does not 
predominate everywhere, and is indeed a relatively recent entry into Western 
understandings of ‘the way we are’ (Geertz, 1979; Burkitt, 1991). The employment of a 
Cartesian metaphysical thesis at the core of theory, and frequent resultant psychological 
‘doping’ of individuals (that is to say, the denial of their agency and privileging of 
‘expert’ knowledges relating to them), can be clearly seen in the next approach to 
depression to be discussed, that advanced by behavioral psychology. 
 
2.3. WHAT IS DEPRESSION? 
PART 3: BEHAVIOURAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
The primary themes in behavioural theories of Major Depression are the behaviourist 
leitmotifs of stimulus and response and, more specifically to the condition, 
overgeneralisation and reinforcement. For virtually all behavioural psychologists 
depression is taken to be a variant on the model postulated by B.F Skinner in 1953, 
which essentially described an overgeneralised response to a circumscribed disruptive 
stimulus (Gotlib & Hammen, 1996). The overgeneralising response (pathology) in 
question here is not unlike the Freudian model. It took the form of a number of 
reductions in behavioural emissions: loss of interest in a range of activities, low self-
esteem, loss of appetite or decreased libido. Suggested stimuli included various forms of 
personal trauma, such as death of a loved one or loss of a job, that is to say the loss of an 
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environmental factor that formerly provided ‘reinforcement’ of non-pathological 
behaviour.  
 
2.3.1. Behaviourism and Depression: Theory.  
Skinner himself advanced the original behaviourist claim that depression was the 
outcome of:  
 
‘[A] weakening of the behavior due to interruptions in established sequences of behaviour 
that had been positively reinforced by the social environment.’ (Gotlib & Hammen, 
1996:71) 
 
This contrasts sharply with Freud’s analysis of depression as the result of disturbance to 
intrapsychic processes due to childhood trauma. The aetiological detail of this theory was 
enhanced by Ferster (1973), who suggested that the behavioural reductions characteristic 
of Major Depression are the result of a failure to produce adaptive strategies to a diverse 
stimuli such as abrupt environmental changes, aversive control or punishment and shifts 
in ‘reinforcement contingencies’ (Lewinsohn & Gotlib, 1995). As Lewinsohn and Gotlib 
document, Ferster explained this adaptive failure in terms of a number of possible 
precipitative factors. These included: 
 
1. Sudden or unexpected environmental changes that necessitate the development of 
new sources of reinforcement. 
2. The engagement by an individual in punishable behaviour which pre-empts the 
possibility of positive reinforcement. 
3. The ‘inaccurate’ observation of the environment by the individual, leading to 
behaviour which is socially inappropriate and thus, as a consequence, a low 
frequency of positive reinforcement. 
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The loss of one means of reinforcement, in Ferster’s analysis, gave rise to ‘chaining’, the 
reduction in all behaviour organised around the lost reinforcer.  
 
‘..the loss of a job may lead to a reduction in all of the behaviours that were chained to 
working.  Thus the individual who lost his job might have difficulty in getting up in the 
morning, seeing friends or colleagues, eating, planning recreational activities, and so on, if 
all these behaviours were organised around his work, the central source of reinforcement.’ 
(Gotlib & Hammen, 1996:71) 
 
Costello (1972) further specialised the theory by adding a distinction between reinforcers 
available to an individual and their actual effectiveness in providing reinforcement, the 
latter, it was argued, being contingent on the integrity of the chain of the former. The loss 
of a given reinforcer causes a loss of reinforcer effectiveness in the rest of the chain, and 
depressive behaviour, particularly the characteristic generalised loss of interest, is a 
manifestation of this. 
In a number of paper in the mid 1970s to early 1980s, Lewinsohn and colleagues 
(Lewinsohn 1974; MacPhillamy & Lewinsohn, 1974; Lewinsohn, Youngren & 
Grosscup, 1979; Lewinsohn, Sullivan & Grosscup, 1982) integrated the work already 
done in behavioural psychology with developments of their own to formulate a much 
more elaborate theory of Major Depression. The core principle proposed, that ‘..a low 
rate of response-contingent positive reinforcement constitutes a sufficient explanation for 
aspects of the depressive syndrome, especially the low rate of behaviour.’ (Lewinsohn & 
Gotlib, 1995:353), was elaborated by the deployment of three additional hypotheses 
relating to these low rates of reinforcement (Lewinsohn & Gotlib, 1995). 
 
1. There is a causal relationship between a low rate of response-contingent 
reinforcement and the dysphoric feelings associated with Major Depression. 
2. Depressive behaviours are maintained by the individual’s social environment through 
its function of providing contingencies in the form of sympathy, concern and interest. 
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3. Low rates of positive reinforcement are, crucially, precipitated by deficiencies in 
social skill. An individual with a deficit of this skill will find it more difficult to attain 
reinforcers in the first instance, and also to establish new reinforcers when old ones 
are lost and, consequently become progressively more passive and inactive when 
faced with problems.  
 
The definition of ‘social skill’ driving the third hypothesis is explicitly provided by Libet 
and Lewinsohn (1973). For them, social skill is  
 
‘..the complex ability both to emit behaviours which are positively or negatively 
reinforced, and not to emit behaviours which are punished or extinguished by others.’ 
(Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973:304) 
 
The degree to which individuals are socially skilful is, thus, assessed by the level to 
which their actions elicit positive consequences from their social environments. This 
focus on the ‘social field’ in which an individual exists, particularly the relations between 
the individual and other people, is further investigated by Coyne (1976) who argues that 
depression is maintained by negative responses from significant others to the 
symptomatic behaviour of the depressive. Taking as a starting point an individual’s 
demonstration of mild depressive symptoms, often in response to stress, Coyne 
postulates a sequence of behaviour that explains the progressive worsening of the 
condition. 
 
‘Individuals in the depressed person’s social environment respond immediately to these 
depressive symptoms with genuine concern and support. The depressive’s behaviors 
gradually become demands, however, that are expressed with increasing frequency. 
Consequently, the depressive’s behavior becomes aversive and elicits feelings of anger or 
resentment from other family members. At the same time, however, the depressed person’s 
obvious distress also elicits feelings of guilt that serve to inhibit the open expression of this 
hostility. In an attempt to reduce both their guilt and anger, family members respond to the 
depressed person not only with veiled hostility, but with false reassurance and support. 
Being aware of, and feeling rejected by, these discrepant or incongruous messages, the 
depressed person becomes more symptomatic in an attempt to gain more support, thus 
making it even more aversive for others to interact with him or her’ (Gotlib & Hammen, 
1996:73) 
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This process of progressive amplification of deviant behaviour continues until the 
relevant ‘significant others’ withdraw from interaction with the depressive, or have the 
depressive removed from their social field by hospitalisation. Within behavioural 
psychology this formulation of the aetiology of Major Depression remained dominant 
with only minor adjustments made. Coates and Wortman (1980), for example, while 
accepting all of the fundamental tenets of Lewinsohn’s work, places a greater emphasis 
on the dynamics of the interplay between the depressed individual and the people in their 
social environment and mutual understandings of the appropriateness of a given reaction. 
Significant theoretical movements in the field did not take place until the 1980s, 
however, when attempts to integrate the findings of the behaviourist programme with 
those from cognitive psychology were made.  
 
2.3.2. Behaviourism and Depression: Identification and Assessment. 
There is a range of techniques for the identification of Major Depression arising from the 
suppositions and findings of the behaviourist approach. Most, consistently with the 
theoretical works, focus upon the dual factors of behaviour (psychomotor and verbal 
activities) and environment though generally place a greater weight on one or the other 
(Lewinsohn & Gotlib, 1995). Information is generally collected through interviews, self-
report or direct behavioural observations. 
 The standard method of interview used by behaviourally-oriented clinicians is 
based on the model recommended by Becker and Heimberg (1985) which incorporates 
both role-play and examination of life circumstances. The former aspect is designed to 
assess social skills by enacting situations that the patient has identified as problematic 
and observing their performance, while the latter is to identify specific behaviour settings 
and people that appear to be associated with the disruptions to the patient’s mood. These 
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interview techniques are very specific to behavioural psychology; many of the self-report 
measures utilised to identify Major Depression, meanwhile, are borrowed from other 
areas of psychology or clinical practice. Favoured formats for self-report are the Beck 
Depression Inventory (detailed in the discussion of cognitive psychology) which 
identifies the presence and severity of Major Depression, and the Interpersonal Events 
Schedule (Lewinsohn, Muñoz, Youngren, & Zeiss, 1978) which lists 160 items relating 
to interpersonal activities in depressed individuals for patients to rate in terms of 
frequency and impact for each month that they are being treated. The results are used to 
assess the severity and progress/recession of the condition. The other method of self-
report measurement employed in the monitoring of fluctuations of symptoms is the 
keeping of behavioural logs or diaries. The Pleasant Events Schedule (PES) developed 
by MacPhillamy and Lewinsohn (1982) is a typical example of this approach. It consists 
of 320 items that describe interactions with the environment that people typically find 
pleasurable (such as ‘being with friends’ or ‘seeing beautiful scenery’).  
 
‘The patient first rates each item on a 3-point scale indicating the frequency of each event’s 
occurrence during the past month. Each item is than rated a second time with respect to the 
subject’s enjoyment of the event. The frequency ratings are assumed to measure the 
individual’s rate of engagement in person-environment interactions, whereas the subjective 
enjoyment ratings are assumed to reflect the individual’s potential for positive 
reinforcement. The cross-product of the frequency and impact ratings provide a measure of 
the total amount of positive reinforcement the patient has experienced over the past 
month.’ (Lewinsohn & Gotlib, 1995:358-9) 
 
The Unpleasant Events Schedule (UES; Lewinsohn et al, 1985) functions in a similar 
way, but assesses specific or potential areas of distress. Both UES and PES can be used 
in both ‘pre’ and ‘post’ treatment scenarios either as means of, respectively, directing the 
treatment or evaluating its effect.  
 The final means of condition assessment favoured by behaviourally oriented 
clinicians is direct observation, geared towards the production of longitudinal records of 
patient behaviour which can be correlated with measures of depression severity. Focus is 
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placed upon three main areas; conversation style, conversation content and psychomotor 
activity (such as smiling). In comparisons with non-depressed controls, depressives on 
hospital wards have been found to smile less frequently (Gotlib, 1982), make less eye 
contact during conversation (Gotlib, 1982), make more negative comments (Blumberg & 
Hokanson, 1983), speak more slowly (Gotlib & Robinson, 1982) and take longer to 
respond to others in conversation (Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973). Using observer-rated 
scales based on such findings, depressed individuals are observed in a number of 
different contexts interacting with different people to evaluate the severity and specificity 
of their condition.   
 
2.3.3. Behaviourism and Depression: Commentary. 
The behaviourist approach to Major Depression echoes themes discussed in the reviews 
of both the DSM-IV and psychoanalysis, while adding significant dimensions which 
feature in neither. Unlike psychoanalytic approaches, the theories detailed above focus 
only upon externally observable phenomena when identifying (loss of appetite, 
decreased libido etc) and ‘correcting’ (changing social environment) depressive activity; 
this is consistent with the declared behaviourist endeavour to rescue psychology from the 
Freudian grasp and restore it to the status of an experimental ‘scientific’ enterprise 
(Edwards, 1997). Unfortunately, the Newtonian stimulus-response model of science 
underpinning the enterprise, as described by Harré & Gillett (1994), provides problems 
of its own. 
 
‘[It] led to the restriction of legitimate categories of phenomena to those that could be 
physically specified such as stimulus conditions, states of environment detectable by the 
five senses (usually only vision was employed), and bodily movement as detected by some 
inhuman apparatus. What is more, both classes of phenomena were thought of as being 
partitioned into independent or dependent variables. This suggested that there ought to be 
some simple and surveyable relationship between types of measurable events originating 
in the organism and some, possibly complex but in principal discernible, set of laws that 
connected the two.’ (Harré & Gillett, 1994:p3) 
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While Skinner argued that at least some classes of ‘mental’ phenomena could be 
classified amongst ‘physical’ behavioural forms and studied in the same manner as other 
forms of behaviour (‘loss of interest’ in activities, for example), and thus accepted the 
existence of a ‘mental’ realm, it was by and large ignored in empirical research which 
progressed making little or no reference to ‘mental process’ at all (Edwards, 1997), as 
can be clearly seen in the studies outlined above. As a consequence, the behaviourist 
account of Major Depression avoids the intrapsychic determinism that characterised its 
predecessor, but only goes as far as to replace it with an environmental determinism23 
ultimately based on the same mind/material Cartesian divide, as shown in figure 2D 
below. This, in turn, leads to a persistent treatment of the ‘subjects’ of behavioural 
psychology (human beings) as ‘objects’; nodes at which measurable environmental 
stimuli are converted into ‘objectively’ categorisable behaviours via straightforward 
causalities.  
 
 
Such a naïvely positivistic investigative apparatus overlooks one simple problem of 
application regarding human beings, as neatly narrated by Bannister and Mair (1968). 
 
‘No one suggests that the subject matter which the physicist, the chemist, the botanist or 
the geologist seeks to order and make sensible, at the same time may seek to order and 
make sense of him. This, however, is perhaps the single most outstanding feature of the 
field of events which the psychologist has chosen to study – people.’ (Bannister & Mair, 
1968:3) 
 
HUMAN 
BEING  
 
‘REAL’ 
EXTERNAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
‘REAL’ 
DEPRESSIVE 
BEHAVIOUR 
DIRECT CORRELATION 
FIGURE 2D: BEHAVIOURAL CARTESIANISM. 
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The positing of simple causal mechanisms linking environmental stimulus to behavioural 
response serves, once again, to deny the individual human’s role as a ‘reasoning’ agent 
with the capacity to make sense of a situation and adjust (in)appropriately to it 
(Garfinkel, 1967; Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1998). It is also grounded in a discredited 
Humean philosophical theory of causality (Harré & Gillett, 1994); the ‘laws’ generated 
from behavioural research (such as those linking ‘depressive behaviour’ to specific 
‘types’ of environmental stimuli) are little more than statistical patterns among sequences 
of events, basic arrays of correlations. They in no way predict what every human being 
will do in response to a set stimulus. Furthermore, this characterisation of human action 
also produces an unworkable contradiction; at once, the behaviourist theory of 
depression places massive weight on the role of ‘environment’ as a causal agent, but 
attempting to render ‘environment’ an objective quantity simultaneously strips the notion 
of ‘context’ of any meaningful import. Take, for example, the therapies outlined by 
Lewinsohn and Gotlib (1995). The first, increasing pleasant activities and decreasing 
unpleasant ones, suggests that an increase in the pleasant activities that characterise the 
individual’s social environment will result in an increase in ‘positive’ behaviours; this is, 
however, contingent upon predetermined notions of what constitutes a ‘pleasant’ or 
‘unpleasant’ social activity. Notwithstanding the obvious cultural differences that arise 
(what is considered appropriate/pleasant/polite in some cultures may be as much as 
abhorrent in others), there are significant differences within any given culture. To raise a 
rather extreme (but highly illustrative) case, we may posit that the experience of pain is 
an unpleasant facet of life and to decrease it will increase affirmative behaviours; this 
may seem very well unless the condition we are treating is ‘masochism’, in which case to 
decrease pain could be thought to be a reduction in pleasant activities for the individual! 
Equally, in the case of depression, the encouragement of social skills and social 
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engagement to combat the condition is contingent upon a singular assumption made by 
the psychologist that the individual will regard these things as ‘pleasant’; if he or she 
does not, then we arrive at a impasse. If the activities/environments that the individual 
‘enjoys’ (seclusion, for example) are also those which are pre-set as being conducive to 
depressive behaviour, then how is this to be ‘remedied’? Environment is doubtless key to 
understanding human action, but only in terms of what it means to the acting humans 
(Heritage, 1984a). To suggest that ‘a context’ is and means the same thing to all people 
(irrespective of culture, interest, relative social position etc.) and can be simply ‘read off’ 
by the analyst as a causal agent, is deeply problematic. The behaviourist account of 
depression, much as with the DSM-IV, can be seen to based upon a set of concepts 
relating to ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ responses that, although couched in a range of 
interesting quasi-scientific slabs of terminology (‘reinforcement’, ‘negative assertion’ 
etc), are grounded in culturally and socially specific common-sense assumptions. As 
Harré and Gillett (1995) contribute; 
 
 ‘When one looked at the descriptions of [behaviourist] experiments about remembering, 
about emotions, about attitudes, about personalities, with an eye to the basic conceptual 
structures in terms of which they had been set up and later interpreted, they all involved 
concepts that had come from a particular culture, with a particular set of moral, political 
and psychological assumptions.’ (Harré & Gillett, 1995:6) 
  
This criticism is equally applicable to the next and final approach to Major Depression to 
be examined in this chapter, that advanced by cognitive psychology. 
 
2.4. WHAT IS DEPRESSION? 
PART 4: COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY. 
While there are a number of different cognitive theories of Major Depression, there can 
be little doubt that the dominant and most prolific school has its roots in Aaron T Beck’s 
1961 study of the dreams of diagnosed depressed patients, A Systematic Investigation of 
Depression, which aimed to evaluate the psychoanalytic proposal that depression was the 
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outcome of the ‘retroflexed hostility’. Finding that the dreams of depressed individuals 
contained little hostility but were rather centred around themes of being deprived, 
thwarted or punished in some way, the study both dismissed the psychoanalytic view and 
formed the basis of a new and highly influential psychological theory which portrayed 
Major Depression in terms of ‘cognitive distortions’.  
 
‘The idiosyncratic cognitive content and cognitive distortions [of and in the patients’ 
reported dreams] led to a clinically based theory that depressed persons view the self, the 
world, and the future negatively, and that a theme of loss permeates their cognitive 
distortions. Furthermore, it was theorised that these cognitive propensities play a central 
role in the development and maintenance of depression.’ (Sacco & Beck, 1995:329) 
 
This ‘dysfunctional’ view of self, outside world and future is termed the ‘negative 
(cognitive) triad’ (Beck, 1967), which is based in ‘negative automatic thoughts’: these 
are, basically, repetitive and hard-to-control perceptions, beliefs and memories that come 
to dominate the consciousness.  
 
2.4.1. Cognition and Depression: Theory. 
For Beck (1991), all types of Major Depression exhibit, and are resultant of, these 
fundamental thought forms. As such, Beck’s cognitive theory is based upon what is 
essentially a notion of ‘defective information processing’. In short, a person’s affect and 
behaviour are determined primarily by the way that he/she views the world. The 
cognitive structures which manage this perceptual field are labelled Schemata (a term 
originating in the work of Bartlett, 1932), intrapsychic cognitive mechanisms which 
manifest in the form of silent/background assumptions or beliefs and which guide 
attention, expectation and interpretation. Beck’s own definition is as follows:  
 
‘[A schema is] a structure for screening, coding and evaluating impinging stimuli. In terms 
of the individual’s adaptation to external reality, it is regarded as the mode by which the 
environment is broken down and organized into its many psychologically relevant facets; 
on the basis of the matrix of schemata, the individual is able to reorient himself in relation 
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to time and space and to categorize and interpret his experiences in a meaningful way.’ 
(Beck, 1964:564) 
 
The schemata in a depressed individual can be seen to be more global, rigid and 
negatively toned than those in a non-depressive (Hollon & Beck, 1979), especially in 
terms of self-concept; for example, according to Weissman & Beck’s Dysfunctional 
Attitude Scale (Weissman, 1980), depressive schemata are operationalised in such 
background beliefs as ‘If I fail at my work then I fail as a person’ or ‘Nothing will ever 
work out for me’. While the character of schematic templates vary enormously from 
person to person, depressive schemata can be observed and identified by the manner in 
which they are reflected in characteristic and systematic errors in logic made by a 
depressed individual. These manifest in six main forms, as shown in figure 2E, which 
Beck (1967) argued were common to all forms of Major Depression.  
 
FIGURE 2E: DEPRESSION AND ‘LOGIC ERRORS’. 
 
1 
Arbitrary Inference 
 
The drawing of conclusions where there is no 
evidence, or the evidence is contrary to the 
conclusion. 
3 
Overgeneralization 
 
The tendency to formulate a general and 
unshakeable rule on the basis of a single incident and 
then indiscriminately apply this rule to related and 
unrelated situations alike. 
2 
Selective Abstraction 
 
The tendency to focus almost exclusively on a 
negative fragment in a situation and conceptualise 
the whole experience in terms of this detail. 
4 
Magnification and Minimization 
 
The tendency to exaggerate the  magnitude or 
significance of negative events, and underestimate 
the magnitude or significance of positive events. 
5 
Personalization 
 
The tendency to bring external events within personal 
terms with no direct evidence. 
6 
All-Or-Nothing Thinking 
 
The tendency to think in entirely black-and-white, all-
or-none terms. 
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FIGURE 2F: SOCIOTROPY 
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Activates at loss 
of job. 
FIGURE 2G: AUTONOMY 
In terms of the genesis of depression, Beck proposes that a ‘psychological 
predisposition’ towards the condition is shaped by negative experiences in childhood. 
His argument is that during development, and as a result of negative experiences, the 
depressively predisposed individual will acquire stable but dysfunctional schemata (that 
is to say that they form in a distinctively negative and self-referential way) which serve 
as a diathesis, a latent vulnerability. The resultant ‘Diathesis-Stress’ (Beck, 1991) model 
of depression as a reactive phenomenon implies that these dysfunctional schemata will 
remain latent until activated by ‘..stressors (precipitating factors) to which the individual 
is sensitized.’ (Sacco & Beck, 1995:331). There are two distinct ‘types’ of schema 
content which interact each with their own class of stressors to provoke a depressive 
reaction. This ‘specific vulnerability’ (Beck, 1991) extension to the original cognitive 
theory of depression divides ‘dysfunctional schema’ into ‘Sociotropic’ and 
‘Autonomous’ forms, hypothetical examples of the operations of which are provided by 
Sacco & Beck (1995) and are schematised in figures 2F and 2G.  
64 
 
People with sociotropic schemata are, Beck suggests, prone to value closeness, 
acceptance, dependency and sharing; dysfunctionality in these cases is activated by such 
stressors as social deprivation and rejection. People with autonomous schemata, 
meanwhile, are thought to value independent functioning, mobility, choice and 
achievement; their dysfunctionality is operationalised by such stressors as failure and 
immobilisation. Within these general parameters exist far more specific patterns of 
vulnerability to depressive disorder, which are evident on a case-by-case basis. This 
specific vulnerability model, Sacco & Beck claim, helps explicate the relatively weak 
direct relationship persistently found by cognitive psychologists between generalised life 
stressors and depressive disorder. The absence of a specific stressor from the 
environment of a depressively-predisposed individual will result in the continued latency 
of negative cognitive schemata. Moreover, Beck et al (1988) argue that both real and 
symbolic losses and threats to autonomy can precipitate reactive depression, and that this 
depression in turn has a powerful effect on the social environment of the individual 
which can provoke further interpersonal stressors in a spiral effect. Sacco & Dunn (1990) 
suggest, further, that such interpersonal reactions themselves may be mediated by 
cognitive processes. As Beck & Sacco (1995) elaborate, 
 
‘..acquaintances and spouses of depressed persons are more likely to attribute the failures 
of depressed (relative to non-depressed) persons/spouses to internal, stable, global and 
controllable factors.’ (Beck & Sacco, 1995:331) 
 
Following from Sacco et al (1993), they illustrate and expatiate as such: 
 
‘[R]ecent evidence suggests that marital dissatisfaction in marriages with a depressed 
partner may be reflecting, in part, an underlying negative cognitive bias in perceptions of 
the depressed person…This bias is also found among mental health professionals (Jenkins, 
Hall & Sacco, 1991). Cognitive theory and therapy thus recognize the role of interpersonal 
processes in depression, but underscore the importance of cognitive processes in 
determining interpersonal reactions.’ (Ibid..) 
  
It is stressed that positive interpersonal relations can counteract the depressive’s innate 
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self-critical tendencies (Beck et al, 1979), but only where the depressive perceives these 
interactions and relationships to be positive. In may cases, depressives render themselves 
impervious to counter-schematic (positive) environmental feedback (Kovacs & Beck, 
1978) by mis-perceiving objectively positive interaction itself as negative in some way. 
In these terms, Beck’s cognitive theory of Major Depression lays claim to the successful 
incorporation of both social/interpersonal and ‘essential’ concerns into one frame for the 
understanding of the condition, though clearly assigns determining primacy to the latter. 
 As previously mentioned, while the corpus of work produced by, and directly 
influenced by, Beck and colleagues is by some margin the most well known application 
of cognitive psychology to the phenomenon of Major Depression, there are a number of 
other cognitive approaches that  have at least some contemporary clinical relevance24. As 
Segal and Gemar (1997) maintain, however, all cognitive accounts of the condition are 
similar in that they stress the centrality of interconnected cognitive content in the thought 
patterns often witnessed in depressed individuals. 
 
‘These cognitive features are seen as arising not simply from negative mood per se, or 
from a generally greater accessibility of negatively valenced cognitive concepts. Rather, 
the individual’s experience with specific negative material determines the way in which 
this information is interrelated and interacts, and it is this interconnectedness among 
specific negative material which contributes to the disturbances of mood and thought that 
characterise depression.’ (Segal & Gemar, 1997:502) 
 
Comprehensive summaries of all contemporary cognitive models of Major Depression 
can be found in Gotlib & Hammen (1996) and will not be listed here. To demonstrate the 
fundamental similarities and differences in detail, however, there follows a brief 
interrogation of what is probably, after Beck’s model, the most famous cognitive account 
of the condition. The ‘learned helplessness’ model, originally formulated by Seligman 
(1975), is based upon the proposal that depressives are subject to the background belief 
that responding and reinforcement are independent of each other. The groundings of the 
theory first appeared in 1967 when Seligman and Maier discovered that dogs which had 
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been pre-treated with ‘inescapable shock’ were subsequently less adept at shock-
avoiding tasks than dogs pre-treated with ‘escapable shock’ or no shock at all, and 
indeed would rarely even initiate attempts to avoid shocks. It was concluded that helpless 
behaviour could thus be learned through exposure to inescapable shock, that is to say that 
deficits in response initiation and failure to understand that active response produces 
reinforcement (‘learned helplessness’) could be acquired through experience. 
 
‘Seligman claimed that learned helplessness could be produced in a variety of situations, 
with different types of uncontrollable events, and across a number of species...Seligman 
suggested that these symptoms [of learned helplessness] are evident in depression as well, 
and advanced the model of learned helplessness as an analog of this disorder, arguing that 
learned helplessness and depression have “parallel” etiology, symptoms, treatments and 
prevention.’ (Gotlib & Hammen, 1996:78) 
 
The inability of the basic theory to account for many of the symptoms of Major 
Depression in actual human subjects (particularly loss of self-esteem) or for trans-
situational generality of the condition, or even for individual differences in episode 
duration, however, led to a number of re-formulations. The most influential of these 
remains that outlined by Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) which added 
concerns of perception, attribution and expectation to the core explanatory field, and 
divided the meta-theme of ‘uncontrollability’ of situation into three separate dimensions 
(internal versus external locus of control, stable versus unstable conditions and global 
versus specific attributions of uncontrollability25) each of which was postulated to be 
related to specific elements of the depressive experience. The generality and chronicity 
of the condition, and its effect on self-esteem, are, in this account, determined by the 
causal attributions made by the individual regarding why she/he is in a position of 
helplessness. Furthermore, and to simplify somewhat, an individual predisposed to 
depression is prone to exhibit tendencies to consistently attribute negative outcomes to 
internal, stable and global factors across a range of contexts. Such a ‘depressogenic 
attributional style’ (a collection of negative attributional tendencies) is taken to be a 
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stable trait, once again rooted in childhood experience: a primary presumption made by 
depressed individuals is that, because early events in their lives were beyond their 
control, thus also will be future events. Also, though to a lesser extent, depression-prone 
individuals are likely to attribute positive outcomes to external, specific and unstable 
causes (Peterson & Seligman, 1984).  
 
2.4.2. Cognition and Depression: Identification and Assessment. 
Cognitive psychology offers more systematic and consistent methods for the 
identification of Major Depression than either psychoanalysis or behavioural psychology. 
The most famous of these, and one of the most widely used self-report methods of 
assessing the condition in modern clinical practice, is the Beck Depression Inventory 
(BDI) originally developed in 1961 by Beck, Ward, Mendelsohn, Mock and Erbaugh. 
The BDI was initially conceived as an interviewer-assisted diagnostic schedule 
consisting of 21 items, each with four possible response choices. It rapidly evolved into a 
self-report questionnaire, however, though the basic structure remained the same, as 
shown in figure 2H (overleaf). 
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The response choices are scored from 0 to 3, with 0 representing a neutral choice and 3 
the maximum level of symptom severity. The sum of the scores represents the BDI total 
score. Of a maximum 63, a BDI total of 0-9 generally indicates a non-depressed state, 
10-18 a mild level of depression, 19-30 a moderate depression and 30-63 a severe state 
(Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988). It is important to add that these transition lines from one 
A. I do not feel sad 
I feel sad 
I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it 
I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it 
0 
1 
2 
3 
L. I have not lost interest in other people  
I am less interested in other people than I used to 
be  
I have lost most of my interest in other people  
I have lost all of my interest in other people  
0 
 
1 
2 
3 
B. I am not particularly discouraged about the future 
I feel discouraged about the future 
I feel I have nothing to look forward to 
I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot 
improve 
0 
1 
2 
 
3 
M. I make decisions about as well as I ever could 
I put off making decisions more than I used to  
I have greater difficulty in making decisions than 
before  
I can't make decisions at all anymore  
0 
1 
 
2 
3 
C. I do not feel like a failure 
I feel I have failed more than the average person 
As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures 
I feel I am a complete failure as a person 
0 
1 
 
2 
3 
N. I don't feel I look any worse than I used to 
I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive 
I feel that there are permanent changes in my 
appearance that make me look unattractive  
I believe that I look ugly  
0 
1 
 
2 
3 
D. I get as much satisfaction off of things as I used to 
I don't enjoy things the way I used to 
I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore 
I am dissatisfied or bored with everything 
0 
1 
2 
3 
O. I can work about as well as before  
It takes an extra effort to get started at doing 
something  
I have to push myself very hard to do anything  
I can't do any work at all  
0 
 
1 
2 
3 
E. I don't feel particularly guilty  
I feel guilty a good part of the time  
I feel quite guilty most of the time  
I feel guilty all of the time  
0 
1 
2 
3 
P. I can sleep as well as usual  
I don't sleep as well as I used to 
I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it 
hard to get back to sleep  
I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and 
cannot get back to sleep  
0 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
F. I don't feel I am being punished  
I feel I may be punished  
I expect to be punished  
I feel I am being punished  
0 
1 
2 
3 
Q. I don't get more tired than usual  
I get tired more easily than I used to  
I get tired from doing almost anything  
I am too tired to do anything  
0 
1 
2 
3 
G. I don't feel disappointed in myself  
I am disappointed in myself  
I am disgusted with myself  
I hate myself 
0 
1 
2 
3 
R. My appetite is no worse than usual  
My appetite is not as good as it used to be  
My appetite is much worse now  
I have no appetite at all anymore  
0 
1 
2 
3 
H. I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else  
I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes  
I blame myself all the time for my faults  
I blame myself for everything bad that happens  
0 
1 
 
2 
3 
S. I haven't lost much weight, if any lately  
I have lost more than 5 pounds  
I have lost more than 10 pounds 
I have lost more than 15 pounds  
I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less. 
0 
1 
2 
3 
Y/N 
I. I don't have any thoughts of killing myself  
I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry 
them out  
I would like to kill myself  
I would kill myself if I had the chance 
0 
 
1 
2 
3 
T. I am no more worried about my health than usual  
I am worried about physical problems such as 
aches and pains; or upset stomach; or constipation  
I am very worried about physical problems and it's 
hard to think of much else  
I am so worried about my physical problems that I 
cannot think about anything else  
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
J. I don't cry anymore than usual  
I cry more now than I used to  
I cry all the time now  
I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though 
I want to  
0 
1 
2 
 
3 
U. I have not notices any recent change in my interest 
in sex  
I am less interested in sex than I used to be  
I am much less interested in sex now  
I have lost interest in sex completely  
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
K. I am no more irritated now than I ever am  
I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to  
I feel irritated all the time now  
I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate 
me  
0 
1 
2 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2H: THE BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY. 
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severity of depression to another were neither designed to be, nor should be treated as, 
fixed or determinate. As Gotlib & Hammen (1996) highlight, the BDI was not really 
constructed to yield a discrete diagnosis of Major Depression; 
 
‘….rather it was constructed to measure depression as one single dimension of 
psychopathology that cuts across a wide variety of diagnostic categories. Its major focus, 
therefore, is on the depth or severity of depressive symptomatology, essentially defined by 
the number, frequency and intensity of symptoms. Defining a subject group as “depressed” 
on the basis of scores above 9 or higher, would be an inappropriate use of the scale if the 
implication is that such a group is diagnosed depressed...the term depressed as applied to 
high scoring research subjects should be replaced by the term “dysphoric” to describe 
subjects whose diagnostic status has not been established by clinical means using 
diagnostic criteria.’ (Gotlib & Hammen, 1996:94) 
 
The BDI and its subsequent reformulations (particularly the BDI-II, Beck, 1996) have 
been immensely influential in both psychology and clinical practice, despite occasionally 
contradictory evidence regarding its effectiveness.  
 
2.4.3. Cognition and Depression: Commentary. 
The cognitive psychological account of depression outlined above is particularly 
interesting in that it represents a fairly clear attempt to integrate the psychological 
concerns of psychoanalysis, the environmental/physical concerns of behaviourism and 
the practical, ‘scientific’ applicability of the biological psychiatry that shapes the DSM-
IV. Like Freud, but contra Skinner, Beck and the other cognitivists discussed in this 
section do not treat ‘mental’ states and processes as inaccessible or opaque to an analyst, 
or an individual as a ‘hardwired’ stimulus-response unit; we are instead presented with a 
model of human psychology grounded in the metaphor of ‘computation’ and an image of 
the individual human being as an ‘information processor’ (Edwards, 1997). This 
difference in focus is not to say, however, that the cognitive psychology of depression is 
therefore a wholly different enterprise to the behaviourist account outlined in section 2.3. 
As Derek Edwards writes of cognitive psychology on the whole,   
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‘…it replaces non-mentalism with mentalism, [but] retains the mechanistic notion of mind 
as an input-output conversion device, where the path between input and output is traced as 
information flow rather than S-R connections.’ (Edwards, 1997:28) 
 
This process can be clearly observed in the account of depression above; 
negative/global/rigid intrapsychic schemata dysfunctionally administer the flow of 
sensory data acquired from the outside world, distorting perception, and the individual 
then acts on this ‘bad’ information to produce behaviours which are depressive in 
character. These schemata (like the Freudian unconscious) are ultimately invisible, but 
are hypothesised from the effects of their operation as seen in an individual’s physical 
and linguistic representations of ‘what is going on’, hypotheses which can be 
‘experimentally’ tested and verified against other cases with comparable circumstances.  
 
Beck’s programme for the study of depression shares, thus, the problematic and outdated 
‘metaphysics of the mind’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Harré & Gillett, 1994; Edwards, 
1997) with both psychoanalytic and behaviourist accounts of the condition, which is to 
say that it is transparently Cartesian in nature, taking for granted a set of healthy/deviant 
‘in the head’ processes that underpin and control ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ functioning in 
relation to a solid, ‘real’ and measurable world. Crucially, these processes are individual 
in nature; as Tajfel (1981) highlights, however, this treatment of the social world as mere 
‘information’ to be processed (‘properly’ or ‘improperly’) by the singular mind does 
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FIGURE 2I: COGNITIVE CARTESIANISM. 
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little justice to the complex organisation of societies, cultures and groups. Even in a case 
where an attempt is made at incorporation of social and interpersonal concerns into a 
frame for the understanding of depression, these foundational problems remain. Beck et 
al (1979), to reiterate a previous example, acknowledge that positive social interaction is 
healthy therapy for a depressive only where the depressive perceives these interactions 
and relationships to be positive. They claim that depressives may render themselves 
impervious to counter-schematic (positive) environmental feedback through the 
misperception of positive interaction as actually being negative in some way. This claim, 
however, requires a definition of interaction which is ‘actually’ positive, and, moreover, 
should be treated as positive. Such a definition can only be determined by an analyst 
(whose own perceptions are taken to be roundly undistorted) according to a set of 
culturally-specific common-sense and, indeed, moral assumptions. It also presupposes, 
given that the ‘external’ world is ‘external’, that all categories with which an individual 
operates are matters of perception (with primacy accorded to the perceiver, rather than 
the category) and thus all physical and social categories, such as those used in the BDI, 
are seen to be initially cognitive categories (Leyens & Codol, 1988), returning us to the 
problem of individualistic theorising. All social activity (people, roles, self) is reduced to 
representations within the head of an individual. Little attempt is made in any cognitive 
account of depression, or any cognitive psychology for that matter, to explore how 
schemata may be shared in common by active social individuals. Derek Edwards (1997) 
summarises the operational problems with such reductionism thus, 
 
‘Cognition and reality are like two sides of a coin. If we want to know about cognition, we 
need to take account of the world, hold reality constant and vary it systematically, so that 
we can discern the workings of the mind. If we want to know about reality, it is cognition 
and other human foibles that have to held constant or under control. We have to assure 
ourselves that we are not deluded, mistaken or misinformed, seeing what we expect or 
want to see, and this may require systematic methods for countering the vagaries of the 
mind…The interesting thing, of course, is what happens when we consider any such 
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purchase on non-psychological reality to be itself a product of human perceptions, 
artefacts, practices and accounts.’ (Edwards, 1997:10) [Original Emphasis] 
 
How do we know that the analyst’s interpretation of the environment is ‘better’ than that 
of the individual being studied? Equally, how can we hold reality ‘constant’? Moreover, 
where does the cognitive assertion that we represent the external world internally in 
micro form – which is to say that we generate pictures in our heads - actually take us 
analytically? Crucially, all it actually implies is that we set up a reproduced internal 
version of a problem with which we started, while providing no actual insight to how it is 
that people actually go about understanding and solving it (Wittgenstein, 1953; 
Widdecombe & Woofitt, 1995; Edwards, 1997). Related to this is another reduction, that 
of the words people use to ‘representations of representations’: (falsifiable) reproductions 
of what is really going on in the head of the individual. Beck & Emery with Greenberg 
(1985) explicitly advocate this mode of understanding when recommending the 
‘downward arrow’ therapeutic technique of ‘belief modification’. 
 
‘The client is asked: “Why would this (negative) event be so upsetting to you?” or “What 
is the meaning of this (negative) event to you?” The therapist repeats the same question in 
response to each answer, in an attempt to ascertain the underlying belief that creates the 
event’s importance. The sequence generally progresses to a more fundamental conviction 
held by the client.’ (Sacco & Beck, 1995:339) [Emphasis Added] 
 
As John Heritage (1984a) summarises, this representational dogma is grounded in a view 
which has a long-standing influence within the social sciences.  
 
‘Within this view, the meaning of a word is what it references, corresponds with, or stands 
for in the real world. Within this view, the function of sentences is to express propositions, 
preferably true ones, about the world...this essentially pre-Wittgensteinian view of 
language has remained a tacit assumption for generations of social scientists..’ (Heritage, 
1984:137) 
 
There is a powerful philosophical critique of this approach grounded in the work of 
Wittgenstein (1953). The single most vital point is, as Wittgenstein himself maintained, 
that internal processes require external criteria to have any sense at all. To phrase it 
candidly, all of our descriptive powers are entirely reliant on a socially acquired capacity, 
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language, and without this capacity any speculation upon ‘cognition’ is rendered 
impotent from the outset. The relationship that ‘mental’ states and processes have with 
language is thus not problematised, in much contemporary psychology, by the potential 
‘truth’ or ‘falsehood’ of a statement regarding semi-permanent ‘attitudes’ or ‘beliefs’, far 
from it; such problems and their attendant ‘solutions’ are flawed by the basic lack of 
realisation that the relationship between mind-state and language is a non-issue. The 
language of the mind is an intersubjectively constituted thing (Coulter, 1979): when a 
person practically speaks or writes about their ‘beliefs’, they are dealing in an active and 
social currency. The cognitive structures can only be hypothesised; the expressed 
language, meanwhile, the intersubjective matrix in which the standard psychological 
categories are realised, is clearly available for description26. In Wittgenstein’s own 
words, 
 
‘The difficulty- I might say- is not that of finding a solution but rather of recognising as the 
solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it...This is connected, I 
believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty 
is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and 
do not try to get beyond it.’ (Wittgenstein, 1981:244) 
 
In the simplest possible terms, cognitive psychology is based on a model whereby the 
mind represents the world to itself, and words and other actions then represent the mind 
to the world. Notwithstanding the criticisms already levelled at these two stages, the 
overall representational reductionism inherent in the theory of depression presents us 
with an insurmountable contradiction when one considers cultural variation (Bowers, 
1998). On the one hand, Beck and colleagues want us to acknowledge that people’s 
assertions relating to their beliefs, for example, stand for hard cognitive structures, and 
can be assessed against reasonable standards of rationality/irrationality. On the other, 
they endeavour to generate a transsituational definition and framework for the 
understanding of depression as a disruption of these structures. If, however, a statement 
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relating to beliefs does directly represent an underlying structure, then the variations in 
vocabulary across cultures must indicate a massive variety of different types of cognitive 
structure, not the universals suggested in the works discussed above, and as such 
‘depression’ must take an equally large number of different forms. No universal 
cognitive explanatory framework can thus be posited which will actually overlay this 
divergence. Echoing the Wittgensteinian concerns articulated above, Len Bowers (1998) 
argues that the target for analysis in the light of this cultural critique can no longer be 
imagined cognitive structures, but the actual words which have been thought to represent 
them.  
 
‘…these words do not stand for some sort of mentalistic cognitive structure, but describe 
complex, logically organised human behaviour; they are part and parcel of human 
activities and therefore eminently translatable. Moreover, it is these human activities which 
are universal, not some posited cognitive entity. Wherever one goes in the world, human 
beings believe, think and feel, however different the vocabularies and grammars that form 
part of those actions.’ (Bowers, 1998:64) 
 
Or in other words, the only way to get a genuine grasp of the ways that people 
experience and deal with depression is to explore the complex methods which people 
actually (and variably) use to orient to it, against an equally complex background of 
human activity (Harré & Gillett, 1994). A number of cross-cultural studies of depression 
(see Schieffelin, 1985) have demonstrated that while the collections of experiences in 
terms of which we have come to understand depression (unhappiness, withdrawal from 
social groups, frustration) appear to be significant cultural commonalities, the 
understanding of them in terms of illness or deviance most definitely does not. 
Obeyesekere (1985), for example, reports how the Buddhists of Sri Lanka locate 
behaviours which in Western clinical frameworks would be understood as ‘depressive’ in 
character within a religious structure that regards the key feature of life to be the 
experience of suffering. As such to be withdrawn and to be frustrated are seen as entirely 
normal and indeed laudable features of the human experience, and expressions of 
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happiness or satisfaction are, in fact, ‘deviant’ in character. Such observations serve to 
definitively undermine any attempt to posit a universal psychopathology of depression 
grounded in cognitive structures.  
In summary, the cognitive account of depression discussed here acknowledges 
the importance of an individual’s knowledge and experience of the world in the 
understanding of human activity, and also acknowledges the key role of environment in 
structuring action. Its reduction of such knowledge to individualistic cognitive 
categories, however, and environment to a variable which modifies these categories, 
renders it vulnerable to the same key criticisms which have been previously advanced in 
relation to biological psychiatry, psychoanalysis and behaviourism. 
 
2.5. MAJOR DEPRESSION, PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
‘Wittgenstein likened words to collections of tools in a tool-box, or to the different 
controls of a locomotive. By using this analogy he was asserting that words have a 
variety of different uses and functions, despite their overall similarity of appearances. 
Words enter into and are crucial parts of human activities or practices. Similarly the 
words ‘mental illness’ are a part and parcel of a variety of formal and informal 
activities, and like a tool they can be used in various ways.’ 
Len Bowers 
“The Social Nature of Mental Illness” 27 
 
While the four approaches to the phenomenon of Major Depression discussed in this 
chapter have demonstrated significant divergences in their theoretical structures for the 
understanding of the condition, the commentaries have identified a number of key 
problems common to them all. Reflecting upon the relative manners of locating the 
condition and its symptoms and causes, as schematised in figure 2J, makes this 
unambiguous. All four approaches locate depression within the individual; the symptoms 
are seen to be either of psychological or physiological character (of ‘mind’ or of ‘matter’) 
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FIGURE 2J: LOCATING MAJOR DEPRESSION. 
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or both, and the aetiologies attribute causality to matter or mind (or both), individual or 
society (or both).  
 
What is abundantly clear, before any operational issues can even begin to be addressed, 
is that the approaches work from a highly problematic Cartesian dualism; the 
individualistic focus they share has already been discussed in some detail. To summarise, 
however; 
 
• Cartesianism invariably leads to the ‘doping’ of individuals; they are understood 
to be slaves to the forces of deviant ‘internal’ drives (psychoanalysis, DSM), 
dysfunctional ‘environmental’ imperatives (behaviourism) or both (cognitivism).  
• The human beings being studied are, as such, seen to be subjective, imperfect, 
partial or even liars (Silverman, 1997). The words they speak are seen to be 
transparently meaningful of something other than the uses to which they are 
being put in specific conversations (Heritage, 1984a). 
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• The very act of theorising is thus, in turn, based on the assumption that the GP, 
psychiatrist or psychologist can be immune to the biases and subjective 
distortions from which the ‘depressive’ suffers and can also know more of the 
life and ‘mind’ of the individual than the individual in question (Harré & Gillett, 
1994). 
• This encourages the representation of people as little more than ‘depressives’ - 
mere evidence of combinations of predefined ‘problem’ variables (Silverman. 
1997) rather than active participants in their own lives.  
• The Cartesian model of the human being gives us no insight into how people 
actually operate in the social world, and thus theories based upon it cannot 
explain human social behaviour. 
 
The problems herein are neatly collected by Craig Calhoun, who argues that:  
 
‘[I]f positive, unitary identity is a form of violence against difference, so absolutized 
differences are a form of violence against intersubjectivity..’ (1992:278) 
 
What is abundantly clear from this review is that decontextualised (that is to say 
medical/scientific) notions of a normal or abnormal, functioning or nonfunctioning 
individual are hugely problematised by the observation that the mind and the body are, in 
all cases, oppositional categories in culture alone. The key question thus becomes: how 
is it possible to explore the meanings of depression without reproducing the 
underpinning assumptions that render problematic the accounts thus far detailed?  
In sum, the generation of abstracted definitions of depression does little to 
explain behaviour in concrete contexts of social action, in a primary care consultation for 
example, because while it could be (at a stretch) argued that these definitions 
homogeneously inform the activity of GPs, it is rather less likely that they inform the 
activity of patients in the same way. The meanings that inform human activity are not 
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intransigent and abstract, but highly flexible and actualised in specific contexts 
(Garfinkel, 1967). If this were not the case, all consultations in which a case of 
depression is diagnosed would be, effectively, identical. To begin exploring alternatives 
to individualistically-oriented models reviewed in this chapter, I will now turn to the 
other branch of social science that has paid significant attention to the phenomenon of 
mental illness over the last century; the discipline of Sociology. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Individual, Society and Mental Illness: 
A Critical Review of Sociologies of (Mental) Health and Medicine 
‘I believe that one cannot understand psychological disturbances from the outside, on 
the basis of a positivistic determinism, or reconstruct them with a combination of 
concepts that remain outside the illness as lived and experienced.’ 
Jean-Paul Sartre28 
 “Reason & Violence” 
 
While there has been, historically, a substantial and varied corpus of work in the social 
sciences relating to the study of illness and ‘mental illness’ in society in general, the 
contribution of sociology to the understanding of why it is that individuals become 
mentally ill has been (and remains) frequently epidemiological in character. As Busfield 
(2001) narrates: 
 
‘In the 19th century the epidemiological approach, which has its roots in concerns about 
public health, was applied by asylum doctors, neurologists and alienists, as well as 
Commissioners in Lunacy, to examine and comment upon the distribution of insanity 
across populations…In the 20th century advances in epidemiology, including the use of 
more sophisticated statistical ideas, greater awareness of the processes of selection, and 
surveys of broader groups of the population, were extended to psychiatric epidemiology in 
which sociologists played an important part.’ (Busfield, 2001:6) 
 
The work of such luminaries as Faris and Dunham (1939), Hollingshead and Redlich 
(1958) and Brown and Tirril (1978) represents a strong tradition in which incidences of 
mental illness are explored in terms of their distributions across populations in relation to 
patterns of class, gender, race and other social-structural variables. This tradition, though 
alive and well today, is not one to be examined here. While sociological-epidemiological 
studies often provide insights wholly absent from individualistically-oriented studies, 
they are, broadly speaking, premised on a simple acceptance of medical 
definitions/diagnoses of mental illnesses, and only go as far as to grant primacy to grand 
social contexts above factors more ‘internal’ to the individual. They are instrumental, 
thus, in the production and justification of hard quantitative aetiologies for (mental) 
illnesses on the wide scale. In this sense they share an openly Cartesian ontology with the 
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approaches outlined in Chapter 2, and are vulnerable to the same critique relating to 
determinism and the problematic ‘mental’/‘physical’ binary. The studies explored in this 
chapter are, instead, a number of classic sociological works that attempt, or at least 
profess, to respecify the very understanding of the core relations between people, society 
and the phenomenon of ‘mental illness’ in such a way as to provide genuinely alternative 
understandings of ‘deviant’ human experience to those so far investigated. The particular 
texts reviewed here are selected not as a representation of the entire range of literature on 
the topic; this would be a thesis in itself. Instead, a few works are examined from each of 
the five major strands of sociological thinking which continue to inform, and resonate in, 
the assumptions of sociologists of mental health and illness today (often in ‘hybrid’ 
types). These are: Durkheimianism (section 3.1), Marxism (3.2), functionalism (3.3), 
symbolic interactionism (3.4), post-structuralism (3.5) and phenomenology (3.6). This 
review is by no means exhaustive. The key aim is simply to critically evaluate the core 
assumptions and methods characteristic of each field with a view to gleaning useful 
insights, and setting aside those less useful, for a practical analysis of depression in 
primary care.      
 
3.1. EMILE DURKHEIM: 
FROM ANOMIC SOCIETY TO SUICIDAL BEHAVIOUR. 
The approach taken to mental illness in the earliest sociological works can be clearly 
observed within a brief examination of the very first true sociological study. Emile 
Durkheim’s classic “Suicide” (1897), an immense investigation of the incidences and 
rates of suicide across a number of Western European societies, interestingly takes up a 
frequent and particular focus on the personal ‘disconnectedness’ as which Major 
Depression was frequently represented in the psychiatric and psychological texts 
examined in Chapter 2. The scale and diversity of “Suicide” prohibits an extended 
81 
 
discussion of the text, though for the purposes of this study sufficient it is sufficient  to 
address those themes which are directly relevant to the topic in hand, principally to the 
concept of anomic suicide.  
 
3.1.1. Durkheim: Mental Illness equals Suicide? 
While Durkheim explicitly acknowledged that within an individual psychological 
constitution there might well exist a tendency, be it a normal or a pathological tendency, 
which could predispose a person to suicide he was keen to dismiss any such tendency as 
a probable, direct and singular factor in the actual act of suicide. There were, however, at 
the time, two powerful accredited knowledges relating to the link between mental illness 
and suicide that it was necessary for Durkheim to undermine in order for his own project 
to succeed:  
 
1. That suicide itself is a special form of mental illness.  
2. That suicide is an inevitable effect or outcome of certain types of mental illness.  
 
Both of these theories are of particular interest here, as in modern medical practice they 
are still highly influential; to recap the relevant proposals of the DSM-IV discussed in the 
last chapter, ‘suicidal ideation’ is seen as a key symptom of Major Depression:  
 
• As such, for an individual to commit suicide, the deliberate act of self-
termination, they must have consciously thought about it. 
• The individual was therefore subject to suicidal ideation,  
• In which case there is an elevated likelihood that, retrospectively, they will be 
seen as having suffered from Major Depression. The diagnostic link between 
Major Depression is not only definite, but reversible. 
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Durkheim’s key aim was, thus, to demonstrate how the phenomenon of suicide could be 
seen as a distinctively social action based on distinctly social causes rather than a 
behaviour mediated by pathological psychiatric states. This was a demonstration which 
required a broad reconceptualisation of the core relations between individuals and 
society.   
 
3.1.2. Durkheim:  A Social Alternative? 
As Douglas (1967) highlights, the theoretical project of “Suicide” is founded upon the 
claim that the internal needs and desires of individual human beings are, in themselves, 
unlimited, but are regulated by a powerful external ‘society’. Humans are reflexive 
entities; they can actively reflect on the conditions of their existence and, as such, they 
can always conceptualise and desire better, more rewarding or fulfilling lives. Because 
an ‘unlimited’ desire cannot be satiated, there must be a force which regulates individual 
passions because, simply, human needs must be sufficiently proportioned to means for 
human social life to function in the regular  and nondisruptive way that it does29. Needs, 
however, do not and cannot self-regulate and, as such, for Durkheim, it is the central task 
of society to play this regulating role30.  
 
‘[Society] is the only moral power superior to the individual, the authority of which he accepts. 
It alone has the power necessary to stipulate law and to set the point beyond which the 
passions must not go.’ (Durkheim, 1897:249) 
 
Under normal circumstances, a healthy society will provide this regulation and thus 
ensure ‘balanced’ (which is to say ‘normal’ or ‘productive’) behaviour in individuals. 
Under exceptional or harrowing circumstances, however, when a society is unbalanced 
by abrupt structural transformations (be they painful or favourable) it can no longer 
adequately regulate human passions and behaviours. This is a state of anomie. Durkheim 
thus employs the concept of societal anomie as one means of explaining differences in 
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suicide rates in different societies31; the variations in suicide rates that occur whenever 
there is an abrupt disturbance in society can be explained by the acute form of anomie. 
Durkheim singles out the sphere of trade and industry (at the time he was writing) as one 
in which anomie is a chronic phenomenon.  
  
‘For a whole century, economic progress has mainly consisted in freeing industrial relations 
from all regulation...’ (Durkheim, 1897:254) 
  
And as such, 
 
‘…the state of crisis and anomie is constant and, so to speak, normal. From top to bottom of 
the ladder greed is aroused without knowing where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can 
calm it…since its goal is far beyond all it can attain.’ (Durkheim, 1897:256) 
 
Chronic anomie in the sphere of trade and industry, Durkheim argues, is a far more 
compelling and substantiable explanation of the high rates of suicide as a regular, 
constant factor among people involved in business than ‘suicidal insanity’. Classifying 
suicidal insanity as a ‘monomania’, a form of mental illness limited to a single act or 
object, he notes that no single, incontestable case of such an illness had ever been shown 
to exist in the history of medicine. Furthermore, Durkheim demonstrates how anomie is 
not in any way limited to public zones of social life, and can have a profound effect in 
the domestic sphere, afflicting those who have experienced separation and divorce32.  
The correlation between failed marriage and suicide was already one frequently 
made at Durkheim’s time, but the popular explanation (that a divorced couple is likely to 
be composed of a pair of individuals with psychological flaws, who are also more liable 
to suicidal behaviour33) was anathema to Durkheim’s way of thinking. Characteristically, 
thus, any such individual-oriented, psychological explanatory mechanisms for suicide 
(and, indeed,  divorce) are rejected, and Durkheim instead argues that in order to fully 
understand suicide in the aftermath of divorce it is necessary for a researcher to focus on 
the essentially social natures of marriage and divorce themselves (Jones, 1986). Marriage 
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is to be understood as society’s moral means of regulating physical instinct, and also as a 
functionally constructive institution dedicated to the management of certain feelings 
which, through evolution, have become complicated by sexuality and desire. As a 
consequence of the way that the social human has evolved, aesthetic inclinations have 
come to be progressively detached from biological necessity; as such, the scope of desire 
has become potentially infinite. Marriage, in the monogamous sense, is society’s means 
of limiting this desire to reasonable levels, enabling the individual to ‘function’ normally. 
 
‘For by forcing a man to attach himself forever to the same woman, it assigns a strictly definite 
object to the need for love, and closes the horizon.’ (Durkheim, 1897:270)  
 
Divorce, in these terms, can thus be understood as an abrupt weakening of a powerful 
moral system of regulation which, as a consequence, allows the desires to run out of 
control and become frustrated34, thus leading to suicidal behaviour. This assertion was 
borne out by the consistently high suicide rates in societies where divorce was a more 
‘permissible’ practice (Jones, 1986). 
Using the concept of anomie, Durkheim is thus able to discredit the first of the 
problematic theories relating to the link between suicide and mental illness; that suicide 
is itself a mental illness of a type. He suggests, in many senses, that suicide is in fact a 
quasi ‘rational’ act in response to given social conditions. The second of the theories, 
meanwhile, that suicide is an effect or outcome of certain types of mental illness, he 
rejects on the grounds that all suicides committed by people who are actually ‘insane’ are 
either devoid of deliberation and motive altogether35, or based on motives that are 
hallucinatory in nature. Many actual suicides, conversely, 
 
‘…[are] doubly identifiable as being deliberate and springing from representations involved in 
this deliberation which are not purely hallucinatory.’ (Durkheim, 1897:129)  
 
As regards less severe ‘psychopathic’ conditions, such as neurasthenia and alcoholism 
which were at the time recurrently linked to suicide, Durkheim argues that there are no 
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societies in his research in which the suicide rate bore any definite relation to the rates of 
neurasthenia and, as such, any association made between the two is speculative at best. 
Alcoholism, meanwhile, he discards by showing that the geographical distributions of 
both alcohol consumption and prosecutions for alcoholism bear no relation to that of 
suicides. 
 
3.1.3. Durkheim: Commentary. 
In summary, then, Durkheim locates ‘psychopathic’ states within the individual, as do 
the psychological/psychiatric accounts explored previously. Contrastively, however, he 
preserves a strong scepticism relating to the capacity of such states of being to actually 
compel social action, thus breaking the incorrigible link between mental illness and 
‘deviant’ behaviour. Mental illness interior to an individual may predispose them to 
commit suicide, but it is never alone a sufficient cause of the permanence and variability 
of suicide rates; rather, anomie in the social world forces the need to withdraw from this 
world at the individual level (effectively isolating the self). In short, a disconnection 
takes place, much as it does for Georg Simmel’s ‘Stranger’ (Frisby & Featherstone, 
1997), and it is this social disconnection that is ultimately responsible for ‘deviant’ 
phenomena such as suicide. What is interesting is that Durkheim, in his refusal to deny 
individual motivation as a contributing factor in determining the act of suicide, escapes 
many of the accusations of ‘determinism’ leveled at his theory. While the ‘suicidogenic’ 
current in any society is to be regarded as wholly autonomous of individual 
psychologies, it only determined the rate of suicide occurrences, not the specific 
individuals who would commit suicide. Consequently a component of ‘free will’ 
underpins his assertions relating to deviant behaviour that is absent from many of the 
psychological accounts in circulation at the time, and remains absent in many of the 
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psychiatric and psychological accounts discussed in Chapter 2. Equally, in “The Rules of 
Sociological Method” (1938) he explicitly argues of deviant activity that 
 
‘What confers this [deviant] character upon them is not the intrinsic quality of a given act, 
but the definition that the collective conscience lends them.’ (Durkheim, 1938:70) 
 
In total, his approach enables us to assert that: 
 
• The rules that define ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ mental functioning vary with the 
values of the social group. They are thus relative in character. 
• The application of rules contains, necessarily, a component of social control. 
• These rules are necessary for the cohesion of society.  
 
Adopting a form of moral relativism, and opening up a line of argument strongly echoed 
in the work of the symbolic interactionists36, he thus demonstrates how his fundamental 
conceptualisation of ‘deviant’ activity is not quite as rigidly proto-functionalist as it may 
at times seem. There are, however, a number of criticisms of Durkheim’s work that are 
not so easily deflected.  
The typologies of suicide that Durkheim postulates presuppose the validity of the 
explanations ultimately proposed for them, which does not serve to undermine his 
arguments entirely but rather to make it possible to entertain other causal mechanisms 
with which Durkheim may not have agreed (Jones, 1986). Furthermore, there is a social 
and cultural inflexibility in his core social hypothesis which actually seems to raise more 
questions than it answers, opening up something of a Pandora’s Box. Durkheim posits 
that under normal circumstances, a healthy society will provide moral regulation (in the 
form of appropriate roles and goals) and thus ensure ‘balanced’ behaviour in individuals. 
Breakdowns in this regulation impair socio-psychological health and cause rises in the 
suicide rate. However, as Robert Alun Jones (1986) asks,   
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‘Aren't there different kinds of "social goals and rules," for example, and aren't some of 
these dis-harmonious? What is socio-psychological "health"? Isn't it socially determined, 
and thus relative to the particular society or historical period in question?...Aren't some of 
our most disruptive drives socially generated? And if they are, aren't they also culturally 
relative?’ (Jones, 1986:114) 
 
Finally, Harvey Sacks (1963) attacks Durkheim for taking it for granted, on the basis of 
tacit commonsense reasoning, that the concept of suicide is a hard social ‘reality’ which 
people understand, and respond to, universally rather than seeing ‘suicide’ as a flexible 
category of naturally-occurring language. The problem with working from an ostensive 
definition of the core phenomenon is, for Sacks, that the concept is then loaded with 
culturally specific assumptions relating to its character that go largely unexplained or 
undescribed which, in turn, 
 
‘…leads to a variety of practical problems, such as, for example, explaining particular 
suicides or explaining the variety of suicide rates..[which]..is to suppose that it is obvious 
that events occur which sociologists should consider ‘really’ suicide…’ (Sacks, 1963:8, note 
8) 
 
Sacks points, instead, to the manner in which sociology, in order to properly describe 
social life, is faced with the preliminary problem of providing a proper analysis of how it 
is that cases of the category itself are ‘assembled’ in everyday life. What is needed, rather 
than premature causal explanations of suicide (be they in terms of mental illness or social 
precipitation) is 
 
‘An investigation of how it is that a decision that a suicide occurred is assembled, and an 
investigation of how an object must be conceived in order to talk of it as ‘committing 
suicide’..’ (Sacks, 1963:8, note 8) 
 
As such, without proper reflection on the categories involved, the sociological analysis of 
such concepts as ‘suicide’ and ‘mental illness’, and any links between them, is rendered 
impotent as an enterprise. This radical argument will buttress the remainder of this 
critical chapter, and the use of ostensive, undescribed categories as definitions will be 
shown to be a persistent flaw in virtually all classic sociologies of (mental) illness. This 
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can be as clearly seen in the work of Durkheim as it can in the, very different, conflict-
oriented neo-Marxist work of Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm. 
 
3.2. MARCUSE, FROMM AND NEO-MARXISM: 
MENTAL ILLNESS AS SOCIAL POWER. 
In his classic paper “Aggressiveness in Advanced Industrial Society” (1967), Marcuse 
argues that there is a fundamental difference between a doctor’s capacity to judge 
‘normal functioning’ in the realm of the physical and the realm of the ‘mental’. 
Assessments made regarding the wellness of an individual’s physical condition are 
relatively simple to make and common-sense in nature.  
 
‘The organism functions normally if it functions, without disturbance, in accord with the 
biological and physiological makeup of the human body. The human faculties and 
capabilities are certainly very different among the members of the species, and the species 
itself has changed greatly in the course of its history, but these changes have occurred on a 
biological and physiological basis which has remained largely constant.’ (Marcuse, 
1967:web)  
 
While acknowledging that a physician, when making a physical diagnosis, must take into 
account issues of environment, background and profession37 the basic concept of ‘normal 
physical functioning’ (identical with ‘good health’) remains, both as a touchstone for 
diagnostic criteria and a medical goal, meaningful and clear. Normal is, thus, ‘well’, and 
that which is not normal is identical with ‘diseased’.  
 
3.2.1. Marcuse: Forcing ‘Normality’. 
For Marcuse, the task of a doctor38 when dealing with the ‘normal functioning of the 
mind’, while on the surface defined in a manner similar to the tasks involved in physical 
medicine, contains components that are of an entirely different order altogether. Normal 
functioning of the mind is functioning which enables an individual to perform their usual 
and expected functions and roles in society – familial, professional and recreational. 
89 
 
These functions and roles are of a social character and normality within them is a 
component of society. In these terms, psychological normality is an institutional, rather 
than individual, condition. Marcuse explains the relative cases explicitly thus:     
 
‘It is probably easy to agree on what is the normal functioning of the digestive tract, the 
lungs, and the heart, but what is the normal functioning of the mind in love-making, in other 
interpersonal relations, at work and at leisure, at a meeting of a board of directors, on the 
golf course, in the slums, in prison, in the army? While the normal functioning of the 
digestive tract or the lung is likely to be the same in the case of a healthy corporation 
executive and of a healthy laborer, this does not hold true of their minds. In fact, the one 
would be very abnormal if he regularly thought, felt, and operated like the other. And what 
is "normal" lovemaking, a "normal" family, a "normal" occupation?’ (Marcuse, 1967:web)  
 
There are a number of strategies that the doctor may adopt in attempting to make a 
‘mentally abnormal’ patient function normally. Direct therapy, as in physical medicine 
can be applied; the patient can be shown how to function properly at work or at home, or 
encouraged to make changes to the environment(s) in which they cannot function. There 
are, however, significant sociological problems with such a strategy. What, to use a 
work-related example39, if it is not specific, stressful, temporally-located problems at 
work that are causing mental difficulties, but the very nature of the job itself? What if a 
situation, in its ‘normal’ condition, is forcing abnormality? Under such circumstances, 
making the patient ‘normal’ would be  
 
‘…normalizing the strains and stresses, or to put it more brutally: making him capable of 
being sick, of living his sickness as health, without his noticing that he is sick precisely 
when he sees himself and is seen as healthy and normal.’ (Marcuse, 1967:web)  
 
Some jobs, Marcuse argues, are by their very nature ‘stupefying’. This is not to say that 
such jobs are socially unnecessary, unproductive or even necessarily underpaid, simply 
that the individual in question is incapable of functioning ‘normally’ within them, he or 
she needs more. This notion is not in any sense limited to ‘menial’ employment, and a 
specific example Marcuse thus provides hints at the foundations of his wider theory.  
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 For the ‘tycoons of business’, specific qualities in a person are both required and 
reproduced by the core demands of capitalist industry: efficiency, profitability, 
performance. Such qualities, which Marcuse summarises as ‘..smart ruthlessness, moral 
indifference, and persistent aggressiveness…’ (Marcuse, 1967:web) are, however, not in 
themselves ‘normal human qualities’ for a human being in most areas of life. To function 
‘normally’ in a business career, thus, requires an individual to be more ruthless, amoral 
and aggressive than ‘other people’, which is to say, more so than ‘the norm’. This is an 
expectation which constitutes nothing less than the ‘…distortion and mutilation of a 
human being.’ (Marcuse, 1967:web), the creation of sickness to be labelled as good 
health, while a refusal of these ‘undesirable’ or ‘anti-human’ traits would render an 
individual inappropriate for a ‘high flying’ career – in some sense mentally ‘abnormal’ in 
high society. 
 
3.2.2.  Marcuse and Fromm: A ‘Normal’ Person and an ‘Abnormal’ Society? 
Marcuse draws heavily on his colleague Erich Fromm’s seminal “The Sane Society” 
(1955) in generating a wider set of observations on the interplay between modern society 
and its psychiatric establishment. Fromm, himself echoing Freud, had investigated what 
he termed ‘the pathology of normalcy’, a condition under which people adjusted to a 
system that only served to cut off their full human development. This alienation, he 
argued, could be seen as a social and political problem. The mass society acted, at its 
core, to commodify people, to render an individual's value as a person dependent upon 
economic worth, rather than on human qualities such as love, reason and artistic 
capacity. Moreover, and in direct opposition to most members of the psychological 
profession both then and now, he recommended not individual adjustment to ‘the 
normal’, but a wider social adjustment that would make the normal more human in 
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character. In these terms, he condemns the very shared social norms which Durkheim 
had maintained held society itself together as a ‘healthy’ body.  
 
‘The fact that millions of people share the same vices does not make them virtuous, the fact 
that they share so many errors does not make the errors to be truths, and the fact that 
millions of people share the same forms of mental pathology does not make them sane.’ 
(Fromm, 1955:140) 
 
The ‘abnormal’ mental functioning of an individual, from this point of view, does not 
reflect on the individual in which it is apparently taking place, but rather on society itself. 
It is, as Marcuse (1967) claims, society which is sick, in that its systems of social 
relations, its institutions and structure inhibit the distribution of adequate raw materials 
and intellectual resources to enable full satisfaction of individual human needs. 
Moreover, an individual who does function normally, which is to say adequately, as a 
citizen of such a society is to be regarded sick also. 
 Marcuse adapts Fromm’s ideas to show how in societies which are particularly 
sick, where the gulf between the potential and actual human conditions is greatest, then 
there must be ever more powerful mechanisms in place for maintaining the status quo. 
The key mechanisms lie in what Marcuse terms ‘surplus-repression’, repressive 
components of the everyday social process which assure submission in individuals via 
the introduction of new stresses and strains on their social circumstances relating to job 
loss, ostracism and so forth. In advanced capitalist societies, however, the gulf between 
actual and available resources is so great that effective and systematic control and 
manipulation at the psychological level needs to be introduced. These societies, thus, use 
an oppositional notion of ‘mental health’, ‘..a meta-concept designating (and preserving) 
mental qualities which are tabooed..’ (Marcuse, 1967:web) by the so-called ‘sanity’ of a 
society which is not itself ‘sane’. As Fromm (1955), however, is keen to point out this is 
not an entirely disastrous state of affairs.  
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‘[The] task must be…to recognize that the individual's ideal of normalcy may contradict the 
aim of the full realization of himself as a human being. It is the belief of the progressive 
forces in society that such a realization is possible, that the interest of society and of the 
individual need not be antagonistic forever.’ (Fromm, 1955:235) 
 
The situation can be changed, and psychologists and psychoanalysts have a significant 
part to play if they can wrest psychology itself from the reactionary elements of society. 
 
3.2.3. Marcuse and Fromm: Commentary. 
It can be clearly seen, even from this rather simplistic review of a diverse and complex 
body of work, that the approach to the phenomenon of mental illness shared by Marcuse 
and Fromm differs in many respects to that of Durkheim, and does, indeed, address a 
number of the criticisms leveled at “Suicide”. It shows, for example, how social rules 
and goals are not necessarily homogeneous, constructive and consensual but can be 
variable, oppressive and, indeed, destructive. It also provides a concrete account of the 
concept of psychological health/illness at the base of the theory; it is not interrogated as a 
‘internal’ condition in itself at all, but rather as a descriptive tool in the arsenal of 
(anonymous) power-elites for the medicalisation and manipulation of a populace (in 
terms of their ‘usefulness’ or propensity for dissent) geared at maintaining the status quo. 
This formulation is, however, utterly neglecting of how such conditions are negotiated 
and understood by active participants in real-life situations. A doctor or psychiatrist can, 
from a reading of Marcuse’s work, be considered simply a puppet of the establishment 
passively applying a pre-determined, static and instrumental framework, a patient the 
powerless recipient personality of his/her judgement. Equally Marcuse, in driving a 
substantial wedge between (complex) ‘social’ and (simple) ‘physical’ categories, creates 
a number of practical problems. As Sacks (1963) highlighted in his critique of Durkheim 
described above, suicide is most definitely a ‘physical’ act, but there are still significant 
socially-driven variabilities in assembling cases of the class in everyday life. Likewise, 
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someone is or is not (biologically) HIV positive, but this does not mean that the issues of 
stigma and social control are any less profound or complex. To put it simply, in positing 
a divide between physical/factual and social/moral categories, Marcuse overlooks the 
social and moral implications involved in the assembly of so-called ‘physical’ categories 
themselves. As Bowers (1998) contributes, 
 
‘…diagnoses of toxic, confusional state, organic dementias and epilepsy are all made on the 
basis of socially contexted judgements, yet nobody would dispute that these are 
physiological disorders.’ (Bowers, 1998:19)      
 
Implicit in this dualism is a familiar mind/body separation that is also hard to maintain in 
the contemporary context. As was seen in Chapter 2, most ‘mental illness’ categories 
(including depression) are structurally defined in contemporary medicine in terms of 
both ‘physiological’ and ‘psychological’ symptoms. Marcuse only seems to allow for a 
condition being classed as one or the other. 
 
3.3. TALCOTT PARSONS: 
STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM AND THE ‘SICK ROLE’. 
Issues of power, self interest or conflict between patient and society figured little in the 
work of Talcott Parsons, widely considered to be the first true theorist of medical 
sociology. Parsons drew upon ideas generated chiefly by Durkheim, as well as those of 
American sociologists Lewis Wirth and L.J. Henderson40, in outlining a complete theory 
of illness, medicine and, moreover, illness behaviour as an integrated component of his 
general analysis of “The Social System” (1951).  
The argument central to this theory is that the rules of society are both social and 
moral in character. As for Durkheim, though contra Marcuse and Fromm, Parsons’ 
social order is based on the primary (moral) objective of attaining popular value 
consensus (for the good of all), and the key way of maintaining this order is for the 
members of society to adopt and follow societal roles, norms and values in their actions. 
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Deviation from these roles, norms and values is invariably met with some mode of social 
control. Society’s institutions are, within this framework, to be conceptualised as sub-
units of the wider system which serve to socialize the members of society in apposite 
behaviours. As such, human action in a modern society cannot be seen as determined 
purely by egotism or individual interest41; rather, it takes place within a normative 
framework distinctive to that society which is guided by shared normative standards. For 
example, Parsons argued that in a contemporary capitalist society, to conceptualise the 
doctor-patient relationship in terms of an economic contract would be to ignore the 
function performed by the normative standards instilled through the doctor’s training as a 
doctor in medical institutions. These principles, what we might term ‘professional 
ethics’, are a key component in guiding a doctor’s own actions within medical practice 
(Turner, 1986), and without adequate reflection on them and their role, any scrutiny of 
medical activity would be incomplete.  
 
3.3.1. Parsons: The Role of the Doctor, the Role of the Patient. 
The doctor, through training and experience within relevant institutions, would be 
expected to have acquired a set of special skills and knowledges relating not only to 
medicine (the application of scientific knowledges to specific illnesses) but to the role of 
the medic, the specific relational patterns of role between practitioner and patient. The 
role of ‘doctor’ belongs to a class of ‘professional’ roles with particular expectations and 
responsibilities attached. Like many other ‘professional’ roles it is allied with, and 
esteemed for, the high levels of technical/scientific authority implicated in its 
performance. The predominantly special value of the role of a doctor within the social 
system for Parsons, however, is in its specific status as a ‘collectivity-oriented’ role 
(explicitly for the good of wider society) as opposed to ‘self-oriented’, which serves to 
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position the doctor’s role as one to be trusted.  It is on this basis that the doctor is 
competent in dealing with even the most personal of problems in a general and objective, 
though specifically focused, scientific manner (ten Have, 1995). These oppositional role 
requirements allow the doctor to enter into the private life of the patient to the degree 
necessary for performing the function of ‘curing’ them, but also to prevent the patient 
entering the private sphere of the doctor through a ‘segregation of context’ and a refusal 
to reciprocate emotional/personal revelations (ten Have, 1995). 
Normative standards and roles in the medical practice do not, however, only 
guide the activity of the healthcare professional, and it was in Parsons’ articulation of the 
counterpoint, the patient’s ‘sick role’, that his theory attained most acclaim and most 
criticism. The sick role is a ‘contingent’ role into which any member of society may be 
admitted on a transitory basis.  
 
‘One may say that it is in a certain sense a 'negatively achieved' role, through failure to 'keep 
well,' though, of course, positive motivations may operate, which by that very token must be 
motivations to deviance.’ (Parsons, 1951:438) 
 
Parsons proposed that this sick role revolved around four primary understandings, shared 
by all members of society, relating to what it is to be ‘a sick person’: 
 
1. Sick persons are exempt from their usual roles in society and obligations to it. 
2. Sick persons are not responsible for their own incapacity. They cannot get well at 
will. 
3. A person can only adopt the sick role on the proviso that they actively wish to 
jettison it as soon as possible by becoming well again, and: 
4. The ailing person is obliged to seek technically qualified assistance and co-
operate in the therapy which is prescribed.42 
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In short, to be ill is to be deviant because, as a physically or mentally sick person, an 
individual cannot fulfil their usual societal functions. Sick behaviour is, thus: 
  
‘…behavior which is defined in sociological terms as failing in some way to fulfill the 
institutionally defined expectations of one or more of the roles in which the individual is 
implicated in the society.’ (Parsons, 1951:146) 
 
Such deviant behaviour, however, is not subject to sanction as are other deviant 
behaviours because it is neither deliberate nor desired by the sick person, nor subject to 
voluntary remission – rather it is subject to exemption from the usual rules of sanction, 
and this exemption has a moral (that is, regulating) connotation. It is not only the 
obligation of the sick individual to identify their condition, but also of others, and 
specific exemptions are themselves to be legitimated by professionals with relevant 
expertise (Richman, 1987).  
As such, Parsons’ project, at its hub, was predicated on the simple adage that 
illness is ultimately, and in all its forms, not to be analysed as a biochemical or 
physiological condition, but a social one concerning the moral relations between the 
individual and the collective (ten Have, 1995). The ‘privileges’ (exemptions from 
responsibility) granted to sick persons are themselves socially provisional. The person 
must want to get well and return to their social responsibilities. Moreover, if 
disinvolvement from work and/or family responsibilities continues for ‘too long’ (a 
duration itself subject to normative and/or professional judgement) then the sick person’s 
immunity from sanction may expire – they may come to be seen as malingerers (Turner, 
1986). 
With relation to mental illness, which is always assumed within Parsons’ general 
frame of ‘illnesses’, it is suggested that the genesis of any specific occurrence can be 
traced to a malfunction in a person's relationships with others. The interaction an 
individual shares with family, friends and colleagues functions both to provide personal 
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reassurance and support and to assist in the reaffirmation of shared group and societal 
values. Should this interaction be either lacking, or deviant in character, then the person 
may become, in Parsons’ terms, ‘Pathological’. The life situation of such pathological 
individuals is that: 
 
1. They are probably helpless and consequently in need of help. 
2. They are not sufficiently technically competent to cure themselves. 
3. They are emotionally involved in their own conditions, which is to say that they 
are disturbed, or anxious, or over optimistic and unable to view their situation 
objectively.  
 
They are, thus, both vulnerable to exploitation and often not in a position to make 
rational judgements. Moreover, they are particularly open and liable to what Parsons 
terms ‘non-rational beliefs and practices’ (ten Have, 1995). Successful therapy for such 
conditions is, for Parsons, grounded in the reintroduction of modes of support which 
signal the acceptance of the sick person as a member of a social group. Additionally, a 
special permissiveness to communicate wishes and fantasies not ordinarily permitted in 
normal social relationships should be accorded to the sick individual by the therapist, 
though the therapist should not in any way reciprocate the expectations of the patient. 
Finally, the therapist should be in control of modes of reward and sanction; the respective 
giving and withholding of approval. 
 
3.3.2. Parsons: Commentary. 
Parsons, like Durkheim, locates mental illness internal to the individual, as a static, 
recognizable condition that ‘happens’ (chiefly as a result of aberrant social stimuli). His 
interest then moves into the realm of establishing how society, through specialized 
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institutions, deals with such phenomena so as to restore both individual and systemic 
functionality. The primary criticism of Parsons’ functionalist framework here is that it 
virtually denies human agency. As Len Bowers (1998) argues, 
 
‘To uphold a functionalist interpretation of an institution [such as medicine] it is necessary 
to assert that the people carrying out the purposes of the institution are unaware of its 
purposes, or in other words are acting unconsciously. This is not only untrue to our lived 
experience…but also fundamentally undermines the notion of function – when applied to 
activities of people, speaking of function is only another way of talking about the purposes 
of people who carry out those activities.’ (Bowers, 1998:120)  
 
In this sense we gain the same sense of actual individuals as relatively aimless 
automatons guided by an all-powerful social structure as was present in Marcuse’s work. 
People, be they doctors or patients, do, however, tend to know very well why they are 
doing what they are doing (Bowers, 1998). Both the neo-Marxist and the structural 
functionalist approaches to mental illness and medicine fundamentally deny this. 
Another popular criticism of Parsons relates to the cultural insensitivity of his work in 
this field. The theory of the social system in its entirety (as with the frameworks for the 
diagnosis of mental illness discussed in the previous chapter) can be seen to be 
consistently based on Westernized models of value and expectation, and this is nowhere 
more clear than in his analysis of illness behaviour (Twaddle, 1979). Displays of angst, 
for example, wholly acceptable in some cultures may be interpreted within a Parsonian 
framework as over-reaction, or even a mental illness in themselves. Richman (1987), 
meanwhile, adds to this the manner in which other elements of illness can confuse 
Parsons’ model of the sick role; children's understandings of health, for example, the sick 
role within the family, and hardship and the sick role. Equally, the expertise of the doctor 
may be applied to individuals differentially according to contingent constraints of time 
and money, or may apply differentially according to considerations of gender or class 
(Freund and McGuire, 1991). In short, like Durkheim, by stipulating a general set of 
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moral rules of sanctioned conduct, Parsons overlooks major differences between 
different categories of rule following and rule breaking (Bowers, 1998). 
Freund and McGuire (1991) propose a further set of largely practical reasons 
why the sick role model is intrinsically flawed43. The sick role is, firstly, not necessarily 
as temporary as Parsons suggests. The increasingly common phenomenon of the chronic 
condition (such as Major Depression) does not fit the sick role as well as the ‘acute’ 
conditions that dominated medical understandings at the time of Parsons original 
theorising44. The status of a condition as an ‘illness’ is itself, moreover, subject to social 
negotiation; a person is not simply deemed transparently ‘sick’ or ‘well’. This 
observation has particular ramifications for the study of mental illness in which, even by 
the admission of the biomedical studies detailed in Chapter 2, there can be a lot of ‘grey 
area’ in both classification and diagnosis. Relationally, the very entering of the sick role 
is not always an uncomplicated and voluntary process as Parsons suggested: the implicit 
dependency may be resented or even rejected, or may carry a significant social stigma 
(see the work of Goffman in the next section).  Furthermore, like Twaddle (1979) and 
Richman (1987), Freund and McGuire note how admittance to the sick role is not 
consistent, but variable. In some cases admittance may be an enforced act (as is, 
frequently, psychiatric institutionalisation and labelling), while in others it may be denied 
outright - the capacity of the patient to pay for treatment, for instance, has a direct 
bearing on rights to entry. In short, social, political and economic concerns are highly 
significant in a manner for which Parsons did not account. 
Finally, while Parsons suggests that a person legitimately admitted to the sick 
role is not considered responsible for their ‘deviant’ condition, there are a number of 
unambiguous instances where this is simply not the case. Alcoholism, for example, while 
classified within contemporary medial expertise as an illness, still clearly carries deviant 
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stigma relating to its origins, similarly HIV (Freund & McGuire, 1991). Furthermore, 
there are a number of DSM classified mental illnesses which, within ordinary society, are 
not always regarded illnesses at all but simply forms of everyday deviance. That which is 
deemed authentic ‘depressive’ behaviour by the medical profession may be, for example, 
regarded simply as ‘moodiness’, ‘anti-social behaviour’ or ‘detachment’ in the wider 
social world. 
While Parsons’ work on (mental) health and illness spawned a wide variety of 
critiques, as shown above, it is worth noting that the first truly comprehensive attack 
came from the symbolic interactionists. Freidson (1970), for instance, argued that 
Parsons’ account of the medical profession is based upon certain unproven assumptions 
and taken-for-granted knowledges relating to the supposed ‘neutral’ and ‘universal’ roles 
of medical practitioners. Like all professional groups, the therapeutic establishment has 
vested interests; the maintenance of its own autonomy being particularly noteworthy. In 
a close-detail investigation of three different medical settings in New York, Freidson was 
also able to show that the ‘sick role’ is not in itself something which is as clearly defined 
as Parsons’ may have suggested. Its imposition by healthcare professionals may cause 
confusion, or even be resisted (Freidson, 1961). Patients in his study were able to, up to a 
point, negotiate their way through consultation processes; the simple, objective ‘reading-
off’ of illnesses from a patient’s symptoms implicit in Parsons’ characterization of the 
diagnostic encounter simply did not take place. It was through the symbolic interactionist 
method of close scrutiny of real-life situations that such critiques were generated and 
new theories of health and illness fashioned, and it is to these micro-theories that we now 
turn. 
 
3.4. SYMBOLIC INTERACTION: 
DEVIANCE, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE SOCIAL SELF. 
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‘The Greeks, who were apparently strong on visual aids, originated the term stigma to 
refer to bodily signs designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral 
status of the signifier. The signs were cut or burnt into the body and advertised that the 
bearer was a slave, a criminal, or a traitor - a blemished person, ritually polluted, to be 
avoided, especially in public places. Later, in Christian times, two layers of metaphor 
were added to the term: the first referred to bodily signs of holy grace that took the form 
of eruptive blossoms on the skin; the second, a medical allusion to this religious allusion, 
referred to bodily signs of physical disorder. ...The term stigma ... will be used to refer to 
an attribute that is deeply discrediting.’ 
Erving Goffman45 
“Stigma” 
 
The symbolic interactionist approach to mental illness, its diagnosis and treatment bears 
a far closer resemblance to the approach that will be taken in this project than the works 
discussed in sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 in terms of foundation and method. There are still, 
however, significant problems in the core conceptualisations of ‘deviant’ activity used 
that need to be addressed. In this sense, the works of Goffman and Mead form a useful 
thematic bridge between the sociological theories thus far discussed and those 
approaches that are to be adopted. 
 
3.4.1. Symbolic Interaction and the Functioning Self: Foundations. 
Symbolic interactionist contributions to the sociology of health and illness, grounded in 
the work of George Herbert Mead (1934), are consistently underpinned by their 
conceptualisation of the social reaction to mental illness (or any other deviant ‘bizarre 
behaviour’) as being itself the deviant phenomenon. In a reflexive process, this negative 
social reaction then serves to inform the behaviour of the individual marked as ‘deviant’ 
who accordingly embarks on a ‘moral career’ (Goffman, 1961) as a deviant human 
being. The symbolic interactionist ‘self’ was deemed to materialize through social 
interaction (socialization, language acquisition), was malleable in character and 
dependent upon the social world for a sense of its own nature (Bowers, 1998). As Mead 
(1934) himself states: 
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‘The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the 
particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group.’ (Mead, 
1934:138) 
  
Then, in a probing parallel with one of Durkheim’s key assertions, Mead proceeds to 
argue that the individual self is in many senses a microcosm of wider society. 
 
‘The structure of the complete self is a reflection of the complete social process’ (Mead, 
1934:144) 
 
Mead’s framework for the understanding of ‘mind, self and society’ provides a neat 
sketch of the prerequisites for ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ mental performance within the 
social world. When the complete and ‘healthy’ union between individual and collective 
is severed or diminished by that collective, social role-taking is rendered problematic; the 
individual can no longer function in a manner that is acceptable or familiar to others 
(which in turn distorts the connection itself). Ungrounded in any sense of belonging to 
something, the individual becomes psychologically and socially disjointed (Mead, 1934). 
‘Role conflict’ becomes endemic as the apposite social roles the self must play become 
internally indistinct, contradictory and confused.  
 
3.4.2. Goffman: The Social Conditions of Mental Illness. 
There is no better elaboration of this process in action than Erving Goffman’s classic 
“Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates” (1961), 
a key contribution to medical sociology and sociology as a whole, in which Goffman 
developed a truly (and revolutionary) sociological view of the structure of the social self 
in the process of its deconstruction. The collection of essays is based on extensive 
fieldwork conducted in a variety of examples of what Goffman terms ‘Total Institutions’. 
Total institutions are any residential establishments based upon bureaucratic organization 
whereby individuals are subject to a single authority which coercively manages their day 
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by day regimes of sleeping, eating and socializing. These institutions may be of a type 
voluntarily entered (Goffman cites an army barracks as an example of such a case) or of 
a type in which an individual is forcibly incarcerated (such as prison); the most profound 
example of a total institution in terms of its capacity to reconstruct the social self, 
however, is the psychiatric asylum, a ‘..forcing house for changing persons, as a natural 
experiment on what can be done to the self..’ (Goffman, 1961:14) 
 To brutally summarise a highly complex work, Goffman maintained that what is 
socially normal can be best understood in terms of what is socially labelled ‘abnormal’ 
and how such states of being are controlled and ‘cured’. The first stage of such control, 
in psychiatric medicine, is the process of hospitalisation. This is, inevitably, a social 
process; judgements have to be made by healthcare professionals and wider society 
relating to an individual’s psychiatric state, and these are contingent upon considerations 
such as the ‘visibility’ of abnormal behaviour (rule violation) and the socio-economic 
status of the patient. It is important, at this stage, to highlight that what is actually going 
on ‘in the head’ of the patient figures little in Goffman’s analysis of the beginnings of 
mental illness. As a component of the process leading to hospitalisation, however, 
Goffman (with no small sense of moral outrage) documents what he terms the ‘betrayal 
funnel’. This funnel, through which a pre-patient is drawn, involves the ‘others’ with 
whom the individual in question has been co-operating (family, friends, colleagues)46 
ultimately stripping him or her of all civilian rights, which is to say progressively treating 
the person as someone who is ‘mentally ill’ rather than ‘a normal person’.  
Goffman observes how, once hospitalised, the patients are purged completely of 
their ‘civilian selves’ (their personal possessions, their ‘freedom’ to move in society 
unobserved etc.) and every aspect of their behaviour is instead constantly reviewed and 
prescribed. In a ‘civil environment’ (that is to say, someone’s everyday world) a person 
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can work at maintaining their individual identity through interaction with those who 
share this environment. These others collaborate in the interaction because they have the 
same aims and needs. But in a total institution such as the asylum, Goffman argues 
(echoing Mead), the inmate is estranged from their ordinary collaborators and instead 
interacts with a psychiatric staff for whom different terms of collaboration are requisite. 
Inmates of the asylum are not only subjected to an extensive series of aggressive 
degradations and humiliations of the self, ‘...any member of the staff class has certain 
rights to discipline any member of the inmate class, thereby markedly increasing the 
probability of sanction...’ (Goffman, 1961:42), but are concurrently cut off from all of 
the physical and social supports that would be capable of sustaining them through such 
an ordeal. Goffman terms this process mortification, a de-socialization of the individual 
by the heavy machinery of the asylum based on a static psychiatric view of the ‘normal’ 
self, rather than an elastic social one. People are given ‘moral careers’ as psychiatric 
patients by the very apparatus put in place to ‘normalise’ them, to convey ‘salvation’ to 
them, and any attempt to resist mortification invariably leads to yet more mortification. 
Moreover, and in a devastating blow, the betrayal funnel is discovered, and patients 
come to realize that those with whom they had intimate personal relations prior to 
hospitalisation can no longer be assumed to be trustworthy; that they have been betrayed 
by them.  
  Within the institution, Goffman observes, individuals adopt new practices (they 
make ‘secondary adjustments’) in order to regain some mode of control over their lives; 
these are ‘...practices that do not directly challenge staff but allow inmates to obtain 
forbidden satisfactions or to obtain permitted ones by forbidden means...’ (Goffman, 
1961:54) such as the use of toilet paper to roll cigarettes, or deliberate enrolment in 
therapy sessions in order to make contact with members of the opposite sex. From the 
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psychiatric point of view these behaviours are somewhat bizarre, but from Goffman’s 
sociological stance they are perfectly rational (albeit desperate) attempts to reclaim that 
which has been taken away. They are, however, through the clinical interpretations of the 
asylum staff, translated from gestures of defiance, attempts to resist prescribed being, 
into symptoms of mental illness themselves, a mere confirmation of the patient’s status 
as an appropriate inmate. As Goffman confirms, 
 
‘..it is…against something that the self can emerge…Without something to belong to, we 
have no stable self, and yet total commitment and attachment to any social unit implies a 
kind of selflessness. Our sense of being a person can come from being drawn into a wider 
social unit; our sense of selfhood can arise through the little ways in which we resist the 
pull. Our status is backed by the solid buildings of the world, while our sense of personal 
identity often resides in the cracks.’ (Goffman, 1961:320)    
 
Within the asylum, where ‘..existence is cut to the bone..’ (Goffman, 1961:305) and 
status is most heavily defined by the ‘buildings’, the behaviours that forge personal 
identity are driven ever more deeply into ever more obscure cracks. In these terms, the 
asylum creates anomalous selves and behaviours, it does not ‘cure’ them. 
 
3.4.3. Symbolic Interaction, Stigma and Labelling. 
In “Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity” (1963), meanwhile, Goffman 
proceeds to bring these emotive themes out of the asylum and back into the ordinary 
world, and the mode of analysis he adopts is in many senses resonant with the purposes 
of this project. Social stigma, he argues, is basically a relationship of depreciation in 
which an individual is denied full social acceptance by his or her peers. This stigma can 
assume a variety of forms: it can be prejudicial, on the basis of, say, a physical deformity, 
it can be interpreted from documentary evidence (a criminal record, for example) or 
deemed through association (an individual keeps ‘bad company’). Equally, stigma can be 
produced through ascription (the assumption of family heritage of an undesirable trait) or 
active achievement, such as ‘dropping out’. Stigma is, as such, at its nucleus, the 
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application of a label which describes someone exclusively in terms of a perceived 
degenerate or simply different pattern of behaviour at the expense of all of their other 
qualities. As a consequence, should I be labelled deviant in this way, 
 
‘Those who have dealings with [me] fail to accord [me] the respect and regard which the 
uncontaminated aspects of [my] social identity have led them to anticipate extending, and 
have led [me] to anticipate receiving; [I echo] this denial by finding that some of [my] own 
attributes warrant it.’ (Goffman, 1963:8-9) 
 
In this sense, Goffman provides a frame for the analysis of stigmatizing illness 
conditions as social phenomena, particularly in terms of social control. As Lemert (1962) 
found in his research on individuals labeled ‘paranoid’, the condition of paranoia itself 
actually arose following a phase marked by unsettling interactional dynamics of 
exclusion and scrutiny with real and discernible others. The stigmatizing of an individual 
is, for Goffman, no more less than one of society’s most compelling means of controlling 
his or her activities; not only is the individual given a label, but forced to accept and 
adjust to it so that they may be allowed to continue their participation (albeit at a 
diminished level) in social life at all. Echoing the ‘betrayal funnel’ postulated in 
“Asylums”, one of the key foci of “Stigma” is upon the manner in which ‘normals’ 
(which is to say non-stigmatized individuals, usually friends, family and doctors) actively 
encourage this acceptance of, and adjustment to, the stigmatized role thus concretising 
the individual’s status as a ‘deviant’.  
 
‘The good-adjustment line. . . means that the unfairness and pain of having to carry a stigma 
will never be presented to [normals]; it means that normals will not have to admit to 
themselves how limited their tactfulness and tolerance is; and it means that normals can 
remain relatively uncontaminated by intimate contact with the stigmatized, [be] relatively 
unthreatened in their [own] identity beliefs. It is just from these meanings, in fact, that the 
specifications of a good adjustment derive’ (Goffman, 1963:121) 
  
In doing so, thus, under the rubric of ‘helping’, the normals place significant and self-
comforting social spaces between themselves, the consequences of their own actions and 
the actual labelled individual.  
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3.4.4. Goffman and SI: Commentary. 
The whole range of Goffman’s ideas have had sizeable influence across a broad range of 
approaches to mental illness, notably in the theory-inclined anti-psychiatry movement, 
but in terms of the empirical approach employed by this project there are a number of 
identifiable problems with his analysis. The most valuable contribution he makes is in his 
observation that all action takes place in a social context, and to strip it of this context is 
to strip it of much of its import. Unfortunately, from this stance it is possible to devise 
contexts in which just about any actual action could be considered ‘normal’, and equally 
it is possible to formulate contexts in which the self same action would be ‘abnormal’ 
and thus imply (as Goffman does) that the application of labels is somewhat arbitrary. 
The very key to why those things labelled ‘mental imbalance’ are deemed ‘irrational’, 
however, is that they are themselves deemed abnormal in the context in which they 
occur. They do not, as Bowers (1998) argues,  
 
‘…become rational because one can imagine sometime, somewhere, in the most strange 
combination of circumstances, that one could find the behaviour reasonable…Goffman’s 
particular trick (on which nearly the whole of his book Asylums rests) of finding 
reasonable explanations for strange behaviour only works because he uses isolated 
individual examples of particular actions, and fails to check his interpretations by asking 
the subjects.’ (Bowers, 1998:18)  
 
In order to explain away whole chains of symptomatic behaviour in an individual as 
being in some way contextually rational, Goffman has to pile coincidence upon 
happenstance; if this explanation is then proven incompatible with the subject’s own, 
‘..the whole edifice collapses..’ (Bowers, 1998:18). The core point implied by Goffman 
and other symbolic interactionists (Lemert, 1951) is that, because any social context 
‘could have been otherwise’, mental illness is solely a social construction; it has no 
underlying reality. This is to miss a key point, as perfectly articulated by Richard Harvey 
Brown; ‘..the fact that a truth is socially constructed does not make it untrue.’ (Brown, 
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1994:23). The fact that ‘mental illness behaviour’ cannot be extracted from the social 
context in which it occurs does not make it any less ‘real’ to the people involved in the 
actual social locale; this is evidenced in the numbers of people who are treated for 
psychiatric problems on a voluntary basis.  
A number of symbolic interactionists have, since Goffman, argued that because 
psychiatric diagnoses are notoriously unreliable (see Rosenham, 197347) and 
inconsistent, a determinate frame for their understanding based on consistent cases 
cannot be generated. As such, the lack of an objective format for diagnosis means that 
there can be no physiological basis to mental illness. If, however, as Goffman asserted 
throughout his works, all action takes place in a social context, how are ‘physiologically’ 
nonstandard behaviours and their diagnoses uniquely exempt from this? Symbolic 
Interactionism in this sense falls into the same trap as Marcuse’s neo-Marxism48; 
physical/social dualism. Moreover, while accepting that the primary realm of social life 
is face-to-face interaction, Goffman and his intellectual brethren, like Durkheim, work 
with ‘undescribed categories’ (Sacks, 1963). They write of social responses to mental 
illness, but do not inform the reader of what mental illness is to the doctor or to the 
patient or to anyone else. They overlook that fact that all key concepts around which 
social life is structured are themselves flexibly negotiated and maintained in the 
intersubjective domain, including ‘physical’, ‘psychological’ and ‘social’ themselves. Is, 
for example, alcoholism a disease of body, mind or society? Or all three? The answer is 
not self-specifying, but contextually flexible and subject to constant negotiation and re-
negotiation not only within everyday life, but also within the scientific medical 
establishment itself. Furthermore, the very theory of deviance discussed here is premised 
upon the assertion that in a ‘civil environment’ people reciprocally collaborate in the 
social interaction that assures role balance because they have the same aims and needs as 
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each other. Like Parsons’ framework for the understanding of action, this account of self 
assumes, and does not demonstrate, that people share common culture and values. In 
these terms, context-to-context variabilities in understanding, interpretation and intention 
by members of society themselves are, fatally, passed over and subsumed instead to a 
broad-spectrum theory.  
A failure to explore the variable assembly of ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ does 
not figure in the work of the final theorist to be examined in this appraisal, although there 
are a number of parallels with the projects of both Goffman and Marcuse. Michel 
Foucault’s work on the historical notion of ‘madness’ in society remains highly 
influential in all areas of social science today, and, while assimilating many of the 
concerns of the sociologists thus far detailed, takes a very singular approach.  
 
3.5. MICHEL FOUCAULT: 
MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION. 
Few writers of recent years have inspired more approbation, controversy and out-and-out 
mystification than Michel Foucault. There is no doubting, however, that (despite his 
wealth of detractors) Foucault advanced a unique and innovative approach to the 
understanding of change in the social world which has underpinned innumerable studies 
since his untimely death in 1984. “Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the 
Age of Reason” (2001 [1961]), Foucault’s first major publication and the text which is of 
primary concern here49, still holds some trappings of the existential phenomenology that 
characterised his earliest writings50 though all but vanished in his later work. It is 
important to point out here that Foucault is himself only occasionally concerned with 
‘individual’ mental illnesses, or particular diagnostic categories. As Gary Gutting (1994) 
maintains, big trends were key to Foucault’s thought (and as we shall see, this is both its 
strength and its weakness).  
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‘Foucault’s ultimate goal was to illuminate (or expose) the true nature of modern 
(nineteenth century to the present) psychiatry. He repeatedly asserts the view that the 
modern conception of mental illness and the corresponding institution of the asylum 
have been constructed out of elements of the Classical experience of madness.’ 
(Gutting, 1994:60)  
 
The central endeavour of “Madness and Civilization” is, then, to map out how, in the 
Western World, the phenomenon of madness has disjunctively, and via a number of 
phases, moved from being characterised as something ‘divinely inspired’ to instead being 
a mode of deviance understood through a medical frame, mental illness. Western 
societies have, for Foucault, come to repress the creative elements of a vivid mode of 
experience by reducing it to an artificial condition. As he states, in line with the thinking 
of Marcuse and Fromm, ‘[M]ental illness is really the misery of society, but society 
constructs it as the sickness of nature.’ (Foucault, 2001:262). Madness is, thus, not to be 
seen as a scientifically-defined state of mind but rather as a socially constructed way of 
considering and categorizing a state of being. He shows how the very ‘Age of Reason’ in 
Europe arose through the subordination of madness, for language and ‘discourse’ 
(approximately, in Foucault’s terms, a self-legitimating network of representations that 
exceeds the precincts of any single work51) require difference to produce meaning. 
Madness and reason, in these terms, are mutually parasitic; there cannot be one without 
the other. What Foucault is thus suggesting is that reason was itself discursively 
constructed, in language, in law, in hospitals and academia as an ‘Other’ to madness.  
 
3.5.1. Foucault: The History of Madness. 
Foucault’s historical perspective documents four focal phases in the Occidental 
‘experience of madness’. The first, the medieval age, he addresses little bar as a 
touchstone for his subsequent analyses. Medieval madness occupied a relatively 
innocuous place in ‘the hierarchy of vices’. It is in the second phase, the Renaissance, 
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that his insights come to life. The Renaissance madman, he observes, was no longer 
hidden. In the fifteenth century, the mad individual was a wanderer as represented in 
the Sebastian Brant poem “Stultifera Navis”, ‘Ship of Fools’: exiled, marginalized, 
but not excluded. The general approach to madness in the literature of the time was as 
a general characteristic of the human subject, a source of wisdom, truth and moral 
opposition to dominant power; it was an ironic counterpart to ‘reason’ and a portal to 
those places that most feared to face. Foucault, in characteristically prosaic style, 
elaborates.  
 
‘On all sides, madness fascinates man. The fantastic images it generates are not fleeting 
appearances that quickly disappear from the surface of things. By a strange paradox, what is 
born from the strangest delirium was already hidden, like a secret, like an inaccessible truth, 
in the bowels of the earth. When man deploys the arbitrary nature of his madness, he 
confronts the dark necessity of the world; the animal that haunts his nightmares and his 
nights of privation is his own nature, which will lay bare hell’s pitiless truth…’ (Foucault, 
2001:20) 
 
In this sense, madness could be considered a rational irrationality as much as an irrational 
rationality.  
 The Classical Age, the age of Descartes and Foucault’s third phase, signalled a 
serious decline in fortune for people deemed mad. Citing the Parisian ‘Great 
Confinement’ in 1656, he shows how the insane came to be seen no longer as a hosts of a 
special form of experience, but were grouped with a host of ‘anti-social’ figures 
(criminals, malingerers, homosexuals and the very poor) and incarcerated in workhouses 
and prisons as such. Though hidden once again, they were not in any way judged to be 
ill; the institutions charged with their care were legal rather than medical in character. At 
this stage, madness is not even a part of European medical history. Medicine, at the time, 
was grounded in the observation of illnesses with definable essences, not the collections 
of symptoms that characterise contemporary psychiatric nosologies. The experience of 
madness was thus deemed to be one of chronic unreason and animality; the mad deemed 
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to be less than human. As such, the strategies for their ‘treatment’ became progressively 
more brutal and centred around physical punishment and public exhibition.  
 The final stage of historical analysis presented in “Madness and Civilisation”, 
the Modern age, is the key element in terms of this project, and echoes themes core to the 
works of Marcuse and Goffman discussed above. The French revolution, for Foucault, 
had stimulated a greater concern for the rights of the individual, and as such the 
homogenous ‘anti-social’ deviant mass of the Classical Age was rationalised into more 
distinct sub-groups. This individuation served to restore to the mad the status of human 
beings, and also called into question the wisdom of mass group incarceration.  The poor 
were seen (and treated) less as criminals and more as victims of economic forces, also 
recognised was their utility as base components of the economy, labouring greatly and 
consuming very little. In these terms, a new institution was needed for the mad, and the 
asylum was born. The asylum is, in Foucault’s terms, a place where the insane are 
rendered clean, useful and passive, which is to say they are brought into line with 
bourgeois capitalist values; the instrument of moral judgement is the doctor, helping the 
incarcerated internalise guilt for their dirty, useless and violent condition. The very 
structure of the asylum aids in this process of internalisation, subjecting the inmate to 
silence, continual observation and moment-to-moment judgement. By the nineteenth 
century, medicine had come to be considered a fully scientific enterprise, governed by 
principles of objective knowledge and value-free thought. Because the effect of asylums 
upon insane individuals was to bring them into line with the dominant values, they were 
thought to be ‘cured’, a process invariably assumed to due to the application of science. 
The morally corrective nature of psychiatry, the exercise of power at the psychological 
level, came to be confused with scientific healing, and, consequently, values with 
objectivity. Treatment of this form reduces the experience of madness to a doctor/patient 
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relationship in which madness is silenced. This ‘normalisation’ is, for Foucault, no better 
than the domination which characterised the Classical Age, because those who cannot be 
made to conform are inevitably confined indefinitely; the deception that this more subtle 
mode of power promotes, however, is that by abandoning torture and brutality as 
methods of treatment, society has progressed.  
The success of this approach in problematising the medical/scientific claim to the 
understanding of mental illness can be seen in Foucault’s specific analysis of the concept 
of ‘melancholia’, a diagnostic term he showed to be related to theories rather than actual 
clinical presentations. Through history, melancholia has been variously considered to be 
detectable through displays of sadness, fixity on a single thought, nihilistic delusion, 
terror of death, guilty delusion and even through believing that one is an animal. The 
only unity herein is through theoretical explanation rather than any demonstrable 
relationship. 
 
‘The original entity was not defined from observed signs nor from supposed causes; but 
somewhere between, and beyond both, it was perceived as a certain qualitative 
coherence, which had its own laws of transmission, of development, and of 
transformation. It is the secret logic of this quality that controls the development of the 
idea of melancholia, not medical theory.’ (Foucault, 2001:114) [Original Emphasis]  
  
Foucault’s investigation of madness ends in the early nineteenth century asylum, with 
Tuke and Pinel, and as such does not offer a critique of contemporary psychiatric 
practice. The social constructionist resonance of “Madness and Civilisation” in today’s 
social studies of mental illness and psychiatry, however, is indisputable. As David 
Cooper claims, 
 
‘We are beginning to recognise the prevalent tradition of psychiatry today as a convenient 
but ultimately misguided way of evaluating the social meanings of madness. The actual 
preoccupation of psychiatry is nothing less than the quasi-academic compartmentalization 
of certain states of experience into formally reduced types of ‘illness’ that are then 
disposable in the field of curing. Curing we understand here as a sort of anti-
healing…totally opposed to healing in the sense of making whole persons.’ (Cooper, 
2001:ix) 
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Concrete articulation of such principles in a more contemporary context can be found in, 
among others, the works of the anti-psychiatry movement (e.g. Laing, 1960; Rosenham, 
1973). Leading anti-psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, for example, takes up the sword in “The 
Manufacture of Madness”, 
 
‘Institutional psychiatry is a continuation of the Inquisition. All that has really changed is 
the vocabulary and the social style. The vocabulary conforms to the intellectual 
expectations of our age: it is a pseudo-medical jargon that parodies the concepts of 
science. The social style conforms to the political expectations of our age: it is a pseudo-
liberal social movement that parodies the ideals of freedom and rationality.’ (Szasz, 
1970:27) 
 
Moreover, echoing both Foucault and Goffman, Kenneth J Gergen (1996) brings the 
argument into an even more vividly present-day arena; 
 
‘Terms such as depression, paranoia, attention deficit disorder, sociopathic, and 
schizophrenia have become essential entries in the vocabulary of the educated person. 
And, when the terms are applied in daily life they have substantial effects - in narrowing 
the explanation to the level of the individual, stigmatizing, and obscuring the contribution 
of other factors (including the demands of economic life, media images, and traditions of 
individual evaluation) to the actions in question. Further, when these terms are used to 
construct the self, they suggest that one should seek professional treatment. In this sense, 
the development and dissemination of the terminology by the profession acts to create a 
population of people who will seek professional help. And, as more professionals are 
required - as they have been in increasing numbers over the century - so is there pressure 
to increase the vocabulary.’ (Gergen et al, 1996:69) 
 
Interestingly, while there are many parallels between Foucault and Goffman in terms of 
linking the behaviour of the mentally ill to the explanatory and strategic institutional 
frameworks in place, Foucault never denies that there is a ‘reality’ to mental illness itself. 
In these terms he does not fall foul of one of the primary criticisms levelled at Goffman. 
There are, however, a range of particular problems with Foucault’s work.  
 
3.5.2. Foucault: Commentary. 
In this section, I will not offer a comprehensive critique of the mechanics of Foucault’s 
historical method itself; this is a well trodden path leading to a (valid) set of assertions on 
his cavalier linkage of theory to actual sources and the obscure and isolated nature of the 
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sources he does choose. As Ian Dowbiggin contributes in the insightful “Inheriting 
Madness”, ‘…there is a seamless quality to Foucault’s model that…fits historical reality 
poorly.’ (1991:170). I will not, furthermore, advance the claim that “Madness and 
Civilization” is Foucault’s last and only word on the topic of mental illness; he does 
indeed himself subsequently criticise the work for being sporadically naïve (Foucault, 
1976), and this review has not been of his work at large. As Gary Gutting argues, to 
attempt to analyse one of Foucault’s books as a ‘microcosm’ of his entire corpus is 
ultimately self-defeating. 
 
‘…Foucault’s work is at root ad hoc, fragmentary and incomplete. Each of his books is 
determined by concerns and approaches specific to it and should not be understood as 
developing or deploying a theory or a method that is a general instrument of intellectual 
progress.’ (1994:2) 
 
As such, the criticisms here are distinctively criticisms of ‘Madness and Civilisation’. 
This section instead explores the essential propositions upon which the specific analysis 
is built, as these propositions are foundational to a range of contemporary critical social 
constructionist accounts of mental illness (Cooper, 2001).  
 Firstly, in characterising madness/mental illness as a mode of experience in the 
existential sense (Rabinow, 1984), Foucault attributes to it a substantial component of 
choice. There is little doubt that this depiction is not one that would be familiar to many 
sufferers of actual mental illnesses, now or ‘then’. The theory, like Goffman’s, is built in 
such a way as to wholly overlook the practical circumstances of ‘being mentally ill’ to a 
mentally ill individual; the romantic interpretation at the nucleus of “Madness and 
Civilization” (that mental illness is, in fact, the wisdom of unreason) is not supported by 
a single shred of evidence from actual mentally ill people. To characterise mental illness 
as a coherent and creative existential state is in itself to silence those to whom it 
professes to give a voice; again like Goffman, Foucault fails to concede the simple fact 
that someone suffering from a socially constructed condition might still be suffering.  
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 Secondly, as Bowers (1998) asserts, there is a major problem with Foucault’s 
reading of pre-seventeenth century history.  
 
‘Did people take their problems to the insane for solution? Did they consult them on 
business matters? Or was their advice sought for family problems and arguments? The 
answers are of course ‘No’ in each and every case.’ (Bowers, 1998:103) 
 
There is a very substantial disparity between postulating wisdom and bliss in madness 
and actually demonstrating it. Foucault’s revisionism is based largely on the laudable 
drive to illustrate how things could be other than they are, but, as it was in every other 
study detailed in this chapter so it is with “Madness and Civilisation”: the key category 
remains undescribed. Rather, an assumed account squirms uneasily under the burden of 
theory loaded onto it. As David Rothman (1971) remarks ,  
 
‘…for all the sweep of [Foucault’s] analysis, the categories seem rigid (are reason and 
unreason necessarily mutually exclusive?), and there remains too little room for other 
considerations…explanation is so caught up with ideas that their base in events is 
practically forgotten.’ (Rothman, 1971:xviii)  
 
Resultant of this disinclination to explore the ground-level social meanings of madness 
are abundant problems in specifying how Foucault’s discourse approach could then be 
used to comprehend particular instances of talk, action or writing in the contexts that they 
occur. Jonathan Potter articulates this as follows: 
 
‘By treating discourses themselves as objects he draws attention away from the practices 
and contexts in which they are embedded…The limitation with this approach is that the 
discourses in this view become pre-formed coherent entities which act as causal agents. 
That is, the processes of interest are seen of those as an (abstract) discourse working on 
another (abstract) discourse. What the approach is not sensitive to is the way discourses 
operate in, say, any particular doctor’s surgery…’ (Potter, 1997:87)  
 
Or, in other words, Foucault’s account can reduce people to ‘Discourse Dopes’. Much as 
members of society are determined by their biology (DSM-IV), or by their unconscious 
(Freud), or slavishly act out normative patterns as in Parsons’ grand system, and are 
puppets of capitalist power relationships for Marcuse, so can it be read in Foucault’s 
meditation on madness that doctors and patients themselves are relatively passive and 
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uncritical entities through which gargantuan discourses operate. A more sympathetic 
reading may allow for people to be considered ‘strugglers’ within a discursive web; even 
then, the problems of application remain.  
Despite these criticisms, Foucault’s ‘Madness and Civilisation’, like Goffman’s 
‘Asylums’, represents a distinct and valuable step away from the problematic 
social/psychological absolutism characteristic of the functionalist and Marxist accounts 
of mental illness. While Goffman demonstrates that the realm of face-to-face interaction 
is the primordial site of social activity, Foucault highlights how human understandings of 
social phenomena are not immanent in the world ‘out-there’, but products of historically 
and culturally located social activity. Both core themes pave the way toward an 
exploration of situated actions as locally (rather than analytically) meaningful events, and 
both combine in the last approach to be examined in this chapter. 
 
3.6. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE? 
It is clear that the studies explored so far in this chapter fall broadly into two groups; in 
the first (Durkheim 1897; Parsons, 1951) the key (and in many cases only) distinction 
between the theories advanced and the psychiatric/psychological frames of the last 
chapter was shown to be one of emphasis, with a transference of focus away from factors 
‘internal’ to the individual and toward macrosocial phenomena. As a result, the 
conceptualisations of the doctor-patient relationship embedded in and arising from these 
theories tend to portray people themselves as puppets of grander, more predictable 
structures; this does not in any way challenge the real problems surrounding situated 
social understandings of Major Depression as they may manifest in a primary care 
encounter involving two active individuals. They only serve to accept the basic 
medical/psychiatric project and its underpinning assumptions while reattributing 
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causality and refocusing on phenomena ‘external’ to the individual. As such, these 
studies disempower actual people, portraying them as ‘cultural dopes’ who play little or 
no active role in the assembly of real social situations.  
The same weaknesses appear in different forms in the second group, the critical 
approaches to the concepts of mental health and illness advanced by Goffman (1961), 
Foucault (2001) and Marcuse (1967). Ostensive definitions drive abstract theorizing 
about mental illnesses in society, their causes and effects, at the expense of investigations 
into the human activities and practices involved in the variable social construction, 
negotiation and understanding of mental illness categories at the local level, where the 
significance of such conditions is most profound. Again, it is fair to say, I believe, that 
the core problem throughout is the reproduction of two basic foundational binaries to 
which so much attention has thus far been accorded in this project; mind/body and, 
particularly evident in this chapter, individual/society. The Symbolic Interactionist 
account of mental illness, for example, allows for the individual to be considered both 
socially determined and agentic (Widdecombe & Wooffitt, 1995) and as such avoids 
accusations of the kind of cultural doping that plague the likes of Parsons. Nevertheless, 
it is still reliant upon an equally deterministic mind/body dualism. In order for Goffman’s 
assertions on the moral character of mental illness categories to be ontologically 
plausible, for example, he requires the touchstone of more ‘objective’ physical illness, 
much like Marcuse. A true alternative to the highly individualistic accounts of depression 
outlined in Chapter 2 and the frequently socially deterministic analyses of mental illness 
discussed in this chapter requires that these dualisms are abandoned outright, and the 
beginnings of such a movement can be located in a brief exploration of one last 
approach; Phenomenology.  
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Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991 [1966]) were students of the highly 
influential phenomenologist Alfred Schütz in the 1940s, and many of his ideas permeate 
their work. Schütz’s primary concern was to demonstrate that the social world is not 
‘objective’ or ‘subjective’, but intersubjective, and that seemingly natural and obvious 
features of the world are constituted largely in the use of language. While the experience 
of any phenomenon is different for different people, there is a supposition that the 
experiences are actually equivalent; people manage to dissipate their perceptual 
differences via ‘the natural attitude’ through which they construct the events of social life 
and maintain the impression of a common world. This implies that the social actor has a 
capacity for interpretation such that in the very process of perception and experience, the 
world is already described. Berger and Luckmann take these themes and use them to 
argue that within the cultural apparatus are methods that members of society use to give 
meaning to their social milieu, and to categorise physical and psychological, individual 
and social phenomena. Every society has its own ‘universe of meaning’, a socially 
derived body of knowledge, ranging from its academic philosophies to its everyday 
social conventions, which is unique to that society. This knowledge is not only produced 
by a society, but that society is produced by it. The universe is located in the social base 
(a ‘plausibility structure’) and the base is legitimated by the universe. The collapse of one 
will precipitate the collapse of the other. Following, to a degree, from Weber, they 
suggest that the very reality of the ‘social structure’ is dependent on belief in its 
existence, and thus for them certainty has a very uncertain foundation. To cite a now 
famous phenomenological maxim, things are only real because people believe them to be 
real. Things have meaning because meaning is bestowed upon them. These meanings 
are, however, entirely socially constructed and thus arbitrary. There are no absolutes, just 
a socially-defined ‘common-sense’ which varies enormously between societies. This 
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relativism renders any given universe of meaning an insecure entity. Crucial to any 
society, then, is the constant legitimation of the body of knowledge, the persistent 
reiteration that meanings are not only true, but just. Without this affirmative 
reproduction, the universe of meaning would collapse and life in the society would be 
meaningless and unstable.  
The phenomenological approach bears a much closer resemblance to the method 
employed in this project than any of those previously detailed in this chapter, focusing on 
the manner in which people understand and construct the features of their social world 
rather than on how they are ‘determined’ by it. From this perspective, analysis is led not 
by the application of a researcher’s own analytic categories to instances of social action, 
but by those understandings manifest in the constructive activity of participants in the 
social world themselves. The implications of such a focus for both sociology and 
psychology are huge, and they are implications which are now coming to be realised in 
what is popularly known as the ‘linguistic turn’ in the social sciences (Widdecombe & 
Wooffitt, 1995), outlined in Chapter 1. 
 
3.7. THE LINGUISTIC TURN: A WITTGENSTEINIAN CONCLUSION. 
The critique mounted across Chapters 2 and 3, in sum, demands that in order to avoid the 
key problems identified, an approach to the study of depression in the primary care 
consultation is required that dismissed absolutist notions of meaning and instead 
addressed construction, interpretation and interaction. Rather than attempt to examine 
and explain situated social phenomena in terms of influence of vast social structures (as 
per Durkheim, Marcuse or Parsons), the mysterious internal processes of ‘disposition’ 
(Beck or Freud) or the biochemical imbalance assumed in the DMS-IV, we should 
attempt to study and understand the public procedures by which the mutual intelligibility 
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of human action is practically accomplished. It is, after all, these very public procedures 
which themselves actually allow for the attribution of agency to an institution or an 
individual mental state. The primary (though not the only) field in which these 
procedures manifest is spoken and written language (Schütz, 1962; Sacks, 1992). The 
main focus of this study, thus, will come to rest upon a conception of contexted language 
use as a social practice key to the production and negotiation of a case of depression. 
As a brief illustration of this pragmatic approach to verbal action, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1969), one of the key forerunners of the late 20th century ‘linguistic turn’ in 
the social sciences, explicitly reformulates the vocabulary of ‘the mind’ (what he terms 
‘the grammars of the mental), the very operations of the human ‘self’, as a vocabulary to 
be defined in terms of practical, observable activity rather than invisible forces that may 
‘cause’ it. The uses of this vocabulary, and the constraints upon it, are entirely socially 
derivative and embedded in human social practice, in ‘forms of life’. In his own words: 
 
‘We only say of a human being and what is like one that it thinks. We also say it of dolls 
and also of spirits too. Look at the word ‘think as a tool.’ (Wittgenstein, 1969:para 360) 
 
The terms ‘think’, ‘feel’ and ‘believe’, to name but three, are intersubjectively 
constituted things; they do not directly access motivating inner states, they have no 
‘inner’ referents, they are themselves autonomous parts of particular social practices. 
Wittgenstein’s recommendation is, thus, that analysts treat people’s practical methods 
of rendering their ‘thoughts’ visible as the primary site of analysis. For example, in 
“Zettel” Wittgenstein points to how people formulate descriptions of their actions 
after an event so as to imbue them with meaningful significance. He invents a scenario 
in which somebody is constructing something from a piece of material, and by a 
process of trial and error, involving constant frustration, is eventually successful. 
Later, the person is shown a film of them engaging in this process. While watching 
this film, the person remarks:  
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“Then I thought: No, that won’t do, I must try it another way”, and so on. He had not, 
however, while originally at work, either spoken or imagined these very words.’ 
(Coulter, 1991:193).  
 
Consider, thus, the word ‘thought’ as a tool: the account of the actions is to be seen as 
the site at which an attempt to produce ‘thinking’, the attempt to give meaning to a set 
of events, is made visible by a speaker pragmatically using the language of the ‘mind’. 
The importance of this argument can be seen with some clarity when we reflect upon 
the problems surrounding the definitions of depression advanced in Chapter 2. 
Everyday judgements (both medical and ‘lay’) relating to depression are made 
frequently and relatively unproblematically and to specific ends - in the context of a 
ward round, the assessment that someone is depressed refers to, among a range of 
things,  their need for care and treatment. The attempt to provide an abstract definition 
of ‘depression’ causes a great deal of confusion (Bowers, 1998), as it assumes that 
depression is a thing, with a distinct essence, for which the word ‘depression’ is 
merely a label with ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ interpretations.  
 
‘Wittgenstein taught that meaning is given by explanations of meaning. The meaning of 
‘mental illness’ is not something hidden or esoteric which is to be found by theroretic 
reflection. Instead, all we have to consider is how ‘mental illness’ is explained in concrete 
circumstances…Lists of necessary and sufficient criteria are only one restricted form of 
explanation which is not privileged over any other. Explanations may be given by 
providing examples, giving instructions for locating, producing or manufacturing 
examples, or by describing ‘ideal types’, providing restrictions, describing special cases 
and many other practices.’ (Bowers, 1998:145)  
 
To reiterate a theme first addressed in Chapter 1, the production of transsituational 
definitions encourages the prioritizing of theory over actual cases (Silverman, 1997). 
People are seen as merely ‘incidences’ of the theoretical concepts. This is a good point 
from which to begin an exploration of the techniques which can be used to address the 
hows of depression construction and depression diagnosis as social actions. How 
depressed must one be for a GP to regard you as being depressed? How do people 
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account for the influence of ‘environment’, how do they construct ‘feelings’? How is 
‘mind’ or ‘body’ done in social discourse? The techniques I shall detail in the next 
chapter lend themselves well to addressing such issues.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Rethinking the Method: 
Conversation Analysis as a Tool for Examining 
the Interview and the Consultation 
‘To put it at its most basic, conversation analysis is the study of talk. More particularly, 
it is the systematic analysis of the talk produced in everyday situations of human 
interaction: talk-in-interaction.’ 
Ian Hutchby & Robin Wooffitt52 
‘Conversation Analysis’ 
 
In the last chapter it was proposed that most psychiatric and social scientific accounts of 
depression, and mental illness on the wider scale, shared assumptions relating to the 
character of human experience that rendered their theoretical frameworks problematic 
when applied to the intricacies of the real world. In this chapter, instead, an approach is 
outlined which facilitates the investigation of depression in terms of its situated 
production. This approach, Conversation Analysis (CA), avoids the pitfalls of absolutist 
and decontextualised notions of meaning and instead addresses construction, 
interpretation and interaction while still remaining sensitive to the fact that Major 
Depression refers to real difficulties that people encounter in the practice of social life.  
To reiterate a central theme which ran through most of the works reviewed in 
Chapters 2 and 3 (explicitly or implicitly), there is a generalised treatment of words we 
speak as being somehow disembodied commentaries on the state of the world. Talk is 
assumed to somehow provide direct access to internal states or the truth of ‘how the 
world (or a person) is or was’ via a representative function. A consultation in primary 
care with reference to such a condition as Major Depression is reliant entirely upon the 
communication skills of GP and patient; the DSM-IV and the psychological accounts 
detailed in Chapter 2 demand that the words spoken should be treated as (falsifiable) 
propositions relating to events ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to the individual that may directly 
represent symptom-related categories. The empirical work of this project, however, will 
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be premised upon a different assumption, and one that will make sense to all General 
Practitioners, Psychiatrists and Counsellors (Silverman, 1997); that talking is an activity 
in itself. Talk about structure or order does not simply ‘reflect’ or ‘describe’ structure or 
order (internal or external), rather it produces and maintains them; the words themselves 
become a crucial part of the state of affairs that the speaker professes to describe. The 
main focus of the analytic dimension of this study, thus, will come to rest upon a 
conception of talk in the primary care scenario as an active social practice. It will be 
argued that the relationship between words, people and the world is better analysed in 
terms of what words do, that is in terms of the actions they perform, than what they 
might ‘represent’53 in an objective non-linguistic realm.  
There are, in contemporary academia and across a range of disciplines, a plethora 
of analytic approaches which could lay reasonable claim to the provision of a 
methodology sensitive to the outlined concerns and appropriate to the empirical 
investigation of language use both in unstructured interviews and in the primary care 
consultation itself. In the social scientific realm, one could list the models of discourse 
analysis (henceforth DA) emanating from linguistics (Sinclair & Coulthard, 1975), from 
sociology (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Woolgar, 1988) or from critical social psychology 
(Parker, 1992; Parker & Burman, 1993). Moreover, there are such approaches as critical 
discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992 & 1995; Wodak, 1996), rhetorical psychology 
(Billig, 1997), discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Edwards, 1997; Potter, 
1998) and conversation analysis (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974; Atkinson & 
Heritage, 1984; Sacks, 1992; Wooffitt, 1992). Drawing upon various materials from this 
archive of research it will be argued that, of these approaches, the conversation analytic 
research programme offers the least problematic methodology for the exploration of the 
material at hand in terms of the theories expounded in the project thus far. In short, this 
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project will be informed with conversation analysis (CA) as this is the approach most 
sensitive to the critique of orthodox psychological and sociological research and 
reasoning outlined in chapters 2 and 3.  
The chapter begins with an interrogation of the wider ‘parent’ discipline of 
ethnomethodology (part 4.1), the fundaments of which should help illuminate some of 
the underpinnings of CA as an empirical approach. Through an investigation of the basic 
tenets of CA itself (in part 4.2) it will be demonstrated how the mechanics of its method 
are founded upon an understanding of social life as an organised but transformable 
phenomenon and, as such, enable a particular focus upon both the dynamic and rule-
governed qualities of specific incidences of language use. Part 4.3, meanwhile is an 
exploration of work already done in conversation analytic research relating to the types 
of data collected for this project, doctor-patient interaction transcriptions and one–to-one 
interview data, with a view to highlighting some more advanced workings of the method 
and a few useful operational pointers. A critical appreciation (in part 4.4) of the other 
social scientific approaches listed above, meanwhile, will serve to illuminate problems 
with their application to the data collected in the light of the criticisms of 
social/psychological approaches previously discussed (in Chapters 2 and 3) but, also, to 
assimilate any useful insights which could be gleaned from research already conducted in 
these areas. Finally, section 4.5 explores the apparent methodological conundrum of 
applying CA to data which is apparently ‘monologic’ in character. 
 
4.1 ETHNOMETHODOLOGY: 
GARFINKEL’S TRAVELS IN THE ORDINARY WORLD. 
Drawing upon and complex and varied system of intellectual roots, particularly Schütz 
and Parsons (Heritage, 1984a), Harold Garfinkel himself coined the term 
‘ethnomethodology’ in the 1950s. Simply stated, he designated as his primary realm of 
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research the way that the social order is constructed and maintained in a taken for granted 
(though highly skilled) way by members of society or social groups. The skills employed 
by members in order to achieve such ends he termed ‘ethnomethods’ (‘folk’ methods), 
which essentially comprise the tacit (background) normative conventions upon which 
people draw in their construction of their social world, and their attribution of meaning to 
everyday events and activities. Social reality does not pre-exist the members of a society, 
rather the former is constantly created by the latter. The apparent intransigents of a 
society, far from being objective realities, are ‘..the accomplishment of the members..’ 
(Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970:353).  
 Common sense knowledge, thus, becomes central to ethnomethodological study. 
In ‘traditional’ sociology such knowledge had often been treated as a ‘residual category’ 
(Psathas, 1979). The analyst should, however, for Garfinkel, 
 
‘seek to treat practical activities, practical circumstances, and practical sociological 
reasoning as topics of empirical study, and by paying to the most commonplace activities 
of everyday life the attention normally accorded to extraordinary events, seek to learn 
about them as phenomena in their right.’ (Garfinkel, 1967:1) 
 
In this sense his agenda was to explore the nature and use of the ‘rules’ so central to 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy. At the heart of Garfinkel’s work is the principle that the very 
procedures through which people produce and manage their organised everyday affairs 
are ostensibly the same activities which they employ to account for their own actions. 
This is because learned competence in the construction of accounts is embedded in an 
implicit and explicit understanding of the social world and our own actions within it. 
Following from Wittgenstein, he identified that an understanding of social life and the 
way that people make sense of their everyday interactions can only be based upon an 
observation, identification and description of these ethnomethods; rather than assume 
that people follow rules in social life, the focus should be upon the practical ways in 
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which the rules are ‘actualised’. As Jeff Coulter argues, with particular reference to 
discourse referencing that which is ‘inside’ the person: 
 
‘What conjoins neo-Wittgensteinian with ethnomethodological inquiries in this domain is 
the claim that the meaning or intelligibility of our ‘mental’ language is to be determined by 
the elucidation of its practical, engaged use-in-context by competent (acculturated) users of 
the language and by its implications in courses of practical conduct.’ (1991:189) 
   
The methods themselves, the practical reasoning of members of society, are what make 
the rules visible. In terms of actual research, then, Garfinkel’s primary directive was to 
observe how members produce and interpret information in intersubjective exchange and 
how they use language as a resource when constructing a meaningful world in which to 
interact.    
 
4.1.1 Garfinkel’s Trinity: Indexicality, Reflexivity and  Accountability. 
Harold Garfinkel argued that everyday social life is not constituted in and through the 
version of language employed by the majority of grammarians or linguists, Saussurian 
langue, rather it is constituted in everyday speech, something rather more like more like 
parole which had hitherto been treated as a bastardised or inferior expression of ‘ideal’ 
linguistic forms. This language is indexical. Like Wittgenstein, Garfinkel highlighted 
how a word or a phrase is naturally incomplete; while an expression may have some 
transsituational signification, this signification varies according to the situation in which 
it is used. ‘Indexicality’ is a term appropriated from linguistics which denotes, simply, 
that an expression draws its meaning from the context of its communication, be that the 
biography of the speaker, the immediate prior exchanges, previous conversations, the 
nature of the relations between two speakers etc. In short, a word is ‘indexed’ in a 
particular concrete interaction and from this it derives the mass of its significance, though 
even then there are still potential ambiguities. Garfinkel extends this principle to the 
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whole range of language: naturally occurring language use only has meaning in terms of 
the pragmatics of its transmission. The sense of talk, therefore, is always a local thing.  
Rather than embark upon the endless quest for an impossible grail for which social 
scientists had been searching for years, a ‘..remedy to the indexical properties of practical 
discourse..’ (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970:339) indexicality should not be seen as an obstacle 
to research, a parasite on objectivity, but as a prime feature of discourse itself. Given that 
everyday people quite freely understand the meanings of everyday language, he 
demonstrates how the indexical properties of words and phrases do not inhibit mutual 
intelligibility, rather they enable it. As Douglas Benson and John A. Hughes state:  
 
‘Members are interested in the particular, not in idealised, standardised or typical 
meanings as such.  They want to know what that guy meant by that particular remark; 
what that gesture was I made to you yesterday; what that notice on the common room door 
means, and so on. And to make sense of these and other communications members pay 
artful attention to the available contextual features to achieve an interpretation.’ (Benson & 
Hughes, 1983:101-102)    
 
People involved in conversation are constantly engaged in interpretative work to 
accomplish the meaning of any given utterance, and this accomplishment is based upon 
common understandings of context. This is a highly skilled process. Conversation only 
appears smooth and ordered, natural and unproblematic, because members are so 
practised at it. The extra-situational generalisation of meaning is therefore not possible: a 
concrete instance can only be analysed in terms of the situation of its production. 
Garfinkel effectively redirects the study of language use away from attempts to purge 
social discourse of the ‘uncertainties’ of indexical expression and replace its presumed 
‘subjectivity’ with more ‘objective’ formulations. Instead he advocates an exploration of 
how people use ordinary language, and make sense of it, by employing indexical 
expressions in a routine way. 
 A second feature of social experience crucial to Garfinkel’s analysis is related 
directly to indexicality, and this is reflexivity. Talk is not simply about actions and 
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‘things’, it also formulates the nature of the action, of the ‘thing’ and, thus, of the 
situation. In these terms, it is a reflexive practice. At a basic level, talk about the world 
also structures the world. When a person talks about their ‘beliefs’, about their 
relationships with others or about social ‘structure’ they are engaged in practical activity 
to realise those very phenomena and their features.  
 
‘..members accounts, of every sort, in all logical modes, with all their uses, and for every 
method of their assembly, are constituent features of the settings they make observable. 
Members know, require, count on, and make use of this reflexivity to produce, 
accomplish, recognise, or demonstrate rational-adequacy-for-all-practical-purposes of their 
procedures..’(Garfinkel, 1967:8) 
 
Reflexivity addresses the equivalence between describing and producing an action. In the 
course of everyday interaction, however, people do not pay attention to the fact that we 
are constituting meaning, order and rationality in their discourse. Reflexivity is largely 
taken-for-granted; it is not something that is theorised about in everyday situations. In 
this area, then, Garfinkel recommends that the goal of analysis should be to evaluate how 
‘the world as it is known’ comes to be known as ‘the world’ (Heritage, 1984:311). 
Furthermore, the reflexive procedures through which people produce and manage their 
organised everyday affairs are the same activities which they employ to account for their 
own actions. Reflexivity itself presupposes that activities ‘..whereby members produce 
and manage settings of organised everyday affairs are identical with members’ 
procedures for making those settings “account-able”.’(Garfinkel, 1967:1). Or, in other 
terms, practical activities are themselves methods for making those same activities 
‘..visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes, i.e. ‘accountable’, as 
organisations of commonplace everyday activities.’ (Garfinkel, 1967:vii). 
 ‘Accountability’, then, the final central tenet of Garfinkel’s social experience, 
refers to the way that the social world is made recognisable, reportable and describable. 
The status of an action, a thing or a person is rendered in interaction, that is, it is made 
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intelligible to members in the activities of those members. In almost Marxist terms, 
however, the processes by which the meanings of things are made ‘solid’ and 
independent from their construction are largely hidden from, and forgotten by, members 
of society. ‘Objects’ and ‘Mind States’ are, respectively, reified as external/internal 
entities; ‘..society hides from its members its activities of organisation and thus leads 
them to see its features as determinate and independent objects.’ (Garfinkel, 1967, 
p.182). Analysis of the way that the social world and actions within it are made 
accountable reveals how members are constantly engaged in the construction and 
reconstruction of the very (highly precarious) social order necessary for mutual 
understanding. An account of ‘reality’, to return to my review of Wittgenstein’s work, is 
the site at which ‘reality’ is rendered visible and the methods of construction of the 
account are the subject material for the ethnomethodologist.  
 A particularly strong way of illustrating the implications of these notions for the 
study of social action and the traditional (and troublesome, as highlighted in Chapter 3) 
notion of ‘context’ is provided by John Heritage (1984a), who contrasts Garfinkel’s 
approach with that employed by Talcott Parsons in the classic (though flawed) 
sociological work “Towards a General Theory of Action”. Garfinkel’s argument is, to 
reiterate, that ‘context’ is best approached as what participants treat it as, ostensibly as 
how participants make conditions relevant to their activities as part of their activities, 
rather than as a concrete and stable situational context for any given action that can be 
‘read off’ by the analyst. 
 
Parsons: The situation of action is a stable object of consensual identification prior 
to action. Such identification is essential if normatively co-ordinated conduct is to 
occur. Such situational identification is essentially a transcendent product of shared 
substantive knowledge of ‘matters’ of fact known in advance. 
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Garfinkel: The situation of action is essentially transformable. It is identifiable as 
the reflexive product of the organized activities of the participants. As such, it is 
on-goingly discovered, maintained, and altered as a project and a product of 
ordinary actions. Situational constitution is essentially a ‘local’ and immanent 
product of methodic procedure rather than a result of ‘pre-existing’ agreement on 
‘matters of fact’.  
 
(from Heritage, 1984a:132) 
 
This point, in particular, will help to illuminate some of the core themes in the following 
discussion of Conversation analysis. 
 
4.2 CONVERSATION ANALYSIS: 
MAPPING THE INTERPERSONAL MATRIX 
Conversation analysis, like ethnomethodology, is a relatively recent development in the 
understanding of the social world which was, as a coherent set of principles, pioneered 
chiefly by Harvey Sacks in a series of lectures in the 1960s and early 1970s54. These 
lectures outlined an original field of study that  was, certainly initially, concerned almost 
exclusively with the organised properties of ‘ordinary’ everyday conversation which, 
crucially, Sacks considered to be the ‘primordial’ site of human interaction. This 
‘mundane’55 interaction, in Sacks’ work, is taken to be the most fundamental form of 
talk, the form from which all other forms either derive or deviate (Sacks, Schegloff and 
Jefferson, 1974). It is the first kind of talk that everyone learns to ‘do’. It is not scripted 
or pre-ordained, and the complexities of turn taking and the management of 
intersubjectivity therein are accomplished, in Derek Edwards’ well chosen words, ‘on-
the-fly’ (Edwards, 1997). Sacks’ project was, then, grounded in a study of as many 
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empirical instances of such naturally-occurring talk as possible, such that it would 
become possible to elucidate its systematic properties. In his own words: 
 
‘The idea is to take singular sequences of conversation and tear them apart in such a way 
as to find rules, techniques, procedures and maxims (a collection of terms that more or less 
relate to each other and that I use somewhat interchangeably) that can be used to generate 
the orderly features we find in the conversations we examine...So what we are dealing with 
is the technology of conversation. We are trying to find this technology out of actual 
fragments of conversation, so that we can impose as a constraint that the technology 
actually deals with singular events and singular sequences of events- a reasonably strong 
constraint on some sets of rules.’(Sacks, 1984:414-415)  
 
The large number of studies that have now been completed have made it possible for 
conversation analysts to describe the ‘architecture of intersubjectivity’ (Heritage, 1984) 
in some detail, the very structures of interaction. These studies address the tacit 
communicative competences which underpin the production of orderly conversational 
exchange, the practical kinds of interactional work to which utterances are put and the 
way that these utterances are designed with respect to the sequences of talk in which they 
occur. In short, CA explores in a fine-grained and stoically empirical manner the local 
procedures through which everyday life is lived and its meanings produced and 
reproduced by co-participants in interaction.  
A key focus of all studies in CA is upon the way that conversation unfolds turn-
by-turn, with participants using prior turns as resource for the design of utterances, and 
how utterances themselves delimit the range of possible following turns. As such, the 
observation of naturally-occurring conversation allows for an analyst to provide a 
description of the interpretative work, the practical reasoning, being done by the 
participants regarding what has been said and what, thus, ought to be said in order to 
maintain the flow of communication. Levinson contributes: 
 
‘Conversation, as opposed to monologue, offers the analyst an invaluable analytical 
resource: as each turn is responded to by a second, we find displayed in that second an 
analysis of the first by its recipient. Such an analysis is thus provided by participants not 
only for each other but for analysts too.’ (Levinson, 1983:321)  
 
134 
 
This is what conversation analysts term the turn taking ‘proof-procedure’. Essentially (to 
return to Garfinkel’s concerns) rather than attempt to analyse an utterance, account or 
description as a meaningful ‘thing’ in isolation CA instead situates any given utterance of 
any length in the context of its immediate interactive milieu to show how the former is 
oriented to the latter, and, thus, generate an understanding of specific meanings derived 
from those of the participants in interaction themselves rather than on some categories 
pre-defined by the researcher.  
As briefly outlined in Chapter 1, any descriptive utterance, from a conversation 
analytic perspective, has to be analysed practically in terms of what it does interactively 
rather than simply as a neutral description of a state of affairs. Accounts of ‘how one 
feels’ in spoken discourse, for a relevant example, can be seen to be oriented toward the 
interactive context in which they are produced and cannot, thus, be treated simply as 
(falsifiable) conduits of information regarding ‘internal’ states. As David Silverman 
(1998) writes of Sacks’ original analyses, not only does CA (in this sense) stand in 
opposition to most contemporary academic treatments of language, it is also quite 
powerfully counter-intuitive. 
 
‘Ordinarily, if we think about it at all, we assume that what we say reflects our state of 
mind. However, what Sacks is showing us is that, in practice, we construct our talk with 
reference to how it will be heard. By saying what we do, positioned in a particular place, 
we thus make available to our hearer(s) a particular reading of what we mean.’ 
(Silverman, 1998:6) [Original emphasis] 
 
This key point, more than any other, echoes Wittgenstein’s key concerns regarding both 
the nature and study of social action. In “Zettel” he articulates a critique of much modern 
social science; attempted explanation of action in terms of underlying (social or 
psychological) causal mechanisms is, ostensibly, little more than speculation. Instead, the 
‘real’ stuff of analysis is there to be observed and understood. 
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‘The difficulty- I might say- is not that of finding a solution but rather of recognising as the 
solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it...This is connected, I 
believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty 
is a description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, and 
do not try to get beyond it.’ (Wittgenstein, 1981:244)  
 
Taking this in conjunction with his meta-declaration that practice gives words their 
significance, we can begin to understand how that which Wittgenstein proposed for an 
analysis of people and the world is manifest in Sacks’ method. 
Many of the central themes and techniques of CA do, as will become clear, 
deviate from what Garfinkel stipulated were ‘proper’ methods and topics for sociological 
research causing some to consider it a sociological approach in its own right, distinct 
from ethnomethodology. Potter and Wetherell, for example, point to the way that 
although ‘Conversation analysis is very much an outgrowth of ethnomethodological 
research [although] its analytical approach is rather different.’ (1987:81). To many, 
however, it remains so intertwined with ethnomethodology, embodying many of the 
principles central to Garfinkel’s own work, that distinctions are quite difficult56 to 
sustain. Derek Edwards, simply and reasonably accurately, suggests that ‘CA is the 
application of ethnomethodological principles to the empirical study of talk.’ (1997:84).  
While even now, years after Sacks’ original work, the primary topic of CA 
remains naturally-occurring ‘ordinary’ conversation, there have recently been a number 
of studies which have moved to apply conversation analytic methods to more 
‘institutional’ settings, ‘asymmetrical’ or openly convention-governed instances of 
interaction; for example there have been some detailed examinations of political 
speeches (Atkinson, 1984), courtroom interrogations (Atkinson and Drew, 1979), radio 
station phone-ins (Hutchby, 1996) and, of particular relevance to this study, interaction 
between healthcare professionals and  their patients (Heath, 1986 & 1992; Frankel, 1984 
& 1990; Silverman, 1997). 
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4.2.1. Conversation Analysis: A Note on Origins and Themes. 
For the sake of brevity, a full account of Harvey Sacks’ early work and findings will not 
be presented here; there are many excellent texts on this subject available (particularly 
Chapter 1 in Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Chapter 6 in Silverman, 1998) which provide 
detailed and extensive narratives on how Sacks initially developed his method from 
specific observations during a study of telephone calls to a suicide prevention centre. It is 
sufficient at this stage to note that, from the exhaustive programme of research in which 
he immersed himself, analysing countless extracts of naturally occurring talk, Sacks took 
Garfinkel’s propositions on the micro-organisation of social life one step further; even in 
the most apparently disorganised, irrational and trivial examples of human interaction, a 
distinct organisation could be observed.  
 
‘If…we figure or guess or decide that whatever humans do, they are just another animal 
after all, maybe more complicated than others but perhaps not noticeably so, then whatever 
humans do can be examined to discover some way they do it…That is, we may…take it 
that there is order at all points.’ (Sacks, 1984a:22) 
 
With this key theme in mind, the workings of the conversation analytic methodology 
itself will now be explored in more detail. 
 
4.2.2. Conversation Analysis: Methodological Grounding. 
A key focus of all studies in CA is upon the way that conversation unfolds turn-by-turn. 
This can be illustrated using a simple example57. 
  
EX. 4(I): [ATKINSON & DREW, 1979] 
 
A: Is there something bothering you or not? 
 (1.0) 
A: Yes or no 
 (1.5) 
A: Eh? 
B: No. 
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The extract illuminates several foundational conversation analytic concepts, which will 
be discussed in turn. 
 
• Adjacency Pairs. 
The first, and hardly revolutionary, issue is that the question is ultimately followed by an 
answer. This is an example of the basic, though crucial, concept of adjacency pairings, 
sequences of two utterances that, in the words of Schegloff and Sacks (1973:396-397), 
are: 
 
• Adjacent 
• Produced by different speakers 
• Ordered as a first part and a second part. And: 
• Typed, so that the first part requires a particular second part or particular range of 
second parts58 
 
More interesting is that B does not initially provide a response to A’s question, causing A 
to reiterate the question. This demonstrates that: 
 
1. The rules of adjacency pairing are not invariant or mechanical (i.e. a question will not 
necessarily be followed directly by an answer), but  
2. The repetition of the question indicates that questioner expects a reply, thus 
adjacency pairings have a normative character. The two parts of a pair are ‘relatively 
ordered’ (Sacks, 1992). 
 
The second part is made conditionally relevant by the production of the first (Schegloff, 
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1972). If it is not then produced, it will be ‘seen to be absent’ (Sacks, 1992) as in this 
case. Furthermore, the fact that A did not repeat the question in full, rather reformulated 
it in increasingly truncated form, demonstrates that he interprets the silence (or non-
utterance) not being resultant of B having ‘not heard’, but of a reluctance to answer. In 
doing so, speaker A also assigns the silence to speaker B; by examining the sequential 
unfolding of the conversation, a one second-long period during which nothing is said can 
be seen to be interpreted as a meaningful product of a specific speaker. This is a good 
example of what Levinson (1983) describes as 
 
‘…the remarkable power of the turn-taking system to assign the absence of any verbal 
activity to some particular participant as his turn: such a mechanism can then quite literally 
make something out of nothing, assigning to a silence or pause, itself devoid of interesting 
properties, the property of being A’s, or B’s, or neither A’s nor B’s, and further, through 
additional mechanisms, the kind of specific significance…’(Levinson, 1983:321) 
 
The significance of the silence in this case is that it has the character of a dispreferred 
response or dispreferred action turn shape (Pomerantz, 1984) which will be examined 
under the next heading. 
 Adjacency pairs do not, of course, exist as single units in most conversations but, 
more often than not, in chains of activity. For example, Sacks (1992) notes how a 
question-answer pair such as ‘What are you doing tonight?’, if answered with a ‘Nothing 
much’, can serve as a pre-signal to an invitation-response pair. Equally, pairs are often 
found within pairs. A good example is provided by Sacks (1992) himself: 
 
EXTRACT 4(II). [SACKS, 1992] 
1. A: Can I borrow your car? 
2. B:  When? 
3. A:  This afternoon. 
4. B: For how long? 
5. A: A couple of hours. 
6. B: Okay. 
 
In this sequence, lines 1 and 6 constitute a request-response pair, and inserted between 
the pair parts are two further pairs. Lines 2 and 3, and lines 4 and 5 each take the form of 
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question-answer pairs. Lines 2 to 5 are, thus, what Sacks terms an ‘insertion sequence’ – 
produced on the mutual understanding between the interactants that B will ultimately 
provide an answer to A’s question. 
Members’ understanding of the tacit, flexible rules of adjacency pairing has direct 
implications for the study of meaning in talk. Recall the very first example with which 
Sacks worked – extract 4(I) in this chapter. He asked the question ‘Where is it 
appropriate to perform given conversation actions?’ with regard to providing an identity 
in a telephone call. Now consider a simple greeting in such a phone call – a simple 
‘hello’. At the beginning of a call, as the first part of a greeting-greeting pair, this is likely 
to be interpreted as a exactly that, a greeting. In the middle of a call, however, Sacks 
suggests, it is far more likely to be heard as an inquiry as to whether the other person is 
still on the line, a first pair part requiring a different type of response.   
 
• Preference Organisation. 
To return to the extract 4(I) it was claimed that the significance of the silence 
(highlighted) is that it has the character of a dispreferred action turn shape. 
 
A: Is there something bothering you or not? 
 (1.0) 
A: Yes or no 
 (1.5) 
A: Eh? 
B: No. 
 
Preference organisation in itself is a strong underpinning theme in CA, and one which 
tells us much about the structure of social relations, both in the specific incidence and on 
the wider scale, and the social organisation of conduct itself. The general term 
‘preference’ is used by conversation analysts to describe cases where alternative, courses 
of action are available in a second pair part; for example, an invitation makes relevant an 
acceptance or refusal, an accusation makes relevant a denial or an admission. A wide 
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corpus of research has shown that these potential pair part completions are non-
equivalent and normatively ranked within the context of interactions (Sacks & Schegloff, 
1979). As a word of caution, it is important to remember that the terms ‘preferred’ and 
‘dispreferred’ in this context do not refer to psychological decision making processes 
regarding the nature of an utterance. Rather, they index the level of inferred expectation 
of a type of response. Jonathan Potter elaborates: 
 
‘[E]ven though a speaker may ‘prefer’, in the usual psychological sense, to turn down an 
invitation, they may opt for the ‘preferred action’, in the conversation analytic sense, of 
accepting it. The preference is part of conversation as an institution rather than of the 
psychology of individual speakers…’ (Potter, 1997:60) 
 
A preferred action turn shape is one whereby agreement is generated, or the 
conversational order maintained. For example, the preferred response to an invitation 
would often be an acceptance, what Sacks (1992) terms a ‘Yes-period’, basically a 
second part that makes conditionally relevant no further clarification or account from its 
producer. A dispreferred turn shape, meanwhile, is one which produces disagreement or 
is problematic in some way and requires justification (Pomerantz, 1984a), what Sacks 
terms a ‘No-plus’59. Refusal of an invitation, for example, can make relevant an account 
from the refuser as to why he/she refused. Failure to produce such an account can 
threaten the local social solidarity (Silverman, 1997) between speakers. In extract 4(i) it 
can be clearly seen, from subsequent utterances, that B’s silence took a dispreferred 
action turn shape; it was problematic and further activity was required. Levinson (1983) 
indicates that there is a large range of available dispreferred second pair parts other than 
silences and direct negative answers; there are also protests of ignorance (‘I don’t 
know’), re-routes (‘Ask someone else’), refusals (‘I’d rather not say’) and challenges to 
the presuppositions of the question (‘I don’t know what you’re talking about’). These 
responses themselves are normatively ranked, and may or may not elicit further 
interrogation by the questioner. In the sample extract above, B’s silence was of a more 
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greatly dispreferred format than the final negative answer. 
Preference organisation for given pair types, as implied, is not in any sense ‘set in 
stone’, it is something actualised in the particular. To reiterate a key theme in Garfinkel’s 
original programme for ethnomethodology, there are no prescriptive rules which can be 
considered to underpin social actions in general; rather, the rule is discoverable in 
specific actions. Garfinkel himself argues that analysts should 
 
‘…refuse serious consideration of the prevailing proposal that..rational properties of 
practical activities be assessed, recognised categorised, described by using a rule or 
standard obtained outside the actual settings within which such properties are recognised, 
used, produced and talked about by settings’ members.’ (Garfinkel, 1967:3) 
 
Some invitations may, thus, prefer refusals, some offers may prefer declines: a first pair 
part itself can be designed so as to embed the expectation of a specific response, that is to 
say preference can be constructed in a specific interaction. For example the question 
‘You won’t be at home at 3pm, will you?’ makes available the inference that a negative 
response is expected in the way that ‘Will you be at home at 3pm?’ does not (Schegloff, 
1988). Equally, producers of second parts can amend or transform the character or level 
of preference or dispreference in a variety of ways.  Schegloff contributes: 
 
‘Speakers display the kind of action they are doing, and the kind of stance they take 
towards what they are doing, by their deployment of [dispreferred responses]…They do 
the response they do ‘as preferred’ or ‘as dispreferred’, rather than ‘doing the preferred or 
dispreferred response’.’ (Schegloff, 1988:453)   
 
A good example of a speaker actively ‘doing’ dispreference can be seen in this extract 
from Sacks (1987). 
 
EXTRACT 4(III) [SACKS, 1987] 
1.   A:  You coming down early? 
2.   B:  Well, I got a lot of things to do before getting  
3.    cleared up tomorrow. I w- probably won’t be too  
4.    early. 
 
4(iii) demonstrates all four of what Heritage (1984b) identifies as the main ways in 
which the dispreferred status of an action can be shown by a speaker60: 
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1. The dispreferred action itself (a decline of an invite) is delayed either within a single 
turn, as in this case, or across a series of turns. 
2. The action is either prefaced or qualified within the same turn as it is produced. 
3. The action is often accomplished in indirect form, and mitigated as such. 
4. The action is often accounted for. 
 
Sacks’ own analysis demonstrates that while A’s initial utterance (line 1) may seem to 
prefer an affirmative response, B’s completion of the pair (lines 2 to 4) is skilfully 
constructed so as to avoid going along with the assumption, that is to be dispreferred, but 
simultaneously is ‘formed up so that the disagreement is as weak as possible’ (Sacks, 
1987:58). Firstly, what Pomerantz (1984a) terms a ‘dispreference marker’ is deployed in 
line 2, a ‘Well’. As Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) report: 
 
‘One of the most significant ways speakers have of indicating the dispreferred status of a 
turn is by starting with markers such as ‘Well’ or ‘Um’..’ (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998:44) 
 
Secondly, the actual decline of the invite to come down early is not given until after an 
account for why B will ‘probably not be coming down early’61. Finally, what looks to be 
the beginnings of a straight ‘I won’t be coming down early’ decline in line 3 is aborted 
and replaced by the weaker form ‘I probably won’t..’. All of these devices serve to 
minimise damage to local social solidarity – to be ‘polite’ and to avoid breakdowns in 
the orderliness of the conversation. An excellent example of the direct analytic 
usefulness of the concept of preference organisation can be seen in section 4.3, in the 
discussion of David Silverman’s study of HIV counselling (1997).  
  
• Communicative Competence. 
The exchange in extract 4(i) is finally ended by the provision of a firm answer by B, 
completing the pair.  
143 
 
 
A: Is there something bothering you or not? 
 (1.0) 
A: Yes or no 
 (1.5) 
A: Eh? 
B: No. 
 
Both of the participants in even this very short sequence of conversation can be seen to 
understand what is required in the situation - that is to say, they are skilled in the relevant 
tacit communicative competences. Both carry out interpretative work in the process of 
the interaction regarding the nature of the prior turns (or non-turns). Speaker A designs 
the questions according to an interpretation of the nature of B’s silence, for instance.  
An important note at this point is that, as with preference organisation, the linguistic 
‘competences’, devices, conversation analysts stress in addressing the orderly manners in 
which speech is designed and produced are not in themselves attempts to model the 
psychological processes underpinning language use. The devices identified are not to be 
considered as necessarily ‘deliberate’ strategies produced by some conscious ‘agenda’. 
These systematic properties of conversation are rather culturally available and socially 
organised resources for, and vehicles of, social action (Wooffitt, 1992). As Harvey 
Sacks forcefully argued in his first lecture: 
 
‘When people start to analyse social phenomena..you figure that [the speakers] couldn’t 
have thought that fast. 
 I want to suggest to you that you have to forget that completely. Don’t worry about 
how fast they’re thinking. First of all, don’t worry that they’re ‘thinking’. Just try to come 
to terms with how it is that the thing comes off. Because you’ll find they can do these 
things. Just take any other area of natural science and see, for example, how fast molecules 
do things. They don’t have very good brains. So just let the materials fall as they may.’ 
(Sacks, 1992:11)  
 
He crystallises here a resonant echo of the powerful, counter-intuitive note that 
Wittgenstein sounds in “Zettel”62: Both call for a radical reshaping of the study of 
cognition, talk and action. Rather than seek to speculate explanation in terms of hidden 
process, rather than seek the ‘why’ of the issue, we should evaluate the ‘how’ of 
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production. Following from Garfinkel, CA as a methodology thus focuses upon the 
doing of talk-in-interaction itself, paying no formal attention to the possible causal 
influence of a prescribed ‘social context’ or hidden ‘individual motive’ except where, 
and this is of paramount importance, ‘context’ or ‘motive’ becomes a part of the 
conversation itself, is oriented to by the speakers and informs the trajectory of the 
sequences of talk. This theme, along with the others arising in part 4.2, will now be 
expanded and clarified in a number of empirical settings directly relevant to interaction 
in the primary care encounter.  
 
4.3 CONVERSATION ANALYSIS AT WORK: 
SOME STUDIES IN MEDICAL INTERACTION. 
‘The distinctiveness of formal types of institutional settings is based on the close 
relationship between the participants’ social roles and the forms of talk in which they 
engage.’ 
Ian Hutchby and Robin Woffitt63  
‘Conversation Analysis’ 
 
There have been, particularly in the last two decades, a substantial number of 
conversation analytic studies published which explore interaction in medical settings: 
counselling, surgery, therapy etc. For the sake of brevity in this section, however, the 
discussion will be based around a detailed examination of three key studies in this area, 
though others will be interrogated where illuminating.  
 
4.3.1. Frankel: Turn Taking, Questions and Rights. 
One of the first serious attempts to apply CA to talk in the primary care consultation was 
by Richard M Frankel (1984), whose paper “From Sentence to Sequence..” focused 
chiefly on the turn-taking structures in interaction between general practitioners and 
patients and the value of analysing the sequential unfolding of the medical encounter. 
The ideas from this paper were subsequently developed in Frankel’s own (1990) 
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publication “Talking in interviews..” in which the activity distribution between doctors 
and patients in terms of asking questions and initiating new topics were more explicitly 
explored. An analysis of extract 4(iv) illustrates well the approach taken: 
 
EXTRACT 4(IV): [FRANKEL, 1990]  
1.   Dr: Very good. (0.4) Very good=lemme see your ankle. 
2.    (2.2) 
3.   Dr: pt. .hhh VERY GOOD 
4.    (1.1) 
5.   Pt: I wanna ask you som’n. 
6.   Dr: What’s that. 
7.    (0.6) 
8.   Pt: pt. .hh (0.5) I have- (0.6) this second toe (.) 
9.    that was broken. (0.4) But I went to the pediatrist 
10.    (.) because I couldn’ find a doctor on th’ weekend. 
11.    (0.4) An he said it wasn’ broken.=It was. 
12.    So it wasn’ (.) taken care of prperly. .hh ‘n when 
13.    I’m on my feet, I get a sensation in it. 
14.    I mean is anything (th’t) can be do:ne? 
15.   Dr: How long ago d’ju break it. 
16.   Pt: Mmh two years. 
17.   Dr:  Yih c’d put a metatarsal pad underneath it… 
 
Frankel’s broader observations highlight how, despite there being no institutionalised 
imperatives preventing patients asking questions of doctors or initiating new topics, these 
actions are, on the whole, undertaken almost entirely by the doctors – a trend  shown also 
in work by Maynard (1991) and ten Have (1991 & 1995). That is to say that doctor-
patient interactions are somewhat asymmetrical in comparison to mundane, everyday 
talk; equal conversational rights are not oriented to by the co-interactants. This does not 
mean for one moment that everyday conversation is necessarily ‘ideal’ or ‘equal’. 
 
‘For instance, a speaker who asks another’s advice on some matter, or one who intends to 
recount a story about an event they witnessed, automatically places himself or herself in a 
position of asymmetry in relation to the recipient. Asking for advice situates the recipient 
in the position of a ‘holder of knowledge’ about, say, a course of action. Similarly, the aim 
to recount a story assumes that the recipient is not already aware of the events.’ (Hutchby 
& Woofitt, 1998:161) 
 
In this particular extract the patient can be seen to actively orient to, and reproduce, the 
‘authority’ of the doctor at the local level by actively issuing a request for permission to 
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ask a question (line 5). This theme is developed in the detailed work of Christian Heath 
(1986 & 1992). 
 
4.3.2. Heath: Diagnosis and the Status of Knowledge. 
Heath’s pathbreaking studies of the primary care consultation utilise not only CA but 
also analyses of the interpenetration of the talk with gaze and body movement captured 
by video camera. As Heath himself highlights, it is essential that data such as this should 
in no way be considered more ‘complete’ than the tape recorded talk normally used in 
conversation analytic studies (see also Heath & Luff, 1992; Heath, 1997). David 
Silverman articulates this point as follows:  
 
‘[T]he idea of ‘completeness’ may itself be an illusion. Surely, there cannot be a totally 
‘complete’ data any more than there can be a ‘perfect’ transcript? Rather, as always in 
science, everything depends on what you are trying to do and where it seems that you may 
be able to make progress.’ (Silverman, 1998:72) 
 
Heath’s work has a great deal of relevance to this project, and remains one of the most 
broad and thorough applications of the conversation analytic method to doctor-patient 
interaction. Some of the most interesting insights arising from this relate to the delivery 
and reception of diagnosis. Heath’s primary concern herein is to demonstrate how on the 
whole, during a consultation, patients systematically withhold negative responses, and 
particularly challenges, to the ‘expert knowledge’ delivered by the GP, even when 
openly given the opportunity. Diagnosis is almost exclusively met with silence or simple 
agreement.  
 
‘By withholding response, patients not only provide the doctor with the opportunity of 
developing the consultation as they so wish, but preserve the objective, scientific and 
professional status of the diagnosis or medical assessment; the silence or 
acknowledgement operating retroactively to underscore the practitioner’s ‘opinion’ of the 
condition…’ (Heath, 1992:262) 
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However, in cases when a response is actually given, as in extract 4(v), it is designed in 
such a way as to stress the patient’s own lack of knowledge, and thus to reflexively 
confirm the GP’s role as unchallenged ‘expert’; 
 
EXTRACT 4(V): [HEATH, 1992]  
1.  Dr: Well there’s a marked er:: (.) conjunctivitis 
2.    on both si:des there mister Banks, erm: 
3.   Pt: ◦er 
4.    (0.2) 
5.   Dr: .thhhhh What set it off though I wouldn’t know: 
6.  Pt: I wouldn’t either I thought it was hay:fever or 
7.    somit like this: 
 
The patient here acknowledges the diagnosis (line 3) in minimal form, and then 
following the GP’s assertion that the cause is uncertain (line 5) responds in such a way as 
to initially reassert his/her own ‘ignorance’ (‘I wouldn’t either’) and then formulate 
his/her own self-diagnosis as a ‘guess’ (‘I thought it was hay:fever or somit like this:’) 
rather than a ‘fact’. As Heath claims, even in a case where, as in 4(v), a GP apparently 
undermines their own status as an ‘infallible’ source of knowledge, 
 
‘…it may be observed how the patient’s contribution preserves the contrasting status of the 
two versions of the illness and in particular embodies the subjective and lay standpoint of 
their own opinion.’ (Heath, 1992:262) 
 
In this sense, Heath empirically demonstrates the ground-level production of the relative 
roles of ‘GP’ and ‘Patient’, and their respective knowledge of health and illness’, in the 
very design of talk in the consultation. Rather than assume the actions taking place are 
direct evidence of standing, monolithic social ‘roles’ which pre-exist the site of action, as 
per Parsons (1951), or power-determined social ‘positions’ which individuals 
passively/unconsciously occupy (Marcuse, 1967), the conversation analytic method 
emphasises how such roles or positions are themselves collaboratively and flexibly 
asserted and reproduced in specific examples of interaction.  
 
4.3.3. Silverman: HIV, Morality and the Construction of ‘Delicate’ Objects. 
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David Silverman’s (1997) highly sophisticated investigation of counselling practices 
surrounding the phenomena of HIV and AIDS has much contemporary and practical 
relevance for this project, and explores a wide variety of themes including the giving and 
receiving of advice and the structure of interviews/information delivery. The area that 
will be explored in this section, however, has particular relevance both to the texts 
discussed in Chapter 3 and to much of the forthcoming analysis; this is the situated 
construction (and deconstruction) of stigma.  
The underpinnings of Silverman’s analysis of ‘delicate’ or ‘stigmatised’ concepts 
in talk can be roundly captured in the following quotation from Jörg Bergmann’s 
‘Veiled Morality: Notes on Discretion in Psychiatry’. 
 
‘By describing something with caution and discretion, this something is turned into a 
matter which is in need of being formulated cautiously and discreetly. Viewed 
sociologically, there is not first an embarrassing, delicate [or] morally dubious 
event..instead, the delicate..character of the event is constituted by the very act of 
talking about it cautiously and discreetly.’ (Bergmann, 1992:154) 
 
A sociology of stigma, then, must not be built on the analyst’s own assumptions relating 
to which situations are in some way ‘intrinsically’ stigmatised; because people are active 
agents in social life, what is ‘proper’ or ‘improper’ is always a matter of local production 
and negotiation rather than of transsituational received wisdom or generalisable rules of 
‘moral’ behaviour. This is at least in part acknowledged by Goffman (1963) who points 
to the variable and contextual distribution of stigma, but who then largely proceeds to 
work with ‘common sense’ examples (deformity, criminal records etc.) without really 
demonstrating how these stigmatic issues are locally managed as ‘stigmatic issues’ (or 
not) by participants in everyday life. Rather, by examining the ways in which a topic is 
attended to as ‘delicate’ by doctor and patient in the sequential unfolding of a 
consultation it is possible to analyse stigma as it manifests in situ, and without any need 
for speculation on the role of psychological process (Silverman, 1997; Heath, 1986). 
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 A number of these themes can be illustrated with reference to extract 4(vi), where 
C designates the counsellor and P designates a male patient:  
 
EXTRACT 4(VI): [SILVERMAN, 1997]  
1.  C: erm: what made you decide to come in then [softer] 
2.    to be tested? 
3.    (1.0) 
4.   P: er: well I (1.2) actually I’d been thinking about 
5.    doing it for some ti:me er:: (0.5) I had (.) I was 
6.    in a relationship about er six or eight months ago 
7.    (0.7) which lasted (1.0) well it ended six or eight 
8.    months ago it lasted for about three years and er 
9.    (1.0) er we had engaged in some unsafe sex  
10.    activities and er I later found out that er my partner 
11.    had been having (.) sex with other people 
   
As Heritage (1984b) and Schegloff (1988) highlight, delaying the delivery of information 
serves to mark it as ‘dispreferred’ or problematic (and thus ‘bad news’) for the benefit of 
the hearer. Silverman points to the manner in which P’s answer (beginning line 4) is 
characterised by a flow of ‘perturbed’ speech in the form of a series of hesitations, 
pauses and self-initiated self repairs (for example, ‘er:: (0.5) I had (.) I was in a 
relationship’). The function of this becomes apparent in the manner in which P rather 
than directly answering the question attends instead to the topic of the amount of time for 
which he was considering having an HIV test. This is a technique Silverman terms 
‘expressive caution’. 
 
‘Two functions seem to be served by introducing this topic. First, it may put P in a 
favourable light since ‘thinking about doing [things] for some time’ may be hearable as an 
activity which suggests the category ‘responsible person’. Second, it avoids P getting 
straight into the issue of his risky activities. This expressive caution is underlined since P’s 
initial utterance (er: well I (1.2) actually) might have led to an immediate disclosure of his 
sexual activities but is forestalled by its repair.’ (Silverman, 1997:67) 
 
Having already constructed his own identity as that of a ‘responsible’ person, P utilises 
this expressive caution to make space for descriptions both of activities and people which 
are ‘good news’ (‘relationship’ and ‘partner’ respectively), further serving by contrast to 
attend to the ‘delicate’ status of the key item, ‘sex with other people’, which is itself also 
made hearable as dispreferred with a micro-delay (line 11). Silverman also observes 
150 
 
how, in this extract, P avoids providing any specification beyond the very general as to 
the actual nature of the people and practices involved in these ‘delicate’ activities. This 
serves to place responsibility for the utterance of further ‘delicate’ issues equally on C, 
who must explicitly request them. In these terms, a patient can neatly find solutions to 
two key interactional problems. 
 
‘First, they avoid the potentially morally dubious activity of volunteering details of sexual 
activity. Second, not knowing what is appropriate in such a consultation, they give the 
professional an option about whether specification is in order.’ (Silverman, 1997:67) 
 
In extract 4(VI), the issue of ‘promiscuity’ is made distinctly accountable in the activity 
of seeking an HIV test; working again from the observation that ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’ 
behaviour are locally produced phenomena rather than transsituational imperatives, 
however, Silverman shows how ‘non-promiscuity’ can also be heard as being made 
accountable in this way. 
 
EXTRACT 4(VII): [SILVERMAN, 1997]  
1.  C:   [How long have you been with him? 
2.   P: Six months. 
3.   C: Six months. (0.3) When were you last with anyone  
4.    before that? 
5.   P: About thr(h)ee years. .hhh= 
6.   C: About three yea[rs 
7.   P:   [hhh I’m a Catholic.=heh 
 
Here, C’s repetition (line 6) of P’s utterance ‘About three years’ in line 5, coupled with 
P’s own laughter token at the end of line 5, marks the original utterance as in some way 
remarkable. It is Silverman’s observation that having not had sex for three years is 
demonstrated here to be activity not usually bound into the category of ‘people who seek 
an HIV test’; C’s repetition functions to call P to account for his/her past behaviour 
which is to be regarded as ‘unusual’ in this context. P proceeds to provide a warrant for 
the behaviour (line 7) based on membership of a religious membership category 
(‘Catholic’)64.  
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The studies detailed above reveal in some detail a variety of socially organised, culturally 
available resources utilised collaboratively by doctors and patients in the 
accomplishment of a variety of situated social actions. Without recourse to explanations 
based on universal social powers or hypothesised psychic realms, it was possible to 
observe certain relations and roles being oriented to and contextually reproduced and to 
describe how specific meanings are constructed, negotiated and transformed in the turn-
by-turn unfolding of interaction. In these terms, the method can be seen to be clearly 
sensitive to the critique of orthodox sociological and psychological reasoning outlined in 
previous chapters. It will now be prudent to explore a number of other (quite similar) 
approaches by way of contrast, and in some places comparison, so as to elucidate the 
status of CA as not only a suitable methodology, but the most suitable to the purposes of 
this project.  
 
4.4 THE MANY FACES OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: 
A CRITICAL COMMENTARY. 
Unlike CA, the empirical programme of Discourse Analysis is based on description of 
the way that a whole range of textual forms are constructed, and to examine the functions 
that specific constructions serve at interpersonal and wider levels. As discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, there are a wide variety of methods termed discourse analysis 
in contemporary academia, inhabiting a range of disciplines. In social psychology, it is 
fair to say that DA as an analytic method grew out of the Sociology of Scientific 
Knowledge65, largely in the highly influential “Laboratory Life: The Construction of 
Scientific Facts” by Steve Woolgar and Bruno Latour, and in Nigel Gilbert and Michael 
Mulkay’s definitive SSK ‘discourse analytic’ study “Opening Pandora’s Box: A 
Sociological Analysis of Scientists’ Discourse”. Ostensibly, these social psychological 
works can be divided into two main strands: The locus classicus in the first of these is 
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Ian Parker’s “Discourse Dynamics”, an approach to the analysis of discourse which 
bears some significant conceptual resemblance to the tradition of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) pioneered by Norman Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995) and applied 
particularly to medical settings by Ruth Wodak (1996), also to and a variety of other 
critically-oriented approaches in sociolinguistics (Labov & Fanshel, 1977; Cicourel, 
1981; Todd, 1983 & 1989). The second strand, and the tradition in which I am primarily 
interested, finds its strongest early articulation in “Discourse and Social Psychology: 
Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour” by Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell and on a 
more sustained empirical level by Edwards and Potter (1992), and Edwards’ subsequent 
“Discourse and Cognition”. This form of DA, now generally termed ‘Discursive 
Psychology’, is informed by CA when dealing with accounts ‘in sequence’, and also, on 
a broader scale, by the rhetorical psychology developed by Michael Billig in the classic 
“Arguing and Thinking” (1997). Its later manifestations, particularly Edwards (1997), 
represent an even greater convergence with CA, distinctive only in their highly specific 
topic-centred approach.  
Although problematic in some ways, discursive psychology (DP) is rather more 
appropriate to the prerequisites outlined already than critical discourse analytic methods,  
providing many useful ideas for a pragmatic analysis of talk in the primary care 
consultation. After exploring the useful characteristics of DP, a review of said critical 
approaches to the analysis of discourse with a particular focus on critical studies of 
medical interaction (Todd, 1983; Mishler, 1984; West, 1984; Wodak, 1996) will help to 
illuminate why I have not chosen them to inform the main analysis when it could well be 
argued that they are (at least to some extent) appropriate. 
 
4.4.1. Discursive Psychology: An Appreciative Critical Commentary. 
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I have no intention here of providing a full review of the SSK projects in which DP has 
its roots66. Instead, I shall take as its genesis point Potter and Wetherell’s “Discourse and 
Social Psychology”, and shall only refer to the work in SSK where its influence is 
important.  
 Potter and Wetherell’s (1987) study functions largely as a critique of the 
orthodox theories, methodologies and categories in social psychology. They explore 
words as actions, and accounts as active constructions, to show how the importance of 
variations in actual language use between accounts of phenomena have been largely 
overlooked in psychological studies. Rather than address accounts of ‘attitudes’, for 
example, as neutral representations of said attitudes, they argue that it is first necessary to 
address the pragmatic work that the accounts themselves do. Descriptions of internal 
states do not, for Potter and Wetherell, give the analyst privileged access to the being of a 
person, rather they are irreducibly social products employed to achieve specific 
interpersonal goals. As they suggest, if a person espouses attitude x on one occasion and 
contradictory attitude y on another, then the accounts simply cannot be treated as 
unproblematic guides to the ‘beliefs’ of the person. The construction and functions of the 
account itself must therefore become a site of interest. Their study is, then, premised 
upon six points which arise from any analysis of the variable descriptions provided by 
different people, or the same person, of ostensibly the ‘same’ phenomenon.: 
 
1. language is used for a variety of functions and its use has a variety of consequences; 
2. language is both constructed and constructive; 
3. the same phenomenon can be described in a number of different ways; 
4. there will, therefore, be considerable variation in accounts; 
5. there is, as yet, no foolproof way to deal with this variation and to sift accounts which 
are ‘literal’ or ‘accurate’ from those which are ‘rhetorical’ or simply ‘misguided’ 
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thereby escaping the problems variation raises for researchers with a ‘realistic’ view 
of language; 
6. the constructive and variable ways in which language is used should themselves 
become a central topic of study. (Potter & Wetherell, 1987:35) 
 
Drawing explicitly on semiotics, they highlight that when considering any given 
utterance or text is necessary to reflect on not only what has been said/written, but what 
could have been, and why in the context of production the relevant selections of 
language were made. Though the attention they pay to the actual organisation of 
accounts owes a lot to CA, one of the primary tools that Potter and Wetherell employ 
when analysing the content of accounts is the (rather less ethnomethodology-friendly) 
‘linguistic repertoire’, an analytic device borrowed from Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) 
whose main analytic device for deconstructing scientific texts was the concept of 
‘linguistic registers’, a division of scientific discourses into ‘empiricist’ and ‘contingent’ 
sets. These represented a more formal, ‘structural’, limited scientific language on the one 
hand, ‘..stressing impersonality and experimental results,.’ (Myers, 1990:28) which is 
used primarily for the writing of one’s own scientific texts so as to minimise possible 
interpretative variabilities, and a more flexible, context dependent lexicon on the other 
which is presented as referencing agency, individual error and other social interlopers 
into the ‘scientific process’. This latter ‘repertoire’ is used by scientists chiefly to 
undermine or discredit the claims of others. Potter and Wetherell, meanwhile expand the 
scope of this tool somewhat. A ‘linguistic repertoire’ is, for them: 
 
‘..constituted through a limited range of terms used in particular stylistic and grammatical 
constructions. Often a repertoire will be organised around specific metaphors and figures 
of speech (tropes)..’ (Potter and Wetherell, 1987:149) 
 
One of the strengths of this strategy is that it helps the analyst address how individuals 
themselves can construct certain versions of their world in certain ways, the procedures 
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of word selection in accounting, including how they  work out and reproduce the 
psychologist’s own categories. As such, the analyst can work with naturally-occurring 
empirical data rather than only that produced in experimental settings. On the downside, 
however, the whole notion of ‘linguistic repertoires’ does seem to owe rather a lot to 
Jaques Derrida’s notorious maxim il n’y a pas hors de la texte, there is nothing beyond 
the text. They do not, in themselves, take the analyst any further into the processes of 
production, reception and adjustment. As Greg Myers (1990) argues, it is essential to 
bear in mind that the repertoires are themselves lines of interpretation, they lead to the 
selection of textual features which parallel these lines of interpretation. Such 
‘..interpretations seem to be limited to showing that there is interpretative variation..’ 
(Myers, 1990:29). Wooffitt (1992), meanwhile, points to the operational problems with 
the manner in which early discourse analysts explore a speaker’s activity through the 
lens of a linguistic repertoire. 
 
‘Such repertoires may be invoked over large sequences of talk. By implication, then, the 
actions being accomplished are located at a general level of the discourse. It is this point 
that is problematic, however, because conversation analysis has revealed that the activities 
accomplished in talk are located at a sequential and interactional order of detail for which 
the notion of linguistic repertoires cannot provide an account.’ (Wooffitt, 1992:60)   
 
Repertoires as an analytic device are also resonant of one of the primary problems which 
will be identified with relation to critical approaches to DA discussed in the next section. 
They are, at their core, researcher-led, rather than data driven; they encourage the pre-
eminence of theoretical concept over an examination of actual human activity and are, 
thus, are not a methodological tool I shall employ. In this sense, more relevant are the 
developments to Potter and Wetherell’s project operationalised in Edwards and Potter 
(1992) and Edwards (1997), where rhetorical strategies in specific instances of language 
use are emphasised more than broad linguistic repertoires. When analysing accounts, 
particularly accounts of self, Edwards and Potter attend to three main themes: action (as 
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for Wittgenstein, the work done by an account, and the words in that account), fact and 
interest (that is the manner in which an account is organised to do its job), and 
accountability (the manner in which speakers/writers attend to the responsibility for the 
actions portrayed in the account, and also, in a more distinctly ethnomethodological 
mode, the way that they are responsible as its authors for its veracity and interactional 
consequences). These features are brought together in a flexible conceptual scheme 
which they label a ‘Discursive Action Model’ (DAM). They list the basic elements of the 
DAM as such: 
 
Action 
1. The focus is upon action, not cognition. 
2. Remembering and attribution become, operationally, reportings (and accounts, 
description, formulations, versions and so on) and the inferences that they make 
available. 
3. Reportings are situated in activity sequences, such as those involving invitation 
refusals, blamings and defences. 
 
Fact and Interest 
4. There is a dilemma of stake or interest, which is often managed by doing attribution 
via reports. 
5. Reports are often therefore constructed/displayed as factual by way of a variety of 
discursive techniques. 
6. Reports are rhetorically organised to undermine alternatives. 
 
Accountability 
7. Reports attend to the agency and accountability in the reported events. 
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8. Reports attend to the accountability of the current speaker’s action, including those 
done in reporting. 
9. The latter two concerns are often related, such that 7 is deployed for 8, and 8 is 
deployed for 7. 
 
(This outline is taken from Edwards & Potter, 1992:154) 
 
They stress that a DAM is not, to an extent, a ‘process model’, ‘..whatever that is..’ 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992:155), rather it is a set of principles that: 
 
‘..orient the psychologist to important features of everyday reports and explanations, that 
might then provide a basis for generating a series of lower level, more specific models for 
actual occasions.’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992:155)  
 
This project is altogether more sensitive to the lessons of CA for the study of language. 
While I will not be doing any ‘Discursive Action Modelling’ herein, the analytic chapters 
will draw upon several studies in this field when addressing the self-referential and 
explanatory properties of accounts of physical symptoms and ‘aberrant’ mind-states. The 
real strengths of DP as a methodology for a study of accounts in self-referential talk are 
in its focus upon the constructed and constructive nature of language use, its criticisms of 
the conventional categories with which researchers work, and its topic-centred approach 
which carries significant implications for the understanding of the way discourse relates 
to broader (constructed) social reality. It has been applied, and not without success, in 
recent years to many ‘traditionally’ psychological themes. 
 In the light of what has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 regarding the standing 
problems with medical, psychological and sociological accounts of depression, it can be 
said that the focus of this project is topic-specific and thus more resonant of discourse 
analytic concerns. The empirical approach I shall adopt, however, must be broadly 
conversation analytic, centred around the meanings that speakers themselves develop in 
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talk, the inferential work done in the design of their talk and the communicative 
competences which underpins it. I shall, though, inform this approach with material from 
studies in DP wherever it is appropriate, particularly when dealing with the ways that 
speakers address ‘internal process’. As Edwards and Potter (1992) note, ‘thinking’, and 
its associated ‘states’, are intrinsic to pragmatic linguistic practices, not the cause of 
them.    
 
4.4.2. Discourse Analysis: Some Criticisms of Criticism. 
The critical social psychology of Parker (1992) and Parker and Burman (1993), although 
bearing some conceptual and methodological similarities to the conversation and 
discourse analytic methods so far discussed in this chapter, seek primarily to address 
power relations and ideological workings in textual materials. The foundational 
differences between these and DP are often grounded in the manner in which ‘Discourse’ 
and indeed ‘Text’ are conceptualised. Potter and Wetherell, for example, define 
‘discourse’ in fairly non-ontological terms: 
 
‘We will use it in its most open sense, following Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) to cover all 
forms of spoken interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds.’ (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987:7) 
 
Critical social psychology, conversely, adopts a more theoretically loaded definition, 
echoing Foucault (1976), generally arguing that a ‘discourse’ is a coherent set of 
meanings and interpretations in a given domain (resonant of the notion of a ‘repertoire’), 
for example ‘medical discourse’, which is actualized in texts, where texts are ‘..delimited 
tissues of meaning reproduced in any form that can be given an interpretative gloss.’ 
(Parker, 1992:6). Compare this with Potter and Wetherell’s rather more pragmatic view 
of texts as spoken and written materials, and the differences begin to become clear. 
Discourses support some power relations, are ideologically charged and, in principle, 
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inhabit just about anything that can be ‘interpreted’. These artefacts could include the 
more obviously linguistic data of spoken dialogue in the consultation to the writing on 
prescriptions, the organisation of the furniture in the surgery and the posters on the 
waiting room wall.  
CDA in its contemporary form, meanwhile, broadly shares a conceptualisation of 
‘discourse’ with the critical social psychologists, emphasising its ideological effects and 
‘institutional’ nature (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997), though the analyses themselves are 
almost exclusively anchored to incidences of spoken and written language. In these 
terms, Ruth Wodak (1996) prescribes Fairclough’s broad-ranging definition of discourse 
as a ‘social practice’:  
 
‘Describing discourse as a social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a 
particular discursive event and the situation, institution and social structure that frame it: 
the discursive event is shaped by them, also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially 
constituted, as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, 
and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is 
constitutive both in the sense that it helps sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and 
in the sense that it contributes to transforming it.’ (Fairclough, 1992:62) 
  
Consequentially, discursive practices can be seen as entities which produce and maintain 
certain power relationships to the benefit of some and the disadvantage of others – 
‘veiled power structures’ (Wodak, 1996:16) which CDA works to expose. 
There are a range of studies which apply, to varying degrees, the general 
principles of these discourse approaches to the phenomenon of doctor-patient interaction, 
although they exhibit some diversity in exact analytic method (Labov & Fanshel, 1977; 
Cicourel, 1981; Todd, 1983 & 1989; Mishler, 1984; West, 1984; Fairclough, 1992; 
Wodak, 1996). Eliot Mishler in ‘The Discourse of Medicine’, for example, explores the 
accomplishment of power in the consultation at the microscopic end of this scale, 
infusing his method with techniques from CA. Through an analysis of specific linguistic 
tools (interruptions, topic changes and so forth) used by doctors, he documents the 
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manner in which medical professionals exercise control of the structure and content of 
conversation. The analysis itself is premised on the notion that doctors and patients speak 
with ‘different voices’. The doctor, ‘the voice of medicine’, employs complex medical 
terminology, describes physical symptoms as ‘objects’, and classifies these using a 
(reductionist) biomedical model of the patient and the patient’s body. The ‘voice’ of the 
patient is organised around ‘everyday’ language detailing the subjective experience of 
being ill against a backdrop of social relationships (or ‘lifeworld’). Within the 
consultation itself, however, the patient’s voice is effectively silenced; the doctor will 
generally ask information-seeking questions which require strictly factual answers, and 
often interrupt talk which appears contravene the patient’s role as ‘information provider’. 
As such, echoing Goffman (1961), Mishler argues that patients are effectively 
dominated, stripped of their identities, by the workings of medicine.  
The key problem with Mishler’s analysis, like those of Alexandra Todd (1983) 
and Candace West (1984) which also employ some CA-type observations, is that it 
seems to begin from the presumption that the consultation is a site of conflict, which is in 
turn based on a set of assumed (pre-allocated) institutional roles and knowledges used to 
characterise the actions and interests of the doctor and patient. Even if we are to accept 
this argument, that the speakers’ social positions are different so their interests must also 
be, we are not shown exactly how or where conflict (or ‘domination’) arises as a result. 
Most fundamentally, however, at no point are we told how this conflict is a property of 
medical interaction as opposed to, say medical interaction. How is the proposed conflict 
characteristic of the institution, rather than the specific activity?  
As highlighted in section 4.3.2, Christian Heath’s (1986) study of doctor-patient 
interaction reveals an active co-operation on the part of patients with the asymmetrical 
structure of consultations. It is, thus, hard to sustain an argument that patients are simply 
161 
 
‘bullied’ into ‘subordinate’ roles. In order to make sense of such activity from a critical 
point of view, we would thus have to without deploy a (discredited) Marxist narrative of 
‘false consciousness’ (the patients are happy being ‘oppressed’ because they know no 
better) and by extension disempower (or ‘dope’) the very people that the analysis is 
designed to empower. Widdecombe and Wooffitt articulate this point perfectly. 
 
‘[A]lthough the analyst may wish to use discourse analysis to speak on behalf of67 
powerless and marginalised groups, their analytic concerns do not give such groups a 
voice. Indeed…discourse analysis actually seems to deny the significance of what people 
may be saying and doing with their talk.’ (1995:65) 
 
At the more ‘macroscopic’ end of the discourse analytic spectrum, Fairclough’s (1992) 
study of medical interviews begins with observations on the manner in which the cycles 
of interaction in the ‘standard’ interview are controlled. Like Mishler, he notes that turns 
are offered by the doctor and accepted by the patient, and the topic of the interaction is 
defined by doctor in narrow medical terms while attempts by a patient to introduce 
personal/moral content are ignored.  
 
‘One has a sense of a doctor shifting and constraining the topic in accordance with a pre-
set agenda, which the patient is not being allowed to disturb’ (Fairclough, 1992:141) 
 
This ‘agenda’ is then linked to broader socio-structural actors such as medical 
professionalism and institutional demands upon GPs to efficiently process patients. This 
‘type’ of interview is in turn contrasted with ‘alternative’ interviews in which a 
(‘minority’) doctor who is open to the notions of holistic or homeopathic medicine 
allows a more collaborative system of turn-taking, and accords the patient rights to 
introduce or switch topics. What Fairclough suggests is that these two forms of 
interaction arise from differing values that are resultant of differing representations of the 
patient. In the former, the doctor is working from a representation of the individual in 
question as, essentially, ‘a broken object’ or ‘person requiring of medical expertise’. In 
the latter, there is a shift to a representation of ‘a whole person’ who is a ‘client’ – what 
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Fairclough himself terms a ‘self-steering self’ which is a ‘…consumer characterised by 
the capacity to choose.’ (Fairclough, 1992:220). In relation to these, the doctor adopts 
appropriate identities with given behaviours; that of the expert (or ‘mechanic) or of the 
listener (or ‘counsellor’) respectively. Moreover, as Michael (1996) summarises, these 
shifts have a direct and contradictory relationship with broader cultural practice. 
 
‘While the alternative interview is in accord with general cultural changes in which 
professional texts and discourse increasing address themselves to a ‘self-steering 
self’…such techniques in the context of medicine will be prohibitively costly in a climate 
of increasing economic constraint. If standard medical interviews fit more closely with 
prevailing economic contradictions, they run against counter-trends towards increasing 
informality.’ (Michael, 1996:32) 
 
While interesting in a number of ways, Fairclough’s project is fatally flawed from the 
outset by its deterministic (somewhat Parsonian) assumption of pre-set roles for a 
‘standard’ interview which guide activity within it. Rather than explore the manner in 
which ‘roles’ are collaboratively produced and managed in the interview, they are 
assumed to be powerful macrosocially-moulded causal agents which in themselves 
impose an agenda on action for both doctor and patient68. As he claims, from the 
contextual activity one has a ‘sense’ of agenda. This is not, however, identical with 
‘evidence’ of such a phenomenon. As Emmanuel Schegloff (1991) reminds us: 
 
‘[T]he lively sense we all may share of the relevance of social structure...needs to be 
converted into the hard currency..of defensible analysis - analysis which departs from, and 
can always be referred to and grounded in, the details of actual occurrences of conduct in 
interaction.’ (1991:48) 
 
The implication in Fairclough’s analysis is that every moment in the ‘standard’ interview 
is (perhaps consciously, perhaps unconsciously) guided and determined by socio-
structural forces; notwithstanding the fact that this is in itself unlikely, it is also not 
actually demonstrated, merely speculated. Equally, it consigns any interview in which 
the doctor allows some breach of the suggested rules of turn-taking, or the patient 
introduces a modicum of personal information (but not so much as to suggest an 
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‘alternative’ format) to the status of a ‘deviant’ case, or else risk collapsing the whole 
edifice around which the analysis is based. By postulating two oppositional ‘types’ of 
total action, a research agenda is set up in which a heterogeneous group of activities have 
to be (awkwardly) compartmentalised one way or the other. The analysis requires the 
two categories be used in order to make any credible causal links with the key social 
trends identified – economic constraint and informal service; the trends are said to 
determine the categories, via the fulchrum of ‘role’, but the categories are themselves 
then used as evidence of the trends. The complex activities of people themselves in the 
medical interaction, and their own understandings of ‘what is going on’, are thus 
relegated to a secondary concern.  
Similar problems arise in Wodak’s (1996) analysis of conversations between doctors 
and patients in an outpatient ward. Prior any actual analytic detail, we are provided with 
the following assertions: 
 
‘[M]edical jargon – as studies have shown (Hein et al. 1985) – is almost never understood 
by patients even if they supposedly accept the doctor’s answers. In interviews with patients 
after conversations with doctors, we found that they had not understood the jargon, but had 
not dared ask the meaning of certain terms. Many patients are afraid to ask questions, 
fearing they might get worse treatment ‘because the doctors would be angry.’’ (1990:36) 
 
And: 
 
‘[T]he jargon demarcates one group from another, it indicates an elite to which you belong 
only if you have the training and have learnt the language…Patients who do not 
understand and do not speak in the same way are discriminated against and excluded…’ 
(1990:36)   
 
Reading the former, it is hard not to get the impression that the described ‘patients’ are a 
profoundly ignorant and timid collection of people, lacking in assertiveness or social 
competence. In truth, however, the category ‘patient’ can potentially describe anybody 
undergoing medical treatment – this could include any range of people and professions 
including trained doctors themselves. Patients are a heterogeneous group, and to 
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generalise (and denigrate) their social knowledges/skills in this way seems somewhat 
presumptuous and insensitive to such variety69. Such an approach echoes the neo-
Marxism of Marcuse and Fromm detailed in Chapter 3; patients are taken to be passive, 
unreflective and powerless entities dominated (through various means) by the machinery 
of medicine, which in turn provides for the very possibility of ideology critique. This 
tendency for prejudgement is further emphasised in the second quotation, where a 
problematic characterisation of doctors’ roles is set up. The use of medical jargon by a 
doctor is said to be indicative of an ‘elite’ status but, through this assertion, the research 
questions subsequently proposed, such as ‘How do doctors exert their power? How can 
such ‘power registers’ be identified?’ (Wodak, 1996:40), appear to have been at least in 
part answered in advance – through the use of ‘impenetrable and elite jargon’. The 
tautology here is profound; the doctors are ‘elite’ because they use the jargon, and the 
jargon is ‘jargon’ because it is used by elites; therefore, patients are helpless. Any actual 
data is, consequently, condemned to be analysed as mere evidence of such a state of 
affairs.  
Wodak’s study, like the others detailed above, anchors its analysis to a politically-
oriented critical realism involving prejudgements about the nature of the phenomenon to 
be examined (relating particularly to power, disadvantage and ‘role’). This in turn feeds 
into a broadly socialist emancipatory project and while Parker (1992) and Fairclough 
(1992), for example, openly acknowledge this, it places a number of significant and 
highly problematic constraints on research.  
 
• It requires that any project have a pre-set agenda regarding what should be found. 
• It grants primacy to the researcher’s own analytic concepts and categories rather than 
the actual data.  
thus: 
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• By characterising people as ‘victims’ of the hidden discursive powers, it ‘culturally 
dopes’ them (recall the ‘Divine Orthodoxy’; Silverman, 1997). 
• It argues that research itself should be a political exercise, an ideology critique 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). 
therefore: 
• It is inaccessible to any researcher who may not share the particular political 
standpoint being expounded. 
 
I can clearly see the appeal of such critical deconstruction to reveal the influence of 
oppressive forces, which is a tradition that can be said to run from Marx, through the 
Frankfurt School (particularly Theodor Adorno) to Foucault (as illustrated in Chapter 3). 
The problems with the studies detailed here have been, however, iterated and reiterated 
throughout this project. They are, at their cores, researcher-centred rather than 
participant-centred, making little attempt to address how people themselves understand 
activity in a consultation, for it is these understandings, not those of researchers, that 
inform actual incidences of human behaviour. Moreover, the productive and constructive  
skills of doctors and patients in achieving mutually acceptable outcomes and shared 
understandings are subsumed to a general narrative of ‘conflict’, presupposed in 
advance. This is not, however, to dismiss the findings of these studies outright. Todd 
(1983) and Mishler (1984), for example, make some interesting and valuable 
observations on the structures of action in the consultation prior to the application of their 
broader theoretical concerns, and such observations will be sporadically drawn upon in 
the analytic chapters of this project.  
Having explored, in this chapter, the strengths of CA as a methodology for the 
analysis of the data at hand and some problems with other methods that could have been 
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used, it is necessary to conclude with an exploration of an apparent problem with the 
interplay of CA and one of the data forms collected for this project. 
 
4.5 A METHODOLOGICAL CONUNDRUM? 
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS AND ‘MONOLOGUE’ TALK. 
‘...can we legitimately claim to provide a distinctly conversation analytic investigation of 
materials which are essentially monologic in character..?’  
Robin Wooffitt70 
‘Telling Tales of the Unexpected’ 
 
The emphasis in the first empirical phase of this project, detailed particularly in Chapter 
6, is upon eliciting from the GP a relatively uninterrupted sequence of discourse on the 
topic of depression and diagnosis with as little input from the interviewer as possible, and 
thus to obtain data which is as ‘unguided’ as possible. This leads, however, to what could 
be seen as a methodological impasse. Applying CA to a ‘relatively uninterrupted 
sequence of discourse’ produced by a single person would seem to be problematic 
insofar as CA is, fundamentally, an approach which takes as it primary material (and its 
key justification system) the sequential, turn-by-turn unfolding of conversation between 
two or more parties. Hence, as Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) write of the ‘unfocused’ or 
‘unstructured’ approach, 
 
‘Data produced from this kind of interview present a particular set of methodological 
problems and possibilities. Due to the informal character of the interview, it is common to 
find that interviewees engage in long uninterrupted stretches of talk. These may consist of 
anecdotes, explanations, stories and so on…These interviews, then, can generate data 
which are not so much interactional as monologic, and it is this feature of unstructured 
interview data which raises some special methodological questions.’ (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 
1998:185)  
 
To look at the problem in a different way, since the turn-taking ‘proof procedure’ that 
conversation analysts employ as their primary means of methodological grounding 
would not seem to be applicable to the IR-data collected, it could well be argued that 
some of the forms of DA discussed in part 4.4 would be better, or certainly more 
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appropriately designed, tools for the analysis of such ‘isolate’ materials. As Wooffitt 
(1992) asks: 
 
‘...what alternative resources are available to the analyst to compensate for the absence of 
the ‘proof procedure’ afforded by the analyses of each other’s talk provided by the 
interactants themselves?’ (Wooffitt, 1992:68) 
 
Traditionally, such materials have fallen within the domain of textually-oriented DA. I 
want to argue here, however, that while such discourse analysts may well conceptualise 
such extracts as being ‘texts’71 (and analyse them in this way), CA remains the strongest 
applicable methodology to the IR-data not because it can also deal with talk in isolation, 
but because the talk analysed should not actually be considered isolate at all; it is, in fact, 
demonstrably dialogic in character.   
 
4.5.1. ‘Monologue’ as Dialogue. 
Consider, to begin the argument, this extract from Miller (1998). 
 
EXTRACT 4(VIII): [MILLER, 1998] 
1.   R: well (.) I’m a Christian (.) umm (.) Church of England  
2.    (1.0) 
3.   I: ºuh huhº (.) 
4.   R: yes (.) which i::snt a very trendy thing for a stu:dent to be  
5.    these days (.5) I s’pose 
6.     (2.0) 
7.   I: no?= 
8.   R: =no its not (.) I get called (.) gu:llible by all my friends in our college 
9.    (.) huh huh 
10.  ·hh (.) which isn’t rea::lly fair because it’s just (.) ºummº 
11.   (1.0) 
12.  I: ºmm hmmº 
13.   (.5) 
14.  R: my beliefs are important to m:e (.5) well ·hh 
15.  they’re jus the way I feel (.) ya kno::w ((smiles)) 
 
The respondent here makes a statement relating to her religious orientation in line 1, then 
there is then a pause followed by an affirmative ‘uh huh’ (line 3) from the interviewer. 
The vocal sign of encouragement prompts the respondent to carry on talking, that is, she 
has inferred from this sound that more information on this topic is required or would be 
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appreciated. Throughout the transcribed interviews used in this project, there are 
occasions when I, as the interviewer, have used this sound or other similar utterances 
such as ‘yes’, ‘yeah’ or ‘mm hmm’ (the latter appearing in line 12 of this extract): this 
class of utterance has itself been shown to have orderly properties (Schegloff, 1981). As 
has been pointed out, and as will become further apparent in this chapter, the interviewer 
is largely inactive throughout most of the interviews in terms of active questioning, 
indeed the interviewer has rather more input in extract 4(VIII) than in most of the IR-data 
extracts used in this project. What the use of small utterances such as ‘uh huh’ and the 
effect it can have on the organisation of the conversation does demonstrate, however, is 
that even extended monologues collected in this manner are not isolate ‘texts’, but are 
subject to persistent interpersonal monitoring and adjustment by both speaker (i.e. active 
interviewee) and recipient (i.e. largely dormant interviewer). As such the relevance of 
CA as a tool for analysing such extracts becomes significantly more apparent. As 
Wooffitt (1992) points out regarding these ‘minimal continuers’: 
 
‘Their occurrence, then, may be of analytic interest in that they are displays of the 
recipient’s orientation to a specific aspect of the speaker’s account. That is, minimal 
continuers may indicate that the speaker is dealing with, or pre-monitors the speaker’s 
dealings with, issues which are in some way sensitive to the business at hand...’ (Wooffitt, 
1992:70)   
   
Minimal continuers are a regular feature of natural conversation, with a variety of 
functions as the analytic chapters of this project will demonstrate.  
To take this argument a step further, there have been a number of studies which 
analyse accounting devices used by people when describing unusual events to illustrate 
how accounts of these things can be approached as social actions. These studies, like 
those of Wittgenstein, emphasise the importance of culturally available communicative 
devices rather than the inner world of process or issues of truth/falsity. By attending to 
the organised and, crucially, intersubjective character of recollections of events and 
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feelings given in extended accounts, CA is able to demonstrate how inherently cultural 
practices are employed in the constructive accomplishment of recall.  
 
4.5.2. Practically ‘Doing Memories’. 
An examination of Jefferson’s (1984) analysis of accounts of shootings, hijackings and 
other ‘unusual’ phenomena amply demonstrates how, even with no input from an 
interviewer at all, members can be seen to organise their discourse so as to attain certain 
ends based on suppositions they make regarding the manner in which their account will 
be received. The device in question, termed ‘At first I thought....but then I realised’, is 
shown by Jefferson to be specifically designed to persuade a recipient of the account to 
infer that the story itself is a product of perfectly normal reasoning processes. In short, it 
is a counter-sceptical move in talk used in a scenario where the speaker reasons that what 
is being said may receive an unsympathetic or incredulous hearing. To take an example 
used by Jefferson (originally cited by Sacks in his seminal lecture “On doing ‘being 
ordinary’”);  
 
EXTRACT 4(IX): [JEFFERSON, 1984] 
 
I was walking up towards the front of the airplane and I saw by the cabin, the stewardess 
standing facing the cabin, and a fellow standing with a gun in her back. And my first 
thought was  he’s showing her the gun, and then I realised that it couldn’t be, and then it 
turned out that he was hijacking the plane.  
 
Jefferson begins by highlighting how the first formulation, what the witness ‘first 
thought’, is somewhat odd in the context of the event. Indeed if we are to believe that a 
man standing with a gun in the stewardess’ back was likely to be showing her the gun 
rather than threatening her in some way really was the ‘first thought’ of the speaker then, 
as Wooffitt points out, ‘..his reasoning processes must have been informed by gross 
naivety or a staggeringly optimistic view of human nature.’ (Wooffitt, 1992:78) Jefferson 
expatiates, however, that in the light of what actually happened (a hijack) the initial 
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claimed ‘assumption’ is not all that odd, and certainly nowhere near as dramatic. The 
function of the device is to present an undramatic, almost exaggeratedly ordinary 
assumption regarding what was happening immediately prior to ‘realising’ that 
something extremely out-of-the-ordinary was taking place. It is highly unlikely that the 
speaker ‘thought’ for one moment that the man was showing the gun to the stewardess, 
nor indeed that the reality of hijacking suddenly flashed into his brain immediately 
afterwards. Indeed why the speaker needed to present an ‘at first I thought’ component in 
an account of an event which was already over, with he himself (and probably his 
interlocutor too) aware of the fact that it was a hijacking, is mystifying unless he is 
obsessed with detail or, more likely, was attempting to construct a convincing account by 
providing materials from which the recipient can infer the normality of his reasoning 
process. This study explores, thus, what has hitherto been seen as an ‘individualistic’ 
psychological phenomenon (realisation) in terms of its orderly production, which is 
contingent upon the social organisation of everyday interaction. In this resonates Jeff 
Coulter’s maxim that ‘to realise’ is not a state or a process or a discrete event, rather it is 
a ‘..defeasible achievement verb.’ (Coulter, 1991:187); the claim to realisation can only 
be ratified intersubjectively. As with Wittgenstein and ‘thinking’ we are looking at 
‘realisation’, a part of the language of the mind, as a tool, an active unit for construction. 
Moreover, it highlights how even apparently ‘neutral’ accounting of an event is also an 
account for that event; it is designed in such a way as to be hearable as a ‘believable 
recollection’.  
The point is that all utterances in conversation, not only accounts of potentially 
problematic phenomena, are constructed so as to be hearable in specific, contextually 
sensitive ways. Sacks and Schegloff (1979) term this recipient design: the manner in 
which turns of any length are internally structured ‘…to be understood in terms of what 
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the speaker knows or assumes about the existing mutual knowledge between him or her 
and the recipient.’ (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998:138). In the case above, the speaker 
demonstrates a clear orientation to the likelihood that an interlocutor would consider an 
aircraft hijack an unusual or extreme event and organises the description accordingly. 
This orientation becomes visible in the action, it is not something that needs to be 
presupposed in advance. Moreover, as Sacks (1992) notes, this fundamental tenet of 
everyday talk is a powerful means of ‘impression management’; members’ talk is 
skilfully and observably designed to make available certain inferences, and delimit 
others, relating to both topics of conversation and the conversationalists themselves. This 
theme, in the context of extended descriptions, is elaborated in detail throughout 
Chapters 5 and 6, but is also highly visible in the analyses of doctor-patient interaction in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
In sum, this chapter has provided an extended elaboration of the suitability of CA for an 
investigation of the diagnosis of depression in the primary care consultation. It has been 
demonstrated how the conceptual underpinnings of CA are sensitive to the critique of 
sociological and psychological reasoning outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, and how, as a 
method, CA provides a means of investigating talk-in-the-consultation without falling 
foul of the Cartesian theoretical impasse.  Also detailed have been a number of studies in 
CA revealing the types of finding that can arise from this type of analysis, and a critical 
appreciation of related discourse analytic projects illustrating both strengths and 
shortcomings in their approaches. Finally, it has been illustrated that CA is an 
appropriate methodology for the study of materials more familiarly associated with the 
discourse analytic programme. With these lessons in mind, it is now possible to begin the 
analytic phase of the project with a focus on the activity in consultations as social and 
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negotiated in character, context as the reflexive product of human activity and meanings 
as local produced and accountable. In these terms, it will be possible to explore the social 
implications of depression without recourse to problematic explanatory mechanisms 
relating to power, social structure or cognitive apparatus. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CA in Action: 
Analysing an Interview and a Consultation 
‘…the key task facing microsociological studies…is to develop an analysis of the tacit 
skills which underpin the recognitional process but which are not captured by the 
diagnostic criteria.’ 
Derrol Palmer72 
 “Identifying Delusional Discourse.” 
 
This chapter serves as a bridge between the conceptual and theoretical concerns of the 
first part of the project and the analytic chapters to follow. Firstly, a brief outline is 
sketched of how the data upon which the project is based was collected and managed, 
and a preliminary empirical focus is subsequently established upon the way in which the 
practical meanings of the ‘solid’ and ‘determinate’ concepts pivotal to the studies 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 373 are contingent upon the character of everyday 
interaction. The aim herein, more specifically, is to begin to describe how it is that all the 
participants in the taped interactions analysed (that is to say interviewer and interviewee, 
doctor and patient) collaboratively organise their discourse so as to occasion the 
relevance of such very phenomena as ‘mood’, ‘environment’ or ‘symptom’.  
As outlined in Chapter 1, all of the data used in this project were collected from a 
single general practice in Lancashire in the months of January to April 2001, and take 
two forms. The first ‘type’ of data examined in this chapter was collected on a single pre-
arranged day in April at the practice itself. Each of the six participating practitioners sat 
for a short and informal interview on the broad topic of depression and their experience 
of its diagnosis in the primary care environment. These interviews were tape recorded 
with the full consent of the GPs themselves. All of the taped data was subsequently 
transcribed in conversation analytic form using the standard transcription symbols 
included in this project on pages x-xi, and will be referred to henceforth as interviewer-
respondent, or IR-data. The second form of data was collected by the General 
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Practitioners themselves over a three month period. Two surgeries were recorded per GP, 
each lasting for around three hours and comprising of 14 to 18 individual consultations. 
This will be termed doctor-patient, or DP-data. 
This chapter is divided into three primary sections. The first (5.1) addresses in 
detail a single sequence of talk from the IR-data corpus in detail, plus issues of data 
collection and management, while the second (5.2) accords the same treatment to a 
sequence from a single consultation in the DP corpus. Finally, section 5.3 explores the 
findings from the two analyses and their relevance for the remaining analytic chapters.  
   
5.1. IR-DATA: 
INTERVIEWS, MONOLOGUES AND AUDIO TAPE. 
‘In sum, by appropriate research design, conversation analytic studies of 
institutional interaction can be made more inclusive in terms of the different 
layers of the organization of interaction’ 
Anssi Peräkylä74 
 “Reliability and Validity in Research..” 
 
In advance of the day that the actual interviews were conducted, I had attended three 
previous meetings with the GPs during which the general themes of the project had been 
explained. All were aware of the project’s working title – ‘Uncertainties and Negotiation 
in the Identification of Depression in Primary Care’ – and were also aware that the 
project was aimed at examining problems with depression recognition in the area’s 
primary care system.  
 
5.1.1. IR-data: Analysing the Interview. 
As mentioned, the interviews themselves were all fairly short (none longer than 15 
minutes) and took the form of an ‘unfocused’ or ‘unstructured’ interview (Lofland & 
Lofland, 1984; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). That is to say, each interview began with as 
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general a question on the topic of depression as possible, and during the course of the 
interview I asked no further specific questions, except when prompted to do so. These 
opening requests are presented in the IR-data throughout the analysis chapters, though 
typically took the form: 
 
EXTRACT 5(I): IR3 
 
1. hi:ya 
2. (1.0)  
3. so (.) then? 
4. ·hhh  
5. this is gonna be pre:tty short >and straightforward< 
6. (0.5) 
7. a::ll I really wanna know is (.) erm 
8. what is de:pression? 
 
Rather than actively choose a piece of data to analyse here on the grounds that it is a 
‘good example’, which tends to resonate somewhat of pre-judgement, I have simply 
elected to use the first interview I recorded, which was around nine minutes in length. 
Speaker ‘I’ is the interviewer (myself), speaker ‘R’ is the GP. Extract 5(II) shows the 
opening utterances of the interview.  
 
EXTRACT 5(II): IR1 
((Tape starts: Interviewer greets GP)) 
1.   I: s:o?  
2.     (.5) 
3.     what I am g:enuinely interested in (.5) to start with a basic question i:::s (.) 
4.     ·hhh (.) what is depression 
5.     (1.0) 
6.   R:  a definition of depression? 
7.     (.5) 
8.   I: erm (.) >whatever you want< 
9.   R: =ha ((laughs)) 
10.     (.5) 
11.    well in the <D S M> classifi (.3) classification of depression there are certain   
12.     disea ((coughs)) 
13.     (.5) 
14.    ⋅hhh (.) certain symptoms present (.3) erm (.) basically a (.) prol::onged period  
15.     of low mood and (.) er (.) >low self esteem< where (.) a patient does not feel 
16.     (.5) 
17.    we::ll 
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Before moving to analyse the data from this extract in more detail, a few fairly general 
notes on the implications of my data collection methods with regard to the analytic 
approach I am advocating are necessary. 
 
5.1.2. Analysis I: Implications of Site and ‘Interviews’.. 
In extract 5(II), and indeed in every interview, I attempted to furnish the respondent with 
resources regarding the broad topic in which I was interested by making an initial and 
very general request for information relating to ‘depression at large’ without actually 
guiding them in how to go about talking on this subject. It is also worth bearing in mind 
that, some time prior to the interview, the respondents had been furnished with further 
resources regarding the purposes of the project (i.e. to explore the difficulties with the 
recognition and diagnosis of depression). The manners in which the different respondents 
addressed the requirements of the interview were variable and very interesting in 
themselves; some launched straight into extended monologue, others asked for further 
clarification regarding what ‘sort’ of information was required. In this case, the 
respondent asked for clarification (in line 6) of the meaning of the opening question 
(lines 1 to 4), and then proceeded after a prompt by the interviewer (in line 8). 
Furthermore, there are considerations of how different respondents orient to the 
‘interview situation’ itself. On nearly every occasion, between sitting down with the 
interviewer to be interviewed and the beginning of the recorded interview itself, the 
interviewee made one or a number of comments about ‘being interviewed’ and their 
prior experiences of it, or a joke about ‘will this hurt’, likening it to being on the other 
end of a consultation to that with which they were familiar. The implications of this are 
important, and are addressed by Widdecombe and Wooffitt (1995) who observed 
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comparable activity in their interviews with people involved in ‘youth subcultures’. They 
note: 
 
‘Of course, the respondent’s orientation to the kind of dialogue on which they were 
embarking would not merely have provided a label, or ‘definition of the situation’. Such an 
understanding also furnishes a set of interpretative resources with which to come to an 
understanding of the subsequent events; that is, because the circumstances could be 
characterised as an interview, the common-sense, taken-for-granted properties of interview 
interaction were therefore available to be drawn upon to inform the respondent’s 
understanding of the moment-by-moment  development of the interaction.’ (Widdecombe 
& Wooffitt, 1995:84)   
 
Figure 5A shows a number of factors upon which it is necessary to reflect when 
considering participants’ initial orientations when confronted with the type of informal 
interview used to obtain the IR-data in this project. 
 
To provide a basic example, a person facing an interview for a job can infer that are 
being interviewed due to their viability as a candidate for the specific job. They can 
tacitly understand that the purpose of the interview is to assess this viability against that 
of other candidates and thus must answer questions posed in terms of promoting 
FIGURE 5A. ORIENTING TO THE INTERVIEW 
 
 
 
The choice of interviewee: 
“Why me?” 
In any interview, the interviewee has to make 
sense of why it is him/her that has been 
approached to talk about the subject and 
thus infer something of what will be required 
of him/her during the interview itself. 
 
 
What this interview will be ‘like’: 
“What is ‘required of me?” 
All interviews are for a purpose. An 
interviewee, drawing on various resources, 
has to interpret the relevant purpose from a 
possible range and orient their talk to it. 
 
Questions in an interview are linked to its 
purpose. The interviewee has to make sense 
of how both their identity and the purpose of 
the interview should inform their responses to 
questioning. 
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themselves as a suitable employee and demonstrating their knowledge of what the job 
requires. 
   
5.1.3. Analysis II: Openings. Interpretative Work and Turn-Taking Systematics. 
At this point, it will be useful to describe the interpretative work being done in the 
opening exchanges of the extract with a view to demonstrating, in an empirical setting, 
some themes consistent throughout my discussion of CA in the last chapter. This in turn 
should help illuminate the primary concerns hitherto expressed regarding how 
psychiatric categories are managed and negotiated in talk of depression, and must as such 
be treated as fluid interpersonal resources rather than determinate psychological or 
environmental intransigents.  
An important theme arising here, relevant to the opening utterances (and, indeed, 
the entire extract), is that of transition relevance (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). 
The two speakers can be seen to clearly understand when it is their own turn to talk, 
when one speaker has finished and it is the turn of the next to start and so forth, and as 
such the conversation maintains a fluid and orderly structure. Sacks et al propose two 
‘rules’ of transition relevance (the first of which is split into three components) an 
orientation to which we can observe from both interviewer and respondent in the course 
of the interaction. These are as follows: 
 
Rule 1: (a) If the speaker has identified, or selected, a particular next speaker, then 
that speaker should take a turn at that place. 
 (b) If no such selection has been made, then any speaker may (but need 
not) self-select at that point. If self-selection occurs, then the first speaker 
has the right to the turn. 
179 
 
 (c) If no next speaker is selected, then alternatively the current speaker 
may, but need not, continue talking with another turn-construction unit, 
unless another speaker has self-selected, in which case that speaker gains 
the right to the turn. 
Rule 2: Whichever option has operated, then rules 1a-c come into play again for 
the next transition-relevance place.  
 
(Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998:49-50) 
 
Firstly, in extract 5(II), lines 4 and 11 constitute a paired action. A question is asked (line 
4) and the respondent infers that a answer is expected of him which he eventually 
provides (line 11 onward). The request makes conditionally relevant response. Prior to 
the production of this second pair part, however, he produces the utterance in line 6, 
calling for clarification of the meaning of the question itself, by means of another 
question. This utterance in itself makes conditionally relevant a response from the 
interviewer. This response arrives in line 8; the interviewer provides such a response, and 
the respondent then goes on to answer the original question. The first thing this reveals 
regards the structuring of adjacency pairs themselves. As Schegloff (1972) articulates, 
the production of the first part of an adjacency pair does not guarantee that the 
completing pair part will, or even ought, to follow at once. In this case, the respondent’s 
utterance makes available to the interviewer that the request itself was not sufficiently 
precise for his conversational purposes. This is an insertion sequence, an adjacency pair 
embedded in another which attends to matters arising from the first part of the first pair.  
 
4.   I: ·hhh (.) what is depression      QUESTION A 
5.     (1.0) 
6.   R:  a definition of depression?    INSERTION:  QUESTION B 
7.     (.5) 
8.   I: erm (.) >whatever you want<    INSERTION:  ANSWER B 
9.   R: =ha ((laughs)) 
10.     (.5) 
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11.    well you have the <D S M> type classifi (.3) classification of…   ANSWER A 
 
Another issue of note here regards the respondent’s reaction to rather indeterminate 
answer (8) to the clarification call (6). The reply in line 8 is a dispreferred response in the 
extreme, at the very bottom end of the scale of normative expectation, so unexpected, 
indeed, as to be humorous. This indicates the call for clarification was not in any way 
answered. The respondent’s subsequent provision of an answer to the original question, 
without yet further demand for clarification, highlights that he inferred from ‘>whatever 
you want<’ that no such clarification would be forthcoming. Had the answer been a 
simple ‘No’, then it is likely have that further calls for clarification (i.e. ‘What do you 
want then?’) would have become relevant. This returns us to Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
argument that, in principle, further clarification can always be requested, but it is only 
really asked for in real-world situations insofar as the practicalities of the situation 
demand. Persistent requests for clarification of the meaning of an utterance cause 
breakdowns in the orderly flow of communication, they are in Garfinkel’s (1967) words, 
‘infuriating’. In this case, then, the production of a reply by the respondent indicates that 
there were sufficient resources available to him from which to satisfactorily complete the 
pair without acting so as to risk jeopardising the conversation’s orderliness. 
 Lines 4 to 11 of extract 5(II) also clearly demonstrate the transformability of 
meaning in the turn-by-turn unfolding of conversation. As discussed, the respondent’s 
call for clarification (6) is answered with a dispreferred response ‘>whatever you want<’ 
(8). A statement such as ‘>whatever you want<’ could be interpreted in any number of 
ways, indeed the word ‘whatever’ in response to a request has widely come to have 
negative connotations. Within the context of this conversation, however, the utterance is 
transformed into, effectively, a ‘yes’, or affirmative reply by the subsequent provision of 
a definition. As Heritage and Watson (1979) demonstrate, next utterances often 
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characterise the talk in the prior utterance in a way that is relevant to the project of the 
next speaker and which may or may not coincide with the project of the last. 
The crucial theme that emerges from this section is that the meanings of 
utterances in interaction are jointly produced. While the question (line 6) opens up the 
possibility of a clarification sequence, the answer (line 8) ultimately closes this down 
without disrupting the flow of interaction. The dialogue then proceeded as if the 
insertions had not been made with the respondent completing the pair proposed in the 
opening question (line 4). As such, we can see in empirical form that the exact meanings 
of the specific utterances to the participants can only become clear when examined in 
terms of the systematic of turn-taking. 
 
5.2.4. Analysis III: Providing a Factual Definition of ‘Ordinary’ Depression... 
The section of the extract that is of interest here directly follows the opening exchanges, 
and deals with the actual provision of a definition of the medical condition ‘depression’ 
(lines 11 to 17) by the respondent. 
 
11.  well in the <D S M> classifi (.3) classification of depression there are certain   
12.   disea ((coughs)) 
13.   (.5) 
14.  ⋅hhh (.) certain symptoms present (.3) erm (.) basically a (.) prol::onged period   
15.   of low mood and (.) er (.) >low self esteem< where (.) a patient does not feel 
16.   (.5) 
17.  we::ll 
 
What is most striking here is the manner in which the definition is provided. Firstly, 
before any actual definition is advanced at all, a classificatory system is made salient as 
being a source of definitions, ‘the <D S M> classifi (.3) classification of depression’ (11). 
This provides for the inference that the character of the forthcoming definition is one of 
‘a reported fact’, and hence simultaneously circumscribes the inference that it may be, 
say, a ‘personal opinion’. Moreover, the ‘certain symptoms’ (14) as which the DSM 
definition of depression is characterised are not described or listed in any extensive 
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detail, rather the interviewer is furnished with a three-part formulation explaining what 
depression ‘basically’ is (lines 14 to 17): 
 
a (.) prol::onged period of [1] low mood and  (.) er (.) > [2] low self esteem< where (.)  [3] a 
patient does not feel (1.5) we::ll 
 
Three-part listing. is a culturally-available rhetorical device commonly used in political 
speeches75. The indexing of three people, qualities, or ‘types of thing’ is employed to 
convey a general class of things (in this case, symptoms of depression) about which the 
talk or text is oriented. An example, taken from a General Election speech by Norman 
Tebbit (See Atkinson, 1984:60) in 1983 is; 
 
‘Labour will [1] spend and spend [2] borrow and borrow [3] tax and tax’ 
 
Tebbit, in this extract, is less concerned with the spending, borrowing or taxation plans of 
the Labour party than with conveying a general sense that its economic policy is 
inherently flawed. Likewise, in lines 14 to 17, the respondent is concerned with setting 
out a ‘general’ DSM pathology for depression.  
There are a number of interesting issues arising from the structure of the 
definition aside from it ‘generality’, however. Firstly, the respondent deploys the label of 
‘a patient’ (line 15) as being the ‘type’ of person who suffers from the depression. A key 
sociological point arising from the deployment of such a category, as Sacks (1992) 
articulates, is that no category invoked in talk is simply a neutral description – all are 
‘inference rich’, they are themselves culturally available resources through which 
speakers can actively do things in conversation. As such, being a ‘patient’ is a 
specifically social category, that is to say, part of a group identity with ‘general’ 
connotations. Moreover, as Garfinkel (1967) shows, group membership is an occasioned 
phenomenon; the way that a speaker aligns themselves or somebody else with a given 
group at a given time, expressing identity in terms of membership of that group, does not 
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imply a fixed and determinate psychiatric, physical or social status - rather, it is local 
interactional context, the purposes and trajectory of conversation, that is the prime 
dictate of the manner of identification (Sacks, 1992; Widdecombe and Wooffitt, 1995). 
So, when the respondent in extract 5(II) occasions the general category of ‘patient’ as 
being the ‘type’ of person who suffers from depression, a range of inferences can be 
drawn by a recipient – in this case, for example, that such a person is ‘ill’ and/or in the 
process of ‘being cured’ (Schegloff, 1972), which in turn serves to concretise the status 
of ‘depression’ as an illness. Moreover, and crucially, within this action the 
accountability for the illness itself is managed. Note the manner in which the illness is 
constructed as being something which is ‘out there’ (Woolgar, 1988a), both in the DSM 
and the world, but which happens in the patient. Depression is a thing which causes a 
patient to feel ‘not well’ – the utterance does not allow for the inference that the patient is 
in any way accountable for their own condition. The symptoms are indexed to the 
disease itself, with the patient a ‘passive’ host. 
In the light of this, what is particularly fascinating about the ‘general’ pathology 
provided, is the ordinariness of it. Rather than explain in term of particular or extreme 
symptoms that afflict the ‘ill’ person, the respondent characterises the inferred ‘type’ of 
depression deployed in the question in terms of ‘everyday’ feelings that anybody could 
experience at just about any time. Harvey Sacks himself (1984) discusses ‘ordinariness’ 
as a specifically social construct. Of an ‘ordinary’ person, he claims;   
 
‘..I am not..talking about an ordinary person as this or that person, or as some average; that 
is, as a nonexceptional person on some statistical basis, but as something that is the way 
somebody constitutes oneself, and, in effect, a job that persons and the people around them 
may be coordinatively engaged in, to achieve that each of them, together, are ordinary 
persons.’ (Sacks, 1984:415)   
 
Being ‘ordinary’ is a quality the relevance of which we all constantly make salient in our 
day-to-day words and deeds in order to achieve certain goals (acceptability, believability, 
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‘normality’). It requires work, and background cultural knowledge regarding what 
‘ordinary’, ‘normal’ or ‘acceptable’ activities look and sound like in understood contexts. 
What constitutes an ‘ordinary person’, ‘ordinary behaviour’ or ‘ordinary feelings’, 
moreover, is not defined by any one person or indeed by any set of sanctioned laws; it is 
a distinctively social phenomenon built in interaction, part of the social matrix. In other 
words, ‘ordinariness’ as a characteristic which, like Wittgenstein’s vocabulary of the 
mental (of which it is probably part), has no absolute physical referent. It is something 
which is intersubjectively constituted. By characterising depression in terms of perfectly 
ordinary human characteristics (‘low mood’, ‘low self-esteem’ and ‘not feeling well’) the 
respondent circumscribes the inference that someone who is suffering from depression is 
in any way ‘abnormal’ – rather, they experience perfectly normal feelings, but for ‘a (.) 
prol::onged period’. In this sense, he formulates a pathology that differs from perfectly 
ordinary states of being only in terms of its duration.  
This sequence clearly demonstrates the transformability of meaning in 
interaction. Drawing upon culturally available meanings for a general class of people 
(‘patients’), the respondent formulates a more specific social identity (‘patients with 
depression’) for which he makes available certain inferences and circumscribes others. In 
these terms, we can see that the description provided is interesting not only in that it ‘is’ a 
description of depression, but that it is organised in such a way as to be recognisable as a 
description of an illness. Dorothy Smith’s K is Mentally Ill: The Anatomy of a Factual 
Account (1978) provides a particularly pertinent parallel to this observation in its analysis 
of an account given by an interviewee relating to the decline into mental illness of her 
friend ‘K’. Smith’s interest is in the manner in which the account is organised so as to be 
recognisable as an account of behaviour which is ‘not normal’. The speaker, Angela, 
uses a variety of techniques to characterise activities which, in themselves, relatively 
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everyday doings as being distinctly bizarre in the context of their occurrence. Take, for 
example, the following extract from Angela’s account. 
 
EXTRACT 5(IV): [SMITH, 1978] 
We would go to the beach or pool on a hot day. 
I would sort of just dip in and lie in the sun 
While K insisted that she had to swim 30 lengths. 
 
Swimming 30 lengths at the pool is not, in itself, wrong, backward or obsessive 
behaviour. Indeed, in many cases it would be seen as a laudable commitment to exercise 
and health. However, in this account such activity is presented in contrast to Angela’s 
own; dipping in and lying in the sun are characterised as appropriate which in turn serves 
to make available that K’s behaviour is not. Moreover, as Wooffitt (1992) highlights, this 
contrastive work alone is unlikely to make this a convincing account of something 
‘unusual’, but in conjunction with introduction of the concept of ‘insistence’, that is to 
characterise K as acting in a compulsive rather than leisurely manner, the effect becomes 
more clear. The use of a precise target (’30 lengths’) also serves to make the documented 
behaviour hearable as in some way ‘obsessive’. Smith’s fundamental point is that few 
behaviours are, in themselves, deviant. Their deviant character, instead, has to be 
‘worked up’ in the detail of the account as we can see the interviewee doing in extract 
5(II) through the use of a durational device (something which recurs throughout all data 
in the project).  
Also noteworthy here is that no attempt is made on the part of the respondent to 
explain what the source of the general pathology he reports, the DSM, stands for. This is 
the first clear indication given that the respondent has assumed, from culturally-available 
and contextual resources, that the interviewer shares certain specific knowledges with 
him – in this case, what the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual is. Such assumptions here 
take the form of pre-held knowledges held relating to the identity of the interviewer and 
the culturally available knowledges bound to this identity category; in this case a 
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postgraduate student studying depression76 really should know what DSM stands for. 
The respondent, in invoking the DSM classification system recipiently designs his 
utterance to make available a number of inferences to the interviewer related to what the 
DSM is and does, and thus its relation to definitions of depression. It is, for example, a 
widely supported medical manual which classifies and defines diseases. As such, the 
definition subsequently reported is made accountable to this manual rather than to 
individual reasoning on the part of the respondent. Woolgar (1988a) terms such a 
strategy an ‘externalising device’, the invocation of a ‘reliable’ body or ‘large’ 
community to downplay the importance of any one individual in the making of a claim, 
that is to say a ‘safety in numbers’ device. In short, the respondent is reducing his 
personal accountability in what may be interpreted as a ‘problematic’ claim77, by making 
relevant that this definition is of ‘institutional’ origin and is widely accepted.  
In terms of accountability, the utterance also addresses the respondent’s own category 
entitlement regarding comprehensive knowledge of DSM classification systems and, 
thus, his status as a reliable author of such a report. As Potter contributes: 
 
‘Knowledge is culturally and normatively linked to categories of actors in a variety of 
different ways. Certain categories of actors are treated as entitled to know particular sorts 
of things, and their reports and descriptions may be given special credence. At its simplest, 
a person visits a doctor because she is expected to know something about illness. She is in 
a category of people who are treated as entitled to have such knowledge; she knows about 
illness by virtue of the fact that she is a doctor. That is, we assume that her category 
membership is a product of training, knowledge and so on.’ (1997:114) 
 
In many cases, category entitlement can be seen to be explicitly formulated78. From the 
outset here, the entitlement is implicit in the GP’s talk. Assuming the interviewer’s 
knowledge of his professional identity, the invocation of the DSM is done on the basis of 
a further assumed shared knowledge regarding the standing of the DSM as both a 
provider of guidance for GPs and an object of which GPs have reliable knowledge. What 
this demonstrates is that the meanings of social identities are not produced in isolation; 
187 
 
the speaker here both draws upon and utilises culturally-available knowledge relating to 
what it is to be a GP. 
To summarise this specific conversational action, answering a very broad question 
with a specific report in this instance serves to limit the interpretative variabilities the 
utterance could produce. The respondent furnishes the interviewer with a set of 
conversational resources drawing upon what he assumes to be ‘shared knowledge’ about 
the DSM and its relationship with depression; the assumption that the interviewer shares 
his understanding of the structure and functions of the DSM shapes the design of his 
utterance and, because the utterance was designed as it was, the interviewer cannot now 
infer that the definition provided is, for example, an ad-hoc opinion. In these terms, there 
is a powerful reflexivity between interactional context and utterance. As Garfinkel (1967) 
argues, speakers take account of context in the design of an utterance, and designs the 
utterance so as to shape the context79. John Heritage (1984a) articulates: 
 
‘[Talk is] context shaped and context renewing...[which] is a major, and unavoidable, 
procedure which hearers use and rely on to interpret conversational contributions, and it is 
also something which speakers pervasively attend to in the design of what they say.’ 
(Heritage, 1984a:242) [Original Emphasis] 
 
Don H. Zimmerman neatly summarises this reflexivity in terms of single words, 
providing a graphic means for its understanding. He presents three identical shapes, as 
shown in figure 5B.  
 
 
INDENTATION 
 
PROJECTION  
FIGURE 5B: ZIMMERMAN’S REFLEXIVITY MODEL 
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The first and third boxes differ from the second in that they each contain a single word. 
The words and boxes interact to produce meanings regarding the nature of the boxes. 
The word ‘projection’ appearing in a different setting would not have the meaning that it 
has here and the box would not have the same nature without it. The word does not 
simply describe a projection and thus take its meaning from the context of its 
appearance, it also creates a ‘projection’ that does not exist in either of the other two 
boxes, which are identical bar for the word itself. Likewise the word ‘indentation’ both 
creates and describes the context in which it appears. The words reflexively create the 
reality of which they are a part. Of course, naturally occurring talk is rather more 
complex than single words, and social context is rather more complex and ambiguous 
than boxes. Zimmerman’s model holds fast, however, as an excellent means of 
understanding a hugely intricate yet ubiquitous element of social life which is, crucially, 
understood and relied upon by all participants in interaction, though, to return to 
Garfinkel’s (1967) proposal, one which is largely taken-for-granted. Reflexivity is not 
something that is theorised about in everyday situations. With reference to the target 
data, this process can be broken down as in figure 5C: 
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Some interesting themes have arisen in this short analysis that will be explored in more 
detail in the remaining analytic chapters, particularly those relating to the flexibility of 
categories, the construction of factual accounts and to category entitlement in discussions 
of depression. Indeed, these key areas of focus take on a central role in the following 
analysis of an actual doctor-patient consultation. What has been demonstrated above all 
else, however, is that even this short account is less a neutral recollection of the GP’s 
knowledge than a situated construction sensitive to the inferential business generated by 
providing a description of depression in an interview.  
The interviewer is now furnished with 
knowledge relating to the widespread 
acceptability of the definition to be 
provided. 
 
He understands what kind of information is 
being requested. 
 
He understands what kind of response to 
‘do’ to a question about depression. 
 
He understands potential ‘problem’ areas. 
- regarding what the DSM actually is. 
 
 
- regarding the relationship between the 
DSM and definitions of depression. 
 
 - regarding the relationship between the 
DSM and General Practitioners. 
 
It is a statement of fact, not a matter of 
opinion. 
 
It is a reliable report, substantiable with 
reference to others. 
 
It is a report he is particularly qualified to 
make on a professional basis. 
FIGURE 5C: TALK, CONTEXT AND REFLEXIVITY. 
 
The utterance is designed to inform 
the future trajectory of the 
conversation and thus alter the direct 
context itself. 
 
 
The speaker practically analyses the 
requirements of the direct context 
 
The utterance is designed on the 
basis of assumed shared meanings. 
 
The utterance is designed to 
circumscribe both the range of 
inferences which can be drawn from 
the utterance and the character of the 
utterance itself. 
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5.2. DP-DATA: 
CONSULTATION, NEGOTIATION AND DIALOGUE. 
In this section the extract to be examined - 5(III), below - is taken from the first 
consultation in the transcribed group in which a diagnosis of depression was explicitly 
made. The data reproduced below shows the opening exchanges of the consultation.  
 
EXTRACT 5(III): DP7 <DEPRESSION> 
((Tape starts: GP greets patient)) 
1.   D: wha::t can I do for you then (.) Mr [X]? 
2.     (1.0) 
3.   P:  e::rm (.) not qui::te sure  
4.     (.5) 
5.   D:  well (.5) lets start with what >you think< is wrong 
6.     (.5) 
7.   P: yeah (.) skinda ha:rd to sa::y 
8.    (1.0) 
9.   D: ºuh huhº= 
10.   P:  = iss not anythin I can really put me finger on I just feel kinda bad 
11.    (1.0) have done for a:ges too 
12.    (.5) 
13.   D: bad in what way? 
14.   P: uhh::  
15.    (1.0) 
16.   D: yes?= 
17.   P:         =uhh:: ((coughs)) kinda worn out all the time (.5) ti:red (.) ºya knowº  
18.    (.5) ahm normally pretty active (.) ah play footie an that (.) 
19.    ºbutº (.) ri:ght now ah (.) jus: can’t seem to do much 
 
Reflecting upon the studies outlined in Chapter 4, it is clear in this extract that the turn-
taking procedures evident in this consultation assume a very distinctive pattern. Simply 
put, the doctor asks questions, the patient gives answers. Within this organisation, an 
‘asymmetry’ of task and topic is reproduced (ten Have, 1991). Topically, the content of 
the consultation is restricted to details relating to the patient. Meanwhile, 
 
‘Patients’ tasks mainly involve, answering questions, and accepting physician’s decisions, 
while doctors are supposed to listen to complaints, to investigate the case and to decide on 
a diagnosis and treatment. Although the initiative for the encounter is primarily the 
patient’s, this task distribution involved quite “natural” interactional dominance by the 
physician, enacted through questioning, investigating and decision-making behaviour, 
coupled with interactional submission by the patient, achieved through answering, 
accepting and generally complying with the doctor’s orders and suggestions.’ (ten Have, 
1991:140) [Emphasis Added]. 
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Even in cases where the doctor’s utterance is not specifically formulated as a question, as 
in line 9, the minimal continuer ‘uh huh’ is treated by the patient as a request for personal 
information. As Frankel (1990) argues, this ‘asymmetry’ of conversational rights is 
oriented to by both speakers as being appropriate to the interactional context, but this 
very orientation also shapes what the primary care consultation actually is. The patient 
makes no actual endeavour to ask questions of the doctor, there are no interruptions and 
no overlapping utterances. GP and patient draw upon culturally available knowledge 
relating to ‘correct’ conduct herein, making this knowledge visible in terms of what they 
actually do and reproducing the ‘institutionality’ of this conduct therein80. Crucially, 
however, as will become apparent later in this project, this task-and-topic ‘imbalance’ 
does not always hold. Furthermore, its absence does not have a ‘destructive’ effect in the 
consultation, but indeed is very often very deliberately abandoned or suspended by both 
speakers to demonstrably constructive ends (see Chapter 8). Underscored herein is the 
importance of viewing this ‘asymmetrical’ organisation as an available resource for the 
accomplishment of social action, rather than, say, as an orientation by participants to 
hard social ‘norms’ or the working of ‘power’. ‘Asymmetry’ itself is a phenomenon 
which is interactionally achieved (ten Have, 1991; Maynard, 1991), not externally 
determined.  
While this general pattern of activity can be identified from an overview of the 
extract above, there are some nuances within this specific conversational organisation, 
however, that require attention in their own right and are detailed in section 5.2.1. 
 
5.2.1. Analysis I: Openings. Marking an Answer as Problematic. 
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From the outset, the doctor asks questions. Line 1 constitutes a general opening, ‘wha::t 
can I do for you then?’, which could be interpreted and responded to in a variety of ways. 
The patient responds ambiguously ‘e::rm (.) not qui::te sure’ (line 3). The original 
question is thus treated as literal, which prompts the doctor, after a pause (indeed every 
transition-relevance point in the extract, bar that between lines 10 and 11, is characterised 
a pause), to reformulate (line 5) with a more explicit request for a description of the 
problem. This action demonstrates that the patient’s utterance took the shape of a 
dispreferred pair part – which is to say not the course of action expected, or most 
conducive to orderly conversational flow (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998), which in turn 
demonstrates that the doctor’s original question was designed as a general request for 
information rather than a literal question. The function of having ‘done’ this 
dispreference in his first answer, however, becomes clear when the patient then responds 
to the reformulated question with another ambiguous utterance, ‘yeah (.) skinda ha:rd to 
sa::y’ (line 7), which is itself treated as a ‘no-plus’ (Sacks, 1992) by the doctor who 
maintains the conditional relevance of further information using a minimal continuer 
(line 9). This action elicits a fuller answer, but one which still maintains a decidedly 
ambiguous character (line 10).  
A number of studies have shown how a string of ‘erms’, pauses and dispreferred 
responses can serve to mark a forthcoming problematic issue (Heritage, 1984b; 
Silverman, 1997), or to delay the delivery of ‘bad news’. In this case, the answer is very 
definitely formulated as ‘awkward’ before it is even supplied, and is then rendered 
explicitly problematic in terms of the pre-announcement ‘iss not anythin I can really put 
me finger on’ - i.e. the patient cannot satisfactorily complete the question-answer pair 
beyond a very general assertion that he does not feel well81 (‘I just feel kinda bad’). 
Although this is a distinctly ordinary formulation of his wellbeing (people ‘just’ feel 
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‘kinda bad’ with some regularity), which circumscribes inferences relating to severity, he 
then recharacterises it in terms of duration ‘have done for a:ges too’ (line 11). This is an 
example of what Pomerantz (1986) terms an Extreme Case Formulation (ECF). 
Pomerantz’s own analysis of the use of ECFs revealed that speakers use them 
systematically to influence the judgements of, and inferences that can be drawn by, co-
interactants, especially when the speaker may anticipate a sceptical or unsympathetic 
hearing of his/her account or argument, or is making a potentially contentious point. An 
ECF is a counter-sceptical or persuasive device in interaction82, and cannot be treated as 
a simple case of exaggeration. The ECF used here (‘ages’) serves to address the patient’s 
own accountability in actually visiting the doctor in the first place by making available 
that the visit is not ‘on a whim’, for example, but rather the result of an extended period 
during which he has been out-of-sorts. In doing so, he also addresses the business of his 
own identity in this scenario. Making available that he is someone who has endured a 
significant period of discomfort prior to visiting the GP, he circumscribes inferences that 
he may belong to the categories of ‘hypochondriac’ or ‘time waster’ by occasioning an 
activity which is bound to neither of these categories. This assertion works alongside his 
claim that what is wrong is not something he himself can ‘really’ identify (line 10), 
which allows for the inference that a process of due consideration relating to the topic 
has taken place over a period of ‘ages’, an activity associated more with a ‘responsible’ 
person than a ‘time waster’. Both serve the dual purpose of potentially engendering a 
more sympathetic hearing from the GP himself, while also delaying the delivery of 
further information relating to his symptoms - which does not appear until lines 17 to 19, 
what Silverman (1997) terms ‘expressive caution’.  
This caution is maintained across the next series of utterances, which begin with a 
short silence (line 12) from which the doctor infers that no further information will be 
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forthcoming without a prompt. This can be seen in the subsequent request for yet further 
information - ‘bad in what way?’ (line 13) which also confirms the status of the patient’s 
description of symptoms an unsatisfactory or incomplete answer to his original question. 
Another series of pauses and truncations of the question follow, and finally the patient 
issues a more detailed description of the symptoms, which has itself, thus, already been 
marked as problematic. These operations are summarised below: 
 
1.  D: wha::t can I do for you then (.) Mr [X]?   QUESTION 
2.     (1.0)     PAUSE 
3.   P:  e::rm (.) not qui::te sure     DISPREFERRED RESPONSE 
4.     (.5)     PAUSE 
5.   D:  well (.5) lets start with what >you think< is wrong  REFORMULATED QUESTION 
6.     (.5)     PAUSE 
7.   P: yeah (.) skinda ha:rd to sa::y    DISPREFERRED RESPONSE 
8.    (1.0)     PAUSE 
9.   D: ºuh huhº=      TRUNCATION 
10.   P:               = iss not anythin I can really put me finger on I just feel kinda bad 
11.    (1.0) have done for a:ges too    DISPREFERRED RESPONSE 
12.    (.5)     PAUSE 
13.   D: bad in what way?     QUESTION 
14.   P: uhh::       DISPREFERRED RESPONSE 
15.    (1.0)     PAUSE 
16.   D: yes?=      TRUNCATION 
 
Considering the first sixteen lines of the extract in their entirety, it can be asserted that 
the initial response by the patient in line 3 is not a simple case of ‘misinterpretation’ of 
the doctor’s original question and, likewise, the initial description of symptoms in lines 
10 and 11 is not an equally uncomplicated case of vagueness. Rather, both utterances can 
be shown to perform specifically designed interactive functions in the context of the 
conversation itself. Both serve to delay and signal a conversational problem relating to 
the question, the latter also to making available inferences relating to the character of 
patient which may encourage a more sympathetic hearing from the GP. The use of such 
devices, thus, highlights that the patient knew exactly what the doctor was requesting in 
the indexical utterance ‘wha::t can I do for you then?’ and, crucially, also makes salient 
an issue relating to the moral character of the consultation itself. Not only does the doctor 
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ask the questions, as already indicated, but the patient should be able to answer them to a 
satisfactory degree. The use of counter-sceptical devices and dispreference markers 
throughout indicates that the patient is fully oriented to his own ‘failing’ in this 
requirement but, and of central importance, the use of such uncertainty as a dispreference 
marker (as in lines 7 and 10) demonstrates that it cannot be treated as a mere ‘obstacle’ to 
communication. Rather, it takes the form of a fluid, socially organised communicative 
resource in itself, available to both GP and patient.  
A degree of uncertainty is to be expected in a consultation - a large part of the 
business of many consultations in primary care, including this one, is for the GP to 
actually identify the nature of the illness; very few patients actually self-diagnose (Heath, 
1992). The patient is, thus, not expected to provide a definition of the illness itself, and as 
shown in Chapter 4, even where the patient does venture an opinion there is a tendency 
to defer to the professional knowledge of the doctor (Heath, 1986 & 1992). Uncertainty 
in providing definitions of symptoms, however, is shown to be explicitly problematic. 
The patient in extract 5(III) orients to an expectation that he should be able to answer the 
GP’s questions regarding his own ‘state of being’, which is to say that he should possess 
adequate knowledge ‘of himself’ to enable to GP to make a professional assessment, but 
also utilises this expectation as a conversational tool. Once again, a detailed analysis 
reveals that the meanings of utterances in a conversation can only be understood in the 
context of conversational flow itself – both in terms of what precedes and follows any 
given utterance. Moreover, the understanding of preference organisation in this extract 
leads us to a supported understanding of the structures of conduct in the consultation 
situation, a theme which persists in the description of symptoms that the patient 
subsequently provides. 
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A particularly noteworthy issue arising from this analysis is that it is difficult to 
sustain any assertion that the words of the patient are the result of the ‘abnormal’ states 
of mind being insinuated at the literal level. It can be clearly seen that speaker P skilfully 
uses a wide range of tacit communicative competences to accomplish some awkward 
interactional tasks without allowing the conversation to break down. The behaviourist 
account of depression, for example, suggests that individuals with the illness take longer 
to respond to others in conversation (Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973) and thus the frequent 
pauses that occur at the transition-relevance points herein are liable to be treated by 
behaviourists as direct evidence of an ‘internal’ disorder. At the beginning of the extract, 
however, and throughout, perturbations of speech and significant pauses in the 
conversation can themselves be shown to perform specific constructive functions. The 
comparison is schematised below, with the operations of the subjects in lighter shade, the 
operations of the analyst in darker. The areas of prime interest to the behaviourist are 
imaginary in character; the internal state (although not analysed in itself) is presumed, 
and from this a causal relationship is further presumed that links the observed action to a 
wider scheme. What is interesting with a CA-based analysis is that the activity of the 
analyst in making sense of the activity at hand is also that of the participants in the 
activity itself, the analyst here going further only insofar as to provide a detailed 
description of what is actually going on. 
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FIGURE 5D: BEHAVIOURISM. 
 
INTERNAL STATE 
(deviant) 
SLOW RESPONSE 
(symptom) 
 
PRESUME 
 
OBSERVE 
 
CAUSE 
FIGURE 5E: CONVERSATION ANALYSIS. 
 
SLOW RESPONSE 
(action) 
 
PROBLEM ISSUE 
(construct) 
OBSERVE & DESCRIBE 
 
FUNCTION 
 
This contrast between the two types of approach is also clear when exploring the next 
part of the extract. 
 
5.2.2. Analysis II: Constructing the Symptoms as ‘Abnormal’. 
As ten Have (2001) notes, early descriptions of symptoms in a consultation tend to be 
rather dense affairs which invite ‘unpacking’ (Jefferson, 1985) by a GP. The section of 
the extract in which I am interested here, is reproduced below and vividly illustrates this 
‘unpacking’ process in action. As already noted, the material of the talk has been marked 
in advance by the patient as ‘problematic’, and itself maintains a distinctly perturbed 
flow. 
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 =uhh:: ((coughs)) kinda worn out all the time (.5) ti:red (.) ºya knowº (1.0) ahm normally 
pretty active (.) ah play footie an that (.) ºbutº (.) ri:ght now ah (.) jus: can’t seem to do 
much 
 
The first observation of relevance is that, although provided as a more specific list of 
symptoms to answer the doctor’s call for clarification (‘bad in what way?’), it assumes a 
three-part format: worn out, tired and incapable of doing much. The three items deployed 
are, in themselves, relatively ordinary in character and formulate a general malaise rather 
than any real specifics of the condition. It is only through the use of the ECF ‘all the 
time’ with relation to feeling worn out that he characterises the condition being described 
as anything other than a transient everyday feeling experience by everybody sometimes. 
Within this list, however, is a key piece of identity work which serves more vividly to 
mark the description as being one of an ‘abnormal’ state. The patient provides a brief 
factual account of himself as an explicitly ‘active’ individual under ‘normal’ 
circumstances, circumscribing any inference that his disquiet may be due to, say, 
habitual laziness, and thus also addressing his own capacity to recognise such symptoms 
as being less than ordinary for him. Moreover, the formulation ‘ri:ght now’ he ‘can’t 
seem to do much’ is not consistent with the life of an active individual. This serves not 
only to function as a complaint and/or identification of a problem, but also to reflexively 
characterise his current personal conditions as not being ‘normal’ because, normally, he 
is not like this. The assertion that he belongs to a category of ‘active people’ is warranted 
in two key ways: 
 
1. Rather than making the simple factual statement ‘I can’t do much’ he formulates the 
problem as something which seems to be the case, circumscribing any inference that 
he has not tried and is not still trying. This device makes available a process of due 
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analysis and reflection relating to what he can and cannot do at the moment; he has 
given consideration to phenomenon X and the result is conclusion Y.  
2. Furthermore, he occasions an autobiographical activity in which, again under normal 
circumstances, he has participated. Drawing upon culturally available knowledge 
relating to the association between sports and exercise, playing football is deployed 
as category bound to the social identity of an active individual and, reflexively, 
functions as a warrant for the use of the identity with respect to the speaker. 
 
Unlike most of his utterances in extract 5(III) thus far, the assertions made by the patient 
relating to identity and autobiography take the shape of reported facts rather than 
opinions or suggestions. Edwards and Potter (1992), drawing on Latour and Woolgar 
(1979), suggest that formulations of states of affairs can be viewed as lying on a 
normatively-defined continuum of modalisation. At one end of this continuum can be 
found ‘statements of fact’, things that ‘are’ and are formulated as such. These generally 
comprise statements based on taken-for-granted knowledge which are so commonplace 
as to require no further information relating to the process by which they were generated, 
i.e. they simply exist as ‘objective facts’ - ‘water is wet’, for example. At the other end of 
the scale are statements which include ‘I believe’ or ‘I think’ or ‘I suppose’. Such 
utterances make the statement contingent upon the ‘mental processes’ of the speaker, and 
characterise the statement as the result of a process of reflection and thought. While the 
patient has hitherto made statements that lie at the most agential end of such a continuum 
(‘not qui::te sure’, ‘iss not anythin I can really put me finger on’, ‘I just feel kinda bad’) 
making available fallible personal processes, the account provided here moves to the 
other extreme. The patient, under normal circumstances, simply is an active individual 
and does play football.  
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In these terms, considering once again the previously attributed problematic 
status of this sequence of talk, orientation is displayed to the unsatisfactory quality of the 
rather imprecise description of symptoms. This is confirmed when noting that the 
factuality of the personal details occasioned contrasts sharply with the modal character of 
his proposed condition and, thus, addresses his accountability not only for recognising 
‘how he feels’ as being aberrant, but for having come to a GP at all when unable to 
clearly define symptoms. This illuminates a theme arising from the work of Christian 
Heath (1986 & 1992) discussed in the previous chapter. Heath highlights how, in his 
data, patients consistently defer to the knowledge of doctors on any matters which could 
be interpreted as ‘medical’ in character, particularly during diagnosis. The opinions of 
the patient are consistently formulated as ‘upshots’ or ‘hunches’ while the utterances of a 
doctor more ‘factually’ formulated, illustrating how the status and roles of different 
category-bound knowledges are reproduced in practical action (Maynard, 1991). In 
extract 5(III) as a whole, and particularly clearly in this segment, we see a sharp contrast 
between the patient’s own assertions relating to ‘how he feels now’ and ‘who he is 
generally’; the former are couched in highly modal terms, the latter are formulated as 
facts. In this contrast the reflexive character of the social experience once again becomes 
abundantly clear. The activity of describing his ‘internal’ states, matters of which he may 
normally be expected to have privileged and ‘expert’ knowledge, requires that the patient 
draw upon culturally available resources relating to the context he is in and the identity 
of the person to whom he is talking - a GP, in a consultation, who may be in a unique 
position to challenge his assertions relating to himself. Using these resources, he 
formulates the way he feels as being unclear and debatable in character, a form of 
deference to his co-interlocutor which may not appear in all contexts, but which in this 
one actually reproduces the character of the symptoms themselves as ‘debatable’ and the 
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knowledge of the GP as ‘superior’ on this topic. To paraphrase Bergmann (1992), these 
issues are not in themselves subject to or exempt from debate, but are made visibly so in 
the action of talking about them as questionable. Equally, in contrastively characterising 
the ‘normal’ as ‘factual’ he makes available that there is no need to defer to the 
knowledge of the GP with regard to these matters, which reflexively serves to 
characterise such factual information as ‘normal’, i.e. not the professional business of a 
GP. 
As we can see, there is some highly skilled and intricate work taking place in this 
short utterance. The foremost matter arising from this section, however, is that the 
account of self in question cannot be viewed as a neutral conduit of information 
regarding normal/abnormal feelings and lifestyle as a diagnostic tool such as the Beck 
Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988) would demand. The patient’s 
utterances have been clearly shown to be active constructions, contingent upon the 
character of everyday communication, which serve to characterise certain 
psychological/physiological states as ‘abnormal’ through formulations of what is 
‘normal’. 
 
5.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS. 
Detailed examinations of two short extracts in this chapter have illuminated a number of 
themes. Firstly, in providing a factual account of the reality of depression, the GP 
interviewed uses a range of conversational resources to counter the possibility of a 
sceptical hearing. Moreover, the central phenomena to the issue as identified by 
numerous studies across Chapters 2 and 3 – depression, symptoms etc. – were shown to 
have a fluid character in the interaction itself. Their meanings could not be taken as 
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neutral and general, but were seen to be constructive and specific to the interactive 
contexts of which they were a part.  
Equally, in the consultation both doctor and patient could be seen to orient to the 
fluid nature of categories in the turn-by-turn unfolding of the conversation. The patient’s 
descriptions of his symptoms in extract 5(III) were shown to serve constructive ends, 
addressing his accountability as a ‘patient’ and marking certain types of utterance as 
problematic in the accomplished context. He does not simply ‘empty his head’ of some 
ambiguous symptoms for the GP to translate into an illness. Rather his account is 
organised in such as way as to be a description of ‘an illness’; this character is something 
that is achieved. The ‘abnormality’ of the state he describes is built using a variety of 
techniques, including the contrastive construction of other feelings and activities as 
‘normal’. Moreover, in designing the account in such a way he orients to potential 
problems with his description as a description. The design of his account is sensitive to 
the inferential possibilities generated by providing an account that may not be adequate 
for the doctor’s diagnostic purposes; this provides clear evidence of an understanding by 
the patient that such orientation may be necessary to receive a sympathetic hearing. Or, 
to look at it another way, he orients to the understanding that there may be undesirable 
consequences in not marking the description he provides as problematic in some way.  
Such concerns are a key topic for Palmer (2000) who, in a fascinating study of the 
accounting procedures of a person diagnosed as ‘delusional’, shows how the 
recognisably ‘delusional’ aspect of the account provided is in two main organisational 
properties: 
 
1. The speaker claims an unlikely experience while not building any ‘unlikeliness’ 
into the description of it; he does not make clear how the experience is an 
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unlikely one as opposed to an ordinary one, thus opening up potential accusations 
of misperception. 
2. The speaker demonstrates a lack of orientation to the contentious character of the 
account itself. 
 
As the recipient of such an account, the psychiatrist can infer that the patient did not see 
what they claim to have seen not as a result of the content of the description (no matter 
how ‘unlikely’ it seems) but through the patient’s disengagement from normal social 
practices of interaction relating to the provision of ‘evidence’ for problematic claims. A 
failure on the part of the patient in extract 5(III) to acknowledge the ambiguity of his 
symptoms is unlikely to result in a diagnosis of delusions, but certainly leaves him open 
to accusations of being obstructive or wasting the doctor’s time. From the account he 
does provide, however, the patient makes available that his is ill, that his illness is worthy 
of the doctor’s attention and that he also understands the description he has provided may 
not be as helpful as it probably should be. This theme, the inferential business involved 
in providing accounts of symptoms, is a matter explored in much greater detail in 
Chapters 7 and 8, with a particular focus on the sociological concept of ‘stigma’. 
These observations are further illuminated by Robin Wooffitt’s analysis of an account 
provided by a professional medium. 
 
‘In the interview, the speaker emphasizes that [paranormal] experiences are a recurrent and 
normal feature of her life and work. Thus, we might reasonably expect that her description 
of specific incidents would reflect the fact that she treats them as , or claims to treat them, 
as ordinary events. Yet close inspection of the details of…her account reveals that she 
displays a sensitivity to norms and conventions regarding paranormal experiences which 
she would reject as having no relevance to her. Thus, there is a discrepancy between what 
she would say is normal and acceptable to her, and what sorts of issues and concerns 
actually inform the descriptions she makes. It appears that, despite claiming that for her 
these experiences are normal, she still orients to the wider, socially organized conventions 
regarding the inauspiciousness of reporting paranormal experiences and the cultural 
conventions which are associated with paranormal experiences.’ (1992: 90-91) 
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In extract 5(II), the doctor is keen to emphasise that depression is an illness which 
happens in ordinary situations to ordinary people. He orients, however, in the detail of 
his description to possible scepticism on the part of the hearer relating to the veracity of 
his account. It may be prescient to ask, at this point, if the same accounting procedures 
have been employed if the phenomenon he was describing was, say, a broken leg? It is 
unlikely. Many writers have suggested that illnesses such as depression are ‘invented’ (or 
‘artificial’) categories with no basis in nature and which are used by their inventors to 
certain (rarely benevolent) ends (Marcuse, 1967; Gergen, 1990; Kaye, 1995). Such meta-
claims, however, as has already been discussed, are problematic in that they merely 
supplant one academic narrative with another and pay little attention to how the people 
(supposedly) being studied actually understand and orient to the issues at hand. What I 
am highlighting here, and will investigate in detail in Chapter 6, is that the contestable 
reality of a condition such as ‘depression’ is an operational matter for the attention of 
people in a wider cultural sense, not only sociologists and critical psychiatrists, and, 
moreover, can be shown to be such in concrete examples of social action. Rather than 
imply, thus, as do many critical approaches, that mental illness categories are tools of 
power used to subordinate a largely passive population, we can instead begin to explore 
how members of that population - GPs and patients - actively engage with, understand 
and use a range of ‘psychological’ and ‘physiological’ categories as fluid, culturally 
available resources. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Constructing a ‘Natural’ Reality for Major Depression: 
Factuality and Function in Accounts of a Mental Illness 
‘The problem of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself.’ 
Martin Heidegger83 
“Being and Time” 
 
In this chapter, the observations arising from section 5.1 (exploring an unstructured 
interview with a GP) are expanded into a broader analysis of a range of interview 
extracts. Herein, the GPs’ activity in the interviews is examined in terms of the manner in 
which it reflects not only on frames for the classification/diagnosis of depression itself, 
but also on medical techniques for the evaluation of GPs understanding of these frames. 
As discussed at length in Chapter 2, contemporary psychiatric/psychological theories 
of depression which have relevance in medical practice are grounded in the assumption 
that depression is a ‘real’ (natural) phenomenon that exists prior to scientific 
classificatory activity, manifests within people and can be recognised through the 
aberrant actions of an affected individual. While the foci of these theoretical accounts 
locate the causes and precise characteristics of the condition in different areas, they are 
categorically unified by this basic underpinning model of the condition. Equally, a 
universally avowed rationale for the production of these frameworks by their authors is 
the facilitation of better recognition and treatment of the condition in front-line medicine. 
A variety of medical studies on the diagnosis of Major Depression in primary care focus 
on GPs’ knowledge of key nosological frameworks in a bid to understand why 
recognition rates are apparently low in comparison to those of other chronic illnesses. 
Tylee, Priest & Roberts (1996), for example, argue that doctors differ in their ability to 
recognise Major Depression and that this variability is contingent on knowledge, skills 
and attitude. Likewise, the Clinical Standards Advisory Group report of March 2000, 
argues that, 
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‘Many patients were satisfied with the care they received in a primary care setting. Primary 
care teams are accessible to people with depression, and most patients said they found their 
GP showed them empathy. However, GPs' knowledge of depression varies greatly.’ 
(CSAG, 2000:2) 
 
Improving knowledge of the character of Major Depression amongst GPs was, indeed, 
one of the central aims of the "Defeat Depression Campaign" (Hannaford, Thompson & 
Simpson, 1996).  
We can see, then, that the issue at stake in terms of evaluating a GP’s likelihood of 
making a successful diagnosis of depression is, to phrase it a little crudely, one of ‘how 
well does the GP know the dogma’. The point is, however, that such knowledge is very 
hard to directly evaluate. On the whole, it is assumed from the relatively low rates of 
diagnosis that there must be a lack of retained knowledge on the part of the GPs, and this 
is invariably the result of inadequate education and training.  
 
‘Many [GPs] have no postgraduate training in the recognition and management of 
depression or in mental health more generally.’ (CSAG, 2000:2) 
 
It is interesting here to draw on Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) famous distinction between 
‘knowledge-how’ and ‘knowledge-that’. The former (procedural knowledge) relates to 
the kinds of knowledge people use in order to perform certain actions (how to talk, ride a 
bicycle or greet someone properly), whereas the latter (propositional knowledge) is a 
particular incidence of the kind of knowledge that people hold in knowing that 
something is, in fact, the case (that water is composed of Hydrogen and Oxygen ions, for 
example). Ryle was keen to overturn the long-standing Cartesian notion (what he called 
the ‘intellectualist doctrine’) that all procedural knowledge is ultimately propositional 
knowledge, and that the evaluation of procedure-practice will lead, inexorably, to an 
understanding of proposition-comprehension. The studies briefly detailed above are 
directly representative of this intellectualist doctrine; a procedural knowledge (how to 
make a diagnosis of depression) is taken to be wholly grounded in a propositional one 
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(the standing nosology of depression). As such, the ability/skill to recognise depression 
in primary care is assumed to be substantiation of a retained knowledge/correct 
understanding of ‘what depression is’ rather than actually constitutive of such knowledge. 
Therefore, where depression is not diagnosed, it is often asserted that a lack of 
propositional knowledge is the root cause.  
The aim here is not to dismiss outright the notion that propositional knowledges have 
a connection to procedural knowledge; after all, someone who had never heard of Major 
Depression could hardly be expected to diagnose it. Rather, as Watson and Weinberg 
(1982) claim, the point is to recognise that practical skills cannot be reduced to 
propositional knowledges but that the latter are, in fact, actualised in the former. Indeed, 
to argue that they can be reduced in such a way produces a major theoretical 
inconsistency. As Ryle himself maintained, if the understanding and demonstration of 
propositional knowledge is itself a procedure, but procedural knowledge is propositional, 
then nobody would ever know anything. 
 
‘The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be 
more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently 
executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed 
intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle.’ 
(1949:30) 
 
Nevertheless, most evaluative techniques prescribed by the medical establishment in the 
UK to are designed to assess ‘correct’ propositional knowledge of Major Depression, on 
the assumption that this will then causally (and correctly) direct behaviour in the 
consultation. The first and most transparent of such techniques is the direct examination, 
such as those sat in medical college. The purpose herein is to directly access 
propositional knowledges ‘stored up’ in the brain via direct questions. Very rarely, 
however, is it necessary, in the everyday course of their jobs, for GPs to chapter-and-
verse quote the DSM-IV or any other established medical text. Rather, to follow Watson 
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and Weinberg’s (1982) line of argument, the knowledges in question are actualised 
within given practices – interpretation, diagnosis and suchlike.  
Recognising this up to a point, evaluation of qualified doctors is usually done 
through the imposition of normative frames of ‘good practice’ against which specific GP 
‘performances’ in consultations can be recorded (usually on videotape) and ‘measured’ 
for success. Based on what David Silverman (1997) terms the ‘explanatory orthodoxy’, 
as detailed at length in Chapter 1, such a strategy still fails totally to examine how 
‘activities come to have meaning in what people are doing in everyday (naturally 
occurring) situations.’ (Silverman, 1997:24). These issues of action-in-the-consultation 
are addressed at length in Chapters 7 and 8. In this chapter, on the other hand, it will be 
illustrated how even a direct interview, asking questions with which a GP would seldom, 
if ever, be confronted in everyday medical practice, is a problematic strategy in the 
assessment of ‘retained’ knowledge.  
The initial question asked of the GPs in the following data is, very simply, ‘What 
is depression?’ in all cases. This could be seen, on the surface, as an exercise in eliciting 
a ‘chapter-and-verse’ verbal citation from a textbook which can then be evaluated, as 
‘memory’ or ‘understanding’, against normative frames for correct comprehension. 
Rather than assuming a position of ‘divinity’ (Silverman, 1997) and presuming that the 
descriptions the GPs provide are neutral conduits to their (correct/incorrect) propositional 
knowledge of the topic in hand, it will instead be demonstrated that even largely 
monologic descriptions are skilfully designed social actions that account for, and to, the 
local interaction context in which they are being produced. In other words, the details 
realised in the accounts are provided for by procedural knowledges. As initially asserted 
in Chapter 5, the words used by GPs to ‘recall’ the natural characteristics of depression 
are, conversely, the tools by which depression is constructed as being a ‘natural’ 
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phenomenon. Even in an interview situation, ‘knowledge that’ (what depression is) can 
only ever be realised as ‘factual’ within the operations of ‘knowledge how’ (answering a 
question, doing an interview, making a case). The focus here is, as such, directed towards 
the practical skills utilised to realise certain knowledges as relevant, and the activities 
within which meanings are constructed and negotiated as part of a dialogue between GP 
and interviewer.  
Finally, and crucially, it is essential to highlight here that this exercise is not 
simply deconstructive, not only concerned with demonstrating the kind of assertions that 
cannot be unproblematically drawn from interview data such as this. By examining the 
practical procedures through which the accounts are accomplished, a range of 
observations can be made that are not dependent upon Cartesian doctrines of 
psychologically-driven action. For example, a particularly interesting affirmative theme 
arising from the previous chapter, and elaborated in a number of the following analyses, 
is that the descriptions of depression constructed by the GPs are not only sensitive to the 
business of giving an account of depression as a ‘real’ phenomenon, but of giving an 
account of depression as a real and problematic phenomenon. The implications of this 
observation for a sociology of Major Depression will be discussed throughout, and at 
greater length in section 6.4. 
 
6.1. CONSTRUCTING THE REALITY OF DEPRESSION: 
PROBLEMATIC FACTS AND FACTUAL PROBLEMS 
For the purposes of the first analytic section it is aids clarity to firstly return to the 
interview examined in the previous chapter, with a view to examining how the GP’s 
account is expanded beyond the initial utterances. Consider this extended transcription: 
 
EXTRACT 6(I): IR1 
1.   I: s:o?  
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2.     (.5) 
3.     what I am g:enuinely interested in (.5) to start with a basic question i:::s (.) 
4.     ·hhh (.) what is depression 
5.     (1.0) 
6.   R:  a definition of depression? 
7.     (.5) 
8.   I: erm (.) >whatever you want< 
9.   R: =ha ((laughs)) 
10.     (.5) 
11.    well in the <D S M> classifi (.3) classification of depression there are certain   
12.     disea ((coughs)) 
13.     (.5) 
14.    ⋅hhh (.) certain symptoms present (.3) erm (.) basically a (.) prol::onged period   
15.     of low mood and (.) er (.) >low self esteem< where (.) a patient does not feel 
16.     (.5) 
17.    we::ll 
18.    (1.0) 
19.   I: y:es? 
20.     (.) 
21.   R: you add a list of six symptoms to it to (.) make the scientific distinction with  
22.     severe depression 
23.     (.5) 
24.   I:  ºuh huhº= 
25.   R:  =and thats >the focus that< all the scientific papers are ba:sed on 
 
Consider here lines 18-25. After a pause of 1 second, the interviewer issues a minimal 
continuer (‘y:es?’ in line 19), indicating that he has inferred, from the silence, that the 
respondent had finished speaking. Interpreting the minimal continuer as a request for 
more information, rather than a simple token of agreement, the GP then proceeds to 
speak again. In lines 21 and 22, the he reformulates the general definition provided in 
lines 14 and 15. The symptoms which were originally cited in line 14, though not 
elaborated, are occasioned once again with the additional characteristic of their quantity 
– six. The qualities of these six symptoms themselves are not actually mentioned, though 
their presence, when taken into account alongside the ‘general pathology’ constitute a 
new phenomenon to this extract - ‘severe depression’. This makes available the inference 
that ‘depression’ is not a simple phenomenon that exists in static, self-identical terms, but 
rather has ‘ordinary’ and ‘severe’ manifestations.  
 
6.1.1. Community as an Agent: Externalisation and Accountability. 
211 
 
A key theme arising from lines 19 to 25 is one of accountability. The respondent 
formulates the distinction between what depression ‘basically’ is, and the nature of 
severe depression (i.e. six specific symptoms), as being a ‘scientific distinction’ (line 21). 
Furthermore, this distinction is also characterised as being ‘>the focus that< all the 
scientific papers are ba:sed on’ (25). Drawing upon the previously established definition 
of depression, the interviewer is furnished with further resources allowing him to 
differentiate between this and another version; the details are, however, as with the 
previous definition, made accountable to an ‘external’ source:  
 
• The distinction is a product of ‘science’. 
• The distinction is a basis for ‘science’. 
   
The invocation of science in these terms makes available a number of particular 
inferences regarding the status of this piece of information. Firstly, as a product of 
‘science’ at large, the account is to be received as a reported fact, circumscribing the 
inference that there is any individual agency on the part of the speaker himself in the 
making of the claim. ‘Science’ is a particularly powerful cultural category carrying 
numerous connotations relating to ‘objectivity’ and, indeed, ‘factuality’84. In this 
account, the accountability is addressed not to specific scientists, or to particular 
branches of science but to ‘science’ itself, a monolithic and depersonalised entity. The 
respondent is indeed using a mode of talk (or writing) that many studies in SSK (Gilbert 
& Mulkay, 1984; Woolgar, 1988a) have analysed as being characteristic of scientific 
texts themselves, a mode which is ‘..organised in a manner which denies its character as 
an interpretative product and which denies that its author’s actions are relevant to its 
content.’ (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984:56). In these terms, 
 
212 
 
‘..when formulating their own claims about the phenomena of the natural world, scientists 
have at their disposal...interpretative forms…which enable them to translate their 
idiosyncratic and defeasible experiences into the impersonal linguistic currency of 
‘experimental evidence’. As a result, scientific speakers seem peculiarly able to construct 
accounts in which they appear to have privileged access to the natural world: indeed, no 
matter what the diversity of views, each scientist manages to convey the strong impression 
that his voice and that of the natural world are one and the same.’ (Gilbert & Mulkay, 
1984:89) 
 
Moreover, in line 25, the respondent uses an ECF in suggesting that ‘all’ the scientific 
papers are based on this distinction. By invoking a unanimous community of ‘expertise’, 
the respondent not only externalises the account, but also constructs a consensus 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992) around the objective status of this fact, which, reflexively, 
contributes to its standing as a fact. This ‘externalised’ mode of accounting is a frequent 
feature of the interviews conducted. Consider, for example, extract 6(II) taken from 
interview IR5: 
 
EXTRACT 6(II): IR5 
1. R: ummm (.) depression is a complicated umm (.) medical condition with a number  
2.   of symptoms including (.) umm (.) sadness (.) obviously (.) but also a number of somatic 
3.   symptoms too: (.) a::nd (.5) ºyesº (.) which have been well researched by 
4.   medical (.5) researchers all o:ver the world↑ (.) especially america and (.) ºhereº 
5.   (.5) 
6.   umm (.) fatigue (.) sleep problems for ahm (.) example 
 
As in extract 6(I) the actual definition provided in the first instance is remarkably 
skeletal. In this case, the single symptom ‘sadness’ is occasioned as the ‘obvious’ one 
among a number, with the list of three completed slightly later with the ‘somatic’ 
symptoms ‘fatigue (.) sleep problems’. By making the claim that sadness is an ‘obvious’ 
symptom of depression, it is important to note, he does not simply draw upon a presumed 
shared knowledge, but constructs it for the purpose of the account. Indeed, he makes a 
brief case for the state of ‘public’ knowledge on the topic of depression. This reflexively 
serves to characterise the ‘other’ symptoms occasioned as somewhat less obvious 
elements of a ‘complicated’ medical condition.  
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Interestingly, the three symptoms are also specifically located by the account; in 
ascribing the identity of ‘somatic’ to ‘fatigue’ and ‘sleep problems’, he excludes 
‘sadness’ from that category and thus, within the context of the description, formulates 
the potentially very ordinary state of sadness as both ‘psychological’ and a ‘symptom’. 
Here again, however, the speaker makes the details accountable to external agencies. The 
identity of a ‘medical’ condition is explicitly ascribed to depression, making available a 
‘institutional’ standing – it is a phenomenon for the attention of medicine. This serves to 
cast depression as bound to the wider category ‘medical conditions’, making available its 
standing as a ‘real’ phenomenon. The solidity of the condition is then further worked up 
by the construction of a community in describing how the ‘less obvious’ symptoms have 
come to be understood.  
The resources employed in this community-building are fascinating. A general 
scale for the community is described (the documented symptoms are the product of 
‘researchers all o:ver the world’), some more specific detail (‘especially america and (.) 
ºhereº’) is advanced. Through the deployment of these resources the GP constructs a 
specific unanimity around the general concept/nosology of depression, and 
simultaneously renders it very awkward for the account to be challenged without 
challenging an international community of qualified people (medical (.5) researchers). 
The explicit binding of the community ‘researchers’ to the category ‘medical’ here is an 
interesting strategy in identity formulation; the use of the social identity ‘researchers’ 
alone may well have been hearable as ‘researchers of medical issues’ in the context of 
this interaction. However, in formulating the community in this way, he makes 
specifically available a variety of inferences relating not only to the 
professional/scientific character of the people involved, but also to their moral character. 
‘Medical Researchers’ as an occasioned social identity provides a different moral 
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framework for the interpretation of the activities in question to, say, ‘university 
researchers’ or ‘employees of a drugs company’ (all of whom may be involved in very 
similar fields/activities of actual research). As Widdecombe and Wooffitt (1995) show, 
fine detail selections in the construction of identity categories are crucial to both the 
sense and persuasiveness of accounts, and are matters to which speakers consistently and 
demonstrably orient. In this case, the interpretative framework provided by the speaker is 
rich with inferences relating to the research as something done for the good of people’s 
health, while delimiting that it may be, for example, for the careers of academics or the 
profits of a corporation. 
The additional detail (‘especially america and (.) ºhereº’ – line 4) further provides 
us with a good example of how CA highlights issues frequently overlooked or dismissed 
by other approaches. The words serve to geographically locate the bulk of the 
aforementioned research. However, the construction of a general, large-scale scientific 
community in the validation of a claim could be said to function as a sufficiently 
persuasive device in itself, rendering this detail superfluous to the account. It is worth 
noting, though, that the community described is of a very large (explicitly international) 
scale. Much as Edwards and Potter (1992) highlight that a purposely constructed 
consensus can be heard as evidence of either truth or collusion, it is fair to say that grand 
generalisations, devoid of particular detail, can be heard as evidence of knowledge on a 
subject, or the absence thereof. The deployment of the additional details relating to the 
specialist sites of research  demonstrates, thus, an orientation to the prior utterance as 
potentially too general in the context of the conversation, even if the interviewer were to 
unmitigatedly assume his category-bound rights (as a GP) to know such things. By 
occasioning specific knowledges relating to the generalisation subsequent to the 
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generalisation itself, he furnishes the interviewer with resources from which to infer that 
his knowledge of the subject in hand is, in fact, of the comprehensive variety. 
 In total, the detail of the account works not only to address the business of 
providing a factual account of depression, but by characterising one symptom as 
‘obvious’ (i.e. a component of popular knowledge) and the others as heavily researched 
discoveries of medicine, it also addresses the issue of knowledge itself. Not only is 
public knowledge of depression portrayed as limited, but medical knowledge of the topic 
is concurrently privileged as being able to access more ‘complicated’ truths. This in turn, 
of course, serves to reflexively reinforce the factuality of the account; the GP, having 
occasioned his knowledge of the science involved, thus aligns himself with this ‘type’ of 
knowledge. As such, he addresses both the veracity of the content of the account and his 
own role as its author (Edwards & Potter, 1992). Taken in conjunction with the cursory 
detail of the provisional definition provided, it can be asserted that the primary activity in 
the early stages of the interview is oriented to the business of demonstrating that 
depression itself is ‘real’, and that the speaker is a reliable author of the account, more 
than to explain exactly what depression actually is.  
The use of ‘research’ as an interactional tool is also telling with respect to the 
construction of a convincing account. By advancing the claim that the symptoms of 
depression ‘have been well researched by medical (.5) researchers’, the speaker also 
makes available an extensive process of proper investigation by appropriate people in the 
medical field and thus delimits any possible inference/assertion that the field is new and 
uncertain, or that the medical knowledge in question (with which he himself is aligned) 
may be ‘incomplete’. This theme recurs in interview IR3, as shown in extract 6(III): 
 
EXTRACT 6(III): IR3 
1.   R: and while there are some (.) practical problems with diagnosis (.5) ahm::: 
2.     (.5) 
3.     usually because a patient presents with (.) ambiguous symptom:s (.) 
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4.     theres really a lot of excellent medical work↑ ºahmº abou::t (.) ahm (.5)  
5.     which shows us exactly what clinical depression is (.5) in real detail ahm 
6.      (.5) 
7.     based on a lot of really careful resea:rch 
 
Here we can see some intricate category management in action. The GP here explicitly 
acknowledges that there are some ‘practical problems’ with diagnosing depression, but 
makes these problems accountable to the patients themselves – they present ‘with (.) 
ambiguous symptom:s’. As such the problems are realised as matters of practicality, and 
practical matters are realised as those of diagnosis. The sanctity of the actual medical 
category of ‘clinical depression’ is, thereby, rendered exempt from this problem zone. 
The claim itself is then warranted with a short account validating the efficacy of the 
medical understanding of Clinical Depression as being an accurate encapsulation of an 
absolute and ‘out there’ phenomenon. The speaker argues that there is an ‘exact’ 
character of ‘clinical depression’ which is, crucially, ‘shown to us’ by ‘really a lot of 
excellent medical work’. Again, the work of Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) has resonance 
here; the claim can be seen to be made directly accountable to a community of work 
explicitly formulated as substantial and of high quality. Circumscribing any inference 
that problems with diagnosis he has described could be resultant of a lack of clarity in the 
work in question, he argues that the work directly and unambiguously shows us what 
clinical depression is. In these terms, he underscores his own status as a reliable author of 
an account of Clinical Depression. Having occasioned his knowledge of the sources, he 
aligns himself with the knowledge, constructed as factual, in them. The inclusive ‘us’ 
employed here serves further to emphasise this clarity and correctness of the work; it 
does not just reveal to him, personally, the true character of Clinical Depression but to a 
wider community which could be hearable as GPs at large, the GP and the interviewer 
or, indeed, anybody who would care to read it.  
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As discussed with relation to extract 6(II), in occasioning the sources (the ‘work’) 
as unambiguously bound to the category ‘medical’ a range of inferences are made 
available relating not only to their scientific standing, but to their moral character. This 
serves a dual purpose in this particular conversation; firstly, the authority of the sources 
in question is addressed through their capacity to show us ‘exactly what clinical 
depression is (.5) in real detail’ (the ECF ‘exactly’ reinforcing the factual status of the 
account) and, reflexively, the authority of the definition itself is addressed through its 
production by numerous, benevolent and high quality sources. In the last line of the 
extract, the GP specifically builds the description of the research on which his sources 
are ‘based’ as also being plentiful and of high quality. It is imperative to note that, in 
doing so, the speaker addresses not only the validity of his claims relating to the 
factuality of his source, but also furnishes the hearer with materials from which to infer 
that its topic, Clinical Depression, is important. As a subject rendered worthy of this 
level of medical research, its real-world, factual standing is further worked up in the 
account. 
 The analyses of the three extracts discussed here have shown how each is clearly 
oriented to the inferential business requisite of providing a convincing account of a 
specific phenomenon as a ‘real’ one, and constructed in such a way as to address the 
speakers credibility as a reliable author of the account from the outset. These are 
significant observations in themselves but, as many studies in CA demonstrate, accounts 
in conversation are rarely produced to no further end (Wooffitt, 1992; Edwards & Potter, 
1992; Widdecombe & Wooffitt, 1995). In section 6.1.2, the apparently brief descriptions 
of depression constructed by a speaker in the opening lines of an interview are shown to 
serve further functions in the unfolding of the conversation.  
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6.1.2. Constructing ‘The Problem’: The Functionality of a Brief Definition. 
Returning once again to interview IR1, it is possible to see how the construction of 
descriptions in certain ways serves to inform the unfolding of the talk and provide for the 
performance of some complex interactional work later in the conversation. Consider this 
extended extract:  
 
EXTRACT 6(IV): IR1 
1.   I: s:o?  
2.     (.5) 
3.     what I am g:enuinely interested in (.5) to start with a basic question i:::s (.) 
4.     ·hhh (.) what is depression 
5.     (1.0) 
6.   R:  a definition of depression? 
7.     (.5) 
8.   I: erm (.) >whatever you want< 
9.   R: =ha ((laughs)) 
10.     (.5) 
11.    well in the <D S M> classifi (.3) classification of depression there are certain   
12.     disea ((coughs)) 
13.     (.5) 
14.    ⋅hhh (.) certain symptoms present (.3) erm (.) basically a (.) prol::onged period 
15.     of low mood and (.) er (.) >low self esteem< where (.) a patient does not feel 
16.     (.5) 
17.    we::ll 
18.    (1.0) 
19.   I: y:es? 
20.     (.) 
21.   R: you add a list of six symptoms to it to (.) make the scientific distinction with  
22.     severe depression 
23.     (.5) 
24.   I:  ºuh huhº= 
25.   R:  =and thats >the focus that< all the scientific papers are ba:sed on 
26.     ⋅hh (.) the problem that we tend to ha:ve in general practice is that >not <  
27.     everybody has (.) severe depression but they have three out of the six  
28.     symptoms and will recover (1.0) 
29.     er (.) people feel low and are sa:d  
30.     (.5)  
31.     and the problem really is with that end of the spectrum (.) ummm (.) ra:ther more  
32.     than with someone who is seve:rely clinically depressed 
 
On a fairly obvious, though not unimportant note, it can be seen in extract 6(IV) that the 
respondent orients to his identity as an ‘expert’ in the medical field as a resource in 
answering the question by, ultimately, explicitly deploying the identity of a General 
Practitioner (the inclusive ‘we…in general practice’) in line 26. The respondent had 
inferred, from context and from resources with which he already been furnished, that the 
question required him to answer in terms of his professional identity, that is to say as a 
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General Practitioner qualified to talk about depression. A second point, and perhaps a 
more sociologically interesting one, is the manner in which the respondent uses prior 
resources to inform the design of his answer. Drawing upon knowledge he holds relating 
to the purpose of the project, and his understanding of his own identity with relation to it, 
he gradually formulates his answer to the question ‘what is depression’ in terms of a 
discussion of the problems with its diagnosis in primary care (lines 31 and 32). Note that 
there are no further questions asked by the interviewer, and no prompts aside from the 
occasional minimal continuer. Thus, from this extract, we can assert the respondent 
reasoned that:  
 
• The interview required him to inform his discussion with his knowledges as a 
GP.  
• The purpose of the interview was ultimately to discuss problems with the 
diagnosis of depression in primary care.  
• The question ‘what is depression’ in this context was directly linked to the 
purpose of the interview, even though it made no explicit reference to primary 
care or problems with diagnosis therein, or to his identity as a practitioner. 
 
To refer back to work of Wittgenstein and Garfinkel discussed in previous chapters, we 
can see that, for the respondent, the exact meaning of the words in the question (which is 
to say, what the speakers made of it) was set by practical reasoning regarding the site of 
its utterance.  
Broadly speaking, thus, in line 31 the respondent is ultimately making a complaint 
that the scientific papers occasioned in line 25 do not always address the types of cases 
actually encountered in general practice. He begins this process by constructing a short 
factual account (lines 26 to 29) relating to ‘the problem’ with the diagnosis of depression 
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in general practice. There are three main devices deployed in addressing the veracity of 
this account. Firstly, when initially outlining his case, the respondent explicitly occasions 
his identity as a general practitioner, thus making relevant his category entitlement 
regarding knowledge of the problems that are had in general practice and, moreover, of 
general practice as a whole (Potter, 1998). Secondly, he externalises the problem by 
formulating this identity in terms of ‘the problem that we tend to ha:ve in general 
practice’. This is to say he characterises the problem as being one which is widespread, 
circumscribing the inference that it is in any way a problem specific to his own 
diagnostic skills, or even a local problem to the practice in which he works. Instead, ‘the 
problem’ is designed to be heard as a ‘community issue’ (Woolgar, 1998a). Thirdly, he 
identifies the problem as being one which the community of general practitioners ‘tend’ 
to have. Rather than describing the state of affairs in terms of specific incidences (e.g. 
difficult cases), he characterises it as frequent though not absolute; something that is 
persistently happening. He formulates what is invariably a heterogeneous group of 
events, differing difficulties faced by different GPs, as a single ongoing activity (Myers, 
1990), if not a determinate one. Finally, by characterising the problems with actual 
diagnosis as being resultant of a lack of shared ‘focus’ between two camps, he manages 
to locate the source of the problem outside of both science and general practice, which is 
to say he reduces the accountability of both communities in the actual production of the 
difficulty in question. In doing so, he skilfully preserves the sanctity of the actual 
scientific enterprise relating to severe depression (which goes entirely uncriticised), and 
simultaneously defends the practice of medicine in real life situations. This observation is 
resonant with that made by Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) relating to the manner in which 
scientists themselves ‘account for error’ by describing problems or contradictions in 
scientific work in terms of ‘contingent’ factors, rather than any flaws in the fundamental 
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workings of science itself. When, for example, attempting to undermine the facticity of a 
claim that competes with their own, scientists cited such factors as ‘...prejudice, pig-
headedness, strong personality, subjective bias, emotional involvement, naivety, sheer 
stupidity, thinking in a woolly fashion, fear of losing grants, threat to status and so on..’ 
(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984:79). In all cases, the inviolability of the scientific method itself 
is preserved. 
In the light of these observations extract 6(IV) can now be reviewed in its entirety, and 
the interactional work being done can be summarised: 
 
1. A general descriptive account of depression is deployed to answer the 
interviewer’s general question. 
2. Drawing on culturally available knowledge relating to the DSM, this description 
is made accountable (externalised) to the ‘institutional’ source so as to be rendered 
‘factual’ in character. 
3. The social identity of a ‘patient’ is drawn upon and reformulated to characterise 
depression as an illness, and someone with depression as ‘ill’. 
4. The character of the condition is descriptively grounded in ‘ordinary’ phenomena 
that can affect anyone, and thus inferences relating to severity are circumscribed. 
5. The condition is then re-characterised as one with different forms – ordinary and 
severe – this distinction being made accountable to a ‘scientific’ community from 
which further inferences can be drawn relating to ‘factuality’. 
6. The respondent explicitly addresses his own expertise in the field of medicine, via 
deployment of a professional identity, as a resource for having made, and making, 
assertions relating to the diagnosis of depression. 
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7. A problem is constructed, and made accountable to a community (general 
practice). 
8. It is made available that the two communities thus far formulated (‘science’ and 
‘general practice’) do not always share a focus. 
9. This ‘division’ reflexively serves to make available the source of the problem, 
while circumscribing any possible criticism of the actual nature of the scientific 
enterprise, or that of general practice, with relation to depression.  
 
Operations 1 to 7 (lines 1 to 24) constitute the construction of a factual state of affairs, 
while 8 to 10 (lines 25 to 32) made available a complaint relating to this, with the 
character of the former being key to the function of the latter, and vice-versa.  
Throughout, however, careful attention is accorded by the GP to the construction 
of the condition itself as a natural and medical ‘fact’ that does exist and is, thus, not 
merely an idiosyncrasy of science, general practice or the GP himself. Interestingly, the 
move here, from providing an account authored by a neutral voice of authority (the 
DSM/Science, in lines 11-25) to one in which the speaker is himself more explicitly 
implicated (General Practitioners, in lines 26-32), represents what Goffman (1981) terms 
a shift in ‘footing’. The speaker takes up two different positions with respect to his own 
talk; one indirect, one more direct. Through this he skilfully manages some complex 
issues of accountability.     
What is revealed by this analysis, above all else, is that the core phenomena of 
‘depression’, ‘science’ and ‘general practice’ are not in any way intransigent in terms of 
their meanings; they do not simply reflect rigid internal states or solid social structures 
connected by ‘stable’ links. The respondent in the extract used all three as flexible 
pragmatic resources in interaction, making them salient in order to accomplish specific 
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conversational ends – providing a factual account, making a complaint, warranting the 
complaint etc. Meanings were accomplished in the interaction itself, the co-interactants 
(even with one of them largely silent) orienting to mutually understood culturally-
available resources and prior utterances in the exchange, all of which was done while 
maintaining the orderly flow of conversation. Possibly the most important observation 
arising from these analyses regards the manner in which the GP organises his account in 
such a way as to render the key phenomena ‘awkward’. He orients to possibility of being 
in an inauspicious position when making his case, using a variety of conversational 
moves not just to neutrally describe internal or external activities and states, but to defend 
what he is saying and his rights to say it. The descriptive materials selected by the GP in 
providing a definition of depression cannot, thus, be analysed simply in terms of 
cognitive memory or ‘fact retention’ as may be prescribed by an evaluative method, but 
rather are demonstrably actions sensitive to the interactional business made requisite in 
providing a defensible account and making a complaint. As Wooffitt (1992) argues in his 
insightful analyses of accounts of paranormal experiences: 
 
‘In each case the very character of the memory is circumscribed by the interactional 
activities in the service of which it is being used. Therefore, the way in which these 
memories are organized may be answerable, not so much to cognitive procedures and 
mechanisms, but to the broader organisation of naturally occurring talk.’ (1992:158) 
 
It is the twin issues of defensibility and complaint that are perhaps the most striking 
aspect of the IR data corpus. As discussed in the concluding section of Chapter 5, the 
potentially problematic nature of depression is not just a theoretical issue within 
academia, but is demonstrably an operational issue which informs the activities of the 
interviewed GPs in providing accounts thereof. This concern is further explored in the 
next section. 
 
6.2. PRODUCING DELICATE OBJECTS: 
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DISPREFERENCE AND EXPRESSIVE CAUTION IN FACTUAL ACCOUNTING 
‘One feature of facts, or any other state of affairs, is that they do not constrain the 
number of ways we may describe them or refer to them’ 
Ian Hutchby & Robin Wooffitt85 
“Conversation Analysis” 
 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the formulation of utterances as dispreferred is a 
powerful means in conversation of marking the potentially problematic nature of the 
present activities or activities to come (Schegloff, 1988; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). 
Recall the brief interrogation of Silverman’s (1997) study of HIV counselling in 
section 4.3.3. His analysis reveals how a variety of conversational techniques 
(grouped as ‘expressive caution’) are used by patients in forestalling the disclosure of 
issues which may be problematic, and simultaneously mitigating or downgrading their 
potentially problematic character. In this section the use of such strategies in the 
factual accounting of the GPs is interrogated in detail, with a view to demonstrating 
how the accounts provided are, firstly, sensitive to their character as an interactive 
phenomenon (not simply monologic outpourings determined by ‘stored information’) 
and, secondly, are sensitive to their character as accounts of potentially contestable 
phenomena. Consider the opening sequences of interview IR4: 
 
EXTRACT 6(V): IR4. 
1.   I: hi (.) ah (.) so:: 
2.     (.5) 
3.     what I am interested i::n (.5) to start off i:::s (.) 
4.     ·hhh (.) what is depression 
5.     (1.0) 
6.   R:  ah:: (.) we:ll (.) that’s the (1.0) bi:g question (.5) i:snt it? 
7.     (1.5) 
8.   I:  ºuhuhº = 
9.   R:   = it relates to >low mood< an (.) sadness (.5) unhappiness a:nd thats (.)  
10.     ah::  (1.5) a bit (.) ºumº (.5) very common among the population I guess? 
11.     (.5) 
12.   I: yeah? 
13.   R:  and ahh. if you survey people (.5) probably up to (1.0) ahm: twenty percent of  
14.     people are suff:er↓ (.) ahm (.) clinically depressed (.) but only a fraction of those   
15.     will come to a GP (1.0) 
16.   I: ri::= 
17.   R:     = well (.) I mean (.) there are people out there who are unhappy and  
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18.     dissa:tisfied with life who arent depressed and (.) then there are people who are   
19.     genuinely depressed:: too so:: (.) it can be very hard to get (.) a real sense of  
20.    (.) the ºwayº i:↓ (.) ahm: (.5) things 
 
It is observable that the primary interactional business to which the GP attends 
throughout the extract relates to the making of a series of complaints about difficulties in 
diagnosing depression in primary care. In this sense, it is clear the interviewer’s initial 
question (what is depression) is understood by the GP as an invitation to do exactly this, 
rather than to provide a direct textbook definition of the phenomenon in hand. What is 
also observable, however, is that the utterances of the GP throughout the extract are 
directly oriented to possible problems with this strategy; he demonstrates a turn-by-turn 
awareness that the answers he is giving may well not be those which are specifically 
required by the question right up to the final ‘admission’ that ‘it can be very hard to get 
(.) a real sense of (.) the ºwayº i:↓ (.) ahm: (.5) things’. This awareness informs his 
account in such a way as to both delay the admission itself and, in the meantime, to 
render it ‘understandable’ in the context.   
 
6.2.1. Constructing Uncertainty, Constructing Certainty.  
The manner in which the question is first addressed is through the utterance ‘ah:: (.) 
we:ll (.) that’s the (1.0) bi:g question (.5) i:snt it?’ (line 6). This is analytically 
interesting for a number of reasons. It does not, obviously, constitute any attempt to 
actually answer the question and, moreover, through the classic dispreference marker 
‘well’ is recipiently designed as a non-answer. It serves instead to acknowledge the 
question as a question, but also to recharacterise the standing of the question itself 
within the interaction. By formulating the interviewer’s prior activity as the asking of 
‘the (1.0) bi:g question’, he makes available that what is being asked of him is by no 
means an easy or straightforward task. The use of the definite article here is an 
emphatic means of casting the question asked as one which has significance beyond 
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the confines of the conversation, it is not ‘a’ question but ‘the’ question, and the level 
of significance is further marked through the scale descriptor ‘big’. Drawing on 
culturally available knowledges relating to ‘the big questions’ in life86, he provides 
resources from which the interviewer can infer that the question just asked does not 
have a simple or straightforward answer. 
Following the minimal continuer in line 8, interpreted as a request for more 
information, a definition is actually provided in lines 9 and 10. This definition is itself, 
however, marked as being problematic in a number of ways. The three-part list ‘>low 
mood< an (.) sadness (.5) unhappiness’ is occasioned as a set of (very similar) 
features to which depression ‘relates’. The condition is, thus, characterised indirectly 
in terms of associated phenomena, rather than formulated as a factual account of what 
it is. The components of this generalised list of (very ordinary) feelings are, 
themselves, then specifically further downgraded in terms of their ordinariness; they 
are ‘very common among the population I guess’. By diffusing the occurrence of 
these ‘symptoms’ among a wide population, their standing as ‘unique’ to depression 
is minimised. Note the manner in which the assertion is attributed the character of a 
‘guess’, a non-fact. This further works within the interaction to acknowledge that an 
outright factual answer is not being provided. The indirect accomplishment of the 
utterance, taken in conjunction with the perturbed flow of talk and self-initiated self-
repair (which continues through to line 15) are classic features of Silverman’s (1997) 
‘expressive caution’; a string of dispreference markers that serve to mark the answer 
to the question as potentially difficult or controversial. 
 Substantively speaking, the materials selected by the speaker in lines 6 to 10 
could easily be read as superfluous, non-committal or evidence of a lack of 
knowledge on the part of the GP. However, the functionality of these strategies 
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becomes clear when observing the manner in which the interaction unfolds. 
Following another minimal continuer, in line 12, a complaint is made: 
 
13.  R:  and ahh. if you survey people (.5) probably up to (1.0) ahm: twenty percent of  
14.     people are suff:er↓ (.) ahm (.) clinically depressed (.) but only a fraction of those   
15.     will come to a GP (1.0) 
 
The complaint itself is basically that depression is a common phenomenon, but not many 
of the people who are clinically depressed it (note the way he self-repairs/downgrades 
the stronger term ‘suffering’) will come to a GP for diagnosis/treatment. A state of affairs 
formulation is initially constructed relating to the significant number of people who are 
clinically depressed; the factuality herein is accomplished through directing 
accountability towards the interviewer as a potential verifier of the details the GP is 
documenting, though even this action is itself accomplished in weak form (‘probably’). 
The complaint itself, however, is formulated as a direct fact (‘only a fraction of those will 
come to a GP’). This is a key point in the conversation; until this point, virtually all the 
materials selected when discussing what depression ‘is’ had been occasioned in (indirect) 
terms of their unsuitability as answers to the original question and their problematic 
nature as ‘facts’. In the complaint, contrastively, not only is the strong form utilised, but 
the GP also occasions his own professional identity so as to address his accountability as 
a reliable author of the report. Concurrently, therefore, he indexes the accountability for 
the problem itself to ‘the depressed people’.  
In extract 6(V), thus, the cautious construction of a ‘state-of-affairs-formulation’ 
(Wooffitt, 1992) as very general and uncertain (lines 9-15) can be shown to be in no way 
directly indicative of cognitive states such as ‘vagueness’ or ‘lack of commitment to a 
point’. It is, rather, an observably skilful interactional activity facilitating the contrastive 
construction of absolute and specific certainty later in the account. Equally, and 
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reflexively, the certainty constructed around a problem serves to reaffirm the general and 
uncertain nature of the prior materials.  
 
6.2.2. Transition and Explanation. 
The lines that immediately follow (17 to 19) constitute the construction of a gist or 
summary (explicitly so, with the use of the clarification marker ‘I mean’) of the account 
thus far: 
 
16.  I: ri::= 
17.   R:     = well (.) I mean (.) there are people out there who are unhappy and  
18.     dissa:tisfied with life who arent depressed and (.) then there are people who are   
19.     genuinely depressed:: too so:: (.) it can be very hard to get (.) a real sense of  
20.    (.) the ºwayº i:↓ (.) ahm: (.5) things 
 
Notably, as he has done throughout, the GP closes down the interviewer’s rights to speak 
at a potential transition relevance point. In lines 8, 12 and 16 verbal activity by the 
interviewer subsequent to a pause by the GP is treated, and thus reflexively 
characterised, as the issuing of a minimal continuer requesting more information. This, 
in turn, delimits the insertion of further questions or the making of direct challenges. This 
consistent self-allocation of turns indicates an orientation on the part of the GP to the 
potentially contestable nature of his utterances within the context of the interaction and, 
in turn, the interviewer is on each occasion furnished further with resources from which 
to infer that the account provided to this point is not ‘complete’.  
As Heritage and Watson (1979) show, gists are used in three different 
constructive ways in conversation: to preserve, to transform or to delete aspects of the 
prior talk87. In lines 17 to 19, the assorted materials previously occasioned relating to the 
character of depression are respecified into one contrast structure: ‘there are people out 
there who are unhappy and dissa:tisfied with life who arent depressed and (.) then there 
are people who are genuinely depressed too:’. While preserving the basic character of the 
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prior utterances in terms of topic (the symptoms of depression are common and not 
entirely specific to the condition itself) the gist deletes the speculative character of these 
materials as they were previously occasioned. The state of affairs in question, although 
still done as dispreferred in the conversation, is now formulated as a factual and ‘out 
there’ (literally) phenomenon. This utterance makes available that the state of being 
unhappy and dissatisfied with life (a truncated version of the list of symptoms originally 
provided in line 9) is common both to people who are ‘genuinely depressed’ and also not 
depressed at all, and, by extension, that identification is not an easy procedure. 
Finally, the GP ‘answers’ the question (‘it can be very hard to get (.) a real sense 
of (.) the ºwayº i:↓ (.) ahm: (.5) things’). This is itself marked as an ‘unsatisfactory’ or 
problematic response, topically and interactionally, in a number of ways. Notably, no 
specific mention of the question-topic ‘depression’ is made here. Rather, the whole 
matter in hand is reformulated using the generalising term ‘things’ and the issue is 
transformed into a ‘general’ problem in primary care as opposed to one specifically 
about definitions. In voicing the answer, potentially hearable as an ‘admission’, as a 
direct upshot (Heritage & Watson, 1979) or consequence of the previously constructed 
state of affairs he circumscribes any inference that the problem is only his, or the result 
of any shortcoming in medicine itself. However, in employing a passive voice, 
accountability for the claim is diffused into a general, reported realm and the problem 
itself is not formulated as an inevitability but rather as a pitfall, something that ‘can’ 
happen. As such, a hearer can infer that despite all the prior obstacles described, it is still 
possible for a GP to get a ‘sense of things’. As such, the utterance addresses 
accountability for the problem in the answer (lack of clarity is a result of a number of 
patient-oriented issues) and simultaneously addresses his own accountability in not 
providing a direct or immediate answer to the question originally posed (lack of clarity in 
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the answer is perfectly understandable given the broader context). As Wooffitt (1992) 
observes, such activities in extended accounts are highly revealing: 
 
‘…in ordinary conversation formulations can be challenged. Recipients can disagree with 
the assessments that their co-participants make, and these disagreements can be aired in the 
turn-taking system through which everyday talk in interaction is managed. However, in the 
production of lengthy accounts, the turn taking system is temporarily abandoned and the 
speaker has free reign to speak until she has finished. Thus there is no next turn in which 
the accuracy or validity of a gist or upshot can be questioned. Consequently, those state 
formulations which are constructed so as to characterise the preceding talk are, for all 
practical purposes, definitive reading of the speaker’s own prior talk.’ (Wooffitt, 
1992:136) [Original Emphasis] 
 
Consider again the extract in its entirety: 
 
1.  I: hi (.) ah (.) so:: 
2.     (.5) 
3.     what I am interested i::n (.5) to start off i:::s (.) 
4.     ·hhh (.) what is depression 
5.     (1.0) 
6.   R:  ah:: (.) we:ll (.) that’s the (1.0) bi:g question (.5) i:snt it? 
7.     (1.5) 
8.   I:  ºuhuhº = 
9.   R:   = it relates to >low mood< an (.) sadness (.5) unhappiness a:nd thats (.)  
10.     ah::  (1.5) a bit (.) ºumº (.5) very common among the population I guess? 
11.     (.5) 
12.   I: yeah? 
13.   R:  and ahh. if you survey people (.5) probably up to (1.0) ahm: twenty percent of  
14.     people are suff:er↓ (.) ahm (.) clinically depressed (.) but only a fraction of those   
15.     will come to a GP (1.0) 
16.   I: ri::= 
17.   R:     = well (.) I mean (.) there are people out there who are unhappy and  
18.     dissa:tisfied with life who arent depressed and (.) then there are people who are   
19.     genuinely depressed:: too so:: (.) it can be very hard to get (.) a real sense of  
20.    (.) the ºwayº i:↓ (.) ahm: (.5) things 
 
In sum, it is clearly visible that the design of the account performs a number of key 
conversational functions: 
 
1. The factuality of a state of affairs (across lines 6 to 19) is worked up in a 
general account of ‘the way things are’, using a variety of techniques. 
2. The account is persistently marked as an ‘incomplete’ answer to the question 
and thus: 
231 
 
3. It forestalls the inference that the GP is unaware of the issues at hand, or that 
he cannot answer the question. 
4. It both prefaces and delays a potentially problematic answer. 
5. It provides resources for answer to be heard as an unfortunate factual 
consequence of a broader state of affairs and therefore: 
6. Mitigates any shortcomings it may have as an answer as ‘understandable’ 
given the broader state of affairs. 
 
These observations highlight, once again, the difficulties in evaluating such data in terms 
of memory or knowledge retention. As Derek Edwards claims: 
 
‘[A]ccounts that ‘externalize’ responsibility for actions occur [in] discursive contexts, as 
local actions being done in and through current talk, rather than having the status of 
persons’ actual or enduring beliefs or all-purpose mental representations of events.’ 
(1997:105) [Original Emphasis] 
 
The speaker in extract 6(V) skilfully designs his talk in such a way as to allow himself to 
use the question as an opening to voice a specific complaint, while circumscribing the 
inference that he is intentionally not answering the question, has misunderstood the 
question, or is ignorant of an appropriate answer. Thus, the content and structure of his 
talk cannot be answerable exclusively to issues of ‘fact retention’ with respect to 
depression, nor to knowledge of the status of primary care on the whole, but rather to the 
local, contextual demands of providing an account of depression and primary care. The 
following section explores these concerns in more detail. 
 
6.3. (RE)LOCATING THE ISSUE: 
DEPRESSION IN GENERAL PRACTICE 
‘[P]articipants’ event reports generally attend to causality, agency and accountability 
for those events, as well as managing accountability for the current action done in 
reporting…’ 
Derek Edwards88 
“Discourse and Cognition” 
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Consider extract 6(VII) below. The manner in which factuality is managed in the initial 
account (lines 4-9) has already been discussed in section 6.1.1. Of interest here, however, 
is the manner in which the account is done as a dispreferred response to the question 
asked and how, in this shape, it further provides for the possibility specific 
conversational activity. 
 
EXTRACT 6(VII): IR5 (1-18) 
1.   I:  okay (.) to start off with a very general question↓ (.5) 
2.     what erm (.) is depression? 
3.     (1.5) 
4.   R: ummm (.) depression is a complicated umm (.) medical condition with a number  
5.     of symptoms including (.) umm (.) sadness (.) obviously (.) but also a number of  
6.     somatic symptoms too: (.) a::nd (1.5) ºyesº (.) which have been well researched  
7.     medical (.5) researchers all o:ver the world (.) especially america and (.) ºhereº 
8.     (1.0) 
9.     umm (.) fatigue (.) sleep problems for ahm (.) example 
10.     (2.0) 
11.   I:  uh huh ºd[oº  
12.   R:      [yes (.) the illness is quite a problem↓ but because the physical side is  
13.     rather less well known it tends to be seen (.) as (.5) by the public as (.) well (.)   
14.     just a bad mood (.) ahm (.) really (.) which can make our jobs all the harder  
15.    ((laughs)) 
16.     (1.5) 
17.     yes? 
18.     (.5) 
19.     oh yes:! ((laughs)) 
 
Orientation is demonstrated to potential shortcomings of the account as an answer to the 
question ‘what is depression?’; we can clearly see a delay (‘ummm’), a series of pauses 
and further hesitations and the indirect accomplishment of the details of the account 
(accountability being indexed to an external community). Both interviewer and 
respondent then orient toward the pause (line 10) as a potential transition-relevance 
point; the interviewer begins to speak, but the turn is closed down by the respondent. As 
such, the pause is retrospectively characterised as ‘time to think’ within a turn, rather 
than the end of a turn which may not satisfactorily complete the question-answer pair. 
Moreover, in beginning his next turn with the confirmation token ‘yes’ and then 
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providing more detail, he characterises the interviewer’s prior turn as a simple 
acknowledgement of what has been said, and thus allocates himself conversational rights 
to proceed. In these terms, the opportunity for the interviewer to further question or 
challenge the answer as-it-stands is removed without any threat to the local interactional 
solidarity. Later in the extract a contrasting piece of activity is observable; by responding 
to the minimal continuer ‘yes’ (line 17) with ‘oh yes’ (line 19), the GP allocates the 
interviewer’s utterance the status as a call for confirmation as opposed to a call for 
clarification and, as such, the affirmative completion of the pair signals that his answer to 
the initial question is now complete. 
 
6.3.1. Formulating a Gist and Some Upshots. 
In lines 4-9, the GP advances an account of depression as a well-researched medical 
issue with certain symptoms. In line 12, he formulates a gist of this prior talk (‘the illness 
is quite a problem’). All previously occasioned detail relating to the symptoms of 
depression (‘sadness’, ‘fatigue’, ‘sleep problems’) is deleted, as is the source of this 
detail, and the condition is reformulated in much more definite terms - as ‘the illness’, a 
‘unity’ with inferentially different properties to ‘a collection of symptoms’. Having ‘an 
illness’ can be heard in a very different way to being ‘sad’ or ‘tired’, especially as 
regards notions of severity. The account of symptoms previously constructed may 
certainly have been hearable, for example, as quite ‘ordinary’, whereas ‘illness’ is a 
proper concern and certainly a ‘problem’. Equally, the prior account addressed 
depression as a real issue for medicine, while ‘illness’ indicates depression is a real issue 
for all. As a gist, thus, the utterance serves to preserve the core concerns of the prior talk; 
that depression is ‘real’ and ‘important’, while transforming the direct inferential 
properties that the category may have in the local interaction itself. Moreover, the stark 
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factuality built into this formulation contrasts sharply with the cautious construction of 
the previous account and is, crucially, designed to be heard as such. While the 
dispreferred manner in which the lines 4-9 are deployed provides for the inference that 
they themselves may not have constituted a full or adequate answer to the question 
posed, it is crucial to note that this design also provides circumstances for the subsequent 
utterance to be heard as factual clarification of the account as one of a real illness.  
As shown in the analysis of extract 6(V), a gist can be used, among other things, as a 
‘foundation’ on which to build a complaint. The GP in the target extract here goes on to 
do exactly this, embedding the complaint itself in a three-parted account. Firstly a 
general state of affairs is formulated, then a further general state of affairs is constructed 
as an upshot of the first, and finally the complaint (‘which can make our jobs all the 
harder’) is formulated as an upshot of the second and which reflexively serves to 
characterise the whole account as one of a ‘problem’.  
  
(1) because the physical side is rather less well known (2) it tends to be seen (.) as (.5) by 
the public as (.) well (.) just a bad mood (.) ahm (.) really (.) (3) which can make our jobs all 
the harder ((laughs)) 
 
Each component of the account, as such, accounts for the next. There is a general lack of 
knowledge about the ‘physical side’ of the illness, which causes a partial/simplistic 
understanding of the illness at the public level, which makes the job of GPs regarding 
depression more difficult. The links are, however, characterised as causal but not 
determinate (‘tends to’ and ‘can’). This serves to delimit any inference that members of 
the public are, say, ‘ignorant’ or that GPs ‘cannot’ deal with depression in primary care. 
As such, the account serves to locate accountability for problems with depression in 
primary care squarely in an abstract and generalised lack of public knowledge relating to 
specifics of depression, while exempting both general public and General Practitioners 
from blame for these difficulties. 
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The structure of the complaint itself also performs a number of important 
functions both within this short account and within the extract as a whole. By 
occasioning his professional identity, his ‘job’, he relocates the issue at hand. No longer 
is the salient topic depression in general, as originally specified by the question, but 
depression in general practice. Furthermore, he addresses his own accountability as a 
reliable author of the account: the public concerns which he documents are explicitly 
formulated as causally linked to his job. Furthermore, by characterising the problem as a 
community problem (‘our jobs’), he restricts the potentially damaging inference that the 
shortcomings in public knowledge are only a problem for him. Finally by arguing that 
difficulties with the public perception of depression do not just make his job hard, but ‘all 
the harder’, he explicitly orients a listener to a category-bound quality of his profession; 
that it is hard work (in the service of the public) anyway.  
This activity is complemented by the laughter token at the end of the utterance. 
As Sacks (1992) notes, laughter can be used as a means of directing a listener in how to 
hear a story or report. Generally, laughter is used to attune co-participants in 
conversation to the light-hearted character of specific talk. Here, however, it neatly 
underscores the point that the GP is making. Despite the fact that the public 
circumstances he describes can complicate his work, he does not mind. As such, with 
some skilful conversational work using the social identity category of a GP, he provides 
circumstances for a more sympathetic hearing of the account. Taking these observations 
into account, it is discernible that the formulated gist (‘the illness is quite a problem’) 
glosses over details of his prior talk which could provide materials for a sceptical reading 
of his subsequent complaint. For example, the claim that depression is well understood 
and researched in medical circles (lines 6 and 7) functions well to illustrate that it is a 
‘real’ thing, but could also imply that subsequently described difficulties in primary care 
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may be due to an inadequacy on the part of GPs themselves. The deletion of these details 
delimits such an inference.  
A final, and crucial, observation on this extract is the manner in which, while the 
complaint is done as a final answer to the question, it is itself also, like the account in 
lines 4-989, marked as dispreferred. As Edwards and Potter (1992) observe, the ‘account’ 
components of dispreferred turns attend to the specific moral and attributional issues 
arising from the dispreferred action itself. As such, in this case, the validity of the 
complaint as an answer to the question is realised within the detail of the account. Lines 
12 to 14 are at once designed as a possible non-answer to the question asked, but are also 
accounted for as such; they are an ‘unfortunate’ upshot of the state of affairs constructed. 
In these terms, the account of a problem, marked as a problematic account, is 
concurrently an account for the problem (Schegloff, 1989).  
 
6.3.2. Lists, Hypotheticals and Complaints.   
In the following extract 6(VIII), the speaker directly addresses problems with the 
identification of depression in primary care consultations. Note the manner in which 
lines 1 to 5 are deployed with significant expressive caution, marking the utterance (‘the 
condition gets (.) well umm (.) missed’ – line 5) as problematic. 
 
EXTRACT 6(VIII): IR2 
1. R:  we are given some good guidelines (.) you know (.) key questions we are  
2.   suppo:sed to ask about mood (.) view of the fu:ture (.5) interference with bodily functions  
3.   (.5) concentration (1.0) umm (.)<loss of sleep> and (.) ah (.) some short stories we can  
4.   ask for an attitude towards but (1.0) patients might ah come in and present with physical  
5.   (.) you know (.) soma::tic complaints and the condition gets (.) well umm (.) missed 
6.   (1.0) 
7.   talking to patients is really important (.5) and talking to patients is something a GP doesnt  
8.   get much time for (1.0) ten minutes for a consultation↑ is not really very much (.) a:: (.) 
9.   umm: (.5) physiotherapist gets forty minutes per patient! 
10.   (1.5) 
11. I:  yeah 
12.   (5) 
13. R:  and uh .hhh (.) the traditional ten minutes in a (.) surgery is good for getting to know  
14.   someone but makes it >rather awkward< to build up a picture of an illness (.) 
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15.   even over a (.) hhh period of ti:me↓ 
 
The speaker constructs an extended list of ‘guidelines’ with which GPs are provided to 
help them with diagnosing depression, and then occasions a problem and another 
problem as an upshot. As such, the potentially troublesome admission is made 
accountable to the activities of patients, while absolving both GPs and the guidelines 
themselves of responsibility for the problem. The guidelines are ‘good’, and the problem 
in general practice is a direct result of the patients’ presentation of symptoms. A hearer is 
consequently furnished with resources from which to infer that some responsibility for 
correct diagnosis also lies with patients themselves. Even if the guidelines and GPs are 
doing their work properly, a patient presenting a ‘somatic’ complaint can prevent the 
proper process of diagnosis taking place; in these terms, presenting in this way is 
reflexively characterised as ‘inappropriate behaviour’. 
The list of guidelines occasioned in lines 2 to 4 contains six components:  
 
‘mood (.) view of the fu:ture (.5) interference with bodily functions (.5) concentration (1.0) 
umm (.)<loss of sleep> and (.) ah (.) some short stories we can ask for an attitude towards’ 
 
Very rarely in everyday conversation are we required to produce extended lists of things. 
Virtually all of the listing activities so far seen in this chapter and the last (primarily of 
symptoms) have comprised of three articles so as to give a sense of ‘generality’; the 
deployment of an extended list such as this has rather different consequences. It is 
important to note that the basic functions of the account in lines 1 to 5 (as described 
above) are not specifically contingent on the production of this list at all. The account 
would, indeed, have made ‘sense’ without it. Consider: 
 
‘we are given some good guidelines (.) you know (.) key questions we are suppo:sed to 
ask but (1.0) patients might ah come in and present with physical (.) you know (.) soma::tic 
complaints and the condition gets (.) well umm (.) missed’ 
 
In these terms, the list itself could be considered somewhat superfluous. In the context of 
the particular interaction, however, we can observe that the extra detail occasioned is not 
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simply a case of the GP ‘recalling’ some extra facts, but rather constructing an account 
so as to achieve the character of an ‘extended list’.  
Providing apparently superfluous detail in an account is demonstrably a means for a 
speaker to address their own accountability as author of a claim when anticipating a 
sceptical hearing (Jefferson, 1984; Wooffitt, 1992). In this case, the GP provides a hearer 
with evidence from which to infer that not only are there indeed many good guidelines 
available, but that he, as a GP, is aware of them and, crucially, remembers them in detail. 
This in turn insulates his subsequent admission of a problem from any challenge based 
on the assertion that he does not know, and therefore cannot apply, the guidelines he 
cites. Moreover, note how the first problem occasioned (lines 4 and 5)  is explicitly 
formulated not as a specific incident, but as a ‘hypothetical’ example – ‘patients might 
ah come in’. As Widdecombe and Wooffitt claim,  
 
‘The use of hypothetical examples, instead of, say, reference to an actual event, has a 
number of interactional consequences. It allows the speaker to distil recurrent features 
from a number of events and bring them together in a form which may not strictly 
represent their occurrences in real life. Furthermore, hypothetical examples have a 
defensive property in the following sense. Making a claim about one specific incident 
raises the possibility that we may be able to justify our version of that event, or expand 
upon specific particulars of the circumstances: when did this happen, who else was there, 
what were you doing? With a hypothetical example, however, no specific incidents are 
proffered and thus there is no recourse to a direct interrogation of the details of the events.’ 
(1995:120) 
 
This use of hypothetical examples is another strategy employed in providing accounts of 
depression which demonstrates a clear sensitivity by the speaker to the possibility of a 
sceptical hearing. 
 
6.3.3. Identity and Accountability. 
In lines 7 to 15, the GP goes on to further address accountability for the key problem 
claim, that depression ‘gets missed’. The first account herein features some skilful work 
with professional identities: 
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7.  talking to patients is really important (.5) and talking to patients is something a GP doesnt  
8.   get much time for (1.0) ten minutes for a consultation↑ is not really very much (.) a:: (.) 
9.   umm: (.5) physiotherapist gets forty minutes per patient! 
 
Again, the account is formulated as a set of things which happen ‘in general’ and, 
interestingly, the specific reference to depression itself is now deleted. The topic for 
discussion is transformed to general practice in general. Broadly speaking, a complaint 
is made that inadequate time is given to a GP to allow them to ‘talk’ to patients properly, 
and talking is really important in general practice. Accountability for problems in general 
is, therefore, now addressed to the institutional ‘duration’ of consultations and, in these 
terms, the previously accountable ‘patients’ are also retroactively absolved from ‘blame’.  
This is interesting activity, and, as shown throughout this chapter, activity 
common to a number of the extracts analysed. Accountability for problems in the 
diagnosis of depression is located ultimately in a general realm which implicates neither 
GPs, patients nor ‘medicine’ itself. The implications of making either GPs or medicine 
accountable for the described problems have already been discussed. They could well 
have potentially damaging effects on the hearable veracity of the accounts, given that the 
speaker on all occasions is inferentially (and sometimes explicitly) category-aligned with 
both. It may also be useful here to reflect on the conversational consequences of 
addressing accountability to the ‘public’ or ‘patients’. Bear in mind the local context, an 
interview between a GP and a (non-medical) research student. One of the dangers of 
implicating ‘patients’ or the ‘public’ in diagnostic difficulties is that these categories are 
potentially inclusive of the interviewer himself. Were the interviewer to be freely allowed 
to draw such an inference, then there is little doubt that local social solidarity could well 
be compromised; it would certainly not provide for a sympathetic hearing of the account 
in question. As such, in each case, the speakers demonstrate a clear sensitivity to the 
potentially negative inferential properties of the identity formulations used, while also 
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occasioning them constructively to accomplish particular conversational ends. It is, 
consequentially, rather difficult to treat the accounts in question as neutrally 
representative of the GPs strongly held beliefs regarding ‘who or what is to blame’.    
 The theme of identity as a conversational resource is further illustrated in the 
subsequent use of a contrast structure.  
 
ten minutes for a consultation↑ is not really very much (.) a:: (.) umm: (.5) physiotherapist 
gets forty minutes per patient! 
 
The GP, having established that ‘ten minutes’ is inadequate time to perform an activity  
key to the proper performance of the job (‘talking to patients’), invites a hearer to inspect 
the ‘working conditions’ of a GP against that of another professional identity, ‘a 
physiotherapist’. The selection of a contrasting identity here is interesting because 
‘physiotherapist’, like ‘GP’, is a profession category-bound to medicine. Indeed, the 
speaker explicitly orients a hearer to this congruence through occasioning that they both 
deal with ‘patients’. As such, both comparability and contrast are built within the 
utterance, providing materials from which it can be inferred that a GP’s job is difficult 
compared even to others in medicine. This issue is further addressed in the final lines of 
the extract: 
 
13. R:  and uh .hhh (.) the traditional ten minutes in a (.) surgery is good for getting to know  
14.   someone but makes it >rather awkward< to build up a picture of an illness (.) 
15.   even over a (.) hhh period of ti:me↓ 
 
Herein, the severity of the complaint relating to the ‘insufficient’ duration of a 
consultation is retroactively downgraded. A positive aspect of the ten minute duration 
is now occasioned, and the complaint itself is reformulated in the weaker terms of a 
GP’s job being made ‘rather awkward’. Crucially, the job of a GP is now 
characterised as ‘building up a picture of an illness’; again, this is a general 
formulation with no direct allusion to depression. Across an extended account, thus, 
the GP can be seen to skilfully reconstruct the actual topic in hand. Depression, ‘the 
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condition’ occasioned as problematic in line 5, is progressively subsumed into a 
general class of illnesses, all of which are to be heard as being affected by the time 
constraints of general practice equally. This activity is demonstrably sensitive to the 
implications of the descriptions being provided. The shift from depression as a 
‘specific condition’ to depression as an ‘one illness among many’ in this extract, for 
example, does not constitute in any way a ‘change of mind’, ‘change of subject’ or 
‘simplification of the issue’. Rather, the organisation of the account is markedly 
sensitive to the inferential business generated by making a complaint, and the validity 
of that complaint is discovered within the account. Moreover, in making his complaint 
the GP observably addresses issues of accountability both for the activity within the 
account, and his own production of it, in such a manner as to delimit potentially 
negative inferences that may be drawn by the interviewer and provide ongoing 
conditions for a sympathetic hearing. 
 
6.4. DEPRESSION, FACTUALITY AND MEMORY: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The key aim of this chapter been has to provide a description of the tacit communicative 
skills employed by GPs in answering a direct question relating to the character of 
depression and, accordingly, in organising an account of depression. In all cases, the only 
resources available to the GPs from which to make sense of the interview scenario and 
what was specifically required of them were (a) the question itself and (b) the fact that 
the interviews were related to a project about problems with the identification of 
depression in primary care. The analytic programme is neither evaluative (designed to 
assess the ‘success’ of their answers), nor quantitative (designed to count the incidences 
of given accounting procedures). Rather, the focus is on the social resources made 
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available by the interviewees in observable conversational practices, and this is telling in 
a number of ways. 
  
6.4.1. Depression, Definition and Memory. 
The first clear observation relates to the ways that the GPs made sense of the basic 
question ‘what is depression?’ which was posed at the beginning of each interview. As 
outlined at the beginning of the chapter, a question such as this could be seen as a ‘test’ 
of retained knowledge, by a reader of the project or, crucially, by the interviewees 
themselves. It could be interpreted as an exercise in eliciting, or a demand for, a chapter-
and-verse definition from a medical text (a propositional knowledge). In context, 
however, such textbook answers are not given. While the GPs generally begin their 
accounts with a brief description of the composition of depression, the accounts are then 
developed in a variety of ways without need for further questioning. These include the 
identification of incongruence between scientific papers and actual diagnostic situations, 
problematic primary care issues resultant of limited public knowledge, complaints about 
time constraints on consultations and so forth. The GPs, utilising knowledge of the 
purpose of the project on the broader scale, are able to interpret the question as a request 
for general information on the problems with diagnosing depression in primary care and, 
in designing accounts to this effect, reflexively transform the requirements of the local 
interactional context itself. These are vividly procedural skills. As such, there is no 
simple and direct recourse to an evaluation of the structures and detail of their accounts 
in terms of ‘memory’. The same question in, say, a medical exam would almost certainly 
not have produced the same types of answer. The accounts are demonstrably contingent 
upon, and also partly constitutive of, the context in which they are produced; to 
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paraphrase John Heritage (1984a), they are context-shaped and context-renewing. As 
such, it can be seen that: 
 
‘[P]rocedural knowledge provides for the application of substantive or prepositional 
knowledge to everyday life contexts, as realised in the performance of actions.’ (Watson 
and Weinberg, 1982:56) 
 
Throughout the data corpus examined specific (procedural) practices are employed to 
render available the factuality of what is being said, and specific resources are 
occasioned to attend to the inferential business generated by describing difficulties in 
general practice to a non-practitioner. Such business included: 
 
• Providing an account of depression as a ‘real’ thing. 
• Constructing a convincing state of affairs such that a ‘legitimate’ complaint could 
be made. 
• Addressing problems with diagnosis without undermining the ‘real’ status of 
depression or their own credibility as a GP and author of the account. 
• Locating accountability for cited problems without implicating any local party. 
 
Rather than simply giving accounts of problem phenomena, certain phenomena are 
actually constructed as problematic to facilitate the making of particular complaints – 
they are rhetorically organised.  
Moreover, the complaints themselves are designed in manners sensitive to the details 
previously occasioned. In this sense, the GPs can be seen to attend to, and monitor, not 
only a generalised context and/or the activities of the interviewer, but their own prior 
turns in the interaction itself. As Hutchby and Wooffitt note: 
 
‘Subsequent contributions to a conversation can be designed so as to take account 
of…prior interactional events or previously disclosed information.’ (1998:175) 
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This once again highlights the fluidity of local interactional contexts. The data does not 
display simple talk ‘about depression’, the regurgitation of static, self-defining and 
transsituationally significant knowledges. What is observable here is a set of available 
meanings-in-the-making. As David Silverman expands: 
 
‘[S]peakers fashion their account[s] in a way that attends to the implications of their 
descriptions. Those implications derive from the machinery of interaction: i.e. both that of 
the apparatus of description…and the sequential organization of turn-taking. Through this 
apparatus and this organisation, people co-operatively organize and discover anew what 
they must have meant.’ (1997:84) [Original Emphasis] 
 
The ‘recalled’ definitions of depression provided are demonstrably shaped to specific 
interactional ends, and are reworked and recharacterised in the turn-by-turn unfolding of 
conversation. Herein we find an explicit parallel with the work of Edwards and Potter 
(1990), Middleton and Edwards (1990) and Wooffitt (1992), all of whom clearly 
articulate the manners in which rememberings (and, indeed, forgettings) are social 
actions which are ‘embodied in and constituted through the dynamics of everyday 
communicative practice’ (Wooffitt, 1992:191) rather than simple representations of 
internal cognitive activity.   
 
6.4.2. Stigma? Or the Situated Construction of a Delicate Object. 
One of the most interesting themes to emerge from the analysis above relates to the 
manner, initially highlighted in Chapter 5, in which the accounts of depression discussed 
above are regularly produced ‘as problematic’. This is to say that the details occasioned 
are organised in such a way as to anticipate a potentially sceptical hearing, even where 
the content of the account of relates to how ‘ordinary’ and ‘real’ depression itself is. The 
same strategies are also observable in relation to accounts of problems with diagnosis; 
specific steps are taken to render such problems ‘understandable’ or to impress that they 
are not the fault of medicine or the GP himself. Such observations could easily provide 
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the foundations for a more general theory of ‘stigma’ relating to depression and problems 
with diagnosis. We could propose two (abstract) knowledges governing the accounts: 
 
1. Depression is a ‘problem illness’ – people may not believe it is real. 
2. Medicine should not have problems with diagnosis. 
 
Such grand extrapolations, however, fall apart if an account is given which is not 
organised in this way. The only way a theory can be upheld is if that account is then 
labelled a ‘deviant’ case (i.e. dismissed as theoretically irrelevant). It is also highly 
probable that the accounts would be organised very differently if given by one GP to 
another, rather than by a GP to a non-practitioner – a speaker in such a case, drawing on 
locally available resources, would probably not infer potential scepticism in the same 
way. Equally, as will become clear in subsequent chapters, the accounts of depression 
given by GPs to diagnosed patients are commonly organised in a variety of manners 
which are different to those above. The point is that a sociology of stigma is condemned 
to fail if it is dependent upon pre-defined notions of what is or what is not stigmatic, or if 
it generalises specific actions to all contexts. In the extracts analysed in this chapter, the 
speakers can be seen to orient to direct local interactional concerns in their construction 
of delicate objects – prior utterances, relative (or potential) inferred social identities and 
the need to make a convincing argument. While broader cultural knowledges invariably 
inform this action (as highlighted in Chapter 5, it is doubtful that the same accounting 
procedures would be employed if describing a broken leg), they do not determine it. So, 
while the analyses herein reveal an awareness on the part of the speakers that they may 
be in an inauspicious position when constructing their accounts of depression and the 
problems with diagnosis, this is not congruous with advancing the meta-claim that 
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‘depression is stigmatised’. Rather, what is addressed here are some public procedures 
through which such an awareness is realised in concrete contexts of social action.  
 Such observations directly challenge Parsons’ (1951) account of medical 
knowledges as ‘neutral’ and universal; accounts of medical knowledge are demonstrably 
constructions sensitive to the inferential properties of giving those accounts in specific 
contexts. Doctors are not ‘cultural dopes’ benevolently applying the fruits of science, but 
have available to them the same culturally-available resources as their patients and ‘the 
public’ at large. Moreover, the observations made in this chapter directly challenge many 
medical texts which address the (undescribed) ‘stigma attached to mental illness’ as 
exclusively a problem with public knowledge (such as Priest et al, 1996; Byrne, 2000). 
We have seen here that ‘delicate issues’ are locally realised and an operational concern in 
the actions of GPs themselves. It is to this matter that the next chapter attends. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Symptoms and Suicide 
The Production of ‘Delicate’ Objects in Consultations 
‘[T]he appealing prospect of a sociology of the moral order must begin by clearly 
delineating the local production of the phenomenon itself.’ 
David Silverman90 
 “Discourses of Counselling” 
 
Contemporary medical studies of Major Depression broadly acknowledge that many of 
the problems with diagnosis and treatment encountered in primary care relate to, and are 
resultant of, a certain social ‘stigma’ associated with depression itself and with mental 
illness at large (Byrne, 2000; Paykel & Priest, 1992). This analysis is generally grounded 
in an assumed shortfall in public knowledge regarding the ‘true’ or ‘legitimate’ character 
of depression as an actual illness (Priest, Vize, Roberts, Roberts & Tylee, 1996; Byrne, 
2000). As the National Framework for the Prevention of Suicide and Deliberate Self-
Harm in Scotland states: 
 
‘The societal view of people with mental health problems is still laden with stigma and 
prejudice…Primary care providers need to address this through staff training, and 
through provision of innovative services that encourage access.’ (Scottish Executive 
Central Research Unit, 2002:44) 
 
The theme of stigma also surfaces in some of the classical sociological texts outlined in 
Chapter 3 (notably Goffman, 1963), and persists in the contemporary sociology of health 
and illness. These latter studies tend either to adopt a Goffmanesque focus upon the 
ongoing personal/social effects of a ‘stigmatic’ condition post-diagnosis (Link et al, 
1997; Markowitz, 1998), or endeavour to explain the sources of this stigma with relation 
to structural issues within society (culture, religion etc). There is good reason to assert 
that none of these approaches really address the issue of ‘stigma’ itself at all. Stigma is, 
without exception, employed as a unified and undescribed category (Sacks, 1963) and 
then efforts are made to explain away its causes or effects, or the problems it creates for 
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doctors or patients. Little attention is actually paid to the variable manners in which 
meanings are produced as ‘delicate’ within the activities of people themselves. Stigma is 
not, after all, a thing-in-itself, but a product of human activity. Chapters 7 and 8 of this 
project address the complex issues of stigma and caution in some detail, holding tightly 
to the ethnomethodological premise that a phenomenon is only to be regarded as a 
phenomenon when operationalised as such in interaction.  
A noteworthy issue at this point is that sociological and medical studies of 
‘stigma’ are, almost without exception, tuned chiefly to the causes and effects of stigma 
with relation to patients. Stigma as an operational issue for General Practitioners is 
widely overlooked except as a reaction from patients that they will have to ‘face’ in 
consultations or, in a similar and related vein, an abstract problem with public 
knowledge91. The following sections explore in detail the manner in which ‘difficult’ 
matters are anticipated, marked and managed by GPs themselves, and collaboratively by 
GPs and patients, within situated activities. In section 7.1, the turn-by-turn construction 
and negotiation of an issue (a set of symptoms in this case) as a ‘problem’ by GP and 
patient is explored. This then illuminates a range of concerns subsequently discussed 
relating to the asking of questions about ‘suicidal inclination’ (7.2), a key institutional 
feature in making a diagnosis of depression. The aim herein is to demonstrate how 
delicate matters are produced and managed in local contexts, and how these activities do 
constructive interactional work in the consultation. 
 
7.1. ‘TRICKY’ SYMPTOMS: 
THE SITUATED NEGOTIATION OF DELICATE MEANINGS 
Returning to consultation DP7, the opening lines of which were analysed in Chapter 5, 
we can see that it later unfolds as follows:  
 
EXTRACT 7(I): DP7 
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1.  D: hhh. ºhave thereº been any specific aches or (.)  ahm: pains? 
2.   P: not really (.) thas: like (.) whus bin worst (1.0) snothin ah can put mah finger on  
3.    (.5) 
4.    jus feel (.) uhm: (1.0) crap an is: gettin me down now (.) ya know 
5.    (1.5) 
6.   D: ºand uhm:º how long have you felt like this? 
7.    (.5) 
8.   P: a:ges (.) six months maybe? 
9.    (.5) 
10.   D: ºri:ghtº (.) ahm (.) would you: say that (.) ºahmº (.) you are enjoying life (.) ah:: 
11.    (.5)  
12.    less? 
13.    (1.0) 
14.  P:  less than:: (.) huh huh (.) who?= 
15.   D:              =hah (.) less than usual (.) hhh. 
16.    (.5) 
17.   P:  we::ll (.) yeah (1.0) but >is: hard< teh enjoy much when ya ºfeelº like this: 
 
Lines 1 to 8 take the form of two straightforward question-answer pairs. The first of the 
GP’s questions (line 1) embeds an assertion relating to the information the patient has 
volunteered to this point of the consultation. In requesting information that is (a) specific 
and (b) physiological by construction (‘aches’ and ‘pains’ vividly being bound to the 
category of ‘physical complaints’) he not only makes available that such information has 
not yet been forthcoming also reflexively characterises the symptoms previously 
deployed in the consultation as being neither of a physiological nor specific nature. In 
line 2, however, the patient answers in the negative (‘not really’), but orients to the 
dispreferred status of this answer by providing further information (a ‘no-plus’ – Sacks, 
1992) which serves both to account for, and mitigate, the his ongoing inability to provide 
the ‘kind’ of information the GP is requesting. The mitigating claim, that what is wrong 
is not something he can easily identify (‘snothin ah can put me finger on’), is itself 
prefaced with a formulation which serves to explicitly characterise the claim as a 
complaint (‘thas: like (.) whus bin worst’). The material of the complaint is characterised 
as ongoing, and he strength of the complaint is compounded with the ECF ‘worst’, 
making available that the it is a matter he takes very seriously. As such, the doctor is now 
furnished with resources from which he can draw inferences relating to the patient’s 
stance towards his own activity as a patient. Orienting to the difficulty the GP is having 
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in eliciting a clear description of symptoms, the patient makes available that it is a 
difficulty he has been having himself, and this in turn serves to mitigate his own 
responsibility for having not produced the kind of self-account required by the 
consultation. Essentially, both participants in the consultation are now ‘sharing’ a 
problem, and the local social solidarity is reinforced. Consequently, the patient cannot be 
heard as being in any way ‘awkward’. Rather, he is now hearably attempting to make 
sense of what is wrong with him, and thus help the GP, but ‘cannot’. In Zimmerman’s 
(1992:439) terms, the patient casts himself as a ‘reasonable witness’ to his own 
behaviour. 
 
7.1.1. Gists, Rights and Emotional Entitlement. 
The central utterance to the sense of this extract follows: the patient, after a short pause, 
re-states his case  ‘jus feel (.) uhm: (1.0) crap an is: gettin me down’ (line 39). This brief 
self-description can be shown to perform a variety of functions both within the 
immediate interactive milieu and in the context of the extract as a whole. In the 
immediate sense, it is an extension of the complaint made in line 2, making available 
further details relating to the position of the patient with relation to his own symptoms. 
Not only are they problematic to him, but they are beginning to affect him emotionally. 
In these terms he addresses his ‘rights’ as a patient – while the symptoms are admittedly 
indistinct, they are still severe enough to be worthy of the attention of a doctor. The first 
part of the utterance is a gist, a summary of his prior talk (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). 
By reformulating all of the previous claims made in the entirety of the consultation 
relating to his symptoms as ‘just feeling crap’, he deletes all of the fine detail of the 
condition that he has occasioned already. Instead, the GP is furnished with a fairly 
ordinary and ‘holistic’ version of how the patient feels (‘crap’) which is in turn rendered 
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more ‘acute’ in character by the subsequent factual claim that ‘is: gettin me down’ (line 
4) – an emotional response to the problem. As such, the whole problem is condensed into 
a general, ‘not too severe’ malaise that is, however, sufficiently severe to be seeking 
medical attention.  
As Derek Edwards (1997) highlights, emotions are usually defined in contrast to 
‘rational’ thought, not only in academic circles, but in everyday life. They are widely 
assumed to be ‘natural’ or bodily phenomena, and to be somehow organic and, crucially, 
involuntary in character rather than artificial and deliberate like conscious thought. 
Edwards (1997) has, in some detail, investigated the use of emotion categories in 
everyday talk and clearly underscores the manner in which the activity can be shown to 
be a decidedly functional rather than merely indicative phenomenon. 
 
‘Emotion discourse is an integral feature of talk about events, mental states, mind and 
body, personal dispositions and social relations. It is used to construct thoughts and actions 
as irrational, but, alternatively, emotions themselves may be treated as sensible and 
rationally based. Emotion categories are used in assigning causes and motives to actions, 
in blamings, excuses, and accounts. Emotional states may also figure as things to be 
accounted for (in terms of prior causal events or dispositional  tendencies, say), as 
accounts (for subsequent actions and events, and also as evidence of what kind of events or 
actions precede or follow them.’ (Edwards, 1997:170) [Original Emphasis] 
 
In line 4, the patient constructs a direct and factual causality; he does not feel well and 
this is making him unhappy. The emotional response is characterised as taking place in 
the present, making relevant that the new phenomenon, his ‘low mood’ has relatively 
recent origins while, as he has already argued, his other symptoms have been persisting 
for some time, thus concretising the direction of the causality. Moreover, it also 
addresses his reasons for visiting a GP now, rather than before – feeling ‘down’ is 
occasioned both an indicator of the severity of the problem and a problem in itself, and 
this requires the skilful use of a number of culturally available resources. A strong 
emotional response, for example, is not generally expected to arise from unimportant, 
irrelevant or minor issues (Sacks, 1984). Equally, strong emotional responses are 
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unlikely to be seen as matters of choice. As such, an account detailing a state of health 
affairs which elicits a strong and involuntary response in him is unlikely to be heard as in 
any way trivial, or its content as unworthy of a doctor’s attention. He can be seen to 
utilise the emotion category of being ‘down’ as a rational warrant for claiming that he is 
unwell and, furthermore, feeling ‘crap’ in the way that he does is reflexively 
characterised as reasonable entitlement to a response such as this. This provides a sharp 
contrast with the cognitive literature detailed in Chapter 2, in which emotional states are 
taken to be biological offshoots (and thus direct evidence) of given ‘mental’ states.  
In formulating a reaction to his condition as being emotional in character, 
however, what is visible here is the patient actively utilising a resource that is difficult to 
dispute. Thoughts and opinions are subject to ‘rational’ contest, they are accountable, 
feelings and emotions far less so, a standing feature of natural conversation (Edwards, 
1997) to which both speakers clearly orient both here and in the subsequent question-
answer pair. The patient provides no justification for his claim and the doctor does not 
contest it in any way, or request further clarification regarding ‘what he means’. Indeed 
the doctor, in his next turn, moves to a different topic-focus, ‘duration’ (line 6), thus 
characterising the patient’s utterance as a complete and/or final answer in this phase of 
questioning.  
 
7.1.2. Forming the Persistence of Time. 
Interestingly, in the question ‘how long have you felt like this?’ (line 6) the doctor does 
not in any way make clear the absolute nature of the ‘this’. Without due reflection on 
what follows, the indexicality of language here would make the utterance impervious to 
serious analysis. ‘This’ could refer to the symptoms previously described or the 
emotional result or both. The patient, however, responds with the ECF ‘ages’. Taken in 
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conjunction with the patient’s assertion that the emotional reaction is a relatively ‘new’ 
thing (line 4), it becomes clear that the patient orients to ‘this’ as indexing his broader 
symptoms, rather than his low mood, an orientation unchallenged by the doctor in his 
next turn (line 10). Herein, we can clearly see how the construction and understanding of 
meaning is, in this sense, very much an issue for the attention of the speakers themselves 
in the turn-by-turn unfolding of conversation; an issue which is potentially unclear or 
confusing if viewed in isolation can be seen to be skilfully negotiated and resolved in 
concrete practical action. Also in the patient’s answer (line 8), we see an example of how 
prior utterances are made relevant and transformed in character at later points in 
conversation. The term ‘ages’ functions as an ECF, once again addressing his own 
accountability in actually visiting the doctor at all, but then is reformulated as ‘six 
months maybe?’. The patient thus infers that as an answer to a direct question about 
duration, ‘ages’ is not in itself likely to be adequate, it would probably make relevant 
further clarification. As such, he reformulates to circumscribe the need for such a request 
to be made.  
In this short utterance, there is some complex work done relating to the use of 
‘ages’ as an ECF. Six months is not, in itself, an exceptionally long time in, say, 
geological terms, and certainly not ‘ages’. Leaving Einstein aside, time is a relative 
phenomenon in social life; an hour is a long time to wait for dinner in a restaurant, but 
not a long time to wait for a house to be built from scratch. As with virtually all social 
phenomena, notions of time and duration are bound in certain ways to certain activities; 
breaching these (very flexible) culturally available temporal ‘norms’ one way or the 
other makes relevant accounting procedures as to why. If dinner were to take an hour to 
arrive, there may be cause for complaint on the part of the customer, if a house were 
actually built in an hour, however, there may be some questions asked relating to its 
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quality. These examples themselves, however, put a very simplistic gloss on the issue. 
What kind of restaurant? What kind of house? What kind of hurry is a person in? The 
borders between ‘reasonable’, ‘not long enough’ and ‘too long’ are flexible, shift and are 
shifted according to the specifics of the activity in question. There is no better illustration 
of the ambiguity of time than in the case of illness: how long can we reasonably expect 
to feel ill before asserting that we ‘are’ ill? And how long should the illness persist until 
medical help is sought? What happens if we go too soon, or too late? These things are 
everyday members’ concerns that are contingent upon a whole range of social and 
personal contexts and made sense of in concrete situated activities. This is an issue rarely 
explored in sociological, psychological or medical texts. Parsons’ analysis of ‘the sick 
role’ (1951), for instance, takes little account of such concerns, using instead a notion of 
‘correct duration’ as something transparently ‘sanctioned’ by the medical establishment 
and understood by doctors and patients alike. This, of course, takes us no further into 
how illness is actually understood at the local level. 
Like emotion discourse, time-talk is not merely a descriptive medium but can be 
used for a number of purposes. Embedded clichés such as ‘time really dragged’, for 
example, do not describe the literal slowing down of time, but rather make available that 
the activities taking place during that period were not much fun92. Also like emotion 
discourse, the use of time-talk in conversation is subject to interpersonal verification, 
stripping the core phenomenon of its ‘objective’ import. Much as emotional states can be 
shown to be something other than simple internal intransigents by way of an analysis of 
their deployment and function, so time can be seen to have a vividly social character. 
Many social theorists have argued this point, presently in relation to mass 
communications, travel and grand social change – ‘time-space compression’ (Lash & 
Urry, 1987; Harvey, 1989) – but frequently such meta-theory overlooks the manner in 
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which people need to understand the phenomenon of time in their everyday activities. To 
characterise a period of time for a state of affairs to persist as, for example, ‘excessive’ is 
to make a claim for which a speaker can be called to account. In extract 7(I), the actions 
of deploying an ECF and then reformulating more specifically can be seen to 
demonstrate an orientation on the part of the patient to the ambiguous character of time 
in social action. In reformulating ‘ages’ as ‘six months’, six months is thus reflexively 
characterised as ‘ages’ in this context. It makes available the inference that six months is 
‘ages’ to specifically feel the way that he does which, in turn, makes available that he has 
felt ‘crap’ for too long. He thus readdresses both his accountability in making the claim 
that he is unwell at all (even if the symptoms are indistinct, they are persistent) and in 
doing so once again addresses his rights to be seeking medical help. 
 
7.1.3. Marking A ‘Change of State’. 
The final section (lines 10-17) of extract 7(I) are interesting in that the focus of the GP’s 
questioning is shifted from patient-as-object to patient-as-subject. Recall: 
 
10.  D: ºri:ghtº (.) ahm (.) would you: say that (.) ºahmº (.) you are enjoying life (.) ah:: 
11.    (.5)  
12.    less? 
13.    (1.0) 
14.  P:  less than:: (.) huh huh (.) who?= 
15.   D:              =hah (.) less than usual (.) hhh. 
16.    (.5) 
17.   P:  we::ll (.) yeah (1.0) but >is: hard< teh enjoy much when ya ºfeelº like this: 
 
This construction of the initial question here (lines 10-12) is interesting in a number of 
ways. A variety of studies have shown how, in the sequence-initial position, a change of 
state token such as ‘right’ can be used to communicate the sense that something has just-
that-moment been noticed or realised by the speaker (Jefferson, 1978; Schegloff, 1979). 
Using the change of state here, along with a number of cautious delays and pauses, the 
GP marks the question as potentially out-of-place, or broadly ‘awkward’ in the 
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interaction, but also relevant – linked to the prior activity. It can be noted that, in the 
context of this particular conversation, the subsequently produced content of the question 
does indeed signal something of a shift in focus. Hitherto, all questions have related 
directly to the patient’s body, state of bodily wellbeing or the character of his symptoms, 
the sorts of question a patient may well expect in a consultation. This question, however, 
makes relevant a very different ‘sort’ of information relating to the patient’s life ‘as a 
whole’ and his viewpoint on it. As such, resources are provided from which the patient 
can infer that although it may be contextually ‘unexpected’, the material of the question 
is still topic-important.  
As a number of studies have observed (Frankel, 1984; Mishler, 1984), there is a 
tendency in consultations for physicians to ignore or sideline utterances by the patient 
that address personal circumstances or subjective experience. Herein, however, we see 
the GP making explicitly relevant such information; ten Have (1989) observes that 
consultations which approach ‘psychosomatic’ or psychological concerns in the 
diagnosis do indeed often do this. Even within the scope of this ‘unusual’ activity, 
however, the GP nevertheless maintains topical control with respect to the ‘kind’ of 
circumstances or experience that are to be heard as relevant – ‘enjoyment’ in this case. 
Secondly, the question is formulated as a thesis (‘you are enjoying life less’) with which 
the patient can agree or disagree from an observer’s (which is to say, less accountable) 
perspective. Thirdly, the design of the question embeds the expectation of an agreement 
with the thesis – it prefers an admission that the patient is enjoying life less, while 
making account-able a refusal of this state of affairs. Consider the alternative questions:  
 
• ‘Are you enjoying life?’  
• ‘You are still enjoying life?’ 
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While cosmetically requesting the same information, the interactional consequences of 
asking these questions are very different to those arising from the question actually asked 
in lines 10-12. In the hypothetical examples above, a claim that one is not enjoying life 
would be more likely to be heard as accountable, especially in the case of the second. In 
the extract itself, however, the patient is furnished with resources from which he can 
infer that to claim he not enjoying life would, in fact, be confirmation of the GP’s 
‘thoughts’ on the matter and would require no further justification. The question in its 
entirety, thus, is designed to create favourable conditions for the production of a 
particular answer to the question. 
In sum, this utterance demonstrates attendance to some intricate inferential matters 
by the GP, and reprises some key themes emanating from the last chapter. Reflecting on 
the sequential unfolding of the extract to this point, it can be observed that the design of 
the question reflects not only an orientation by the GP to the possible ‘awkwardness’ of 
the topic’s position within the interaction, but also a tacit understanding that the potential 
admission of ‘enjoying life less’ could be a difficult one for the patient to make. Recall 
the patient’s previous accounts of ‘how he feels’, both in Chapter 5 and previously in this 
chapter. They are consistently organised so as to delimit the potentially damaging 
inference that he is ‘awkward’, a time waster or a hypochondriac; to explicitly volunteer 
information at this point, then, that he is not enjoying ‘life at large’ may be hearable as 
further evidence of this. Indeed, in the unfolding of this interaction it may well be 
hearable as the cause of his rather indistinct complaints. The form of GP’s question, 
however, allows for the patient to reveal such detail in an indirect manner and without 
these consequences. This design profoundly informs the activity arising from the 
question: 
 
14.  P:  less than:: (.) huh huh (.) who?= 
15.   D:              =hah (.) less than usual (.) hhh. 
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16.    (.5) 
17.   P:  we::ll (.) yeah (1.0) but >is: hard< teh enjoy much when ya ºfeelº like this: 
  
In line 14 the patient initiates a clarification sequence, thus marking the original question 
itself as troublesome in some way. The detail of the insertion itself insinuates that the 
question is incomplete or unclear, but is marked with a laughter token which invites the 
GP to hear (and treat) the utterance as not being a ‘serious issue’ in the interaction 
(Jefferson, 1979). The GP accepts and returns the laughter token immediately, and 
completes the pair with truncated reformulation of the question which reasserts ‘topical 
control’ (Greatbatch, 1988:407) and maintains the conditional relevance of a statement 
relating to the patient’s enjoyment of life.  
This is interesting in that both patient and GP, as a result, carry off the pair in its 
entirety ‘as if’ the patient knew exactly what the GP meant in the first place. The 
collaborative offer-acceptance of a laughter token serves here to reflexively characterise 
the patient’s turn as ‘making a joke’ (Silverman, 1998) about a potential grey area in the 
GP’s original formulation, rather than misunderstanding the question. In this sense the 
clarification sequence appears to add little in the way of new information to the exchange 
– it is mutually treated as ‘talk about talk’. Functionally, however, it can be noted that the 
patient’s initial insertion performs two key tasks: 
 
• The invitation by the patient, as ‘troubles teller’ (Jefferson & Lee, 1992), to 
‘share a joke’ serves to diminish the contextual ‘seriousness’ of the GP’s 
question itself and, consequently, the answer that is conditionally relevant. 
• It serves to postpone the production of such an answer. 
 
In line 17, the answer is finally given and formulated as an agreement with the GP’s 
thesis ‘you are enjoying life less’.  
 
we::ll (.) yeah (1.0) but >is: hard< teh enjoy much when ya ºfeelº like this: 
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Interestingly, though, while such an affirmative answer is a preferred response in terms 
of the design of the question, it is done here as dispreferred. As noted, the utterance has 
been delayed across a series of turns via an insertion sequence, and it is prefaced with the 
classic dispreference marker ‘well’ (Pomerantz, 1984). Moreover, and crucially, the 
agreement is formulated within the utterance using a ‘yes-but’ device which serves to 
make available that this agreement is not absolute. As Knoblauch (1991) notes, ‘yes-but’ 
is a powerful conversational means of allowing agreement, and avoiding conflict, while 
simultaneously preserving the validity of an alternative (or potentially so) point of view 
on the topic in hand. It also provides a means for the patient to provide extra detail where 
a closed-ended question only made relevant a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer (Pomerantz, 1984b). 
In this utterance, a case is built for the GP’s thesis being correct up-to-a-point, but 
incomplete. By making available that his ‘not enjoying life’ is a direct upshot of a set of 
health circumstances, he circumscribes a range of potentially damaging inferences: that 
he is ‘the sort of person’ prone to feeling this way, or that he may usually ‘not enjoy life’. 
Moreover, the answer is formulated in the second person (‘when ya feel like this’), as 
something ‘anyone’ might experience given the circumstances, further mitigating his 
own accountability in the state of affairs in question. Taken in its entirety, the utterance 
neatly characterises the state of ‘not enjoying life’ as being an undesirable but logical 
result of his symptoms, rather than a symptom itself.  
 In lines 10-17 of extract 7(I), both speakers visibly display a clear orientation to 
the potentially delicate inferential character of an answer made conditionally relevant by 
a question, while doing specific interactional work to limit the awkward implications of 
giving it. GP and patient can be seen to work collaboratively, thus, to attain specific 
mutually acceptable goals. This is a theme which has permeated the analysis of extract 
7(I) in its entirety. Questions and answers have been demonstrably and skilfully managed 
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in the turn-by-turn unfolding of the interaction in such a way as to create favourable 
conditions for the disclosure of potentially awkward information while constituting and 
reconstituting the patient’s ‘moral’ character as a legitimate teller of legitimate 
symptoms. On all occasions, potentially delicate or awkward situations arising from the 
interaction are neatly monitored, marked and managed in the interaction. As David 
Silverman observes: 
 
‘Ironically, interactional solutions are solutions to the very problems that members locally 
produce for themselves. This means that both problems and solutions arise in the 
sequential organization of talk.’ (1997:78) 
 
So, as observed in the last chapter, it is not a case of particular issues, symptoms or 
illnesses being in themselves ‘stigmatic’ or delicate, but rather the need for caution or 
delicacy arises from the machinery of their situated production. This observation has 
particular relevance for the next topic to be investigated. 
 
7.2. ASKING ‘THE SUICIDE QUESTION’: 
INTERACTIONAL STRATEGIES AND CONSEQUENCES 
The NHS guidelines in the UK relating to the diagnosis of Major Depression in primary 
care clearly stipulate that, on suspicion of a case, a GP should assess the danger that a 
patient represents to themselves via a direct question such as ‘Have you thought life is 
not worth living?’, ‘Have you though of harming yourself?’ or an ‘equivalent’ (Gunnell 
& Frankel, 1994). Furthermore, given that ‘suicidal ideation’ is a key symptom of Major 
Depression, eliciting such information also becomes key to diagnosis. As Suchman and 
Jordan (1990) note of ‘structured interviews’, however, one of the key problems with 
asking prescribed questions is that they may well violate the natural flow of talk. In 
everyday conversation, participants orient to prior turns and previously disclosed 
information in the design of questions and answers. Where a pre-defined question is 
asked in a pre-defined sequence, however, not only is the usual contextually sensitive 
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nature of questioning likely to be noticeably absent, but the possible types of answer that 
can be produced are also limited. The upshot of this type of questioning, as Hutchby and 
Wooffitt argue, is that it may ‘become very irritating to the respondent’ (1998:76). It may 
appear to request information that the respondent has already provided (appear 
‘irrelevant’), constitute abrupt (and unaccounted for) changes of subject (seem ‘out of 
place’) or prevent the respondent from disclosing information that has become 
contextually relevant from prior utterances. All such consequences can seriously 
undermine the flow of interaction.  
The primary care consultation is not, of course, subject to the same rigidity of 
sequence as a structured interview. However, the directives above present the GP with a 
particular kind of interactional problem – how, if the patient does not volunteer the 
information or present an ‘obvious’ opportunity to ask, to insert a question about 
‘suicidal thinking’ in such a way as to cause minimal sequential disruptions or 
complications. In section 7.1.3 it was observed how a GP utilised a range of culturally 
available devices in introducing a question-topic so as to dually maintain its contextual 
relevance and facilitate favourable conditions for a potentially delicate disclosure by the 
patient. In this section the strategies employed by GPs in asking questions about suicide 
and self-harm, and interactional consequences thereof, are explored in detail. It is key to 
stress once more before proceeding, however, that sequential relevance is a members’ 
issue. A topic is not ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’ to an interaction until it is treated as 
such by co-participants in that interaction.  
 
7.2.1. Doing Expressive Caution.  
Consider the following extract, which follows extends from that analysed in section 7.1.  
 
EXTRACT 7(II): DP7 
1.  D: ºri:ghtº (.) ahm (.) would you: say that (.) ºahmº (.) you are enjoying life (.) ah:: 
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2.    (.5)  
3.    less? 
4.    (.5) 
5.  P:  less than:: (.) huh huh (.) who?= 
6.   D:              =hah (.) less than usual (.) hhh. 
7.    (.5) 
8.   P:  we::ll (.) yeah (1.0) but >is: hard< teh enjoy much when ya ºfeelº like this: 
9.   (1.5) 
10.  D: ºahmº (.) now (.) is there (.5) ahm (.)have you at any (.) 
11.   er::: (.) ti::me? (.5) wo::ndered or (.) well:: (.) thought that it  
12.    might not be (.) you know (.) ºwell:: º (.5) worth it? 
13.    (2.0) 
14.   D:  I (.) mean↓[ um 
15.   P:      [no (.5) I just feel ill 
16.    (1.0) 
17.   D:  okay then (.) ahh. ((continues)) 
 
Recall that the disclosure (line 8) by the patient established a muted agreement with the 
material of the GP’s question ‘are you enjoying life less?’ (lines 1-3). From a third-party 
perspective (with knowledge of the diagnostic frames for depression) this disclosure 
could easily be read as topically connected to the question about ‘suicidal thoughts’ that 
follows (lines 10-12). In line 10, however, the GP uses the sequence-initial change of 
state token ‘now’ to mark this utterance as potentially ‘out of place’ within this 
interaction. It also, however, marks the question as directly resultant of an analysis of the 
prior utterances. As such, he orients to the possibility that the patient may not receive the 
question as a ‘logical progression’ in the conversation. Also noteworthy in this respect is 
the heavily perturbed flow of talk. In line 10 the question begins the dispreference 
marker ‘well’, then ‘false starts’ (the speaker self-repairing his first attempt), and further 
contains a series of pauses, hesitations and delays (‘er’, ‘you know’). Silverman (1997) 
explores at length the manner in which such perturbations (or ‘turbulence’) are routinely 
utilised by speakers to explicitly display an orientation towards the embedded material of 
an utterance as ‘delicate’.  
Working from a normative frame of ‘good practice’, it could be asserted that the 
fine detail of the question seems rather ‘vague’:  
 
have you at any (.) er::: (.) ti::me? (.5) wo::ndered or (.) well:: (.) thought that it might not 
be (.) you know (.) ºwell:: º (.5) worth it? 
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‘Vagueness’, however, is something actually worked up in the design of the question. 
The ‘delicate material’ itself is formulated in the most everyday, ordinary terms available 
for this topic: ‘thinking it might not be worth it’ as opposed to ‘thinking about 
committing suicide’ or ‘having suicidal thoughts’. Moreover, the specific information 
made conditionally relevant pertains to occasional (‘at any time’), formless (‘wondered’) 
and non-determinate (‘might’) thinking about this matter. This selection of terms serves a 
range of interactional functions. Given that the content of the question has been 
characterised as resultant of an analysis of prior utterances, the design of the question 
will thus make available to the patient very specific inferences relating to the GP’s 
reasoning about the patient. A direct question such as ‘do you think about committing 
suicide?’ would, crucially, place the patient squarely in the category ‘potentially suicidal 
people’. The design of the utterance neatly sidesteps such an implicit categorisation. 
Furthermore, by making relevant ‘occasional wonderings’ about ‘possibilities’, the GP 
provides the patient with space to admit to having such thoughts while only aligning 
himself with the delicate category in the weakest possible terms and, thus, more 
favourable conditions are generated for the patient to answer affirmatively should the 
conversational trajectory unfold in this way.  
The GP thus attends to prospective problems relating to the specific positioning of 
the utterance in the interaction, and also its topic-focus, in a number of ways:  
 
1. He makes available a thematic connection between the question being asked and 
prior interactional activity, but also implies that this connection may not be 
‘obvious’. 
2. He marks the subject material of the question as ‘delicate’. 
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3. He designs this material so to minimise damaging implications (regarding the 
character of the patient) that could potentially arise from an affirmative 
disclosure. 
4. This is indicative of inferences drawn by the GP about the patient’s possible 
reception of the question:  
a. The patient may not understand the sequential relevance of the question. 
or 
b. The patient may understand the relevance of the question, and object to 
its implications. 
or 
c. The patient may understand the question, not object to the material but 
find an affirmative disclosure awkward to make.  
5. As such, if (a) is true, the GP makes space for himself to continue with a line of 
questioning which may not seem ‘appropriate’ at this stage through action (1).  
6. If (b) is true, meanwhile, he creates conditions for a more favourable hearing 
through actions (2).  
7. And if (c) is true, he creates more comfortable conditions for an affirmative 
disclosure through action (3).  
 
The turbulent form of the utterance and the vagueness of the question could easily be 
read, in a decontextualised way, as evidence of ‘lack of confidence’ on the part of the 
GP. Such psychological attributions, however, fall apart when exploring the constructive 
functions of the activity within the sequential organisation of the specific conversation. 
Herein, the perturbations of speech can be seen to work interactionally as a pre-
announcement (Schegloff et al, 1977) of a delicate matter to constructive ends, the 
‘vagueness’ as a means of facilitating an easier disclosure for the patient.  
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7.2.2. Some Interactional Consequences.  
In the event, there is a 2 second silence at the transition relevance point (line 13), which 
is quite long in conversational terms. The GP then initiates a turn, explicitly marking it as 
a clarification: ‘I mean’ (line 14). This allocates the silence to the patient, but also 
retrospectively characterises the prior question as potentially unclear for the patient’s 
purposes – it needs clarification if the patient is to complete the pair. In these terms, the 
patient’s non-answer is cast as resultant of him not fully understanding the question 
(rather than, say, a reluctance to answer). Accountability for the silence is diffused 
between both speakers but, crucially, the conditional relevance of an answer to that 
question (topical control) is maintained. In this sense, an interactional problem arising 
from the question is quickly dealt with. Interestingly, however, the actual clarification 
itself is not forthcoming because the patient initiates his turn almost as soon as the GP 
begins to speak.  
 
13.  D:  I (.) mean↓[ um    ← 
14.   P:    [no (.5) I just feel ill  ← 
15.    (1.0) 
16.   D:  okay then (.) ahh. ((continues)) 
 
As a number of CA studies have shown (see Maynard, 1991 or ten Have 1991 & 1993), 
patient-initiated overlap in medical interaction is relatively unusual when compared to 
everyday talk. As Jefferson (1986) further argues, however, the initiation of a turn when 
the previous turn does not appear complete cannot be treated as a simple and 
unproblematic case of ‘interruption’. Rather, an interruption is something oriented to by 
speakers as an interruption. The patient, in this case, proceeds with his turn as if the GP’s 
utterance had not been inserted, thus recharacterising the insertion itself as a ‘minimal 
continuer’ or token of encouragement. Moreover, the GP’s subsequent activity clearly 
displays an orientation to the patient’s turn as ‘legitimate’. He makes no attempt to 
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pursue the trajectory of conversation he has opened up in line 58 and, furthermore, 
explicitly acknowledges the patient’s utterance (line 59) as a satisfactory completion of 
the question-answer pair.  
The GP’s activity described above is in substantial part, of course, contingent 
upon the character of the patient’s answer: the negative: ‘no (.5) I just feel ill’. Firstly, by 
making available that no clarification is necessary, by answering the question directly, 
the patient provides for the inference that he did, in fact, understand the question in the 
first place. Thus the silence proceeding the question is, significantly, reconstituted as a 
‘delay’ or reluctance to answer, and the GP’s interjection as ‘out of place’. Secondly, all 
inferences regarding the patient that the question itself has opened up, related to ‘suicidal 
thinking’ and its implications, are systematically closed down. An alternative framework 
for making sense of the described symptoms is then provided – ‘I just feel ill’. As such, 
the patient firmly distances himself from the potential category-ascription ‘people who 
think about suicide’ and firmly locates himself in the far more ‘everyday’ category 
‘people who (just) feel ill’. By closing down the topic in this way and re-setting the 
agenda for discussion, the patient profoundly informs the future trajectory of the 
interaction. Decidedly unfavourable conditions are created for any further questions 
pertaining to ‘suicidal thinking’: they would have to be introduced as contextually ‘out of 
place’ (the topic is dead) or implicative of the patient ‘not telling the truth’. The GP’s 
acknowledgement token (okay – line 61) reflexively characterises this as an end to the 
topic, and a new avenue of questioning begins. 
According to Jefferson and Lee (1992), medical advice is most likely to be well 
received where it is in some way requested by the patient/client and, as such, emerges: 
 
'as the logical outcome of a diagnosis offered by the troubles-recipient and concurred in by 
the troubles-teller; i.e. the advice is sequentially appropriate and the talk is interactionally 
"synchronous"' (Jefferson & Lee, 1992:408) 
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This suggests that, where these observed features are absent, i.e. where a 'trouble' is not 
first presented by the client, we are likely to find the advice rejected. Heritage and Sefi's 
(1992) account of health visitor-mother interactions further elaborates this analysis of 
advice rejections. They observe that the mothers, in their data, usually resist any advice 
which is not recipient designed to a specifically elicited 'problem'. The extract below 
shows how advice reception is organized in these circumstances. The health visitor (HV) 
has not based her advice (lines 1-3 and 5-6) on any 'diagnosis' or problem provided by 
the mother (M) or father (F): 
 
[HERITAGE & SEFI (31) [4A1:14-15]] 
1. HV:  but it is recommended that if possible (0.2)  
2.    all of them are better than: (0.7) i- it's  
3.    better to have them all than (0.5) uhm: (0.7)  
4.    no:t,= 
5. F:          =( [ ) ( (to baby)) 
6. HV:  [whooping cough can be a killer in the baby  
7.    under one. 
8.    (1.0) 
9. HV:  Uh:m (1.2) but it m- (0.2) maybe you'd  
10.    like to have a think about it and= 
11. M:  Mm hm 
12. HV:  uh:m talk it over with the doctor 
13.    (1.0) 
14. HV:  when you see him at clinic 
15. M:  Mm hm. 
 
Heritage and Sefi focus primarily on the 1.0 second long pause at line 8. They argue that 
HV's subsequent ‘downgrading’ of her advice (line 9 onwards) into a less direct form 
shows that she monitors the parents' failure to speak at that juncture as indicating 
resistance to the advice itself. As such, it is shown that a more favourable environment 
for the giving of advice can be created by the establishment of an agreed 'problem' that is 
being experienced by the potential advice-recipient. Advice is, in these terms, much 
more likely to be well received when it is addressed to a client 'problem' elicited by a 
series of questions and a request for specification. The analysis of extract 7(II) revealed 
some complex and negotiated strategies in the management of issues and categories 
surrounding a topic marked as delicate. It was possible to observe how even apparently 
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dysfunctional or ‘troubled’ talk serves constructive functions within the local context of 
the consultation. Also highlighted, however, with relevance to Heritage and Sefi’s study 
detailed above, are the interactional consequences of not establishing a direct and mutual 
consensus on the character of a ‘problem’ in advance of the asking of a question about 
‘suicidal’ thoughts. Herein, as a result of the patient’s only muted agreement with the 
GP’s initial question-thesis, the suicide question itself had to be marked as ‘out of place’ 
and treated as a distinctly delicate object, and the flow of the interaction was briefly 
compromised subsequently with the patient abruptly closing the topic down. In the next 
extract, meanwhile, a different strategy is observably employed to achieve a different 
kind of result.  
 
7.2.3. Doing ‘Ordinary’ Embarrassment.  
In lines 3 and 4 of extract 7(III) shown below, taken from consultation DP27, the patient 
constructs an ongoing and ‘embarrassing’ state of affairs (she keeps ‘crying at work’) 
which she ‘cannot help’. 
 
EXTRACT 7(III): DP27 <DEPRESSION> 
1.   D:  are you finding the symptoms disru:ptive (.) um: (.) in >your routine<? 
2.    (.5) 
3.   P:  yes (.) very much (.) I keep crying at work and thats really (.) well (.5) 
4.    stup↑ ahm: (.) emba:rrassing↓ (.) but I just cant help it 
5.    (1.0) 
6.   D: I s:ee: .hhh (.5) so:: (.5) you (.) um: (.) dont know how to co:pe with all this? 
7.    (.5) 
8.   P:  ºwell:º[   
9.  D:            [do you (.) ºsorryº (.) ever think that its just all too (.5) much or that 
10.    (.) you cant carry on:? um= 
11.   P:  =no: (.) ive (.) ive never felt that bad (.5) no (.) just very (.) you: know (.) do:wn 
12.    (.) 
13.    goo:d ((continues)) 
 
Key to the interactional sense of the formulation is the manner in which she self-repairs 
‘stupid’ (line 4). The two terms, ‘stupid’ and ‘embarrassing’, have markedly different 
inferential properties as descriptors of her own behaviour. To label this behaviour 
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‘stupid’ would allow for a wide range of inferences to be drawn pertaining to it being 
inherently ‘unnecessary’ or ‘unwarranted’. The re-selection of ‘embarrassing’, however, 
delimits such inferential possibilities while instead the furnishing the GP with resources 
from which to infer that ‘crying at work’ is merely a normal behaviour taking place in an 
inappropriate context. Any potentially awkward inferences arising from this formulation 
are then themselves mitigated through the assertion that the behaviour is involuntary (‘I 
just can’t help it’).  
It is important to note, however, that the patient does not simply construct an 
‘embarrassing state of affairs’, but, crucially, a state of affairs as embarrassing - in 
explicitly formulating the behaviour as embarrassing she attends to some inferential 
issues relating to her own character as author of the account. As Palmer (2000) identifies, 
‘hallucinations’ or ‘delusions’ are generally recognised in psychiatry not through the 
particular content of an account, but from a marked lack of orientation on the part of a 
speaker to the unlikely or contentious character of a claimed experience. By describing a 
behaviour (regularly crying at work) as embarrassing, the patient here orients a listener to 
the inferentially unusual character of this behaviour and makes available a ‘normal’ 
reaction to it (embarrassment). As such, she does, in Sacks’ (1984) terms ‘being 
ordinary’. By constructing an identity for herself as a ‘normal’ person experiencing 
‘unusual’ behaviours, she underscores the veracity of her account as one given by a 
normal person with normal perceptions (a ‘reasonable witness’ – Zimmerman, 1992). 
These are interesting observations in themselves, but central to this analysis is the 
manner in which this account forms a major resource in the GP’s subsequent activity. 
 
7.2.4. Prefacing the Question. 
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In line 6 the GP issues the assessment token ‘I see’ (Atkinson, 1982; Frankel, 1984), 
which herein serves a number of purposes: 
 
• To mark the previous utterance as a satisfactory completion of a pair. 
• To mark the information in the utterance as ‘new’ or significant. 
o As such, the patient is equipped to expect a potentially unforeseen 
trajectory of talk. 
• To make visible his ‘correct’ understanding of the significance the utterance.  
o Which insulates future utterances by the GP against the accusation that 
they are based on a misunderstanding of the circumstances. 
 
As has been observed on several occasions in this chapter, the forthcoming activity is 
thus marked as potentially awkward, but also relevant, using what is ostensibly a ‘hear 
me out’ device. 
Subsequently, the GP constructs a gist of the patients talk: ‘so you don’t know 
how to cope with all this’. While condensing all detail thus far disclosed in the 
consultation into the generalised summary-token ‘all this’, the gist itself preserves the 
sense of one part of the immediately prior utterance: the admission by the patient that 
she ‘cannot help’ her behaviour. Interestingly, despite the patient’s endeavours to align 
herself with an ‘ordinary’ identity, the GP’s utterance places her in an altogether more 
delicate category (which he marks as such via a series of pauses and hesitations) – 
‘people who don’t know how to cope’. This announcement is, superficially, rather 
‘combative’. It appears to undermine some of the interactional work done by the patient 
by offering an alternative version of what she is ‘actually saying’. As John Heritage 
observes, in (traditionally combative) political interview contexts an interviewer will 
often  
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‘..restate the interviewee’s position by making overt reference to what might be treated as 
implicated or presupposed by that position…’ (1985:110)   
 
Heritage’s analysis goes on to reveal that such activity is usually done to the direct ends 
of eliciting from the interviewee an agreement with, or refusal of, the summary. In this 
consultation, however, when the patient takes up the subsequent potential transition-
relevance position (line 8) the GP almost immediately closes down the turn.  
 
6.  D: I s:ee: .hhh (.5) so:: (.5) you (.) um: (.) dont know how to co:pe with all this? 
7.    (.5) 
8.   P:  ºwell:º[         ← 
9.  D:            [do you (.) ºsorryº (.) ever think that its just all too (.5) much or that  ← 
10.    (.) you cant carry on:? um= 
 
While the GP himself orients to the overlap as interpretably an interruption (note the 
apology in line 9) he carries on nevertheless. In this sense he retroactively characterises 
the pause that the patient treated as a transition point (line 7) as, in fact, ‘merely’ a pause 
in his turn. This has the effect of allowing him to continue talking without violating the 
patient’s rights to take her turn. The significance of this activity within the interaction 
becomes more profound, however, when the character of the patient’s abortive turn in 
taken into account. As discussed on several occasions previous, ‘well’ (line 8) is a classic 
dispreference marker and hearably so. The GP’s closing down of the turn, thus, prevents 
the production of what may well be a challenge to his summary. This is interesting as, 
alongside the apparent ‘telling the patient what she meant’, it could be taken as simple 
evidence of the GP ‘not listening’, interrupting or not employing a sufficiently ‘open 
style’ in the consultation, directly contravening the recommendations for good practice in 
the diagnosis of depression as stipulated by, among others, Tylee, Priest and Roberts 
(1996). An exploration of the trajectory of the interaction, however, reveals a much more 
subtle, intricate and constructive function for these situated activities. 
 
7.2.5. On the Preservation of Relevance. 
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The ‘interruption’ itself (lines 9-10) ultimately transpires to take the form of a question 
relating to ‘suicidal thinking’. As in the previous extract, the word selection omits any 
direct reference to suicide or self-harm. Moreover, the design of the utterance closely 
mirrors the design of his previous turn (itself retrospectively characterised as a factual 
statement/analysis of the patient’s talk). Indeed, ‘thinking it’s just all too much’ is 
formulated as an ongoing upshot of ‘not knowing how to cope with all this’. 
 
• so:: (.5) you (.) um: (.) dont know how to co:pe with all this? 
• do you (.) ºsorryº (.) ever think that its just all too (.5) much or that (.) you cant carry on:? 
 
It is also interesting to note that the question itself is not characterised by the same 
turbulence or delays as were observed in extract 7(II), but is delivered rather more 
directly. The point is that the details of the first utterance here render the content of the 
subsequent question conversationally relevant, so it does not need to be marked as 
awkward or ‘out of place’. A specific problem is formulated, and an identity ascribed to 
the patient, about which the question asked has direct sequential relevance. As such, the 
question itself is hearable as a ‘logical outcome’ (Jefferson & Lee, 1992) of prior 
activity. The GP in these terms addresses the issue of placing a potentially awkward 
question not by marking it as awkward, but rather by adapting the conversational context 
to create conditions suitable for the asking of the question. It can now be observed that a 
challenge to the material of the initial statement arising before the question was asked 
would have undermined this conversational relevance (as occurred in extract 7(II)). By 
closing down a potential challenge, however, the GP risks seeming transiently ‘impolite’, 
but simultaneously maintains the relevance of the question he subsequently asks and, 
thus, the contextual sensitivity of that question (the extent to which it is hearable as ‘out 
of place’) is diminished. Furthermore, the asking of the question also reflexively delimits 
the patient’s opportunity to challenge the preceding statement by ‘moving on’ her 
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conversational obligation to that of answering the question. As Sacks (1992) notes in his 
earliest work, there is a normatively appropriate sequence doing things in conversation, 
contingent on the character of the conversation. To step outside of the relevant sequence 
can disrupt the flow of talk and make available a range of inferences about the speaker. 
In this case, for the patient to return to her challenge subsequent to the asking of the 
question would have been hearable as evading the question itself or even rudeness and, 
crucially, would have violated the ongoing question-answer sequence that has hitherto 
characterised this interaction as one between a GP and patient. Whatever she may ‘wish’ 
to do, there is now a normative pressure to attend to the task at hand. As such, the GP 
places the patient in a position where the easiest way of maintaining the local social 
solidarity is simply to answer the question, and thus the conversational risks of 
interruption as a ‘displacement’ strategy (Sacks, 1992) are minimised. Finally, as a 
‘logical upshot’ of a state of affairs, the question itself embeds the expectation of an 
affirmative answer. As in the previous extract, this demonstrates some key inferential 
business on the part of the GP: an affirmative answer is more potentially awkward or 
embarrassing to give, and a negative answer would be less troublesome for the patient. 
Thus by embedding the expectation of an affirmative answer, the GP creates conditions 
whereby the patient can provide such an answer with minimal need to account for it. The 
patient is, consequently, provided with a ‘best of both worlds’ context for answering a 
potentially awkward question. 
  A close analysis of the organisation of extract 7(III) reveals how an apparent 
‘interruption’ can be shown to be a highly constructive method for avoiding the 
production of a matter as overtly delicate and thereby facilitating more comfortable 
conditions for the patient to provide an affirmative answer should she wish to do so. The 
274 
 
success of this strategy is emphasised by the patient’s completion of the pair as a 
straightforward question-answer, explicitly acknowledging the relevance of the question.   
 
11.  P:  =no: (.) ive (.) ive never felt that bad 
 
While the answer refuses the detail of the question it also characterises those details as a 
logical extension of the way the patient actually does feel, and thus the contextual 
legitimacy of the question itself is endorsed. 
 
The two extracts analysed in this section reveal two different methods for addressing the 
potentially thorny task of asking a patient about suicidal thoughts. The first, in extract 
7(II), faced with only a tentative consensus on the nature of a problem, employs a number 
of resources to mark the question as delicate but relevant. The second, in extract 7(III), 
manufactures a consensus via the closing of a challenge such that the question becomes 
sequentially relevant. Despite these differences, the extracts are demonstrative of an 
orientation by both GPs to 2 key interactional requirements: 
 
• Making the question relevant to the local interactional context. 
o Thus minimising the likelihood of ‘troubled’ reception of the question 
itself. 
• Creating comfortable conditions for the disclosure of potentially delicate 
information in the patient’s answer. 
 
This is in no way to suggest that the GPs are ‘trying’ to elicit affirmative answers; in both 
cases, the negative answer subsequently provided is treated unproblematically. Rather, 
the GPs work to avoid disruptions to the flow of conversation that the question itself may 
cause, while also rendering a potentially difficult disclosure as easy for the patient to 
make as possible should the interaction unfold in this way. These strategies are 
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observable in all 8 cases in the data corpus where a question about suicidal thinking is 
asked, though the exact manner of their accomplishment varies greatly. Take, for 
example, extract 7(IV), in which an affirmative answer to the question is provided. 
 
7.2.6. Category Bound Activity as Ordinary Activity. 
In line 11 below, as has been observed previously, the GP formulates a question as a 
logical upshot of the patient’s prior talk (‘so its just (.5) well (.) all too much at the 
moment?’).  
   
EXTRACT 7(IV): DP63 <DEPRESSION> 
1.    D:  has it been ahm. (.) worse since you stopped working at [X]? 
2.    (.5) 
3.   P: yeah (.) definitely (.) I mean (.) losing ma job↓ meant tha (.) um: (.) I just dun  
4.    know what to do with mahself all day an: 
5.    (.5) 
6.   D:  yes?= 
7.   P: =um (.5) I jus dun know wha ta do (.) I jus feel (.) ya know useless:? (.) all I  
8.    wanna do is (.) well (.) sleep all day an (.) huh huh (.5) i: don have any trouble 
9.    sleepin though so at leas thas not a problem↑ 
10.    (.5) 
11.   D: so its just (.5) well (.) all too much at the moment? 
12.    (1.0) 
13.   P:  yeah tis (.5) ºtoo muchº yeah 
14.    (1.5) 
15.  D: under these kinds of circumstances (.) a lot of people (.) quite understandably (.) 
16.    start to think they dont want to carry on with (.) li:fe (.) an:d have you ever (.) had 
17.    any worries or (.) thoughts like that? 
18.    (1.0) 
19.   P:  well (.) um:: (.5) sorta (.) yeah 
20.    (1.0) 
21.   D:  yes? 
22.    (.5) 
23.   P:  i mean (.) some days i wake up (.) huh huh (.) in the afternoon[ (.) like ah said (.) 
24.   D:                 [ºheheº 
25.   P: and ah:: jus think ahd be better off if (.5) if I werent here at all  
26.    but (.5) ahd never do anythin stupid (.) ya know  
27.    (.5) 
28.   D: just the occasional thought (.) then?= 
29.   P: =yeah (.) they jus kind ah (.) pop in there huhh huh 
30.   D: =huh (.) okay (.) thats ºgoodº 
 
In this case, the upshot is accepted unproblematically by the patient who completes the 
pair as a straightforward question-answer (‘yeah tis (.5) ºtoo muchº yeah’) in line 13, the 
repetition of part of the question itself marking the agreement as a particularly strong 
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one. The GP then goes on to ask the key question, the detail of which is fascinating. 
Firstly, a factual state of affairs is constructed. The detail of the previously agreed 
problem is truncated to a set of ‘circumstances’, which externalises the problem to the 
patient himself and downgrades his personal accountability for the way he feels. Also 
‘these kinds of circumstances’ makes available that the patient’s position is in no way 
unique but there are many similar circumstances, an inferential property of the utterance 
further worked up by the addition of the detail that ‘a lot of people’ encounter them. 
Moreover, an activity is then formulated which these people, ‘quite understandably’ tend 
to do (start to think they don’t want to carry on with life). This activity itself is 
formulated as an upshot of said circumstances rather than made accountable to the 
people themselves, and is also presented in a weak form (they start to think) 
circumscribing any inference that such thoughts are a ‘total’ experience. Finally, the 
patient is asked if he has ‘ever’ had comparable thoughts himself, thus minimising the 
implication that the patient may think this way ‘all the time’. In this way the GP 
constructs a general category of ordinary people in common (if undesirable) 
circumstances, and an activity as perfectly reasonably category-bound. The patient is 
then invited to affiliate himself to this category via a disclosure of the relevant activities. 
However, should he not do so, inferential space remains for him to have similar 
‘circumstances’ to this category of people without being a member of it. The key point 
is, however, that should the patient respond in the affirmative, the thoughts he admits to 
are inferentially: 
 
• The outcome of circumstances. Therefore: 
o Not his ‘fault’. Thus: 
 More easily admissible. 
• A group phenomenon. Therefore: 
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o Not unusual. Thus: 
 Less delicate. 
• Occasional. Therefore: 
o His affiliation to the relevant category is temporary. Thus: 
 Not overtly ‘serious’. 
 
In line 19, the patient does indeed issue a (mutedly) affirmative answer. Despite the 
design of the question embedding a preference for such a ‘yes’ answer, however, the 
answer itself is done as dispreferred – prefaced with ‘well’, delayed and accomplished in 
weak form (‘sorta’) to minimise the strength of the agreement. The patient in this sense 
accepts an affiliation to the category constructed by the GP, but in tentative terms. He 
‘sort of’ has those (already specified very vaguely) thoughts. In line 21 the GP issues a 
minimal continuer which the patient takes up as a call to account for this ‘incomplete’ 
agreement:  
 
19.   P:  well (.) um:: (.5) sorta (.) yeah   ← Dispreferred Response 
20.     (1.0) 
21.   D:  yes?     ← Call to Account 
22.    (.5) 
23.   P:  i mean (.) some days i wake up….  ← Account 
 
The purpose of doing the answer as dispreferred becomes evident herein. The design of 
the question mitigated the need for the an account to be provided for an affirmative 
answer. The patient, however, formulates his initial answer as openly ‘incomplete’ 
making relevant the GP’s call for clarification. Consequently, the patient can then 
provide an account for his answer where one was not specifically germane having now 
been asked to do so.  
As noted in section 7.1.3, the strategy of doing an answer as dispreferred where the 
question embeds its content as preferred can be indicative of a reluctance to accept all of 
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the potential implications of the question itself. The detail of the account provided 
confirms this purpose: 
 
23.  P:  i mean (.) some days i wake up (.) huh huh (.) in the afternoon[ (.) like ah said (.) 
24.   D:                 [ºheheº 
25.   P: and ah:: jus think ahd be better off if (.5) if I werent here at all  
26.    but (.5) ahd never do anythin stupid (.) ya know  
27.    (.5) 
28.   D: just the occasional thought (.) then?= 
29.   P: =yeah (.) they jus kind ah (.) pop in there huhh huh 
30.   D: =huh (.) okay (.) thats ºgoodº 
 
The account itself is formulated explicitly around a ‘yes-but’ device (Pomerantz, 1984b). 
Herein the patient reasserts that he does indeed have thoughts like those detailed in the 
question he has been asked. Notably, he formulates these ideas within a backdrop of 
extremely ordinary activity, and uses laughter (a token returned by the GP) as a means of 
directing the GP to hear the overall account as, while not a joke, ‘not too serious’ 
(Jefferson, 1979). As such, the severity of the thoughts in the account is further 
downgraded.  
The ‘but’ component (line 26), however, is key; he makes the claim that he 
would not ‘do anything stupid’ as a consequence of these thoughts. Orienting to an 
awareness of the causal connection between suicidal thoughts and suicidal actions, the 
inferential link between his activity and ‘suicidal’ activity is firmly closed down used 
using the ECF ‘never’. The opportunity for the GP to ask any further questions on the 
topic is, consequently, also closed down. In conjunction, by characterising any activity 
resultant of ‘suicidal thoughts’ as stupid, he also addresses his own identity as author of 
the account. The act of admitting suicidal ‘thoughts’ has very powerful inferential 
properties, not least relating to ‘psychological unreliability’. By explicitly characterising 
actions resultant of such thoughts as ‘non-rational’, he makes available his own 
‘rationality’ in relation to the topic and, thus, underscores the veracity of the account 
itself.  
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7.3. ‘TRICKY’ ACTIVITY: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
‘You must always be puzzled by mental illness. The thing I would dread most, if I 
became mentally ill, would be your adopting a common sense attitude; that you could 
take it for granted that I was deluded.’ 
Ludwig Wittgenstein93 
 “Conversations 1947-48” 
 
A number of important themes have arisen from the detailed analyses presented in this 
chapter. The first and most fundamental of these is that ‘stigma’, or what constitutes an 
awkward or embarrassing issue, is a matter arising within, and attended to, in local 
interactional contexts. The second is that professional and lay knowledges are by no 
means mutually exclusive; in all cases above, both GP and patient could be seen to orient 
to inferential possibilities arising from their own actions, and from those of each other. 
There are a range of more subtle issue, however, that arise from the fine detail of these 
analyses.  
 In section 7.1, the patient demonstrates a clear orientation to what is ‘proper’ 
information to provide in a consultation, not simply relaying ‘unclear symptoms’, but 
actively constructing his symptoms as unclear and, furthermore, understandably so. He 
organises talk about emotion and time in such a way as to emphasise the factual status of 
what he was saying, and to underscore the validity of bringing the matter to the attention 
of a GP at all. His talk is observably constructed and constructive, orienting to and 
transforming the local interactional context while maintaining the unbroken sequential 
flow of questions (from the GP) and answers (from the patient) with no 
misunderstandings, interruptions or overlaps. Also observable is the manner in which the 
GP orients to these activities by the patient in marking a question and its potential answer 
as ‘delicate’, simultaneously creating more favourable conditions for the disclosure of 
information which could otherwise undermine the patient’s efforts to establish the 
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identity of a ‘legitimate’ patient. The patient, in turn, draws upon his own and the GP’s 
prior utterances in the consultation when managing his disclosure of such information. 
The organisation of this disclosure also delimits potentially damaging inferences 
regarding himself and his authorship of the symptoms described so as to close down 
specific trajectories of the interaction that could have followed, while opening up others. 
Both GP and patient monitor the unfolding of the consultation, and the inferential 
properties of the categories employed, to produce, manage and ultimately mitigate a set 
of issues as contextually problematic. With this resonates John Bergmann’s (1991:154) 
assertion that, sociologically speaking, stigma is not an intrinsic property of an object or 
issue but is something realised in the construction of that object or issue. The question 
‘are you enjoying life less?’ is not inherently awkward or difficult to answer, neither is an 
affirmative answer to that question inherently delicate. However, in this local 
interactional context both question and answer make available potentially damaging 
inferences regarding the patient given the ongoing attempt to establish his legitimacy as a 
an ‘ill person’, rather than a time-waster or hypochondriac. To paraphrase Silverman 
(1997), the ‘stigma’ itself arises within, and is dealt with through, the machinery of 
interaction. 
 In section 7.2, meanwhile, an issue was explored at length which most people 
would probably regard as ‘delicate’ in some way – how to ask someone if they think 
about self-harming, or even suicide. Again, however, the manner in which particular 
activities and issues are treated as ‘awkward’ by the participants in those consultations is 
demonstrably accountable to local interactional concerns, while the grand social meta-
stigmas suggested in a range of sociological and medical texts, directing the behaviour of 
social actors from afar, remain staunchly invisible. The point is, of course, that people are 
not ‘cultural dopes’ and do not simply ‘act out’ social forces. One particular area in 
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which this is evident is the way that the GP speaking in extract 7(III) demonstrably 
produces the question itself highly cautiously where, crucially, it was potentially 
sequentially inappropriate; a full prior consensus on the nature of a relevant problem had 
not been established. Where such consensus had been established (or in the case of 
extract 7(IV), ‘manufactured’), the question was delivered much more directly (and 
received much more favourably). As such, the degree to which the topic was approached 
by the GPs as delicate was contingent upon prior activity in the consultation itself, rather 
than some general social rule of thumb regarding what is a ‘delicate’ issue. Moreover, 
whether admitting or denying suicidal thoughts, the patients speaking in this section were 
oriented to the inferential issues arising from being categorised as ‘troubled’ for the 
received veracity of their accounts. Even in the final extract, where the patient did indeed 
disclose affirmatively relating to such thoughts, he did so in such a way as to emphasise 
the rationality of his own position regarding the disclosure and its implications. This also, 
in itself, does much to undermine any simple association drawn between ‘suicidal 
thoughts’ and ‘irrationality’. While making a disclosure that could potentially render 
doubtful the ‘correctness’ of his general reasoning process, he shows the skills to 
simultaneously rework the categories and mitigate such inferences. This theme, 
particularly, will be explored in much more depth in Chapter 9. Equally, the design of the 
GPs’ questions demonstrated similar orientations, collaboratively allowing for the 
patients to answer affirmatively with minimal damaging interactional consequences 
incurred. 
 Also key to the analyses herein have been illustrations of the constructive 
functionality of apparently ‘dysfunctional’ talk by the GPs. For example, it has been 
shown how both highly perturbed talk in the asking of a question and ‘interruption’ of 
the patient are not simply evidence of ‘lack of confidence’ or ‘not listening’ respectively. 
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Rather, both were observably designed to create more comfortable conditions for the 
delivery and reception of a potentially awkward question. Herein, the observations find 
kinship with the work of Jefferson and Lee (1992) and Heritage and Sefi (1992). 
Although these studies related to the delivery of medical advice, their findings on 
acceptance/rejection are very relevant here. Both maintain that advice is best received 
where it can be heard as the ‘logical outcome’ of a problem which is identified by the 
practitioner and agreed upon by the client.  
Observed herein were efforts by the GPs striving to create such interactional 
relevance for the asking of a question such that the material of the question would be 
well received and answered as a relevant question in the sequence. Consider again: 
 
DP27 
  D:  are you finding the symptoms disru:ptive (.) um: (.) in >your routine<?  QUESTION 
   (5) 
  P:  yes (.) very much (.) I keep crying at work and thats really (.) well (.5)   
   stup↑ ahm: (.) emba:rrassing↓ (.) but I just cant help it   PROBLEM 
   (1.0) 
  D: I s:ee: .hhh (.5) so:: (.5) you (.) um: (.) dont know how to co:pe with all this?  SUMMARY/UPSHOT 
   (.5) 
  P:  ºwell:º[        CONSENSUS 
 D:            [do you (.) ºsorryº (.) ever think that its just all too (.5) much or that  QUESTION 
 
 
DP63 
  D:  has it been ahm. (.) worse since you stopped working at [X]?   QUESTION 
   (.5) 
  P: yeah (.) definitely (.) I mean (.) losing ma job↓ meant tha (.) um: (.) I just dun   
   know what to do with mahself all day an: 
   (.5) 
  D:  yes?= 
   P: =um (.5) I jus dun know wha ta do (.) I jus feel (.) ya know useless:? (.) all I   
   wanna do is (.) well (.) sleep all day an (.) huh huh (.5) i: don have any trouble PROBLEM 
   sleepin though so at leas thas not a problem↑     
   (.5) 
  D: so its just (.5) well (.) all too much at the moment?   SUMMARY/UPSHOT 
   (1.0) 
  P:  yeah tis (.5) ºtoo muchº yeah     CONSENSUS 
   (1.5) 
  D: under these kinds of circumstances (.) a lot of people (.) quite understandably (.) QUESTION 
 
On both occasions, the first question is of a form requesting details about the impact of 
symptoms on ‘life in general’, eliciting a problem relating to this. A summary is then 
advanced by the GP relating to the ‘general character’ of the problem and a consensus 
sought. Once attained, a question relating to suicidal thoughts is then (relatively 
unproblematically) asked. Reproduced below are two more cases of the occurrence of 
this structure. In DP38 suicidal thoughts were admitted, in DP42 they were denied: 
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DP38 
  D:  and this is affecting your (.) studies too?     QUESTION 
   (1.0) 
  P:  yes (.) i cant concentrate (.) my mind keeps wanderin all over (.) ill have to  
   drop out if i dont get some work done soon=    PROBLEM 
  D:  =im sure that’s not the case (.) [X] university has good structures  
   for dealing with things like this (.) but its ºfairº to say that (.) at the moment (.)  
   your not co:ping (.) ahm (.) well?      SUMMARY/UPSHOT 
   (5) 
  P:  no (.) im not sure what to (.) do at all     CONSENSUS 
   (.5) 
  D:  its normal when people feel like this to ((continues))   QUESTION 
 
 
DP42 
  D:  it seems that this is making life ve:ry hard indee:d (.) would you say that  QUESTION 
   you are enjoying things that you no:rmally enjoy a lot less than usual 
   or that your view (.) ahm (.) the future looks (.) bleak to you (.) too? 
   (1.0) 
  P:  well (.) yeh (.5) both (.) i just want to feel better but nothin seems  PROBLEM 
   to (.) ya know (.5) help 
   (.5) 
  D:  right (.) so (.) your not enjoying life at all?    SUMMARY/UPSHOT 
    (.5) 
  P:  sa bit of an understatement↓     CONSENSUS 
    (1.0) 
  D:  have (.) you ever got to the point of ((continues))    QUESTION 
 
In all four cases, the sequential relevance of the question is established prior to its asking. 
In all cases the material of question is accepted as relevant and not challenged or 
problematised by the patient, even when a ‘no’ answer is given. In the observed 
incidence where this structure did not feature, the question about suicidal thoughts 
became a problem issue despite the GP’s best efforts to establish its relevance in a 
different way, and the question-answer sequence temporarily broke down. 
 
DP7 
   D: ºri:ghtº (.) ahm (.) would you: say that (.) ºahmº (.) you are enjoying life (.) ah:: QUESTION 
   (.5)  
   less? 
   (.5) 
 P:  less than:: (.) huh huh (.) who?= 
  D:              =hah (.) less than usual (.) hhh. 
   (.5) 
 P:  we::ll (.) yeah (1.0) but >is: hard< teh enjoy much when ya ºfeelº like this:  PROBLEM 
  (1.5) 
 D: ºahmº (.) now (.) is there (.5) ahm (.)have you at any (.)   QUESTION 
  er::: (.) ti::me? (.5) wo::ndered or (.) well:: (.) thought that it  
   might not be (.) you know (.) ºwell:: º (.5) worth it? 
  (2.0) 
  D:  I (.) mean↓[ um      TROUBLES 
  P:    [no (.5) I just feel ill 
   (1.0) 
  D:  okay then (.) ahh. ((continues)) 
 
In these terms, it can be stated that not only is the design of a question itself crucial to the 
way it is received (as acknowledged in the bulk of the medical literature previously 
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reviewed), but also its positioning within the interactional sequence. In the next chapter, 
these themes are developed with reference to the diagnosis of depression itself. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
The Social Reality of Depression: 
Diagnosis, Reception, Defence and Accordance 
‘When persons partake in social activities, they routinely make assessments…a summary of 
the actor’s sense or experience of the event…Second assessments are produced by recipients 
of prior assessments in which the referents in the second are the same as those in the priors.’ 
Anita Pomerantz94 
“Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments…” 
 
 
Chapters 5 to 7 have, thus far, examined a variety of themes arising from the data 
collected for this project. It is fair to assert, however, that to this point little has been said 
on the topic of depression in the primary care consultation. As was stressed in Chapter 
6, the manner in which GP’s describe depression in an interview cannot be treated as a 
transparent representation of the ‘knowledge’ and ‘attitudes’ that they will bring the 
consultation itself; rather, the accounts they provided were demonstrably constructs 
accounting for and to the context of their production. Equally, while ‘suicidal ideation’ 
may well be a key component of depression in the DSM-IV, the manner in which 
questions on that topic were managed and answered in the consultation were shown to be 
sensitive to the local inferential business generated by asking and answering questions 
about suicidal thoughts. It is entirely possible, indeed likely, that a possible diagnosis of 
depression is ‘on the mind’ of a GP at that point in the consultation – it is quite possible 
that it is ‘on the mind’ of a patient – but the activity that takes place is observably not 
answerable to hypothetical psychological states so much as it is to the character of talk-
in-the-consultation. The point is, of course, that ‘depression’ is not an issue for the 
conversation analyst until it becomes an operational matter explicitly attended to by 
participants in conversation themselves. In the recorded consultations resulting in a 
diagnosis of depression collected for this project, the category ‘depression’ itself was not 
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at any point made directly relevant until the diagnostic ‘phase’. It is, therefore, within 
diagnostic activities that the analysis of depression-in-the-consultation begins. 
It is possible, with a knowledge of the nosology of depression, to look at a 
particular consultation subsequent to its end and argue that particular question-answer 
phases were particularly relevant to the process of reaching the conclusion that was 
reached (or ‘should’ have been reached). Such assertions, however, take us no further 
into the consultation as experienced by GP and patient. For them the specific local 
context and what it ‘means’ is an ongoing mutual accomplishment (Garfinkel, 1967) 
without the benefit of hindsight; the activity of making a diagnosis of depression 
retroactively characterises the interaction as having been ‘about depression’ for the 
participants themselves. As will be shown in this chapter, the making of a diagnosis 
provides both speakers with resources from which they can actively re-evaluate their 
own, and each other’s, previous activity within that consultation (Peräkyla, 1998). It is 
fundamentally problematic, thus, to explore action in the consultation prior to the 
diagnosis as being ‘about depression’ and evaluate in these terms. Indeed, it is perfectly 
emblematic of Silverman’s (1997) ‘divine orthodoxy’. In this chapter, thus, the ongoing 
analysis of tacit skills displayed by GPs and patients in concrete contexts of social action 
is developed with respect to the provision and reception of a diagnosis of depression. Six 
‘new’ diagnoses are explored with a view to describing the complex inferential and 
communicative business involved in the production of an outcome satisfactory to GP and 
patient. Prior to the analysis, however, there are some key issues to be explored. 
 
8.1. DIAGNOSIS, RECEPTION AND REPAIR: 
SOME PRELIMINARY THEMES 
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Paul ten Have (2002) proposes the following ‘ideal structure’ for the primary care 
consultation.  
 
1. Opening.  
2. Complaint.  
3. Elaboration, examination end/or test.  
4. Diagnosis. 
5. Treatment and/or advice.  
6. Closing. 
 
He is at pains to stress, however, that; 
 
‘The sequence is called 'ideal' because it is in many cases not actually descriptive of the in 
fact realized sequential structures, but rather indicative of a general trend in their 
organization. One can observe many deviations from it that seem to be quite acceptable to 
the participants, but they do demonstrate a general orientation to such an organization. It 
often happens, for instance, that during a later phase they return to an earlier one, 
especially when problems arise later on. It should be noted that phases 2 to 5, which are 
the ones specific for the occasion, usually include some sort of 'discussion' of what is 
proposed or done, leading to some sort of accordance, as when a patient accepts a 
diagnosis or agrees to a treatment.’ (ten Have, 1995:web) 
 
Ten Have’s final point here is key, as it is in the diagnosis (and ‘discussion’ thereof) that 
depression as a communicative category first becomes salient within the consultations 
collected. It is, however, in this phase that one of the most striking features of the data 
arises, what we might call a ‘regular deviation’ from the proposed ‘ideal structure’. As 
noted here and at length in Chapter 4, challenges to a GP’s diagnosis are unusual 
(Frankel, 1984; Heath, 1992) and even when they do occur they are frequently deployed 
in such a way as to assume the character of guesses or hunches (Heath, 1992), so to 
preserve the relative roles of expert/lay knowledge.  
What is initially striking from an examination of the corpus of data collected for this 
project is that, while most diagnoses are indeed received in exactly this way, the 
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diagnoses of depression are very frequently in some way questioned or challenged in the 
patient’s first turn after the diagnosis itself. In the consultations analysed in this chapter, 
the challenge to the diagnosis initiates another set of activities on the part of the GP – not 
simply ‘elaborating’ his diagnosis subsequent to the usual accordance, or giving advice 
on how to ‘follow it up’, but actually explaining and justifying in order to reach the 
accordance. The diagnostic ‘phase’ of these consultations is, then, visibly punctuated by 
two negotiative ‘sub-phases’ interspersing the regularly oriented-to structure: 
 
1. Delivery of diagnosis.   (GP) 
a. Resistance to diagnosis.  (Patient) 
b. Defence of diagnosis.  (GP) 
2. Accordance.     (Patient) 
 
Extract 8(I), analysed in detail in section 8.2, is a good example of this activity visibly 
taking place: 
 
EXTRACT 8(I): DP7 <DEPRESSION> 
1.   D: okay (.) right (.) then      DELIVERY OF  
2.    (1.0)       DIAGNOSIS 
3.    we:ll (.) ºahmº (.) I don think is: anything se::rious 
4.    (0.5) .hhh (0.5) 
5.    looking at what you’ve sa::id (.) the most likely cause is (.) 
6.    (1.0)  
7.    ºahmº maybe (.) a little depression 
8.    (.5) 
 
 
9.   P: e::rm?       RESISTANCE 
10.    (1.5) 
11.   D:  ye:s (.) a little bit of a depression there (.) I ºthinkº 
12.     (5) 
13.   P:  oh (.) yeah? (.) spose it ºmighº (.) but (.5)  
14.    ya ºumº sure? (.) 
15.    snot like ahm (.5) ºlikeº suicidal or anythin like ah said (1.0)  
16.    jus: a bit (.) ya know (.) run down  
17.    (1.5) 
  
 
18.  D:  ya::h (.) a lot of people do think that (.) ahm: (.) depression is just about DEFENCE 
19.    feeling really down and hopeless (.5) an a lot of the (.) time yes it is (.)   
20.    but ah: (.) ºwellº (.5) not a:lways 
21.    (1.5) 
22.   P:  uhuh?= 
23.   D:            =no (.5) you might just feel ahm (.) run down for a long time (.) 
24.    or low and just not well (.) like you said 
25.    (1.5) 
26.   P: ºri:ghº 
27.   (.5) 
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28.    and I think the best explanation here is a:: little bit of depression 
29.    (1.0) 
30.   P:  ukay       ACCORDANCE 
 
Surprisingly, despite the massive medical literature on recognising and managing 
depression in primary care, and the popular focus on ‘correct consultation techniques’ 
therein, there seems to be very little written on actually giving the diagnosis. The focus 
of these studies instead tends to fall upon methods for improving the chance of a correct 
diagnosis (Howie et al, 1991), the employment of generalised ‘good communication 
skills’ (Miller & Goldberg, 1991) or schemes for combating the patient’s difficulties with 
accepting a diagnosis of depression (Green & Dowrick, 1994). As a range of studies in 
CA clearly demonstrate, however, a diagnosis is itself a situated social action the design 
and position of which is inference-rich, context-shaped and shaping and which raises and 
closes down a range of interactional possibilities (Heath, 1986 & 1992; Peräkyla, 1998). 
The medical model of diagnosing depression, however, appears to imply a (cognitive) 
information transfer model whereby the diagnosis is transparently provided by the GP 
and the received by the patient, who then reacts positively or negatively according to an 
internalised level of social stigma. This sits oddly ill at ease alongside the recommended 
procedures for conducting the earlier stages of the consultation (see the very specific 
guidelines and suggestions for approaching topics of suicide and self-harm outlined in 
Chapter 7) which, although static and contextually insensitive, acknowledge that the way 
in which things are done makes a difference. In this chapter the variable construction of 
diagnoses of depression themselves will be of key importance; attention will be directed 
to the manner in which their design is oriented to prior activity in the consultation and to 
the inferential business generated by their production.  
As discussed above, one of the striking elements of the data corpus relates to the 
manner in which diagnoses of depression are often challenged or questioned in some 
way. I will bracket all such strategies, for the sake of convenience, under the catch-all 
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term ‘resistance’ although this is not to suggest that on all occasions the purpose of the 
activity is to ‘block’ or ‘change’ the diagnosis. It is certainly the case in most medical 
texts on the subject (Priest et al,1996; Byrne, 2000) that resistance to such a diagnosis is 
explained within the condemnatory framework of ‘patient ignorance’; patients resist 
because they do not properly ‘understand’ what depression is and consequently succumb 
to social stigma.  
A number of studies from both the medical establishment (Roter et al, 1995; 
Schulberg et al, 1998; Cole, Raju & Barrett, 2000) and from the social sciences (Link, 
1987; Link et al, 1989) have explored the occurrence of resistance to/rejection of 
diagnoses of mental illness in a variety of ways. The former, working again chiefly from 
the assumption that resistance to a diagnosis of mental illness is a direct result of lack of 
information on the part of the patient, tend to argue that ‘educating the patient’ in the true 
nature of their condition (Gordon & Duffy, 1998) is the only realistic solution. This 
approach proposes a relatively ‘static’ patient, whose ‘misguided’ beliefs and 
understandings of depression, although problematic, are ‘modifiable’ by a doctor. Once 
in possession of the ‘correct’ knowledges relating to the ‘real’ character of Major 
Depression the patient will acquiesce and diagnosis will be accepted. American Family 
Physician argues: 
 
‘One way to involve patients is to educate them about their disorder. Confusion and 
embarrassment often surround a diagnosis of depression. Therefore, it is essential to try to 
dispel negative perceptions of the disorder with an explanation of the causes, mechanisms 
and impact of the illness..’ (2000:9) 
 
This narrative is founded on some cognitivist assumptions that have already been 
demonstrated to be somewhat dubious: 
 
• Situated behaviours are directly motivated by (and representative of) static 
knowledges (perceptions) held in the brain. 
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• Adjusting these perceptions will adjust the behaviours. 
 
The ultimate product of this line of reasoning is a view of patient resistance as an 
inescapable property of patient ignorance, which entirely denies the patient’s capacity to 
act in this way for any other reason. Ignorance is, however, judged against the 
‘correctness’ of medical knowledge, what Wynne (1991) terms the ‘Deficit Model’. As 
Michael (1996) argues, such research 
 
‘…tends to focus upon the deficits lay people’s understandings as measured against 
accredited scientific knowledge…[and]…it comes as no surprise that the public comes out 
of the survey as somewhat lacking.’ (Michael, 1996:110) 
 
In Chapter 7 we have already seen how it is very difficult to unproblematically attribute 
activity in the consultation directly to internal structures and cognitions without running 
into significant theoretical and practical problems. Indeed, the actions of both GPs and 
patients in the consultations analysed were seen to be more directly and observably 
contingent upon the organization of talk-in-the-consultation itself. As such, there are few 
grounds on which to suggest that the simple transference of specific knowledge from GP 
to patient will have the exact effect that medical surveys suggest. The sociologically-
oriented texts on resistance, meanwhile, tend to adopt a focus on institutional (and 
sometimes incommensurable) incongruities in knowledge between doctors and patients 
and, by extension, on the (un)acceptability of medical labels/stereotypes to given groups 
resulting from grand socio-structural factors – culture, religion, gender, media influence 
and so forth. The patient herein, although usually the oppressed ‘champion’ of the piece, 
is systematically disempowered by the assumption that his or her socio-cultural 
positioning is a determining aspect of action. Moreover, although it is conceded that 
doctor and patient may posses differing knowledges, rather than the patient having a 
simple lack of knowledge, little or no endeavour is made to explain how this difference 
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manifests in concrete contexts of social life. As a consequence we are not encouraged to 
see the skilful everyday practices utilised by a patient in negotiating or resisting a 
diagnosis, but instead to conceptualise two monolithic (and theoretically significant) 
discourses colliding in a surgery.  
The goal of this chapter is not, thus, simply to illustrate some form of ‘shortfall’ in 
public knowledge95, or to critically evaluate the ‘impenetrability’ of medical knowledges. 
What is described in this chapter are the flexible methods by which knowledges are 
actively mobilised by GPs and patients to specific interactional ends, methods which 
challenge both medical and sociological approaches to the study of mental illness. Far 
from being the passive recipients of (or hosts for) powerful scientific labels suggested by 
the neo-Marxist and structural functionalist traditions, or Goffman’s ‘victims’ of 
medicine, the patients can be seen to be active participants in the consultation, skilfully 
reconstructing medical categories to specific ends. Equally, the chapter will show how 
GP’s work to attain mutually satisfactory accordance not by simple indoctrination96 of 
their patients, but through negotiated constructions oriented to the patient’s identity as a 
legitimate challenger and a rational person. The next section illustrates these themes in 
detail with reference to one particular consultation. 
 
8.2. DIAGNOSIS, RECEPTION AND DEFENCE: 
AN INSTANCE ANALYSED 
This extract was originally produced in the previous section, but is reproduced here for 
the sake of clarity.97 
 
EXTRACT 8(II): DP7 <DEPRESSION> 
1.   D: okay (.) right (.) then 
2.    (1.0)  
3.    we:ll (.) ºahmº (.) I don think is: anything se::rious 
4.    (0.5) .hhh (0.5) 
5.    looking at what you’ve sa::id (.) the most likely cause is (.) 
6.    (1.0)  
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7.    ºahmº maybe (.) a little depression 
8.    (.5) 
9.   P: e::rm? 
10.    (1.5) 
11.   D:  ye:s (.) a little bit of a depression there (.) I ºthinkº 
12.     (5) 
13.   P:  oh (.) yeah? (.) spose it ºmighº (.) but (.5)  
14.    ya ºumº sure? (.) 
15.    snot like ahm (.5) ºlikeº suicidal or anythin like ah said (1.0)  
16.    jus: a bit (.) ya know (.) run down  
17.    (1.5) 
18.   D:  ya::h (.) a lot of people do think that (.) ahm: (.) depression is just about 
19.    feeling really down and hopeless (.5) an a lot of the (.) time yes it is (.)  
20.    but ah: (.) ºwellº (.5) not a:lways 
21.    (1.5) 
22.   P:  uhuh?= 
23.   D:            =no (.5) you might just feel ahm (.) run down for a long time (.) 
24.    or low and just not well (.) like you said 
25.    (1.5) 
26.   P: ºri:ghº 
27.   (.5) 
28.    and I think the best explanation here is a:: little bit of depression 
29.    (1.0) 
30.   P:  ukay 
 
The first key observation arising herein is that the GP explicitly claims that the diagnosis 
is not one of anything ‘too serious’, and thus should not be treated as particularly ‘bad 
news’. A close analysis of the organisation of the diagnosis, however, reveals a very 
different stance towards what he is saying.  
 
8.2.1. Delays, Diagnosis and Appeals to Local Social Solidarity. 
The initial deployment of a diagnosis (line 7) is marked as ‘delicate’ through a series of 
delays and prefaces and is accounted for with an explicit reference to the patient’s own 
activities (line 5), diffusing the accountability for the diagnosis itself between both 
interactants. Moreover, through the use of ‘maybe’ it is delivered in a weak form, as a 
possibility rather than a concrete ‘fact’. All of these activities imply an inference made 
by the GP that the diagnosis itself may not be well received, or be problematic in some 
way. After a pause of 0.5 seconds, the patient issues a minimal utterance ‘e::rm?’ (line 
9). While not an interruption, it is interesting to note, the utterance follows fairly directly 
after the GP’s prior turn; this is revealing in that the patient does not wait any substantial 
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time to find out if the GP has more to say, but then does not attempt to expand his own 
utterance either. Equally, the doctor’s subsequent re-statement of his opinion (line 9) 
demonstrates that he has interpreted the pause as sufficient indication that the ‘e::rm?’ is 
not the beginning of a fuller utterance but a call for clarification or more information.  
Following the more affirmative ‘yes’, however, the clarification itself contains no 
more information than the original diagnosis, and indeed is designed in such a way as to 
maintain the high level of modality assigned to the previous assertion that this is a case of 
depression. Indeed, this time the doctor actively constructs the diagnosis as a direct 
product of his own thought process (‘I ºthinkº’) rather than as a ‘fact’ immanent in the 
patient. This is interesting because it could well be argued that the GP is actually inviting 
a challenge. By being in some way ‘less assertive’ about the diagnosis, by formulating its 
production in terms of human (and consequently fallible) activity rather than 
externalising it as ‘way things are’ he opens himself up to questions relating to its 
accuracy. However, in the context of the interaction itself, we have already seen, through 
a variety of techniques, the GP consistently orienting to the possibility of an 
unfavourable reception. In these terms, this specific formulation serves to circumscribe 
the possibility that the patient will infer he is being diagnosed with anything ‘serious’, 
and thus delimits the rights of the patient to dispute the diagnosis on the grounds of 
‘importance’. Moreover, it renders any such challenge a direct challenge to the GP 
himself rather than to, say, the category or process. As has been noted in many CA 
studies, there is a general preference for agreement in conversation (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 
1998) with parties collaboratively working towards mutually acceptable outcomes. 
Direct and/or personal challenges are, wherever possible, avoided (Sacks, 1992). As 
Brown & Levinson (1987) propose, directly implying/stating that someone is in error can 
be a ‘face threatening’ act; it calls into question their standing as a competent social 
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agent. Orienting to the possibility of a problematic reception for the diagnosis, the GP 
designs the delivery in such a way as to maximise the threat to local social solidarity that 
a direct challenge could have (Silverman, 1997) and therefore forestall any such activity. 
Observations such as these are crucial to the understanding of interaction in the 
consultation. We can, again, see how a GP’s apparent uncertainty (or lack of 
‘assertiveness’, as a normative frame would probably reveal) can be finely organised to 
invite an unchallenged outcome from a potentially awkward situation.  
On the surface, the manner in which this diagnosis is designed could be seen as 
illustrative of an orientation to a generalised stigma about depression which the patient 
may be ‘affected by’. As will be demonstrated later in this chapter, however, the 
diagnoses of depression collected are not always constructed using this kind of ‘caution’; 
as such, it is difficult to appeal to a universal narrative of ‘stigma’ to explain the 
character of the GP’s activity herein. Recall now the analyses of earlier sections of this 
particular consultation presented in Chapters 5 and 7. The patient was, throughout, 
persistently oriented to the ‘problems’ with his descriptions of symptoms, and has 
consistently designed his utterances so as to emphasise the ‘physical reality’ of his 
illness, and his mood as an upshot of this illness. Moreover, his case as a legitimate 
presence in the surgery is founded on the availability of this stance. A diagnosis of 
depression risks undermining this legitimacy via a contradicting the implicit ‘physicality’ 
of the symptoms - the category ‘depression’ itself is rich in available inferences relating 
to issues of ‘mood’ and ‘psychology’. Peräkyla (1998) shows, in an elaborate study of 
diagnosis, how the design of the GPs’ diagnoses frequently display a clear sensitivity to 
the stance the patient has adopted towards their own symptoms. In this case, inferring 
from such a stance that a diagnosis of depression may be problematic, the GP works 
skilfully to transform the context of the interaction in such a way as to minimise the 
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likelihood of a dispute. The importance of this activity is in no way undermined by the 
fact that a challenge is still made (the ‘ya ºumº sure?’ in line 12), but is indeed further 
illustrated by organisation of the challenge itself.  
 
8.2.2. Doing a Challenge. 
Consider how the consultation unfolds immediately subsequent to the actual provision of 
a diagnosis. 
 
11.   D:  ye:s (.) a little bit of a depression there (.) I ºthinkº 
12.    (5) 
13.   P:  oh (.) yeah? (.) spose it ºmighº (.) but (.5)  
14.    ya ºumº sure? (.) 
15.    snot like ahm (.5) ºlikeº suicidal or anythin like ah said (1.0)  
16.    jus: a bit (.) ya know (.) run down  
 
As has been noted in a number of studies (Heath, 1992; ten Have 2002), typically 
diagnosis is followed by an accordance and the consultation moves into a discussion of 
options or advice. The patient here, however, initiates a clarification sequence, beginning 
with the newsmark ‘oh (.) yeah (?)’ (line 11). As Heritage (1984b) observes: 
 
‘Through the use of this particle, informed, counterinformed, or questioning parties can 
assert that, whereas they were previously ignorant, misinformed or uninformed, they are 
now informed. Correspondingly, the informing, counterinforming, or answering party is 
reconfirmed as having been the informative, knowledgeable, or authoritative party in the 
exchange. By means of the particle, the alignment of the speakers in their sequence-
specific roles is confirmed and validated.’ (1984b:315) 
 
As noted on several occasions in this project, newsmarks are also hearable as indicative 
of a possible incongruity between the positions of speakers with regard to a topic or 
issue, pre-announcing a ‘problem’ (Jefferson, 1986). The use of this dual function herein 
upholds the authority of the diagnosis, while also signalling it as ‘not expected’. The 
main challenge then begins with a ‘yes-but’ structure (Pomerantz, 1984b); the patient 
does the preferred response embedded by the question (an agreement) as dispreferred. 
The heavily mitigated agreement (‘spose it ºmighº’) circumscribes any available 
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inference that may be made relating to him being outright ‘dissatisfied’ with the 
diagnosis or that it is ‘wrong’. Simultaneously, however, the mitigation token itself 
(‘but…’) opens up conversational space for the patient to carry on speaking at a point 
where a ‘yes’ would typically have formed an accordance on the diagnosis (a yes-period) 
and the consultation would then have shifted back to the GP’s turn (ten Have, 2002). The 
following activity (the material of the challenge) is thus made sequentially relevant by 
prior activity. 
The first important observation regarding the challenge itself here is that by 
formulating the initial ‘objection’ to the diagnosis as a question (‘ya ºumº sure?’) the 
action is accomplished in indirect form. In isolation, this could well be analysed as a 
simple call for confirmation. Rather than allocate a turn to the GP to provide 
confirmation/justification at that point, however, the patient provides a short account 
(lines 13 and 14), thereby attending to the character of the question as one of a challenge, 
rather than a request. The account itself, on the surface, tells a short story about the 
patient’s own recent wellbeing which is, of course, also ultimately a reformulation of 
detailed descriptions of symptoms he provided previously in the consultation. He is not, 
in this sense, making available any ‘new’ information that might shed new light on the 
diagnosis; in fact he makes explicitly available that the details are not new (‘like ah said’, 
line 12). Cosmetically, the account appears to comprise two separate components. The 
first is the refusal of the GP’s diagnosis through an appeal to a symptom the patient does 
not have (‘suicidal motivation’ we might call it). Cognitive/survey methods would 
doubtless reveal that the utterance ‘snot like ahm (.5) ºlikeº suicidal or anythin’ is a 
representation of a deeper ‘silent belief’ (Beck, 1964) relating to the connection between 
depression and suicide. This belief would take a form something like the syllogism: 
 
• Depressed people are suicidal people.  
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• I am not suicidal. 
• Therefore I am not depressed. 
 
The DSM-IV, conversely, stipulates that ‘suicidal ideation’ is a symptom of depression 
but one does not have to be suicidal to be depressed (APA, 1994). Comparing these 
constructions would then reveal a shortfall in the patient’s knowledge of the topic, which 
is obstructing the diagnosis. By the same logic, the second component of the account can 
be read as the deployment by the patient of an alternative (self) diagnosis, providing 
direct access to an internal state of affairs; he is ‘jus: a bit (.) ya know (.) run down’. This 
may be judged as a lie, a ‘misguided self assessment’ (as it conflicts with the GP’s 
opinion), or the truth in which case it does actually seem like rather a bizarre thing to 
‘admit’. One could ask: 
 
• If this is ‘all’ that is wrong, why go to the GP in the first place? 
• If you know what is wrong, why wait for a diagnosis? 
• If you did want a diagnosis, why then correct the GP afterwards? 
 
As such, this action opens up potential accusations of ‘being difficult’, or even worse, 
wasting the doctor’s time. Whichever way, it does not put the patient in a good light. So, 
from this point of view, what we have in lines 13 and 14 is a misinterpretation of the 
implications of the diagnosis, followed by an apparently cantankerous self-diagnosis. It 
is, however, only through an analysis of the sequential functions that this utterance 
performs within the context of the conversation that its constructive sense really becomes 
clear. 
 
8.2.3. Organising the Resistance. 
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Consider again the first ‘component’ of the utterance: the patient makes the claim (‘snot 
like ahm (.5) ºlikeº suicidal or anythin like ah said’). As noted in Chapter 7 with regard to 
this particular consultation, the GP had previously, and in line with NHS directives, 
questioned him on the issue of ‘suicidal thoughts’ and the patient had responded very 
clearly in the negative. By occasioning the absence of a suicidal tendency again, in the 
business of challenging a diagnosis of depression, he selects one particular element of the 
prior interactional activity (out of many available) as particularly relevant to the task in 
hand. The utterance both orients to, and specifically makes available, the inference that if 
he is not suicidal then there are grounds on which to suggest that he is not depressed98. In 
other words, the patient skilfully incorporates the material of the GP’s own questioning  
into the resistance of the resultant diagnosis. This action serves to construct a link 
between depression and suicide which is inevitable and reversible, and thus a functional 
equivalence between the categories ‘suicidal person’ and ‘depressed person’. His self-
exemption from the former makes available an inferential exemption from the latter and 
this exemption, in turn, provides a warrant which addresses his own accountability in 
challenging the diagnosis at all. In these terms, the syllogistic logic described above is 
evidently not transparently representative of a background belief; it is constructed within 
the interaction for the interaction. Moreover, through a specific referencing of the issue 
as one which has already been discussed (‘like ah said’), he makes available the 
inference that this particular part of the consultation has been underplayed or not taken in 
to sufficient account, and accordingly furnishes the GP with resources through which to 
‘re-evaluate’ his opinion. 
The purpose of this situated construction becomes clearer still in the second part 
of the account, the assertion by the patient that he is (‘jus: a bit (.) ya know (.) run 
down’). Interestingly, by virtue of its positioning within the consultation, an utterance 
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which at any earlier stage (i.e. pre-diagnosis) would probably would have been (and, 
indeed, was) occasioned and interpreted as a symptom now takes the shape of a 
summary. It is formulated now as an alternative to the interpretation of symptoms 
provided by the GP in his previous turn. The state of being ‘run down’ is placed in direct 
opposition to the state of ‘being suicidal’ and, consequently, to the GP’s diagnosis itself. 
While ‘depressed’ and ‘suicidal’ were constructed as interchangeable and mutually 
accountable categories, here he posits two categories as an antagonism: ‘I’m not X…I’m 
Y’. It is of value to remember at this point that, like ‘suicidal ideation’, ‘fatigue or loss of 
energy’ is a key symptom of Major Depression as defined by the DSM-IV (APA, 1994). 
We can see here, however, a ‘lay person’ making an argument against a diagnosis of 
depression out of what might be interpreted (certainly from a survey/normative frame 
point of view) as the presence of the one of the symptoms. As Sacks (1992) and Edwards 
(1997) both highlight, the world does not always fall neatly into distinct classes of things, 
especially not opposing or mutually exclusive classes. Rather, classes have to be 
constructed as oppositional.  
 
‘In discourse, binary oppositions can be manufactured, and they lend themselves to 
rhetoric. Even when they are ready made, people do not have to select them...there is a 
huge flexibility available in descriptive discourse.’ (Edwards, 1997:237) [Original 
emphasis] 
 
The DSM-IV constructs ‘fatigue’, ‘suicidal ideation’ and ‘Major Depression’ as 
interrelated categories for the purpose of producing a classificatory framework. The 
patient, meanwhile, constructs an equivalence between ‘suicidal’ and ‘depressed’, and 
then ‘run down’ and ‘suicidal’ as an oppositional binary to achieve a specific 
interactional goal: that of resisting a diagnosis of depression without explicitly 
challenging the diagnosis of ‘depression’ itself or allowing for the inference that he 
‘knows better’ than the GP regarding the category ‘depression’.  
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We can see, then, that the dispreferred character of the challenge is maintained not 
only in the original challenge, but in the warrant for having made it (itself, of course, a 
means of showing dispreference). In sum, to paraphrase Heritage (1984a):   
 
1. The action is prefaced within the same turn as it is produced. 
2. The action is accomplished in indirect form, and mitigated as such. 
3. The action is accounted for. 
 
In these terms, the contrastive characters of ‘suicidal’ and ‘run down’ can be seen not to 
be selections of arbitrary ‘extreme’ and ‘ordinary’ descriptive terms respectively which 
index thoughts and feelings internal to the patient. The direct equivalence between ‘a 
little bit of a depression’ and ‘suicidal’ constructed by the patient is a discursive strategy 
employed in the resistance of a diagnosis of depression sensitive to the inferential 
business generated by the diagnosis itself. It is clearly not, then, directly and 
transparently answerable to matters of ‘correct’ or ‘inferior’ knowledge of the DSM-
defined interplay between Major Depression and ‘suicidal ideation’99. It cannot simply 
be argued that he ‘does not understand’ what depression is. Moreover, by occasioning a 
‘feeling’ such as ‘jus: a bit (.) ya know (.) run down’, the patient orients to tacit 
knowledges relating to ‘ways we all feel sometimes’ (Sacks, 1984). Indeed, it is worth 
noting that the ordinary state is built explicitly in terms of its ordinariness. He is not ‘run 
down’, but just a bit run down; he further appeals directly to the ‘common knowledge’ 
value that the category has (‘ya know’). The ordinariness of his ‘self-diagnosis’ is 
engineered to realise the ‘not normal’ character of ‘suicidal’ and, by extension, 
depression. Simultaneously, the use of a formulation such as ‘suicidal’ serves to render 
‘run down’ an ordinary state when compared to depression.  
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The utterance, then, serves to retroactively address the all prior utterances in the 
consultation as subject to a possible re-negotiation. Much as was the allusion to ‘suicidal’ 
behaviour, it can be seen to provide resources for the GP on how to re-read the patient’s 
prior self-accounting in different terms (those of being ‘run down’ rather than 
‘depressed’ in this case). This observation provides a pertinent parallel with Dorothy 
Smith’s famous study K is Mentally Ill which has already been discussed on a number of 
occasions in this project, and at particular length in Chapter 5. Smith (1978) shows how 
events and activities which could potentially be heard as ‘perfectly normal’ can be 
discursively organised in such a way as assumed a decidedly ‘deviant’ character. What 
we see here, however, is the patient designing an account in such as way as to make 
available that feelings/actions that have been previously read as ‘deviant’ may in fact be 
retrospectively seen as relatively ‘normal’.  
In lines 13-16, thus, the patient attends to a number of complex interactional 
issues. Firstly, the state of being ‘run down’ which he constructs, while very ordinary in 
comparison to ‘suicidal’, is still occasioned as sufficient grounds on which to see a GP 
and resistant any likely interpretation that he ‘should not be visiting his GP at all’. 
Secondly, by occasioning a state of health as contradictory to the GP’s opinion at this 
stage of the consultation potential interactional difficulties could arise on the grounds 
that he has already decided what is wrong with him, and that he could have saved the GP 
a lot of time and effort. However, in formulating this state of health as a suggestion 
embedded in a clarification sequence, a ‘possible’ alternative, he defers to the GP’s 
knowledge (Heath, 1992) and allocates a further turn to the GP to present this 
knowledge. As such, a face-threatening (Goffman, 1978) outright rejection is avoided. 
The very action of challenging the diagnosis is, however, still ‘unusual’ (Heath, 1992) - 
presumably the patient booked the consultation because he did not feel well, indeed, he 
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explicitly claimed as such early in the consultation – a diagnosis of ‘illness’ in some form 
would, it is hardly speculative to suggest, have been an expected outcome. However, the 
activity herein serves to characterise the diagnosis as unsuitable in this context – a 
potentially ‘risky’ activity insofar as it does imply a failing on the part of the GP. This is 
another action which could very easily be read as a simple orientation on the part of the 
patient to a standing ‘stigma’ with respect the character of depression at large – he would 
rather be considered ‘difficult’ than a ‘depressive’. This ‘resistance at all costs’ theory, 
however, is undermined by the fact that fairly soon afterwards, in line 30, he does 
actually and explicitly accept the diagnosis. We could, of course, then explain this shift 
in position by the patient as representative of a ‘change of mind’, but then the supposed 
power of social stigma is yet further undermined – its influence can be utterly eradicated 
by a few words from a GP. However, to use ‘change of mind’ as an explanatory 
mechanism here equally portrays the patient as a passive agent in the interaction which 
sits rather ill at ease alongside his offering a challenge to the diagnosis in the first place. 
As such, any attempt to explain the activity here in terms of psychological states or grand 
social structure produces immediate contradictions. A real sense of ‘what is going on’, as 
ever, only becomes readily apparent from an analysis of the sequential unfolding of the 
interaction. 
 
8.2.4. ‘Public Knowledge’: Legitimacy and the Maintenance of Local Solidarity  
It has already been noted how the patient’s challenge (lines 13-16) is organised in such a 
way as to account for the character of GP’s prior utterances. The diagnosis is oriented to 
the possibility of a problematic hearing, and the challenge is then accomplished in 
indirect form, as a call for clarification, to avoid compromising the local social solidarity. 
What is particularly interesting here is the manner in which the dispreferred characters of 
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both turns then facilitate the GP’s activity subsequent to the challenge. Because the 
challenge has been made in such way as to address a potential problem with the 
diagnosis, rather than to reject it outright, the GP is able to close down this problem 
while minimizing potential further problems in the interaction itself. 
 
13.  P:  oh (.) yeah? (.) spose it ºmighº (.) but (.5)  
14.    ya ºumº sure? (.) 
15.    snot like ahm (.5) ºlikeº suicidal or anythin like ah said (1.0)  
16.    jus: a bit (.) ya know (.) run down  
17.    (1.5) 
18.   D:  ya::h (.) a lot of people do think that (.) ahm: (.) depression is just about 
19.    feeling really down and hopeless (.5) an a lot of the (.) time yes it is (.)  
20.    but ah: (.) ºwellº (.5) not a:lways 
21.    (1.5) 
22.   P:  uhuh?= 
23.   D:            =no (.5) you might just feel ahm (.) run down for a long time (.) 
24.    or low and just not well (.) like you said 
25.    (1.5) 
26.   P: ºri:ghº 
27.   (.5) 
28.    and I think the best explanation here is a:: little bit of depression 
29.    (1.0) 
30.   P:  ukay 
 
Interpreting from the 1.5 second pause (line 17) that the patient’s challenge is complete, 
the GP begins the next utterance with an acknowledgement token (‘ya::h’). He then 
provides a short account (lines 18 to 20) addressing the call for clarification via a 
narration of the character of depression and the status of public knowledge in general. 
This, like the challenge itself, takes a ‘yes-but’ structure. Firstly, he constructs a 
‘popularly held’ conception of depression and acknowledges the correctness of this 
understanding.  
 
A. a lot of people do think that (.) ahm: (.) depression is just about feeling really down and 
hopeless (.5) an a lot of the (.) time yes it is (.) but ah: (.) ºwellº (.5) not a:lways 
 
Formulation A is observably done as a gist of the X component of the patient’s challenge 
(line 15).  
 
X. snot like ahm (.5) ºlikeº suicidal or anythin like ah said 
 
305 
 
The patient’s challenge is thus retroactively characterised as being grounded in accurate 
and commonly held knowledge and, thus, the action of challenging is reflexively 
ascribed legitimacy within the consultation. This knowledge itself is, however, then itself 
ascribed a ‘partial’ character – it is true a ‘lot of the time’, but, crucially ‘not always’. In 
lines 23 and 24, the GP builds a ‘minority’ understanding of depression as different to 
that in formulation A, but ‘equally’ correct.  
 
B. you might just feel ahm (.) run down for a long time (.) or low and just not well (.) like 
you said 
 
Formulation B gists the Y component of the patient’s challenge and explicitly so, 
directing the speaker to the content of his own prior utterance, this time also echoing the 
‘ordinariness’ of the original (‘you might just feel…’).  
 
Y. jus: a bit (.) ya know (.) run down 
 
By working up an equivalence between the patient’s own reported symptoms and an 
alternative version of depression, the GP undermines the substance of the patient’s 
challenge while circumventing any direct dismissal of the challenge itself and, therefore, 
minimising potential damage to the local social solidarity that such activity could cause. 
Equally, by attributing the status of ‘less well known’ to this latter (relevant) version of 
depression, he avoids implying that the patient is ‘ignorant’ of easily-available facts. 
Rather, the patient’s challenge is cast as being based upon a reasonable, well known and 
correct assertion that would be applicable in many circumstances. Note also the manner 
in which the gists constructed here serve to undo the relational character of the symptoms 
as built by the patient. In the challenge, ‘suicidal’ and ‘run down’ are accomplished as a 
binary opposition. The term ‘suicidal’ in the GP’s turn is, however, deleted and the 
overall severity of the materials is downgraded to ‘really down and hopeless’. The 
second component, a virtual repetition of the patient’s utterance (‘run down and low’) is 
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now hearable as a ‘related’ alternative. This softening of the inferentially available 
‘range’ of depressive illness further serves to inform a hearing of the specific diagnosis 
as ‘not serious’. 
 In this way, the GP manages to answer the call for clarification via the release of 
‘new information’ which both speakers then orient to as sufficient clarification: 
 
23.  D:            =no (.5) you might just feel ahm (.) run down for a long time (.) 
24.    or low and just not well (.) like you said 
25.    (1.5) 
26.   P: ºri:ghº 
27.   (.5) 
28.    and I think the best explanation here is a:: little bit of depression 
29.    (1.0) 
30.   P:  right (.) ukay 
 
The GP restates his diagnosis subsequent to the completion of the clarification sequence, 
and the patient offers accordance in return in the form of a series of ‘marked 
acknowledgements’ (Heritage & Sefi, 1992; Silverman, 1997).  
 
‘Marked acknowledgement can be done for example through ‘oh right’ or repeats of key 
components of the advice. These acknowledge the informativeness and appropriateness of 
the advice…’ (Silverman, 1997:140)    
 
This would cosmetically appear to support the medical ‘indoctrination’ model of 
accordance-seeking (Gordon & Duffy, 1998) – the patient is educated in the true nature 
of depression and the diagnosis is subsequently accepted. The key point is, however, that 
the ‘information’ is not to any extent ‘new’ unless we are to attribute a very short 
memory, or very poor reasoning process, to the patient. It has been established 
previously that the patient does not have ‘suicidal thoughts’ and that his main symptoms 
are ‘feeling run down’ – indeed he reasserts these things as having been previously said 
in his challenge. A diagnosis of depression was nevertheless made, so it is readily 
available from the local interactional context that feeling run down is a symptom of 
depression, while thinking about suicide is not necessarily key to its diagnosis. This 
raises a number of interesting issues relating to both the challenge and the explanation. 
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As established, it is very difficult to establish a ‘reason’ for the challenge itself in 
psychological/socio-structural terms without running into immediate contradictions. 
Equally, in the light of this, it seems equally inexplicable that the GP should be able to 
explain the diagnosis using information of which the patient is already aware to produce 
a successful accordance with that diagnosis. 
 
8.2.5. Summary: Resistance as ‘Ordinary’ Activity.  
All categories are inference-rich (Sacks, 1979). Diagnosis is not simply the description of 
an illness, but the offer of admittance to a category. Accordance with this diagnosis 
constitutes an acceptance of this category and all that it implies. As Sacks himself notes: 
 
‘…any person who is a case of a category is seen as a member of a category, and what’s 
known about the category is known about them, and the fate of each is bound up in the fate 
of the other…’ (1979:13) 
 
The patient throughout the consultation has been at pains to emphasise the veracity of his 
reasoning process with regard to his symptoms; he has constructed them as unclear, as 
potentially unsatisfactory and consistently delimited any inference that his symptoms are 
a product of his ‘mental state’ rather than vice-versa. All of his activity has thus been 
geared toward the construction of an identity as an ordinary person doing a rational thing 
in consulting a GP – a ‘reasonable witness’ (Zimmerman, 1992) to his own state of 
health. The acceptance of a diagnosis of depression (a ‘mental’ illness) challenges this 
interactional work in a way that admission to the category ‘asthmatics’ does not. Outright 
refusal of a diagnosis, however, also runs the same risk; it is inferentially ‘not ordinary’ 
behaviour in a consultation and ‘face’ threatening to the GP. What actually occurs, 
however, is muted resistance to the diagnosis in the patient’s first turn, in the form of an 
initiated clarification sequence, followed by an accordance subsequent to an the GP’s 
response to this call for clarification. This activity is neatly illuminated by Widdecombe 
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and Wooffitt’s (1995) work on ‘resistance to category ascription’. They note how their 
interviewees, when asked a question about their style or appearance, sometimes produce 
a first turn which actively avoids generating a self-categorisation relevant to that 
question. In one particular case, they argue,  
 
‘By producing a turn which does not address those parts of the prior turn which make 
relevant, and invite her to confirm, a particular kind of categorical self, she makes 
available the inference that the identity is not relevant to her. In this sense, her first turn in 
the exchange thereby invokes, and makes salient for that stage in the interaction, her 
identity as an ordinary person. Through her utterance she is doing ‘being ordinary’.’ 
(Widdecombe & Wooffitt, 1995:100) 
    
Crucially, they also note that by doing this in the first available turn speakers manage to 
avoid denying potential categorical relevance outright (which may be seen as 
obstructive), while marginalising that category-affiliation as ‘only one aspect of them’ 
(Widdecombe & Wooffitt, 1995:104).  
The implications of these observations with respect to extract 8(II) are clear to 
see. The patient, in the face of a diagnosis of depression, initiates a clarification sequence 
which defers his admittance to the diagnostic category. He asks as an ‘ordinary person’ 
rather than a ‘depressive’ and, moreover, this question is designed in such a way as to 
reassert his explicitly ordinary identity (it embeds memory and ‘logic’) and further 
occasions resources to the same effect (he is just ‘run down’). The GP, meanwhile, in 
treating the question as reasonable, rational and legitimate (and downgrading the 
implications of depression to a ‘physical’ realm) collaborates in the construction of this 
ordinariness in the guise of the disclosure of ‘new information’, which in turn 
circumscribes the inference that the patient ‘should have known this’. The final 
accordance is then reached as an outcome of this category consensus – the patient is an 
ordinary person who is depressed, rather than a ‘depressive’. As such, any inferences 
arising from the diagnosis that could be potentially damaging to the patient’s standing as 
a reliable author of his own accounts are delimited, while his status as ‘unwell’ is 
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ultimately confirmed. Finally it is also observable that for the duration of this activity the 
normal question-answer sequence of the consultation is suspended; the GP relinquishes 
topical control to the patient and makes no attempt to reassert it until an accordance is 
reached. As a result, the patient is allocated the identity of a ‘knowledgeable agent’ 
within the interaction (Silverman, 1997) with equal conversational rights to the GP. This 
facilitates and reinforces the construction of a ‘competent’ identity for the patient.  
Once again, thus, interactional problems and solutions are observably produced, 
managed and solved in the flow of talk with no need to appeal to (invisible) 
psychological or socio-structural ‘variables’ for their ‘explanation’. From an extended 
analysis of extract 8(II) it has instead been possible to glean a number of key 
observations. 
 
1. The construction of the diagnosis is sensitive to the stance adopted by the patient 
with regard to his own symptoms throughout the consultation. 
2. The patient’s resistance is sensitive both to inferential business generated by the 
diagnosis with respect to this stance, and to the design of the diagnosis itself. 
3. The resistance reasserts the patient’s ‘ordinary’ identity, delimiting potentially 
damaging inferences while also avoiding compromising the local interactional 
context. 
4. The GP collaborates with the construction of this ordinary identity, temporarily 
relinquishing control of task and topic, to achieve a mutually acceptable ‘result’.  
 
Drawing upon these issues five more ‘new’ diagnoses of depression will now be 
investigated, with a view to illustrating the rich variety of resources employed by GPs 
and patients in the negotiation of a diagnosis of depression. 
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8.3 STOP FOR A SHORT STORY: 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNTS IN RESISTANCE. 
In the previous section it was noted that the key function of resistance to a diagnosis of 
depression displayed in the talk of a patient was the preservation of an ordinary identity. 
In this section, the same kinds of orientation are observable in the talk of two other 
patients, though the means by which the resistance is accomplished is rather different. 
Both speakers herein construct autobiographical narratives post-diagnosis to 
problematise the GP’s assessment, which immediately makes salient some important 
themes. 
 As Frankel (1984), Mishler (1984) and Todd (1989) all note, there is a tendency 
in consultations for physicians to ignore or sideline utterances by the patient that address 
personal circumstances or subjective experience. Moreover, as Sacks (1992) highlights, 
even in everyday conversation ‘stories’ are not simply ‘inserted’ into the sequence; the 
prospective teller of a story has to engage in a number of interactional tasks to align 
participants in the conversation to the relative roles of ‘teller’ and ‘recipient(s)’ of that 
story. Furthermore, as Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) argue, 
 
‘…the telling of a story involves the teller in keeping possession of the conversational 
floor longer than the basic rules of turn-taking ordinarily allow. That is, the story-telling 
turn consists of more than one turn-constructional unit, and there has to be some way of 
indicating to the recipient that such an extended turn is underway, in order to refrain from 
taking the floor themselves at what might otherwise be a legitimate transition-relevance 
place.’ (1998:134)    
 
This, of course, presents particular problems for a patient in the consultation where, 
typically, turns are only taken when made relevant by the doctor, and the character of the 
information in the turn is specified by the design of the request (Maynard, 1991; ten 
Have 1991). Despite ten Have’s (1989) assertion, and the demonstrations previously in 
this chapter and the last, that such sidelining of ‘personal circumstances’ does not occur 
to the same degree when potentially ‘psychological’ issues are at stake, the character of 
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the ‘personal’ material that can be provided is still fairly precisely specified within the 
GP’s questions. However, as we have seen with respect to extract 8(II), the first turn after 
diagnosis offers a patient a different kind of opportunity. Having not been asked a direct 
question, the range of actions available to the patient is not restricted in the same way. 
While there may be a general preference for a simple agreement with the diagnosis (ten 
Have, 2001), an opening arises for the patient to invite the suspension of the GP’s topic 
and task control. Nevertheless, the patient is still faced with task of inserting details 
which have not to any extent been ‘requested’.  
Consider extract 8(III), which follows immediately from a guarded admission of 
‘occasional’ thoughts about self-harm (data not shown). The patient has, however, 
adopted a clear stance towards these thoughts as ‘just thoughts’. 
 
EXTRACT 8(III): DP38 <DEPRESSION> 
1.  D: right (.5) then (.) ahm (.5) 
2.   what you have is: (.) ahm (.) id say (.) a pretty mild case of depress:ion= 
3.   P:  =o:h 
4.    D: yes? 
5.     (1.0) 
6.   P:  snuthing rea::lly (.5) jus: (.) um 
7.    (.5) 
8.   D:  yes? 
9.   P:  well (.) its jus that my sister was (.) ahh. she got told she was depressed by her  
10.    doctor down at  [X] university but she used to ring up and (.) well (.) not say  
11.    anythin (.5) sit there in silence or (.) she:d burst into tears for no reason 
12.    (.) and keep saying that she was gonna (.) you know (.) hurt herself and 
13.    .hhhh 
14.    (1.0) 
15.   D:  ºmmmº  
16.   P: well (.) im not like that 
17.    (.5) 
18.   D:   no (.) not at all (.) that sounds like quite a (.) a severe case of depression to me 
19.    (.5) your symptoms are better described as mild (.) i mean (.) your lucid but (.) 
20.    just struggling a bit (.) really 
21.    (1.0) 
22.   P: yeah (.) alright (.) makes sense 
 
The diagnosis itself is delivered rather more directly than that seen in extract 8(II), 
without the delays and high level of perturbation. It is, however, delivered in a weak 
form, explicitly as a personal opinion and as a ‘mild case’. In this sense, the GP again 
demonstrates an orientation to the material as potentially problematic regarding the 
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patient’s stance towards his symptoms (and delimits the severity of these inferences), but 
not as if the diagnosis itself is likely to be a ‘surprise’ - he does not mark it as in any way 
‘new’. What is particularly interesting here, however, is the manner in which space is 
created for the patient to take an extended turn. Following the diagnosis, the patient 
issues the newsmark ‘oh’ (line 3). This is hearable as reasserting the GP’s role as 
knowledgeable agent in the context but, however, given the construction of the diagnosis 
as ‘expectable’, marking the diagnosis as a ‘new’ thing constitutes an implicit challenge 
to the design of the diagnosis itself (Greatbatch, 1988). The GP treats the utterance as 
such, issuing a call for clarification and retroactively characterising it as dispreferred – a 
no-plus. In this way, the patient ‘invites an invite’ to tell his story. Prior to the story, 
however, the patient downgrades its importance in a prefacing utterance ‘nothing really’, 
at which the GP issues an encouragement token, ‘yes?’, illustrating to the patient that he 
is now aligned as a story recipient (Sacks, 1974). In these terms space is made for the 
story to be told, while the authority of the GP’s turn, and its content, is upheld.  
 
8.3.1. Resistance by Contrast. 
The detail of the story itself, deployed in lines 9 to 12, is finely and constructively 
organised: 
 
well (.) its jus that my sister was (.) ahh. she got told she was depressed by her doctor 
down at  [X] university but she used to ring up and (.) well (.) not say anythin (.5) sit there in 
silence or (.) she:d burst into tears for no reason that I could tell (.) and keep saying that 
she was gonna (.) you know (.) hurt herself 
 
Note that an identity for the protagonist is explicitly occasioned – the teller’s sister. This 
is interesting in there is no absolute need to identify this person at all in terms of the 
substance of the story. However, as with all mobilised social identities, the specific 
selection demonstrably attends to inferential concerns arising from account itself 
(Widdecombe & Wooffitt, 1995). In this case, ‘his sister’ is somebody about whom the 
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speaker has category-bound rights (within ‘family’) to possess valid information and to 
be ‘concerned’. As such, the veracity of the story, and his own authority and moral 
standing as its teller, is reinforced. Secondly, the contextual relevance of the story is 
established; his sister was told she was depressed by a doctor, just as he has been. As 
such, from the outset, the GP is furnished with details from which he can infer that the 
story is both reliable and relevant. Also to these ends, the protagonist’s own activities are 
geographically located and her being there is warranted; his sister was elsewhere (exact 
location deleted), because she was at university. Like his sister’s identity, this detail is 
hardly crucial to the sense of the story and it would have maintained its character as a 
story-about-someone-diagnosed-with-depression with the omission of either one, or 
both, of these elements. As Wooffitt (1992) shows, and as investigated at length in 
Chapter 6, however, the inclusion of apparently irrelevant detail in an account can 
virtually always be seen to have constructive inferential properties. In this case, for 
example, the addition of ‘small detail’ like a geographic location provides for the 
inference that he ‘remembers well’ – he is ‘on top of the facts’, so to speak.  
Moreover, being ‘at university’ aligns his sister herself with the social identity of 
a ‘university student’, which in turn makes available a number of resources relating to 
her general age, level of intelligence, lifestyle and so forth. This is interesting because 
immediately beforehand in the consultation, the patient’s own identity as a student has 
become a salient topic. Recall this exchange, previously seen in Chapter 7: 
 
 D:  and this is affecting your (.) studies too?       
   (1.0) 
  P:  yes (.) i cant concentrate (.) my mind keeps wanderin all over (.) ill have to  
   drop out if i dont get some work done soon=     
  D:  =im sure that’s not the case (.) [X] university has good structures  
   for dealing with things like this (.) but its ºfairº to say that (.) at the moment (.)  
   your not co:ping (.) ahm (.) well?       
 
In these terms, the patient builds an ‘equivalence of circumstance’ between himself and 
his sister. They are hearably of comparable age, ‘intelligence’ and lifestyle. However, in 
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the subsequent account of his sister’s ‘depressed’ behaviour, a stark contrast is then 
constructed. This account assumes a distinct three parted structure: 
 
[1]she used to ring up and (.) well (.) not say anythin (.5) sit there in silence or (.) [2]she:d 
burst into tears for no reason (.) and [3]keep saying that she was gonna (.) you know (.) 
hurt herself 
 
The point here is not that the account is transparently about ‘abnormal’ behaviour, but 
rather that the account is organised to accomplish the abnormality of the behaviour 
(Smith, 1978). Firstly, the activity of ‘not saying anything’ (subsequently upgraded to 
‘sitting in silence’) which is not in itself particularly ‘bizarre’ (and in some contexts 
highly appropriate), is located within the activity of having ‘rung up’. The selection of 
this specific activity reveals an acute sensitivity to inferential possibilities on the part of 
the patient; ‘not saying anything’ on the phone could equally be hearable as ‘listening 
attentively’ – however, actually being the caller makes relevant the category-bound 
obligation of ‘having something to say’. People do not generally ring up to say nothing. 
Equally, ‘crying’ is not in itself a particularly ‘freakish’ activity. Note, though, the 
construction of the activity as ‘bursting into tears’, a more violent and sudden event than 
‘starting to cry’. As such, the behaviour is hearable as quite extreme. Crucially, next, the 
patient explicitly states that there was ‘no reason’ for this behaviour. Like all ‘emotion 
displays’, ‘bursting into tears’ is subject to situated entitlements (Sacks, 1984; Edwards, 
1997); one of the key factors in the right to experience a strong emotional reaction is an 
appropriately important precipitating event or action. It is only within such a cause-effect 
frame that a strong display is hearable as ‘normal’. In stripping the behaviour not only of 
an appropriate reason, but of any reason at all, it is entirely disaligned with activity 
which is ‘ordinary’, reasonable or rational. 
 An interesting feature of the first two parts of the three part structure is the 
manner in which an undoubted diversity of concrete events are formulated as ‘ongoing’ 
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homogeneous behaviours (Myers, 1990): ‘She used to…’ and ‘She’d…’ both make 
available a single repetitive character for each of the activities occasioned. As such, 
‘traits’ are constructed within the talk. The final part of the account explicitly emphasises 
this trait-like dimension of the behaviour under scrutiny; she would ‘keep saying that she 
was gonna (.) you know (.) hurt herself’. Herein the patient utilises ‘reported speech’ as a 
discursive tool; as Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) note, this is a particularly potent means 
for a speaker to emphasise their intimate acquaintance with the events in the account. 
The key point is that this utterance makes relevant prior activity in this consultation. As 
discussed, the patient himself has made clear that while he has had thoughts about self-
harm, they were just ‘thoughts’. In this account, meanwhile, his sister was hearably 
making repeated and explicit threats regarding self harm. This statement, thus, performs 
a variety of functions. It characterises the other components of the three part list, her 
silent behaviour and emotional volatility, as having a potentially dangerous upshot, 
which reflexively adds gravity to the story-topic. Moreover, it readdresses his rights, 
morality (and reliability) as story-teller. In these terms, the story in its entirety makes 
vividly available a knowledge of the character of depression itself grounded in the 
speaker’s concrete personal experience.  
 The fine detail of this short story, thus, demonstrates sensitivity to a range of 
subtle inferential concerns generated by its telling within the consultation. From the 
outset it is constructed as specific; personnel, places and circumstances preface the 
actions described. Consider the consequences of building the story in terms of a nameless 
‘somebody’ in a nameless place with no particular circumstances occasioned. It is far 
more likely that such an interactional product would be received as a ‘hypothetical 
example’ which could do serious damage to the factual standing of the account and, by 
extension, to the patient’s implicit knowledge-claim relating to the character of 
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depression itself. This also sheds light on his early deployment of the fact that his sister 
was told she was depressed ‘by a doctor’; given the factual construction of the events in 
the account, which are insulated against challenges on the grounds of lack of direct 
knowledge, the character of the account as one of depression cannot now be challenged 
by the GP without contradicting another medical opinion. 
 Note how the main body of the story ‘ends’ with a hanging ‘and’ (line 12). The 
GP orients to this as indicative of the story being as yet unfinished, issuing instead an 
minimal utterance hearable as an understanding check (Sacks, 1974), ‘mmm’, signalling 
his alignment as ongoing recipient of the story. The patient immediately takes up the 
potential transition relevance point, and concludes ‘well (.) im not like that’, explicitly 
marking an overall asymmetry between the way ‘he is’ and what he (entirely 
legitimately) understands depression to ‘look like’ (gisted as ‘that’). This is particularly 
interesting in that the utterance ultimately constitutes a dispreferred response to the 
diagnosis itself - it is unquestionably a challenge to the assertion that he is depressed. 
This illuminates the entire story sequence as a preface to this challenge, addressing its 
validity and his rights to make it. In these terms, he manages to counter-assert that he is 
not depressed without directly disputing the material of the GP’s diagnosis in the first 
post-diagnostic turn or directly challenging the GP’s authority. 
 Once again, if read as a transparent conduit to thoughts and beliefs, this activity is 
readably grounded in a ‘limited’ understanding of depression. Once again, however, it is 
very hard to uphold this reading within the context. At no point in the consultation has 
either speaker implied that the patient is catatonic or a danger to himself, yet a diagnosis 
of ‘mild’ depression was still made. As such, it is readily available that mild depression 
does not feature catatonia or self-harm. Equally, the patient appears to execute a quite 
awesome vault-face in his next turn, accepting the diagnosis after the GP effectively 
317 
 
restates his diagnosis. Consider again, however, the detail of the account. Throughout, 
the patient works consistently to attribute an ordinary identity to himself; he tells 
believable and relevant stories, he constructs logical arguments. Moreover, by building 
his sister’s behaviour as particularly ‘abnormal’, he provides a framework from which 
his own symptoms can be re-read as very ordinary in comparison – especially given that 
he has aligned his circumstances with those of his sibling in terms of similarity. As in 
extract 8(II), the GP collaborates with this self-normalising activity. 
 
16.  P: well (.) im not like that 
17.    (.5) 
18.   D:   no (.) not at all (.) that sounds like quite a (.) a severe case of depression to me 
19.    (.5) your symptoms are better described as mild (.) i mean (.) your lucid but (.) 
20.    just struggling a bit (.) really 
21.    (1.0) 
22.   P: yeah (.) alright (.) makes sense 
 
In line 18, the patient’s assertion that he is not ‘like that’ is confirmed. The ‘that’ in 
question, however, is characterised as ‘severe depression’ and the diagnosis of ‘mild 
depression’ is reasserted by contrast. This diagnosis is then elaborated into an explicit 
acknowledgement of the patient’s ‘lucidity’ and a downgraded summary of his entire 
illness as ‘just struggling a bit’. Both components function to confirm the ordinariness of 
the patient’s behaviour, and an accordance is forthcoming. All potential inferences 
relating to the patient’s unreliability as a witness to, or agent in, his own behaviour are 
collaboratively circumscribed. Comparable activity is also visible in extract 8(IV) below. 
 
EXTRACT 8(IV): DP27 <DEPRESSION> 
1.  D: well (.) now ahm .hhh 
2.   id say (.) given everything youve to:ld me (.) that you have a bit of  
3.    a (.) depression 
4.    (1.0) 
5.   D: is:[ not seri.hh 
6.   P:      [I supp (.) sorry you↓= 
7.   D: =no (.) no carry on 
8.    (.5) 
9.   P: i was just going to say that (.) um (.) I still go out and have fun (.) and its only  
10.    sometimes that i get (.) upset and silly (.) yesterday I had a brilliant day and .hh 
11.    (.) so today I was wondering if I should come to see you (.5) at all 
12.   D:  you did the right thing (.) depression can be a (.) sporadic thing (.) it wont stop 
13.    you being happy all the time 
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14.    (1.0) 
15.  P:  so (.) a bit of depression (.) then? 
16.   D:  yes 
17.   P: so (.) what now?  
 
Herein the GP explicitly occasions the patient’s own symptom-telling in the design of his 
diagnosis. As such, from the outset, the patient is oriented to the diagnosis as being a 
direct rather than implicit outcome of her reported activity. Nevertheless, the diagnosis is 
formulated as an opinion (‘I’d say’) and in downgraded form (a bit of a depression). 
After a one second pause, the GP begins to speak again, fractionally after which the 
patient initiates her turn. As has been observed throughout this study, the transition 
relevance point immediately subsequent to the diagnosis is usually reserved for a turn, 
preferably an accordance, from the patient (ten Have, 2001). The GP’s continuance 
would imply that he has interpreted the pause itself as indicative of resistance from the 
patient. As Heritage notes: 
 
‘[I]f speakers can analyse a pause as prefatory to rejection, they can use the time to step in 
to modify and revise the first utterance to a more “attractive” or “acceptable form.’ 
(1984:274)   
 
The GP’s abortive turn does indeed begin with what is apparently a confirmation that the 
diagnosis is not ‘serious’. As such, it can be observed that a certain level of resistance to 
the diagnosis is anticipated by the GP, which is supported by the fairly cautious 
construction of the diagnosis itself - this point is elaborated in section 8.4 below. 
Potential problems arising from the simultaneous speech are quickly resolved. The 
patient apologises, characterising her turn as an ‘interruption’ of the GP, but the GP then 
takes a turn to reallocate conversational rights to the patient. As such, the patient’s post-
diagnostic turn is re-established as the ‘correct one’.  
Interestingly, however, this short deferral of the turn provides the patient with an 
opportunity to produce a different kind of utterance to that which she may otherwise 
have produced. Her turn is, crucially, no longer relevant primarily as a ‘direct’ response 
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to the diagnosis, but rather as a response to the GP’s invitation to talk. She takes up this 
opportunity, and constructs a narrative on the topic of her recent activity which would, 
notably, have been very difficult to produce in this form in an immediate first turn after 
diagnosis without first marking it as sequentially problematic. She does, however, 
mitigate the inferential possibility that she is ‘misusing’ her turn by prefacing her account 
with the statement ‘i was just going to say that..’, reflexively characterising it as the one 
that was previously started. 
 
8.3.2. Downgrading the Symptoms, Upgrading the Evaluation. 
Reproduced below is the account produced by the patient in lines 9 to 11 of the extract. 
 
I still go out and have fun (.) and its only sometimes that i get (.) upset and silly (.) 
yesterday I had a brilliant day and .hh (.) so today I was wondering if I should come to see 
you (.5) at all 
 
Firstly, an ongoing activity is constructed; regularly ‘going out and having fun’ makes 
hearably relevant the identity of a generally normal, balanced and sociable human being. 
The GP is then invited to inspect this against an alternative state of affairs which takes 
place ‘only sometimes’ – she gets ‘upset and silly’. Previously in the consultation (see 
Chapter 7) she had explicitly identified one of her symptoms as ‘keeping crying at work’ 
which was ‘embarrassing’. In this utterance she gists the symptom in a significantly 
weaker way, downgrading its frequency and severity, and adjusting her stance towards it 
appropriately. In this sense, through the referencing of pre-diagnostic activity in the 
consultation, the relevance of the account itself is also established. In these terms, she 
constructs a general state of affairs in her life which actively delimits a range of 
inferential possibilities relating to her symptoms being particularly severe, troublesome 
or frequent. This is followed by a fragment of autobiographical detail through which she 
draws the constructed normality of her ‘general’ everyday life into the immediate 
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temporal frame - yesterday was ‘brilliant’, which not only preserves the sense things 
being ‘ordinary’ but makes available a sense of ‘improvement’. Finally, she makes 
relevant a ‘quandary’ as an upshot of this state of affairs; under these circumstances, she 
was unsure whether or not her symptoms were worthy of the GP’s attention. On the 
surface, this seems like a slightly odd thing to do, given that her resultant decision is 
apparent from her presence in the surgery. Moreover, as has been previously seen in this 
chapter, it risks aligning the patient herself with the category ‘time waster’ – if indeed 
that is all that is wrong, why trouble the GP with it at all? As Jefferson (1984) and 
Wooffitt (1992) have shown, however, the explicit occasioning of ‘thought processes’ in 
talk is a powerful means of asserting the rationality of the thinker. Herein, the patient 
constructs a distinctly normal state of affairs, punctuated by occasional glitches which 
are not themselves that out-of-the-ordinary. She then constructs a very ‘reasonable’ set of 
cogitations relating to whether or not such a state of affairs is worth troubling a doctor 
with. As such she addresses her ordinary identity in two entirely different, though 
synergetic ways – through accounts of her activities/symptoms themselves, and through  
her inferentially available stance towards those activities/symptoms in the context. 
 As we have seen before in previous extracts, the GP collaborates in the 
construction of this ordinary identity.   
 
12.  D:  you did the right thing (.) depression can be a (.) sporadic thing (.) it wont stop 
13.    you being happy all the time 
14.    (1.0) 
15.   P:  so (.) a bit of depression (.) then? 
16.   D:  yes 
17.   P: so (.) what now?  
 
In line 12, the patient’s turn is acknowledged as legitimate, and the ‘choice’ resultant of 
her occasioned thought process is acknowledged as rational. Moreover, the diagnosis is 
reconstructed as being entirely consistent with the details of the patient’s story. Note, 
however, the manner in which the GP uses the term ‘depression’ to index the diagnostic 
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condition in his response, which is downgraded to a ‘bit of depression’ (the original 
diagnosis) in the patient’s subsequent call for confirmation. The patient shows a 
sensitivity to a possible upgrading of the condition, and moves quickly to delimit this 
possibility before offering her accordance with the diagnosis and explicitly returning 
topical control to the GP. 
 
In each of the two extracts analysed above, the diagnosis-resistance-defence sequence 
first described with reference to extract 8(II) is again collaboratively accomplished with 
minimal disruption to the consultation. By deferring accordance with the diagnosis 
across a number of turns while a ‘rational’ identity is established for the patient, the 
participants in the interactions negotiate the conversational materials, and the sequence 
of interaction itself, so as to reach that accordance to mutual satisfaction. The resistance 
itself can once again be seen to be a local and functional interactional strategy not 
contingent on the category ‘depression’ at large, but on its implications within the 
consultation itself. In the next section, a case is examined in which the GP constructs a 
‘rational’ character for the patient in response to an inferred (silent) resistance. This is 
especially revealing in that it demonstrates that the patient’s ‘rational’ character is an 
inferential matter for the attention of a GP in the consultation even where the patient does 
not clearly make it so. The final two extracts then show a case where the GP does not 
‘take up’ the opportunity to collaborate with the patient’s construction of an ordinary 
identity, and the interactional consequences thereof, and a case where the patient 
constructs such an identity in the unproblematic acceptance of a diagnosis of depression.  
 
8.4 SHAPING AN ORDINARY IDENTITY: 
STRATEGIES AND CONSEQUENCES. 
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As initially observed with respect to extract 8(IV), it is possible for a GP to monitor a 
patient’s silence as evidence of resistance to the diagnosis provided. Decontextualised 
silence, in itself, could be hearably representative of a whole range of patient activities; 
‘time to think’, ‘slow uptake’ and so forth. Key to this analysis, however, is the manner 
in which the absence of a preferred response to the diagnosis is retroactively 
characterised as resistance by a GP’s subsequent activity. This is interesting in that it 
(once again) demonstrates an orientation on the part of the GP that the diagnosis itself is 
(for whatever reason in that context) one which may be resisted.  
The earlier stages of extract 8(v) were investigated in Chapter 7. The patient has 
admitted thoughts about ‘not being alive’, but has also been at pains to stress that they 
are vague, rare and he would never act on them.  
 
EXTRACT 8(V): DP63 <DEPRESSION> 
1.  D:  well: (.5) ri:ght  
2.    (1.0)  
3.    this looks to me like a pretty straightfo:rward case of (.) ahm (.) of depression? 
4.    (1.5) 
5.    which (.) ahm .hhh (.5) is very common and pretty easily (.) ahh: (.) treated 
6.   P:  ºmmhmº? 
7.    (1.0) 
8.   D: you were really clear about your (.) sym:ptoms (.) and you appear to have the   
9.    most common sym .hhh (.5) ones (.) your (.) ahm (.) ti:red low and not interested  
10.    in things sleeping too much (.) generally run down (.) all of which are (.5)  
11.    consistent with a minor (.) depression er: (.) which we (.) can talk through (.)  
12.    what to do now if you want?  
13.    (.5) 
14.   P:  yeah (.5) so what do we: (.) er: (.) do?  
 
The diagnosis here is delivered in the most direct form yet seen. There is a degree of 
modalisation (it ‘looks like’), though the diagnosis is delivered as self evident 
(‘straightforward’) and is not delayed or marked as ‘problematic’. Moreover, it is not in 
any way downgraded as in prior consultations; the condition is constructed as 
‘depression’ as opposed to ‘a bit of depression’ or ‘mild’ depression.  This formulation 
places the patient quite squarely in the category ‘depressives’ and makes available every 
inference that the category could imply. Note the subsequent string of activity, however. 
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After a 1.5 second silence, the GP adds further information, downgrading the 
inferentially available ‘severity’ of the category – it is very ‘common’ and ‘easily 
treated’. Treating the pause, where he may have expected an accordance (or a least some 
form of contribution) from the patient as implicit resistance, he begins work on 
‘normalising’ the identity of depression itself and, reflexively, that of the patient. To 
recall Sacks’ (1979) words, once a category is applied to a person, what is known of the 
category is known of the person and what is known of the person becomes known of the 
category. By downgrading the category itself, the patient is furnished with resources 
from which to interpret its implications for him as a member of that category. In this 
case, to be a depressive is not ‘unusual’ and it is not ‘permanent’.  
As Silverman (1997) observes, silences can be used by patients to mark a prior 
utterances as dispreferred in mitigated and indirect form – they avoid the making of a 
direct challenge while nevertheless providing the other speaker with resources from 
which to infer that more activity is required. Following Heritage (1984a), Silverman 
further observes that this activity is typically met with a downgrading of the problematic 
materials which indicates a monitoring of the silence as resistance. The consequence of 
such activity is that an environment can be created whereby, 
 
‘…all parties can seek to reaffirm local social solidarity without directly acknowledging 
the existence of a disagreement.’ (Silverman, 1997:140) 
 
Such activity is directly observable in this extract. In line 6, the patient issues a minimal 
utterance (‘mmhm’) after which the GP then provides a longer account of the 
consultation itself. Heritage and Sefi (1992) and Silverman (1997) have analysed how 
medical advice is often resisted through the use of ‘unmarked acknowledgements’: 
 
‘These are minimal response tokens which have a primarily continuative function; they do 
not either acknowledge the advice-giving as newsworthy to the recipient or constitute an 
undertaking to follow the advice. They can be heard as a form of resistance in themselves 
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because, implicitly, such responses are refusing to treat the talk as advice…’ (Silverman, 
1997:140)    
 
In this case, the GP clearly treats the patient’s utterance as evidence of an ongoing 
resistance to the diagnosis. The utterance is not received as an accordance with the 
diagnosis itself, prompting more activity.  
 
8.4.1. Rationality: Direct and Indirect. 
In lines 8 to 11, the GP constructs an account in which a range of inferential issues 
relating to the patient’s identity are persistently attended to, both directly and indirectly. 
 
you were really clear about your (.) sym:ptoms (.) and you appear to have the most 
common sym .hhh (.5) ones (.) your (.) ahm (.) ti:red low and not interested in things 
sleeping too much (.) generally run down (.) all of which are (.5) consistent with a minor (.) 
depression 
 
Firstly, the GP characterises the patient’s accounting of his own symptoms as ‘clear’. 
This serves two key purposes: 
 
1. To reinforce the veracity of the patient’s prior talk. 
2. To validate the diagnosis. 
 
The explicit connection between patient’s activity and diagnosis as ‘product’ thereof, 
which we have often seen deployed within the diagnostic utterance itself, is now 
established. Accountability for the diagnosis is thus distributed between both participants 
in the interaction, but simultaneously any available inference that the diagnosis could 
have been made from, say, a lack of lucidity on the part of the patient is delimited. The 
GP thus skilfully finds a way of reaffirming the diagnosis of depression while also 
‘playing up’ the patient’s standing as a reliable witness to his own life.  
 The remainder of the account constitutes an explanation of ‘how the diagnosis 
was reached’. This is done by gisting the details of the patient’s self-accounting 
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throughout the consultation but note, however, the selection of symptoms. All are of a 
vividly ‘physiological’ character, and any allusion to the most recent symptom discussed, 
thoughts about suicide/self harm, is deleted entirely. As such, a general list is constructed 
which makes available ‘an illness’ while circumscribing any potentially damaging 
inferences relating to the patient’s reasoning procedure or general psychological state. 
Even within this list, the individual symptoms are built as distinctly ordinary – none of 
them are, in themselves, particularly ‘pathological’. Rather, depression (now 
downgraded to ‘minor’ depression) is available as a correlation of symptoms, rather than 
a ‘hard illness’. The entire category is thus contextually reconstructed to account for the 
patient’s resistance and to accord the him the opportunity to speak within the 
consultation as an ordinary, rational person rather than a ‘depressive’. Finally, the GP 
offers the patient an opportunity to talk about ‘what to do’. Herein he carefully constructs 
a mutual responsibility for such activity (‘we’ can talk through), which implicitly embeds 
an accordance with the diagnosis as precursory. The patient accepts this opportunity in 
his next turn, issuing a marked acknowledgement (‘right’), and echoes the GP’s own 
distribution of accountability (what do ‘we’ do?), generating an accordance on the 
diagnosis itself and moving the consultation to a phase of discussion of treatment. In this 
way the entire ‘disagreement’ is managed in indirect terms; the distribution of 
accountability offered by the GP for ‘what happens next’ is premised on an acceptance of 
the diagnosis, and the patient’s acceptance of the diagnosis is reflexively premised on 
this distribution. 
What is particularly revealing in this extract is the orientation demonstrated by 
the GP to the necessity of establishing an ‘ordinary’ identity for the patient, even when in 
no sense explicitly prompted to do so. So far in this chapter we have observed GPs 
collaborating with patients in the construction of such identities; in this extract the GP’s 
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activities are demonstrably based on an inference that this is the problem, and the reason 
he is encountering resistance at all. Equally, it is observable that much of this activity is a 
direct outcome of the structure of the diagnosis itself. Recall that it was delivered 
directly, in a ‘strong’ form (certainly when compared to those already seen in this 
chapter) and as implicitly resultant of the patient’s activities. This is an important 
observation which sheds light on prior analyses in this chapter. On a number of 
occasions, the GPs have explicitly made the diagnosis accountable to the content of what 
the patients have said during the diagnostic utterance. This can now be observed to be 
functional strategy not only in the general diffusal of accountability for the diagnosis 
itself, but also in addressing the patient’s standing as a reasonable witness. To phrase it 
bluntly, the GPs make explicitly available that the diagnosis is based on reliable 
accounting from the patient, rather than, say, on the patient ‘seeming weird’. In this case, 
where such activity is not done, and likewise in extract 8(III), the diagnosis is initially 
met with silence and the GP has to work to produce a turn from the patient. While in 
extract 8(III) this turn is explicitly allocated and the patient begins reconstructing her own 
identity, herein the task falls to the GP via the patient’s non-responses. Ultimately, 
however, accordance is achieved in both cases with the local social solidarity reaffirmed. 
These observations illuminate the next extract, 8(VI), where significant problems are 
encountered. 
 
8.4.2. The Salient Sickness: Interactional Consequences. 
In consultation DP33, the patient has hitherto been generally complaining of insomnia, 
tiredness and loss of appetite (data not shown).  
 
EXTRACT 8(VI): DP33 <DEPRESSION> 
1.  D:  ye:s (.2) well [PATIENT’S NAME] it strikes me that you (.) have depression (.)  
2.    not severe↓ but its just as well [you came in 
3.   P:                        [ºmmmº↓   
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4.    (1.0) 
5.   D:  I know there are some (.) misperceptions about depression (.5) it’s not an 
6.    uncommon illness though (.) and we can sort out treatment now↑ 
7.    (1.5) 
8.   D: and in a minor case like this (.) there should be no problem 
9.    (1.0) 
10.    its not a big deal at all  
11.    (.5) 
12.   P: well (.) your the doctor↓ 
13.    (1.0) 
14.    D: would you like to know the available treatments? 
15.   P: yes if you want 
16.     (1.5) 
17.   D:  alright (.) then ((continues)) 
 
The striking thing about this extract is the degree to which the patient ‘withdraws’ after 
the diagnosis has been made. The diagnosis itself is not quite as ‘direct’ as that in the 
previous extract; while not explicitly linked to the patient’s symptoms it is nevertheless 
delivered in a weaker form (it is ‘not severe’). Before the diagnosis is even complete, 
however, an unmarked acknowledgement (‘mmm’) is issued which, by going on to 
advance further details, the GP observably treats as resistance. In a succession of turns, 
each prompted by a silence from the patient, the GP does some intricate interactional 
work relating to the category itself. Firstly, he explicitly occasions his awareness of 
‘misperceptions’ about depression and then builds a case for what depression actually is: 
an ‘illness’ which is ‘not uncommon’ and ‘treatable’. Reflexively, thus, the patient’s 
resistance is characterised as being grounded in a ‘misperception’ that it may be 
otherwise, although accountability for this is diffused into a general knowledge-realm. 
He then works to downgrade the severity of the specific case itself across two more turns 
– it is ‘minor’, should not be a ‘problem’ and is not a ‘big deal’.  
This active reassurance that the patient is not ‘particularly ill’ is something that 
has been observed in all the extracts analysed in this chapter so far. However, in this case 
it is met with (particularly in the context of a consultation) a very strong rebuke – ‘well, 
you’re the doctor’. Implicit deferral to the professional category-bound knowledge of the 
GP has been evident in a number of analyses in this project, and has been previously 
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documented in CA studies (Heath, 1992). Patients frequently formulate their own ideas 
as guesses or hunches so as not to challenge the authority of the GP’s opinion. Here, 
however, the patient makes this authority explicitly relevant, and the utterance is marked 
as a necessary (though unwilling) deferral to the GP’s knowledge.  
Interestingly, however, the GP treats this strong rejection of the diagnosis as an 
accordance and asks if the patient would like to know the ‘treatments’ available, 
switching the topic and closing the last. The inherent reflexivity of talk-in-interaction 
here proves an invaluable resource for the GP in avoiding direct conflict, or the 
disagreement itself becoming the focus of the interaction. By orienting to a rebuke as an 
agreement in his next turn, the GP is able to move the conversation along without the 
rebuke itself becoming a focus of the interaction. As it stands, the patient provides a 
strongly dispreferred answer to this question as well, characterising the trajectory of the 
conversation itself as being entirely of the GP’s choice, and remains largely dormant for 
the remainder of the consultation. Herein, major interactional problems were seen to 
arise where no facility was offered to the patient from which to infer that he is a normal 
or rational human being. Despite the GP’s endeavours to downgrade the diagnosis itself, 
and reassure the patient that depression is a ‘common’ illness, his identity as a primary 
‘ill’ person remained salient throughout and the patient withdrew.  
 
8.4.3. The Rational Depressive: Logic in Accordance. 
It is crucial to note that the ‘ordinary identities’ which underpin all of the analyses in this 
chapter are not simply resources in the resistance of a diagnosis of depression. They 
demonstrably become salient as a result of mutual speaker sensitivity to the inferential 
business generated by the very production of that diagnosis. This is nowhere better 
illustrated that in extract 8(VII) in which the patient unproblematically accepts the 
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diagnosis, but uses the diagnosis itself as a resource with which to construct such an 
identity. 
 
EXTRACT 8(VII): DP19 <DEPRESSION> 
1.  D:  hmmm (.4) it seems to me (.) from what youve told me (.) that you have 
2.    a mild case (.) of depression  
3.    (.5) 
4.   P: yes (.) i kind of though that (.3) was what it might .hhh (.) be 
5.   i kind of did a bit of rese:arch huhh (.4) on the internet (.) and (.) well (.) 
6.    feeling down (.) really tired (.) loss of appetite it all (.) well (.) adds 
7.    up to depression[ºreallyº↑ 
8.   D:      [i wish .hh everyone was as diligent as you ((laughs)) 
 
The patient not only offers a direct accordance with the diagnosis in line 4, but actually 
goes on to confirm that it is what she has suspected all along. This, on the surface, is a 
slightly ‘odd’ thing to do; it certainly raises some potentially awkward questions relating 
to why she did not volunteer this information at an earlier stage. The account in its 
entirety is, however, visibly organised to achieve a range of interactional functions.  
Firstly, the assessment is formulated in a weak form, she ‘kind’ of thought that it 
‘might’ be depression, making available her ‘lay’ standpoint towards the material and 
asserting the overall authority of the GP’s diagnosis (Heath, 1992). Simultaneously, 
however, in making available to the GP a congruity of conclusions between herself and 
the GP, she in turn makes inferentially available a congruity of reasoning. Moreover, she 
then constructs a short narrative warranting the claim that she had indeed come to this 
conclusion independently. The rhetorical organisation here is striking:  
 
i kind of did a bit of rese:arch huhh (.4) on the internet (.) and (.) well (.) feeling down (.) 
really tired (.) loss of appetite it all (.) well (.) adds up to depression[ºreallyº↑ 
 
The whole account is organised around a three-part list of symptoms which ‘add up’ to 
depression, each component of which is fairly ‘ordinary’ in itself. Again, symptoms 
relating to ‘irrational thought’, as salient in the DSM-IV nosology as ‘low mood’, 
‘fatigue’ or ‘loss of appetite’, are not selected. As such she downgrades the severity of 
the category to which she has accepted admission through its summary in ‘general’ 
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terms, while making explicitly available a knowledge of ‘what depression is’. Moreover, 
this claim to knowledge is prefaced with a short narration of the means by which she 
came to possess it. Herein she explicitly characterises her process of discovery as 
‘research’, a category itself rich in inferences relating rational, methodical behaviour, and 
further occasions the source, ‘the internet’, the use of which inferentially requires at least 
a degree of technical know-how. In sum, thus, in the very acceptance of the diagnosis of 
depression, the patient skilfully reconstructs her ‘depressive’ identity in terms of logical, 
rational behaviour. 
 
The themes arising from this chapter, not least that of ‘ordinary identities’, form the 
backbone of the next, concluding, chapter wherein they are explored in terms of their 
relevance to issues of theory, policy and application. As a consequence, only a brief 
summary of these themes is presented in the last section with a view to setting up the key 
debates with clarity.  
 
8.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
DEPRESSION IN CONTEXT 
There is little doubt that a number of the analytic observations arising from this chapter 
reflect in significant ways on theoretical stances (medical and social scientific) to 
depression and its diagnosis in primary care.  
Following the work of Anssi Peräkylä (1998), it has been demonstrated that it is 
not only the topical detail of the patient’s occasioned symptoms that informs the structure 
of diagnosis, but the stance that the patient adopts towards these symptoms. The 
diagnoses of depression analysed employ a variety of different resources to a variety of 
different ends and with a variety of interactional consequences. Caution in the 
construction of the diagnosis is, for example, seen to be a highly functional strategy in 
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avoiding the production of problems relating to the patient’s interactional integrity, while 
insulating the diagnosis itself against direct challenge. This caution is achieved in a 
number of ways; formulating the diagnosis as a ‘guess’, for example, explicitly relating it 
to the content of the patient’s own utterances or delaying it either within a turn or across 
a number of turns. Further observed are some highly skilled methods employed by 
patients in the first-turn resistance of diagnosis - mitigated agreements making space for 
further activity (yes-but), silence and unmarked acknowledgements prompting further 
activity from the GPs and story prefaces opening up extended turns where turns may not 
otherwise have been available at all. All are accomplished in such a way as to make 
relevant potentially conflict-causing detail while preserving the relational roles of GP and 
patient, avoiding direct challenges to GP or his diagnosis and delimiting the inference 
that the patients were being ‘rude’ or ‘awkward’. 
Perhaps the most striking structural aspect of the extracts above is the manner in 
which, in the face of a challenge to diagnosis, the normal turn-taking system is 
temporarily abandoned. The patients assume rights to ask questions, and the GPs do not 
challenge these or attempt to close them down. Both parties in each case display an 
orientation to the post-diagnostic phase as ‘different’ to that which came before. A 
number of studies (see ten Have, 2002) have shown how, post-diagnosis, the patient is 
generally accorded rights to ask about the implications of the condition and strategies for 
coping/curing. However, in virtually all cases these studies address the consultation post-
accordance and address the manner in which patient’s effectively request the GP’s 
advice. Herein, we can observe the GP being challenged in a very different way. The 
orientation the GP’s generally display towards this activity, however, leads us to the 
single most prevalent theme to arise herein.  
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As discussed from the outset, it is a leading theme in the modern medical 
understanding of depression that resistance to diagnosis is most commonly encountered 
as a result of a generalised social stigma guiding patients to object to the label. However, 
in the consultations observed in this chapter, a range of strategies were visibly employed 
by GPs and patients in the construction of a rational identity for the patient. In these 
cases, the patients had gone to great lengths to address their own standings as reliable 
witnesses on their own behaviour prior to diagnosis, and, sensitive to the inferential 
properties of a diagnosis of depression, worked to re-establish this identity thereafter. 
The strategies for doing so are fascinating: the construction of ‘logical’ arguments, the 
telling of short stories and the narration of deliberation on whether to seek medical help 
at all. Crucially, it can be observed that the resistance of patients to the diagnosis is not 
an end in itself resultant of ‘social forces’. Rather resistance is a constructive strategy in 
delaying accordance with the diagnosis while some inferential business generated by the 
diagnosis is attended to.  
The ‘rational’ identity is, furthermore, not only a matter for the attention of 
patients; not only did the GPs collaborate in its construction through acknowledgements 
of ‘good questions’ and allocation of rights to ask them, but in one case where the patient 
remained largely dormant, the GP visibly constructed such an identity for him. Equally, 
resistance is only one strategy in the accomplishment of such an identity – in the final 
extract an open accordance is accompanied by an account performing the same 
interactional tasks. Also seen are the potential interactional consequences of not closing 
down inferences which challenge the patient’s standing as a reliable witness; in extract 
8(VI) the patient effects a withdrawal from communication, issuing an extremely unusual 
rebuke of the GP’s opinion when neither diagnosis nor defence corroborate the stance he 
has adopted towards his own symptoms. 
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Finally, and crucially, in all of these activities an ongoing construction and 
reconstruction of ‘what depression means’ is observable. Throughout the extracts, certain 
characteristics are emphasised and others deleted in the service of such activities as 
making/resisting/explaining a diagnosis. Moreover, it is not only the ‘implications’ of 
depression that are fluidly negotiated in this way, but the very character of depression 
itself. In extract 8(III), for example, competing ‘versions’ are negotiated to the ends of 
establishing two ‘equally valid’ interpretations of the illness. What this highlights above 
all is that the meanings that inform the consultation itself are not necessarily those in the 
DSM-IV, or the cognitive or behavioural accounts of Major Depression. When faced 
with a challenge to diagnosis, the GPs do not simply ‘reel off’ the key symptoms in a bid 
to ‘educate’ the patient, but rather construct a version of depression sensitive to the 
contextual task in hand. The wider implications of these observations, alongside those 
arising from the other analytic chapters, will now be drawn together in the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
Conclusion: 
Depression, Theory and Policy 
‘Practitioners and researchers do not necessarily have an easy relationship.’ 
David Silverman100 
“Discourses of Counselling” 
 
As initially highlighted in the conclusion of Chapter 6, the key aim of this project has 
been to provide a description of the tacit communicative skills employed by speakers in 
situated incidences of social activity. The analytic programme has been neither 
evaluative nor quantitative; rather, a descriptive approach to the social resources utilised 
by the GPs and patients in observable conversational practices, to observable ends, has 
been employed. In this sense, a ‘conclusion’ in the conventional sense is not salient here 
– there are no hypotheses ‘proven’ or ‘results’ to present, and this chapter can in no way 
be termed a ‘natural end’ to the project. Indeed, in line with the premises upon which the 
project is founded, any attempt to generalise the analytic outcomes to ‘all consultations’ 
or ‘depression at large’ would be to do violence to the very situation-specific skills that 
have been revealed. Throughout the project the problems with ‘normative frames’ of 
‘good practice’ have been consistently exposed; as such, no ‘alternative’ normative 
frame is to be generated here. It is nevertheless possible to maintain, however, without 
advancing that claim that these consultations are ‘typical’ or that the findings of the 
project are generalisable to all consultations, that the observations made have 
ramifications for medical theory and policy, and for a sociological understanding of 
‘mental’ illness and the primary care consultation. The GPs and patients speaking in the 
extracts above did talk in the constructive ways analysed, and the fact that they can do 
this has practical implications both for research and practice. Prior to an elaboration of 
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these themes, however, it is necessary to provide a brief summary of the analyses in 
Chapters 5 to 8. 
 In Chapter 5, two short extracts came under scrutiny; the opening sequences of 
one interview and one consultation. With regard to the former, it was illustrated that the 
account of ‘depression’ provided by the GP was less answerable to an independent 
character of the illness, or to internal knowledges relating to such a character, than to the 
contexted business of providing an account of depression in an interview. Drawing on 
the work of Smith (1978), it was highlighted how the GP organised his utterances to 
emphasise some features while delimiting others to the ends of building his account to be 
recognisably one of ‘an illness’. Equally, it was illustrated how, through appeals to 
‘community knowledge’ and professional identity, the GP carefully attended to the 
veracity of the account itself and his own reliability as its author. As such, it was asserted 
that GP was constantly engaged in the ongoing construction of depression rather than 
simply ‘emptying his brain’ of the details made relevant by the question. Drawing on the 
work of, particularly, Wooffitt (1992) and Palmer (2000), it was then shown how the 
patient in the consultation also demonstrated similar orientations in the construction of 
his symptoms. In the turn-by-turn unfolding of the interaction, the patient addressed his 
identity as a ‘patient’ and marked certain types of utterance as problematic to the 
accomplished context. The ‘abnormality’ of his state of health was built using a variety 
of techniques, not least the contrastive construction of other feelings and activities as 
‘normal’. Moreover, the design of his account was observably sensitive to the inferential 
business generated by providing an account that may not be hearable as ‘a clear set of 
symptoms’; this illustrated a clear orientation by the patient to the necessity of such 
design for the reception of a sympathetic hearing. All such activity was accomplished 
within a regular sequence of questions asked by the GP and answers given by the patient, 
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through which the ‘institutional’ character of the interaction was produced and 
maintained. 
 In Chapter 6, the interviews with the GPs were more closely examined, and the 
analysis revealed a number of interesting themes. Firstly, the GPs displayed a clear 
orientation to the question ‘what is depression?’ as meaningful in terms of the purposes 
of the project as a whole, rather than as the simple request for a description of depression 
specified within the question itself. Developing their accounts into narratives on the 
problems with diagnosing depression in primary care, specific resources were occasioned 
to attend to the inferential business generated by describing such difficulties to a non-
practitioner. To reiterate, these included:  
 
• Providing an account of depression as a ‘real’ thing. 
• Constructing a convincing state of affairs such that a ‘legitimate’ complaint could 
be made. 
• Addressing problems with diagnosis without undermining the ‘real’ status of 
depression or their own credibility as a GP and author of the account. 
• Locating accountability for cited problems without implicating any local party. 
 
In a parallel with the work of Jefferson (1984) and Wooffitt (1992), it was highlighted 
that the details of the accounts of depression constructed were not so much directly 
answerable to issues of ‘memory’ or fact retention, but to the broader character of 
naturally occurring talk – the business of making complaints and attributing causes, for 
example. This, in turn, illuminated a further issue; the sensitivity of the accounts to the 
possibility of a sceptical hearing. As a range of medical and sociological texts argue 
(Goffman, 1963; Green & Dowrick, 1995; Gordon & Duffy, 1998), ‘mental illnesses’ at 
large can be seen as highly ‘stigmatised’ and the ‘defensive’ posture adopted by the GPs 
337 
 
could be read as evidence of this. However, in the situated construction of their accounts, 
the GP were seen to orient to direct local interactional concerns in their construction of 
‘delicate objects’ – prior utterances, relative (or potential) inferred social identities and 
the need to make a convincing argument.  
 The theme of ‘delicate objects’ featured heavily in Chapter 7, in which, drawing 
extensively on the work of Silverman (1997), the construction of ‘difficult’ topics and 
actions were explored in terms of their local production. Firstly, a case was highlighted 
in which a question was marked as ‘potentially problematic’ by the GP asking it. The 
analysis revealed that this activity stemmed from a particular reading of the patient’s 
prior activity, rather than any innate property of the question-topic itself. The patient had 
not merely ‘communicated’ his symptoms, but built an account of them in such a way as 
to emphasise their ‘physical’ nature, their legitimate status as illness-symptoms and, 
furthermore, to underscore his own standing as a reliable teller of them. The material of 
the question risked inferentially undermining this stance (Peräkyla, 1998) adopted by the 
patient, and the design of the GP’s question was organised so as to compensate for this 
possibility. As such, the question itself was demonstrably sensitive to the inferential 
business generated by its own asking in the light of the patient’s prior utterances. The 
patient, in turn, drew upon his own and the GP’s prior utterances in the consultation 
when managing his disclosure of the information made relevant by the question. The 
organisation of this disclosure delimited potentially damaging inferences to his ‘case’ by 
closing down specific trajectories of the interaction that could have followed, while 
opening up others. Both GP and patient carefully monitored the unfolding of the 
interaction itself to produce, manage and ultimately mitigate a set of inferential issues as 
contextually problematic.  
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These observations were then applied to the asking of questions about ‘suicidal 
thoughts’, a key component in the guidelines for the diagnosis of depression. Herein, in 
line with the work of Jefferson and Lee (1992) and Heritage and Sefi (1992), it was 
observed that the questions themselves were better received (they caused fewer 
interactional problems) where hearable as the logical consequence of a consensus on a 
specific ‘problem’ originally raised by the patient. Moreover, the degree of caution in the 
design of the question was again visibly contingent upon the patient’s prior activity in the 
consultation itself and the establishing of such a consensus, rather than some general 
social rule of thumb regarding what is a ‘delicate’ issue. Equally, whether admitting or 
denying suicidal thoughts, the patients themselves were also oriented to the inferential 
issues arising from being categorised as psychologically ‘troubled’ for the received 
veracity of their accounts. 
 Finally, in Chapter 8, all of the analytic themes arising from Chapters 5 to 7 were 
brought together in an analysis of the construction and reception of diagnoses of 
depression themselves. The most striking theme arising here in was the degree to which 
GPs and patients collaborated in the construction of an ‘ordinary’ identity for the patient, 
reinforcing their standing as a ‘reliable witness’ to their own accounts. As such, it was 
observed that the inferential business generated by a diagnosis of depression is an 
operational matter for the attendance of both GP and patient in local interactional 
contexts. This attendance was observed in the structure of the diagnoses themselves, the 
‘resistance’ by patients and the explanatory activities of the GPs. Crucially, within these 
activities, the central category ‘depression’ itself was visibly constructed and 
reconstructed in the service of these activities. Certain characteristics were emphasised 
and others deleted in the achievement of outcomes satisfactory to all parties.  
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9.1. THEMES AND DIRECTIONS 
Having reviewed the key analytic themes to arise from this project, they will now be 
examined under two main practical areas of implication: their reflection on 
psychiatric/psychological theories of depression and guidelines for general practice. 
 
9.1.1. Depression, Psychiatry and Psychology. 
As initially identified in Chapter 2, contemporary biomedical and cognitive approaches 
to depression (and their psychoanalytic and behavioural ancestors) are based upon 
models of the human as a decontextualised, normal or abnormal, functioning or 
nonfunctioning individual. The illness is taken to operate internally and drive social 
action, manifesting in a number of readably ‘deviant’ ways. ‘Deviant’ actions, thus, are a 
means through which the illness can be recognised. In the analyses above, however, the 
diagnosed ‘depressives’ were visibly capable of skilled engagement with a variety of 
complex interactional tasks; making cases, management of identity issues and so forth. 
This breaking of any simple relationship between ‘depression’ and ‘irrationality’, 
however, is only a small issue. After all, the frameworks outlined in Chapter 2 do not 
deny outright a patient’s capacity to ‘reason’ (though this is sporadically implied). The 
point here is rather more fundamental. A number of activities which, as stipulated by the 
standing nosologies of depression, are readably ‘depressive’ in character were shown to 
have highly constructive, situation-specific functions. Silences or delays in answering 
questions, for example, actively served to mark issues or actions as ‘delicate’, and were 
not simply cases of the patient being ‘slow to answer’ – a key symptom of depression in 
the behavioural account (Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973). These functions were, however, 
only available from an analysis of action in context, whereas the biomedical and 
cognitive models of depression encourage the reading of actions as context-neutral, and 
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significant of pre-defined internal ‘problem structures’. Equally, these models openly 
treat accounts of symptoms as neutral conduits into to the life and mind of the unwell 
individual. However, as particularly demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 7, an account of 
symptoms can be built so as to achieve certain situated interactional ends. Rather than 
simply describing a ‘vague’ set of ‘physical’ symptoms, the patient was actively 
involved in the construction of vagueness and physicality so as to underscore his own 
understanding of the potentially problematic character of his account while 
simultaneously reinforcing his case for bringing his symptoms to the GP. To no extent 
can it be asserted that he simply ‘did not understand what was going on’ or that his 
accounts were transparent evidence of a ‘general vagueness’ of demeanour. 
 The key theme underpinning all analyses in this project is that the words people 
use are not the ‘representations’ of cognitive processes that such analysts as Beck (1967) 
characterise, but are in themselves social actions. Answers to questions, disclosures of 
information and descriptions of symptoms have all been shown to be constructions 
sensitive to the inferential business generated by their own production, and their status 
with regard to prior activity in the consultation. Indeed, the activities arising from 
questions relating to ‘suicidal thinking’ and to diagnoses of depression themselves 
showed a particular sensitivity to the possibility of prior actions and accounts being seen 
as evidence of ‘distorted reasoning’. Moreover, the GPs themselves oriented to the 
specific character of these constructions, the stance taken by the patient towards his or 
her symptoms, in the design of their own activity. This sensitivity demonstrably 
maintained the local social solidarity within the consultation, with impasses skilfully 
avoided.  
As such, the main issue arising from this project as regards the standing 
frameworks for the understanding of depression is not that they are ‘worthless’ or 
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‘dangerous’ as is implied throughout much of the anti-psychiatric literature also detailed 
in Chapter 2 (Szasz, 1973; Tomm, 1990; Gergen, 1990; Kaiser, 1996), but something 
rather more practical. As established early in the project, the purpose herein was not to 
‘debunk’ medical theories of depression; there is little doubt that these frameworks have 
helped alleviate the suffering of people in the real world and continue to do so, and the 
majority of the patients speaking in Chapter 8 ultimately and explicitly accepted the 
diagnosis as a ‘viable’ explanation of their symptoms. ‘Depression’ as a medical 
category is not simply, thus, a ‘tool of oppression’ (see the next section for an elaboration 
of this point). To argue that it is systematically disempowers any patient who claims to 
have benefited from treatment for depression, casting them as a ‘liar’ or a victim of 
Marxist ‘false consciousness’. In these terms, accounts of oppression and power 
systematically treat humans as ‘dopes’ every bit as much as the DSM-IV that they 
criticise so heavily. What I wish to argue, instead, is that behaviour in the consultation 
(of GPs or patients) is not directly answerable to these static nosologies. It is not the 
DSM-IV or cognitive frameworks for the diagnosis of depression that are in themselves 
problematic, but the assumption that they are neutrally applicable to situated contexts of 
social action. Asking a GP to read a patient’s accounts as neutrally representative of 
‘internal’ process is asking a GP to ignore a lifetime of social experience; for all people, 
talk is a constructive activity. This was nowhere clearer than in Chapter 6, where the 
GPs’ own accounts of depression could be seen to be oriented less to static 
knowledges/memories of ‘what depression is’ and more to the interactional business of 
providing a convincing account, making complaints and warranting them. By focusing 
on meanings as they are realised in the collaborative sequential unfolding of interaction, 
rather than on what these meanings ‘mean’ in terms of nosology, we come closer to an 
understanding of the consultation as it is experienced by participants in it. By exploring 
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‘depression’ in terms of its orderly production within such consultations, we come closer 
to an understanding of its social reality. The reflexive transformability of meaning is a 
standing feature of human interaction (Heritage, 1984a), oriented to and utilised by all 
members of society. Rather than ignoring this fact in the ever-advancing quest for the 
‘perfect’ (abstract) definition of depression, attention to how flexible understandings 
actually inform activity in the public domain may lead to a better ground-level 
understanding of what the condition really means to people themselves. In this way, the 
present and numerous impasses between theory and practice can be avoided.  
Above all, what is clear from the analyses in Chapters 5 to 8 is the fact that no 
matter how rigid the DSM-IV and its related diagnostic frameworks may be, and how 
decontextualised their guidelines for dealing with patients, in real contexts GPs actually 
work with highly complex skills in social interaction arising from years of practice in 
both medical and non-medical settings. The biomedical model which is often criticised 
for ‘dehumanising’ patients (Gergen, 1990; Kaiser, 1996), by neglecting such subtle 
social skills and reducing GPs to agents of pure ‘measurement’, can also be said to 
objectify these front-line healthcare professionals. This observation also has particular 
ramifications for critical sociological approaches, which in some cases simply portray 
doctors as the public face of medical ideology – the wielders of establishment power.      
 
9.1.2. Depression, Stigma and The Primary Care Consultation. 
The implications of CA in general for abstract notions of ‘good communication skills’ in 
medical settings have been discussed throughout, and find their strongest articulation in 
Silverman’s (1997) analysis of HIV counselling. Nevertheless, there are several 
examples arising herein which demonstrate how the imposition of normative frames for 
‘good practice’ can, in fact, label highly constructive activity, performing affirmative 
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functions, as ‘bad practice’. In Chapters 7 and 8, there were a number of cases where the 
GP’s ask questions or construct diagnoses with hesitation and high levels of modality. 
This could easily be read in a decontextualised way as evidence of a ‘lack of confidence’ 
in what is being said, even a lack of clarity. The analysis revealed, however, that such 
activities served to mark certain issues and topics as ‘potentially problematic’ while 
simultaneously maintaining relevance and minimising the opportunity for the patient to 
challenge the material therein. In Chapter 7, the active functionality of ‘interruption’ 
(potentially analysable as ‘not listening to the patient’) was seen in terms of its capacity 
to maintain the relevance of a forthcoming question and minimise potential problems that 
could arise from it. Finally, in Chapter 8, the GPs were seen to consistently downgrade 
the details of diagnosis in the face of a challenge, which could be said to portray a ‘lack 
of confidence in the diagnosis’, but was sequentially instrumental in achieving a 
consensus on that diagnosis. In these terms, it is clear that actions in conversation do not 
have transsituational functions or interpretations, and cannot, and should not, be analysed 
as if they have. To do so risks condemning the very tools of success.   
 Possibly the most potent observations arising regarding practice, however, regard 
the issue of ‘stigma’. While there is no need to rehash the entire debate here, the 
fundaments of the medical approach to stigma is summarised in the following quotation 
from American Family Physician, first seen in Chapter 8.  
 
‘One way to involve patients is to educate them about their disorder. Confusion and 
embarrassment often surround a diagnosis of depression. Therefore, it is essential to try to 
dispel negative perceptions of the disorder with an explanation of the causes, mechanisms 
and impact of the illness..’ (2000:9) 
 
Stigma is taken to be related to lack of knowledge. Embarrassment is taken to be a 
situated outcome of stigma. In a number of the analyses in Chapter 8, resistance to 
diagnosis was observed, which is almost universally treated in medical literature as the 
result of ‘social stigma’ (Gordon & Duffy, 1998). However, a number of contradictions 
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arose herein. Firstly, the patients generally only resisted briefly. This undermines the 
supposed power of such stigma as a force ‘blinding’ the patient to reason. Secondly, the 
subsequent acquiescence was not as a result of the divulgence of ‘new’ information by 
the GP – the ‘information’ in question usually featured nothing that was not already 
explicitly or inferentially available from the context. Thirdly, the patients’ own resistance 
did not in any way demonstrate an ‘ignorance’ of the character of depression itself; 
indeed, it was often constructed to make clearly available an understanding of what 
depression actually is (and in several cases, the exact source of this understanding). 
Rather, the resistance was observably a functional strategy in the reworking of identity 
categories, a strategy generally understood and supported by the GPs themselves. As 
such, the accordance is reached not via the ‘transfer of information’ which is then 
‘processed’ by the patient, but via the contextual reconstruction of publicly available 
categories. As Silverman (1997) eloquently summarises with reference to counselling: 
 
‘It is evident that, in this perspective, there are no a priori right or wrong ways of 
responding to clients. What works has to be interactionally devised on each occasion. This 
suggests a revision of the concepts we have about counselling (and indeed any profession 
involved in communicating with clients). The skills of the counsellors…are not primarily 
based on owning a special (professional) body of knowledge. Instead, such skills depend 
on an apparatus of description that is publicly available to everyone – including clients…’ 
(1997:86-87)  
 
Contrary, thus, to many of the apparent assumptions of policy-makers, it seems fair to 
assert that the GPs speaking throughout the analyses appeared to be highly skilled in 
terms of the practical business of, say, eliciting symptoms and delivering diagnoses. 
These skills involved the constructive use of apparently ‘dysfunctional’ conversational 
actions such as ‘vagueness’ and interruption, but, above all, the GPs’ consistent, delicate 
and subtle (and, indeed, effective) methods for treating a patient as a rational, ordinary 
human being revealed a contextual sensitivity to the fine detail of the patient’s talk that 
notions of ‘good practice’ invariably ignore. 
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In these terms, to once more and finally reiterate the leitmotif of this whole 
project, an understanding of the intricacies of the consultation, and the role of 
‘depression’ as a diagnostic category therein, is available not from a focus on difference 
and deficit but from an analysis on the shared and constructive skills of GPs and patients 
in the accomplishment of situated, interactional business. It is in this realm, not text 
books or guidelines, that ‘stigma’, symptoms, problems and solutions, the very social 
reality of depression, are constructed, negotiated and managed by sentient, social human 
beings. 
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APPENDIX 1 
FURTHER DSM-IV CRITERIA 
(ADAPTED FROM APA, 1994) 
 
 
• Criteria for Manic Depressive Episode:  
(a) A distinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood, 
lasting at least 1 week (or any duration if hospitalization is necessary).  
(b) During the period of mood disturbance, three (or more) of the following symptoms have 
persisted (four if the mood is only irritable) and have been present to a significant degree:  
 
Figure A1/A: Symptoms in a Manic Depressive Episode 
1. Inflated self-esteem or grandiosity.  
2. Decreased need for sleep. 
3. More talkative than usual or pressure to keep talking.  
4. Flight of ideas or subjective experience that thoughts are racing.  
5. Distractibility. 
6. Increase in goal-directed activity or psychomotor agitation. 
7. Excessive involvement in pleasurable activities that have a high potential for painful 
consequences. 
 
(c) The symptoms do not meet criteria for a Mixed Episode. 
(d) The mood disturbance is sufficiently severe to cause marked impairment in occupational 
functioning or in usual social activities or relationships with others, or to necessitate 
hospitalisation to prevent harm to self or others, or there are psychotic features.  
(e) The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or a general 
medical condition.  
 
• Criteria for Mixed Episode:  
(a) The criteria are met both for a Manic Episode and for a Major Depressive Episode (except 
for duration) nearly every day during at least a 1-week period.  
(b) The mood disturbance is sufficiently severe to cause marked impairment in occupational 
functioning or in usual social activities or relationships with others, or to necessitate 
hospitalization to prevent harm to self or others, or there are psychotic features.  
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(c) The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of 
abuse, a medication, or other treatment) or a general medical condition (e.g., 
hyperthyroidism).  
 
• Criteria for Hypomanic Episode:  
(a) A distinct period of persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood, lasting throughout at 
least 4 days, that is clearly different from the usual non-depressed mood. 
(b) During the period of mood disturbance, three (or more) of the following symptoms have 
persisted (four if the mood is only irritable) and have been present to a significant degree. 
 
Table A1/B: Symptoms in a Hypomanic Episode. 
1. Inflated self-esteem or grandiosity. 
2. Increased need for sleep. 
3. More talkative than usual or pressure to keep talking.  
4. Flight of ideas or subjective experience that thoughts are racing. 
5. Distractibility. 
6. Increase in goal-directed activity or psychomotor agitation. 
7. Excessive involvement in pleasurable activities that have a high potential for painful 
consequences. 
 
(c) The episode is associated with an unequivocal change in functioning that is uncharacteristic 
of the person when not symptomatic.  
(d) The disturbance in mood and the change in functioning are observable by others.  
(e) The episode is not severe enough to cause marked impairment in social or occupational 
functioning, or to necessitate hospitalisation, and there are no psychotic features.  
(f) The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of 
abuse, a medication, or other treatment) or a general medical condition (e.g., 
hyperthyroidism). 
 
• Criteria for Bipolar I Disorder (Most Recent Episode Unspecified): 
(g) Criteria, except for duration, are currently (or most recently) met for a Manic, a Hypomanic, 
a Mixed, or a Major Depressive Episode. 
(h) There has previously been at least one Manic Episode or Mixed Episode. 
(i) The mood symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.  
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(j) The mood symptoms in Criteria (a) and (b) are not better accounted for by Schizoaffective 
Disorder and are not superimposed on Schizophrenia, Schizophreniform disorder, Delusional 
Disorder, or Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.  
(k) The mood symptoms in Criteria (a) and (b) are not due to the direct physiological effects of a 
substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication, or other treatment) or a general medical 
condition (e.g., hyperthyroidism). 
 
• Criteria for Bipolar II Disorder. 
(a) Presence (or history) of one or more Major Depressive Episodes.  
(b) Presence (or history) of at least one Hypomanic Episode. 
(c) There has never been a Manic Episode or a Mixed Episode.  
(d) The mood symptoms in Criteria (a) and (b) are not better accounted for by Schizoaffective 
Disorder and are not superimposed on Schizophrenia, Schizophreniform Disorder, 
Delusional Disorder, or Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. 
(e) The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning.  
 
• Criteria for Cyclothymic Disorder. 
(a) For at least 2 years, the presence of numerous periods with Hypomanic symptoms and 
numerous periods with depressive symptoms that do not meet criteria for a Major Depressive 
Episode. In children and adolescents, the duration must be at least 1 year. 
(b) During the above 2-year period (1 year in children and adolescents), the person has not been 
without the symptoms in Criterion A for more than 2 months at a time.  
(c) No Major Depressive Episode, Manic Episode, or Mixed Episode has been present during 
the first 2 years of the disturbance.  
(d) The symptoms in Criterion (a) are not better accounted for by Schizoaffective Disorder and 
are not superimposed on Schizophrenia, Schizophreniform Disorder, Delusional Disorder, or 
Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.  
(e) The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of 
abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., hyperthyroidism). 
(f) The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning.  
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Endnotes. 
                                                 
1
 1998:vii 
 
2
 As has been noted by many sociologists of religion, one does not have to attribute a definite existence to 
God to advance the claim that God has an authentic and visible force in the social world (Berger, 1969). 
The variable understandings, constructions and interpretations of religious categories in all arenas make 
tangible differences in people’s lives.  
 
3
 This rather grand statement will be explored in much more depth in Chapter 3. 
 
4
 Granting cognitive phenomena ontological standings in research and assuming a unitary self as the basis 
of human life serves not only to limit that research, to enforce the widespread inability to approach 
behaviour as anything other than a bio-cognitively motivated phenomenon, but also, as I shall discuss, to 
legitimate the entirely unnecessary dualisms between ‘individual’ and ‘society’, and between ‘mind’ and 
‘body’ that persist in contemporary scientific and social scientific research (Widdecombe & Wooffitt, 
1995). 
 
5
 What I am trying to express here is not in any sense a complete denial of ‘mental process’, after all 
someone without a brain could hardly claim to ‘think’, ‘understand’ or ‘remember’. As Potter and 
Wetherell warn, there is a danger in becoming embroiled in ‘..fruitless debates about the reality or non-
reality of mental entities, which can easily end up in the kind of linguistic imperialism which denies all 
significance to cognitive processes.’ (1987:180). While I would not dispute for a moment that there is 
process ‘internal’ to the individual going on during intelligent action, I would dispute wholeheartedly the 
notion that such actions are straightforwardly reducible to a set of chemically-driven cognitive operations 
which mediate the ‘real world’ and a realistic/unrealistic inner representation of it, and from which, 
respectively, normal/abnormal social action springs. Moreover, as will be asserted throughout this project, 
the existence of cognitive processes is a non-issue herein as the focus herein is upon action, not ‘thought’. 
 
6
 An extended interrogation of this theme is included in Chapter 3. 
 
7
 1995:37 
 
8
 It is important to add at this stage that, while the models investigated in this chapter are of comparatively 
recent origin, this is not to suggest that there was no medical understanding or treatment of Major 
Depression prior to this. Indeed, there is a rich history of medical knowledge on the subject dating back to 
the times of Empedocles and Hippocrates. This extended history up to and including the work of Kraepelin 
is documented, so as to avoid convoluting the themes arising from this chapter, in Appendix 1. 
 
9
 Major Depressive Disorder (Single Episode), Major Depressive Disorder (Recurrent), Dysthymic 
Disorder and Major Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. 
 
10
 The full diagnostic codes and directives for their use are included in Appendix 1. 
 
11
 For a full account of the highly specialised and interlocking schematisations of Major Depressive 
illnesses, refer to DSM-IV (APA, 1994:317-391).  
 
12
 Note: A practitioner is guided to not include symptoms that are ‘clearly’ due to a general medical 
condition, or mood-incongruent delusions or hallucinations. 
 
13
 Note: This exclusion does not apply if all of the manic-like, mixed-like, or hypomanic-like episodes are 
substance or treatment induced or are due to the direct physiological effects of a general medical condition. 
 
14
 Also applied to the current or most recent episode, where relevant, are the following specifiers describing 
particular orientations of symptoms: ‘Chronic’, where the full criteria for a Major Depressive Episode have 
been met continuously for at least two years. ‘Catatonic Features’, where the clinical picture is dominated 
by elements of catatonia (see Appendix 3 for full criteria). ‘Melancholic Features’, where the episode is 
characterised by a particularly sharp loss of pleasure in almost all activities (see Appendix 3 for full 
criteria). ‘Atypical Features’, where mood reactivity shows significant changes, but not in the expected or 
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most common forms (see Appendix 3 for full criteria). ‘Postpartum Onset’, when the onset is within 4 
weeks subsequent to the delivery of a child. 
 
15
 Dysthymic Disorder is further specified according to ‘Onset’, either ‘Early’ (before the age of 21 years) 
or ‘Late’ (after the age of 21 years), and ‘Atypical Features’ (see the prior discussion of Major Depressive 
Disorder). Also, the criteria for the diagnosis of Dysthymia illuminate the aforementioned Longitudinal 
Course specifiers in Recurrent Major Depressive Disorder. These specifiers are of four general varieties: 
Recurrent, with full interepisode recovery & with no Dysthymic Disorder. Recurrent, without full 
interepisode recovery & with no Dysthymic Disorder. Recurrent, with full interepisode recovery 
superimposed on Dysthymic Disorder. Recurrent, without full interepisode recovery superimposed on 
Dysthymic Disorder. 
 
16
 Which is to say it has no tangible ‘essence’. 
 
17
 Sigmund Freud, Collected Papers, vol. 4, trans. Joan Riviere, New York, Basic Books, 1959:158. 
 
18
 Such as hysteria and obsessional neuroses. 
 
19
 Though, it is important to add, he was more inclined to the term ‘melancholia’ in his early work. 
 
20
 Credited by today’s psychiatric establishment as being the analytic forebear of Major Depression – see 
Shorter (1997). 
 
21
 Crying, grasping, smiling and so forth. 
 
22
 The term is derived from the name of René Descartes, the notion’s most famous proponent, who in 
“Meditations on the First Philosophy” argued that the ‘mind’ was of a very separate realm to ‘matter’ 
(which included the body). The body was of chemical, mechanical and pneumatic composition, the mind a 
haven of thoughts and feelings (Harré & Gillett, 1994). While the actual analysis of two differentially 
composed realms has lost credibility, Descartes’ core thesis persists. There are a multiplicity of complex 
critiques of Cartesianism that are now well established, though its principal failing is fairly straightforward 
and will be discussed in detail in section 2.5. 
 
23
 Recall the ‘..weakening of the behavior due to interruptions in established sequences of behaviour that 
had been positively reinforced by the social environment.’ (Gotlib & Hammen, 1996:71) 
 
24
 Comprehensive interrogations of these can be found in Gotlib & Hammen (1997) or Gotlib, Kurtzman & 
Blehar (eds.) (1997). 
 
25
 This dimensional structuring was borrowed from Weiner, Frieze, Kulka, Reed, Rest & Rosenbaum 
(1971). 
 
26
 This critique will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 4. 
 
27
 1998:149 
 
28
 In Laing & Cooper, 1971:6 [Original Emphasis]. 
 
29 
….otherwise society becomes a lawless free-for-all governed exclusively by self-interest, and individuals 
live out lives governed by dissatisfaction and frustration. 
 
30 The constraints applied are borne unequally by a society's members; society determines the respective 
value of different social services, the relative reward allocated to each and the consequent degree of comfort 
appropriate to the average worker in each occupation. 
 
31
 The other explanatory frames are, of course, egotism, altruism and fatalism. 
 
32
 And also afflicts widows and widowers. 
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33
 See the study of Bertillon (1882), summarized by Durkheim on p. 260 of ‘Suicide’. 
 
34
 …as with greed in the world of enterprise. 
 
35
 In which cases the question arose as to whether they could be classified as suicide at all. 
 
36
 See section 3.1.4. 
 
37
 …which may serve to problematise the process, or even, in exceptional cases, render it unworkable. 
 
38
 …or psychiatrist. 
 
39
 The interplay between work and mental illness having been a key theme in the texts examined in Chapter 
2 as well as in Durkheim’s project. 
 
40 Writh argued that illness as a phenomenon could only be comprehended completely if the patient was 
conceptualised as a ‘whole’ entity and within a total social context. Therefore, any enterprise that attempted 
to understand illness exclusively in ‘medical’ terms is bound to be incomplete. On a similar note, 
Henderson argued that the diagnostic encounter between a doctor and a patient is not comprised of a one 
dimensional, objective analysis of a static condition by the doctor, but rather involves a full social 
interaction. (Turner,1986). 
 
41 To emphasise utilitarian doctrines within a reductionist framework was, for Parsons, to ignore the shared 
values by which the equilibrium of society is maintained. 
 
42 See Twaddle, 1979. 
 
43
 See Freund & McGuire, 1991:132-138. 
 
44
 The moral connotations anä the everyday-life practical concerns relating to chronic illness differ in many 
important respects those relating to illnesses classified as ‘acute’. 
 
45
 Goffman, 1963:1  
 
46
 So to as to spare them any kind of pain or embarrassment. 
 
47
 Rosenham (1973) sent whole teams of volunteers who pretended to be ‘hearing voices’ to various 
hospitals to ‘seek help’. They were promptly, by and large, diagnosed as schizophrenic, and although the 
volunteers then ceased their deception, this very action of ‘not hearing voices any more’ was itself 
perceived by the hospital staff as being further evidence of their unbalanced mental state, thereby 
illustrating the fixed attitudes that exist within such institutions. 
 
48
 See the critique in section 3.1.2. 
 
49
 Though some of the themes are subsequently revisited, particularly in “Discipline and Punish” (1976). 
 
50
 See, for example, “Maladie mentale et psychologie” (1962). Trans. Alan Sheridan as Mental Illness and 
Psychology (New York: Harper and Row, 1976)  
 
51
 What Roland Barthes would call the ‘Text’. Weedon defines Foucault’s discourse as ‘…ways of 
constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which 
inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and 
producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and 
emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern.’ (1987:108). 
 
52
 1998:13 
 
53
 Unless representation itself is to be cast as a form of social practice, see Woolgar (1987) or Myers (1990). 
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54
 His collaborators Gail Jefferson and Emmanuel Schegloff were instrumental in popularising these 
lectures. They also made their own highly valuable contributions to the field both before and after Sacks’ 
untimely death in 1975.  
 
55
 This is not to say trivial, as will become clear. 
 
56
 Not to say, pointless... 
 
57
 This instance predates full CA transcription methods, but is more than adequate to make the point.   
 
58
 A question and answer, for instance, an invitation and an acceptance/refusal or a greeting and a greeting. 
To answer a greeting with a refusal would be nonsensical – it would contravene the (albeit flexible) rules of 
turn-taking.  
 
59
 The ‘problematic’ nature of a response is not dictated by some a priori categorisation, but rather is a 
resource by which interactants characterise actions as being problematic. 
 
60
 This list adapted from Silverman (1997) 
 
61
 Again, what Sacks terms a ‘No-plus’. 
 
62
 See page 4/3. 
 
63
 1998:149 
 
64
 This is interesting in itself, as the category is neither explained by P, nor questioned by C. We can thus 
infer that P assumed an understanding on the part of C inferences relating to this particular category and 
‘celibacy’, and C did indeed share these knowledges. 
 
65
 …leaving aside the variants of DA emergent of sociolinguistics (such as Brown and Yule, 1983), which 
take so different an empirical approach to that which I am advocating that it is only the name ‘Discourse 
Analysis’ which brings them into consideration at all. They take little account of the crucial Wittgensteinian 
and ethnomethodological concerns set out in this project. 
 
66
 Thorough summaries of these things can be found in Edwards (1997) chapter 3, Potter and Wetherell 
(1987) chapter 3 and Wooffitt (1991) chapter 3. 
 
67
 ...and as Jean-François Lyotard (1987) warns, the most advanced form of oppression is ‘speaking in the 
name of’. 
 
68
 The manner in which this occurs, via ‘representations’ is also problematic in its suggestion of fixed 
templates for ‘seeing’ people. (See Harré and Gillett, 1994 or Edwards, 1997) 
 
69
 It is also interesting to note that the proposed lack of understanding of medical jargon by patients is 
supported by interview data in which the patients claimed to have, effectively, simply ‘done what the doctor 
would have wanted’ because they were afraid not to. Notwithstanding the rather negative picture of doctors 
painted here, if we are to suppose that the patients (universally) give ‘unreliable’ feedback to doctors due to 
issues of ‘fear’, then how are we to suppose that the feedback given to a researcher immediately afterwards 
is untainted by personal concerns? Is it not possible that the patient is merely telling the interviewer ‘what 
they want to hear’ also? 
 
70
 1992:68 
 
71
 As Hutchby and Wooffitt contribute, ‘Lengthy accounts produced by an interviewee, with little or no 
contribution from an interviewer, certainly seem more like textual materials than ordinary conversation.’ 
(1998:185-186)  
 
72
 Palmer, 2001:678 
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73
 ..be they moods, ‘dysfunctional’ thoughts, ‘abnormal’ actions or personal histories and environments - 
‘physical’ or ‘mental’ symptoms and states. 
 
74
 Peräkylä, 1997:205 
 
75
 And also in the ‘time honoured’ three-part sermon, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, or the bulk of jokes in 
which the Englishman, Irishman and Scotsman do their bit. Note: this footnote also takes that form. 
 
76
 ..and, since no call for clarification comes from the interviewer, it is also fair to say that he assumed 
correctly. 
 
77
 Note that the project, as the respondent was aware and has oriented to – see part 5.2.1, is about the 
problems with the recognition and diagnosis of depression. 
 
78
 Indeed, subsequently in this interview (data shown in Chapter 6, extract 6(II)), the respondent does finally 
make relevant an explicit identity as a General Practitioner to validate his discussion of problems in general 
practice. 
 
79
 Though once again it is crucial to bear in mind that these are not to be regarded ‘cognitive processes’, see 
again Harvey Sacks’ argument as summarised in chapter 4 of this project. 
 
80
 Which is to say that the knowledge is not only used, but maintained. 
 
81
 Which it is fair to assume that both he and the doctor would already have inferred from his presence at a 
consultation. 
 
82
 Other ECFs include ‘every’, ‘never’, ‘always’.... 
83
 Heidegger, 1962:33 
 
84
 This is a potentially contentious statement within academia – but the statement above does not really 
relate to the assumptions of Sociologists of Scientific Knowledge, rather to wider cultural knowledges.  
 
85
 Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998:202 
 
86
 Other ‘big questions’ might be ‘Will you marry me?’, ‘Does God exist?’ or ‘What is the meaning of life, 
the universe and everything?’ The point is that no ‘big questions’ can be answered without serious 
consideration and none have an absolute/predictable or consistent answer, except the last, which is 42. 
 
87
 They can be used by speakers to recharacterise the talk of others, or, as in this case, of themselves. 
 
88
 Edwards, 1997:106 
 
89
 And final account sequence in extract 6(V). 
 
90
 1997:84 
 
91
 This issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8. 
 
92
 In much the same way that ‘small world’ does not describe some kind of physical shrinkage… 
 
93
 ch. 6, Personal Recollections, ed. Rush Rhees (1981) 
 
94
 Pomerantz, 1984a:57-59 
95
 After all, it would not be revolutionary to suggest that a significant part of a patient’s expectation within a 
consultation is that the General Practitioner will be in possession of knowledges relating to illness that 
extend somewhat beyond the ‘ordinary’. 
 
96
 Which, as will be shown, runs the risk of making available the inference that the patient simply does not 
know what he/she is talking about. 
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97
 A useful observation precursory this analysis is the manner in which the GPs ‘draw a line’ under the 
main body of the consultation and prepare the patient for the ‘diagnostic phase’. Crucially, there appears to 
be a very regular structure to the immediately preceding actions; in the huge majority of the cases in the 
corpus in which a ‘new’ diagnosis is made: the question-answer sequence is broken by a longer-than-
average pause on the GP’s turn and the diagnosis itself is prefaced by a sequence-initial change of state 
token (very often ‘right then’ or ‘well then’). This constitutes an explicit orientation towards the GPs’ 
professional identity and the category-bound activities therein. The GP assigns the character of sufficient-
for-his-purposes to all prior activity, and to pre-announce a ‘new phase’ in the consultation. This structure 
is, moreover, frequently and explicitly oriented to by patients as signalling a forthcoming diagnosis. In the 
extract below, for example, we see a patient begin to push the GP for a diagnosis when one is not 
immediately provided. 
 
DP14 <Dermatitis> 
P: but its not (.) painful at all (.) no 
(2.5) 
D: okay (.) right then (.) ahm: 
(1.0) 
P: what do you think↑ (.) then?= 
D: =oh its only determatitis (.) nothing to worry about ((continues))   
 
This is a phenomenon observed also by Heath (1986) with respect to physical examinations in primary care. 
 
‘In case after case as the examination is brought to an end the doctor produces some form of assessment, not 
infrequently a diagnosis, and goes on to discuss how the complaint should be managed. In cases where assessments are 
not immediately forthcoming on the completion of the examination or are temporarily suspended through further 
inquiries, we find the patient pressing the doctor for a comment or even a diagnosis.’ (Heath, 1986:124) 
 
As such, we can observe that diagnosis is itself an interactional event, marked as a diagnosis by a GP and 
subject to sequential expectations by the patient. 
 
98
 It is likely that the patient was already in possession of some culturally-available knowledges relating to 
linkage between depression and suicide, and even if not it is evident that the unfolding of the consultation 
has (re)furnished him with these resources. Origins of such resources are not, however, what is the issue 
here; rather, it is the activities within they are made salient. 
 
99
 Bear in mind that one of the key symptoms of Major Depression as defined by the DSM-IV is ‘suicidal 
ideation’, but the absence of such ideation does not preclude a diagnosis of depression. 
 
100
 1997: 211 
 
 
